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Huddersfield 
I do not promise you glory, I do not 
promise you fame, but I do say that 
in the days that are coming the memory 
of the men and women who lived for 
socialism in these dark days will be 
revered and honoured. 
George Lansbury, 1896. 
M. J. Crick. - 'To make twelve o'clock at eleven'. The 
history of the Social-Democratic Federation. 
The Social-Democratic Federation has been ill-served by 
historians, dismissed as an irrelevance or an alien intrusion 
into British politics. This thesis attempts to provide a 
balanced and coherent account of the SDF's history, emphasisi: 
regional as well as national developments to demonstrate that 
until the early years of the twentieth century, the party 
posed a genuine alternative to the supposed 'mainstream' 
development of the ILP/Labour Party. The Federation was far 
from the monolithic, centralised organisation, dominated by 
Hyndman, thatis often depicted. A study of the branches in 
Lancashire and Yorkshire reveals regional diversity and 
demonstrates that they enjoyed considerable autonomy, but 
although this autonomy allowed branches in areas like 
Lancashire to adapt to their environment with considerable 
success it also produced a party prone to internal divisions 
over strategy. Consequently it failed to develop consistent 
policies. This proved a fatal handicap at a crucial period 
in the history of the British Socialist movement, during the 
formative years of the Labour Party. The SDF was margin- 
alised, preoccupied with its own internal debates at a time 
when it could have exercised considerable influence inside 
Labour's ranks. It never satisfactorily resolved the debate 
over which course to pursue, that of reform or revolution, 
until the outbreak of the First World War brought the divisioi 
within the party to a head, which ultimately caused its 
dissolution. Nevertheless its eventual demise should not 
obscure its achievements which, as is often the fate of 
pioneers, remain largely unsung. It educated and agitated; 
it played a leading role in the formation of both ILP branches 
and Labour Representation Committees; it produced a generation 
of working-class intellectuals and militants; it championed 
the cause of the unemployed. Most important of all, the SDF 
was responsible for re-introducing Socialism to the British 
political agenda. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 
The following abbreviations have been used in the text: 
BSP. British Socialist Party. 
BWL. British Workers' League. 
CPGB. Communist Party of Great Britain. 
DF. Democratic Federation. 
ILP. Independent Labour Party. 
INL. Irish National League. 
ISB. International Socialist Bureau. 
IWMA. International Working Mens' Association. 
LEL. Labour Emancipation League. 
LRC. Labour Representation Committee. 
MSL. Manhood Suffrage League. 
NAC. National Administrative Council (of the ILP). 
NSP. National Socialist Party. 
NSS. National Secular Society. 
SDF. * Social-Democratic Federation. 
SL. Socialist League. 
SLP. Socialist Labour Party. 
SNDC. Socialist National Defence Committee. 
SPGB. Socialist Party of Great Britain. 
SRC. Socialist Representation Committee. 
TUC. Trade Union Congress. 
* The Social-Democratic Federation changed its name to the 
Social-Democratic Party in 1906. For the sake of simplicity 
iv. 
the party has been referred to as the SDF throughout, 
except in direct quotations, where, after 1906, it appears 
as the SDP. 
V. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Social-Democratic Federation 'passed away' on 12 October 
1939, little noticed and unmourned. Latterly its function had 
been little more than to provide 'an annual dinner of veteran 
right-wing Labour Members of Parliament'; 
1 it had become an 
anachronism, an historical curiosity. Henry Pelling's comment 
that it was 'a rather weedy growth in the political garden'2 
has been reflected by the treatment the SDF has received from 
Labour historians. Thus whilst the minuscule organisations of 
the Socialist League, the Socialist Party of Great Britain and 
the Socialist Labour Party, secessions from the SDF, have 
received detailed attention3 the SDF has been incoherently 
treated and often neglected. David Englander has identified 
one of the reasons for this: 'The autobiographies of those who 
made "successful" careers in the trade unions and Labour Party 
too often pause for a disparaging observation on their SDF 
experience. ' 
4 
Yet the Federation was the pioneer organisation 
of the Socialist revival in the 1880s, the veteran campaigner 
of the free speech and unemployed agitations, a vital presence 
at the founding conference of the Labour Representation Committee 
and, later, an important constituent of the Communist Party. 
It clearly merits a history of its own. 
As Eric Hobsbawn has pointed out the SDF's lack of 
institutional treatment is partly explicable by the fact that 
'The Social-Democratic Federation has long been the problem- 
child of labour historians... The least subtle student of its 
affairs is forced into unaccustomed complexities, contradictions 
and nuances. '5 One result has been a fragmentalisation of its 
history. Pelling has recorded the early years in his Origins 
of the Labour Party and Walter Kendall has given a substantial 
account of the party's progress in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century in his Revolutionary Movements in Britain 
1900-1921. These two works epitomise the problem of 'placing' 
the SDF. Was it a reformist or a revolutionary grouping? To 
which tradition did it contribute most? To compartmentalise it, 
history by examining only its role in the Socialist revival, it., 
contribution to the Labour Party, or its place in revolutionary 
'mythology', is to ignore the fact that the Social-Democratic 
Federation had a continuous history over more than fifty years 
encompassing the vital period of development of the modern 
British Labour Movement. 
The SDF cannot be dismissed lightly. It was the first 
modern Socialist organisation of national importance in Britain, 
Marx disliked it, Engels despaired of it, Morris, Burns, Mann 
and countless others left it, yet it survived. The dissidents 
established other bodies which either disappeared, like the 
Socialist League, remained unimportant sects, like the SPGB, 
or established only regional influence as with the SLP on 
Clydeside. Meanwhile, the SDF continued as the major British 
representative of Marxism from the early 1880s until 1916 and 
thereafter a monument to, and echo of, the movement's past. 
Survival alone was no mean feat but the party also had its 
achievements, often obscured by the sheer weight of criticism 
heaped upon it. It established itself as the major Socialist 
organisation in several areas, notably London and the cotton 
2. 
belt of North-East Lancashire, with the result that Marxist 
theory entered the British Labour tradition. One reason often 
posited for the failure of the SDF is that its Marxism was 
'alien' to native traditions. The exact nature of the SDF's 
Marxism is debatable, as is the extent to which it penetrated 
the movement, but that its presence was established and real is 
indisputable . 
The SDF's role in propagandising and popularising Marxism 
is much underestimated. One of its greatest achievements was 
that it was a most important school for working-class militants 
and activists, exercising a disproportionately large influence 
in relation to its size. It provided groups of cadres or 
potential cadres, the leaders and the brains, rather than the 
mass organisations. John Burns, Tom Mann, Will Thorne, George 
Lansbury, even James MacDonald and Harry Quelch are well known to 
Labour historians. Yet Ernest Bevin, James Ramsay MacDonald and 
Margaret Bondfield also received their introduction to Labour 
politics via the SDF. Equally importantly George Tabbr. on in 
Salford, Charles Hurley in Blackburn, Charlie Glyde in Bradford, 
and countless others who never made the national stage were 
converted to Socialism by the Federation. Its work and role 
at a local level is much obscured by a concentration on its 
national leaders. Thus Chushichi Tsuzuki's H. M. Hyndman and 
British Socialism fails to provide a full history of the SDF. 
The purpose of this thesis is to chronicle the history of th 
Social-Democratic Federation. The one work which might claim 
to fulfil that role is the party's official history, Social- 
3. 
Democracy in Britain, begun by H. W. Lee, its long-serving 
secretary, and completed by E. Archbold. But this is a flawed 
account, a blatant apologia, which concludes that the party 
disappeared because it was successful, its principles having 
been accepted by the Labour movement in general and the Labour 
Party in particular; it therefore had no further function to 
perform. This assumption raises a number of questions. First, 
had the political philosophy of the SDF been incorporated into 
that of the Labour Party? Alternatively, was entry into the 
Labour Party an admission of failure, a recognition that thirty 
years of Marxist agitation had produced few results? Did the 
SDF in fact adapt and moderate its own politics as a reaction to 
its lack of success, until it was eventually indistinguishable 
from the mainstream of British Socialism? Discussion of these 
questions should establish the SDF's place on the political 
spectrum and enable an assessment of its contribution to the 
development of the British Labour and Socialist Movement. Paul 
Thompson, in Socialists, Liberals and Labour - The Struggle for 
London 1885-1914, has disputed the accusation that the SDF's 
failure stemmed from its importation into Britain of an alien 
creed. This thesis aims to contribute to this discussion by 
examining the SDF's ideology. Did the party have a coherent 
ideology? The number of breakaways from its ranks would suggest 
not and also, perhaps, a failure to adjust ideology to changing 
events and to relate theory to practice. 
A further controversy arises over party membership. The 
SDF has been seen primarily as a London organisation, but more 
recently P. A. Watmough has reminded readers that by the early 
years of the twentieth century provincial membership had out- 
I 
stripped that of London, with Lancashire a more stable base that 
the capital. 
6 
Why did the SDF succeed in some areas and fail it 
others? What explanation can be advanced for its success in the 
cotton towns of Lancashire, where Burnley reported a branch of 
over 1,000 in the 1890s, as opposed to its comparative failure 
in West Yorkshire? Mere membership figures can be misleading. 
There were very real difficulties involved in being a member of 
a Socialist organisation in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, victimisation being the most obvious. Many 
therefore remained, in the words of Robert Blatchford, 'the 
great unattached', though they were nonetheless influenced by 
the party. Research has suggested that membership of more than 
one Socialist organisation was common in the North of England 
into the twentieth century. The Socialist movement, as Stephen 
Yeo has reflected, was very much a crusade in its early years, 
differences being subsumed in enthusiasm for a common cause. 
Such unity tended to degenerate into factionalism as the new 
century progressed, particularly as Socialists attempted a 
modus vivendi with the Labour Party, a very different vehicle 
for the expression of working-class aspirations from that 
originally envisaged. Stanley Pierson has seen The Journey 
from Fantasy to Politics prior to 1910, the postponement of 
the Socialist goal in favour of more short-term, practical 
advances, as the turning point in the movement's history. 
The above questions have been examined within a chronologic 
framework to render a coherent account of the SDF's history. 
Whilst not arguing the existence of a revolutionary situation in 
5. 
Britain during the life of the SDF it will be suggested that the 
Federation, against a backcloth of political and social unrest, 
should have exercised a more considerable influence on British 
working-class politics. The SDF suffered throughout its history 
from the lack of a clear identity; there was a dichotomy between 
its revolutionary phraseology and its increasingly reformist 
practice which eventually rendered it impotent. Nonetheless, the 
struggle to establish its presence enabled the SDF to make a 
contribution to both the theory and practice of the movement which 
was by no means negligible. 
6. 
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PART I 
THE REVIVAL OF SOCIALISM 
8. 
INTRODUCTION. 
When Henry Mayers Hyndman called a meeting of London Radicals 
at the Rose Street Club, Soho, on 2 March 1881, he took the first 
step towards the formation of the Social-Democratic Federation, 
an organisation which was to be instrumental in the revival of 
British Socialism. Over thirty years had elapsed since the demise 
of Chartism as a movement and during those years Labour gave 
partly apathetic, partly active, adherence to the existing order. 
This was the golden age of British capitalism, with free trade 
and individualism the dominant ideologies. As Theodore Rothstein 
later pointed out, 'Repudiation, not only of revolution, but of 
politics in general and concentration on purely economic trade 
union action - this was the main background to the British Labour 
Movement of the post-Chartist period. '' The completeness of 
the reaction from the revolutionary idealism of the 1830s and 
1840s was noted by an old Chartist, Thomas Cooper, touring the 
North of England in 1869 and 1870. He found the working populatio 
there in a far better material condition than thirty years earlier 
but he 'noticed with pain that their moral and intellectual 
tradition had deteriorated. ' Far from discussing the great 
doctrines of political justice or Socialism working men now talked 
of their shares in co-operative stores or building societies and, 
he noted with scorn, 
You will see others, like idiots, leading small 
greyhound dogs, covered with cloth, in a string:.... 
Working men had ceased to think, and wanted to hear 
no thoughtful talk- at least it was so with the 
9. 
greater number of them. 
2 
Whilst one must comprehend the extent of the rupture in the 
mid-nineteenth century in order to appreciate the difficulties 
faced by the pioneers of the Socialist revival in the 1880s, 
nonetheless it would be a truism to suggest that Socialist 
doctrines could have emerged fully-formed from this period of 
quiet. The presence of old Chartists such as the Murrays and 
Townshend at the Rose Street meeting was proof that isolated 
pockets of radicalism had resisted the spread of reaction. More 
importantly, from the mid-sixties onwards there were currents of 
thought and action which contributed to the Socialist revival. 
The British working class may have been at its most quiescent 
but in another sense, as Dona Torr has noted, 'The foundations 
3 
of power were laid. ' 
10. 
NOTES . 
1. T. Rothstein, From Chartism to Labourism, (1983), p. 202 
2. T. Cooper, The Life of Thomas Cooper, (1886), pp. 393-4 
3. D. Torr, Tom Mann and His Times. (1956), p. 175 
11. 
CHAPTER ] 
A CENTRE OF ORGANISATION. 
One legacy of the Chartist period was a strong internationalism 
within the Labour movement, demonstrated by support for the 
Northern states in the American civil war, for the Polish 
insurrection of 1863 and for Garibaldi. The organisers of 
demonstrations in favour of these causes, men such as Odger, 
Cremer and Applegarth, were also prominent members of the 
International Working Men's Association, founded in London in 
September 1864. The convenors of the meeting may have been 
British trade unionists but the intellectual inspiration was to 
be provided by Karl Marx, who aimed to renew Chartism by giving 
the British working class the theoretical base he believed they 
lacked. In so doing Marx provided a bridge between Chartism and 
Socialism in Britain, for at least three of the Council of the 
IWMA later became members of the Social-Democratic Federation. 
1 
Moreover, the programme of the British section of the IWMA was 
almost identical to that of the Democratic Federation. Marxist 
ideas were not imported into this country in the 1880s but had 
formed part of the debate within extreme radical circles in the 
sixties and seventies and were incorporated into the political 
philosophy of some of the Federation's early converts. 
Simultaneously the liberal individualist doctrines 
dominant in the mid-nineteenth century were under attack from 
several directions and by 1880 Liberal thought was in the throes 
of a crisis, a reflection of the growing incapacity of Liberal 
12. 
governments. Trade depression, unemployment, the Irish question, 
the war in Egypt, all deepened the discontent of Radical elements 
in Britain and caused attacks on the orthodox political economy. 
Yet this assault was the culmination of a century-long cultural 
struggle to come to terms with the divisions in society created 
by the industrial revolution. As Stanley Pierson has noted 
many early recruits to Socialism, largely from the non-industrial 
middle class, underwent an acute crisis of identity resulting 
from a clash between their personal ideals and the working of 
social institutions. 
2 H. W. Nevinson was a typical example: 
'To myself' , he wrote, 
though I naturally belonged to the comfortable classes, 
the attraction of repulsion was very strong, and during 
those years my shamed sympathy with working people 
became an irresistible torment so that I could hardly 
endure to live in the ordinary comfort of my 
surroundings 
This `divided consciousness' led many to seek new philosophies 
which could provide them with a meaningful social role. Three 
currents of nineteenth century thought provided a filter through 
which many Socialist adherents eventually emerged. 
The idea of a 'Christian Commonwealth', which would secure 
social harmony through common moral feelings, was a strong 
influence on many British Socialists. However, whether 
it was 
expressed by Coleridge, Thomas Arnold, or the Christian 
Socialists 
it was a conservative force, arguing the need not for a new system 
i 
13. 
but for the old to exhibit its true function and energies. Two 
thinkers played a major part in the translation of Christian 
ideals of community into Socialist forms, and their influence 
was later acknowledged by many Socialists. Carlyle's Past and 
Present and Ruskin's Unto This Last shattered existing notions 
about the social system. Carlyle indicted the competitive, 
individualist ethic inherent in capitalism whilst Ruskin assaulted 
industrialisation as destructive of human dignity and freedom, 
leading to the degr4dation of the operative into a mere machine, 
an argument analogous to the Marxist theory of alienation. Yet 
both men looked to the past for their ideal, to a quasi-feudal 
age and authoritarian forms of government. Socialists repudiated 
these aspects of Carlyle and Ruskin, 
4 but their moral and social 
teachings, their critique of capitalism, permeated the movement. 
The work of John Stuart Mill provided a third important 
foundation for the Socialist revival. Sir Ernest Barker has 
said that Mill served 'in the years between 1 848 and 1880, as the 
bridge from laissez-faire to the idea of social readjustment by 
the State, and from political Radicalism to economic Socialism. '5 
Mill's moral teachings prepared many Radicals to view Socialism 
more favourably- in an almost Owenite sense he hoped for the 
perfectibility of mankind by means of systematic moral education, 
inspired by a moral and intellectual elite at the head of 
society. His economic theories were never very favourable to 
Socialistic schemes; a concern for individual liberty made him 
sceptical of practical plans for social reconstruction, seeing 
in them possible authoritarian tendencies. Here too he 
influenced 
many early converts to Socialism. Tom Mann learned by heart one 
I 
14. 
passage from Mill's autobiography: 
The Social Problem of the future we considered to be, 
how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action 
with a common ownership in the raw material of the 
globe and an equal participation of all in the bene- 
fits of combined labour. 
6 
i 
The gulf between the norms of an industrial and urban 
society and the aesthetic impulse of many in the mid-Victorian 
era, which led to Pierson's 'divided self', was best expressed 
through these three dominant modes of thought, the Christian, 
the romantic and the utilitarian. Some experimented with more 
exotic solutions, as exemplified by cults such as the 
Swedenborgians. Many early Socialist recruits had tested a 
number of strategies and philosophies. They had emerged from a 
chaotic cultural milieu. Mere theorising however would not have 
led to Socialism, particularly as those suffering this alienation 
and attempting to find solutions were largely of the middle class 
or provincial lower middle class. Attempts to translate theory 
into practice allowed these traditions to adopt more popular forms 
and enter a wider arena. 
Until the end of the eighteenth century working-class 
protest was usually expressed in traditional Christian terminology 
The French Revolution and the writings of Thomas Paine led to a 
new and secular radicalism, as expressed by the Corresponding 
Societies and the various Jacobin Clubs, coupled with Robert 
Owen's doctrine of natural harmony. Owen's utopian strategies 
15. 
caused the collapse of his model communities but the main 
impulses of the movement continued in other forms. The co- 
operative movement attempted economic security, spiritualism 
satisfied the milleial bent and Owen's educational mission was 
reformulated by Holyoake as Secularism, a morality based on 
material and social facts. At its peak Secularism had some 100 
branches with 7,000 members but its greatest influence did not 
stem from its crusade against religion. As Edward Royle has 
pointed out, it was also 'a political movement which was a part 
of the mainstream of the British Liberal tradition. ' 
7 
Most 
Secularists were Radicals to some degree and the freethought 
leaders, Bradlaugh in particular, gained more support with their 
popular Radical politics than with their attacks on religion. 
Willard Wolfe has noted that the chief Radical strongholds of 
Victorian England were to become labour strongholds of the twentiet 
century and more importantly that Socialism as it eventually 
evolved in Britain was 'old Radicalism writ large', a new way of 
stating old ideas and feelings. 
British Radicalism lacked a distinctive social theory of 
its own and was a very diverse movement, embracing the extreme 
left wing of the Chartist movement and the Liberal, individualist 
philosophy of the middle class. It was essentially a vast, 
in- 
coherent protest movement against social privilege and the 
landed 
aristocracy, originating in the Wilkite agitation of the 
1760s 
for the reform of Parliament. Indeed parliamentary reform was 
its panacea for social distress and its political platform. 
As 
the nineteenth century progressed the left wing of Radicalism 
i 
16. 
as represented by Chartism, was superseded by the classical 
liberal theories, albeit applied to all men. The Movement was 
against the establishment, pro-free trade, for an end to foreign 
wars, and it became increasingly identified with nonconformity 
in religion. Whilst the leadership was middle class it embraced 
too the 'aristocracy of labour', who epitomised the same moral 
code and saw the aristocracy as parasites worth any struggle to 
be rid of. 
Socialists, of course, extended their animus to all forms 
of exploitation, social power and status not based on strict 
moral desert. Their insistence on a workman's right to the 
'whole produce of his labour' owed an obvious debt to Liberal 
individualism, with surplus value being an extension of that 
theory. The capitalist rentiers replaced the landed aristocracy 
as the chief object of hostility, but both Socialists and Radicals 
shared a hatred of the leisured classes. The major differentiatior 
between the two lay in the Socialist emphasis on the collective, 
in their conception of an organic society, and here they had a 
much closer affinity to the romantic-conservative theories of 
Carlyle and Ruskin. Radicalism pointed to the shibboleths to be 
knocked down but failed to provide any alternative, and in that 
sense proved a powerful yet negative inspiration for the Socialist 
Movement. its political campaigns of the 1860s and 1870s were 
training grounds for future converts to Socialism. 
The major concerns of British Radicals were parliamentary 
reform, Republicanism - albeit short-lived - Ireland, the Eastern 
Question and, above all, land reform. Parliamentary reform 
i 
17. 
can be taken for granted as a cause common to all radicals, 
although the usual cry for manhood suffrage would be extended by 
the Socialists to universal suffrage. Republicanism impinged very 
briefly on the political scene. Continuing the tradition of 
Paine, Shelly and Carlile, it re-emerged in response to the 
economic depression of the late 1860s and the absence from public 
life of Queen Victoria at that time. The International Republican 
Association was formed in 1869 and a periodical, The Republican, 
appeared in September 1870. Yet from the beginning there were 
divisions between the moderate, respectable Republicanism exemp- 
lified by Bradlaugh and the more extreme groups such as the 
Universal Republican League, the O'Brienites and the IWMA. 
Bradlaugh argued that in England it would be possible to work 
within the law and he could not stomach the IWMA's support for 
the Paris Commune. Respectable Republicanism collapsed in the 
wave of sympathy for the Prince of Wales, who caught typhoid in 
1872, leaving a myriad of small, sectarian groups competing for 
support. The overwhelming support for the 1887 jubilee demonstrate 
its marginality but, nonetheless, the arguments, particularly 
in the London political clubs, provided one further support for 
'the foundations of power'. 
The Eastern Question aroused strong feelings amongst 
Radicals and more importantly attracted others such as William 
Morris, previously politically inactive. Gladstone had attacked 
the 'Bulgarian Horrors' but the next Liberal Government, of 1880, 
was soon to be involved in wars in Egypt and the Sudan. This too 
stimulated some Radicals to seek alternatives to parliamentary 
3 
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reform, and H. H. Champion was one who came to the Social- 
Democratic Federation as a result of Liberal Imperialism. 
Ireland was central to British politics from the 1870s 
onwards, because of its acute agricultural crisis, the disciplined 
body of Westminster Irish M. Ps, and the fact that a considerable 
number of absentee landlords formed an important section of the 
3 
Tory Party. There was a traditional sympathy between Irish 
revolutionaries and politically conscious English workers. 
Jack Williams and George Lansbury were but two to graduate to 
Socialism via Radical campaigns for Irish freedom, whilst legis- 
lative independence for Ireland would form part of the Democratic 
Federation programme. Ireland was also intimately connected with 
the question of land reform and this, more than any other issue, 
paved the way for Socialism. 'For most future Socialists, land 
reform was a half-way house on their march from radicalism. ' 
8 
The land reformers were a very diverse body, ranging from the 
relative moderation of J. S. Mill's Land Tenure Reform Association 
to the land nationalisation of the Land and Labour League. 
Ricardo's theory of rent underpinned their arguments and their 
basic principle was that 'no man made the land; it is the original 
inheritance of the whole species. '9 The Radicals detestation of 
landowners stemmed from the view that theirS was 'a kind of 
income which constantly tends to increase, without any exertion 
or sacrifice on the part of the owners. ' 
10 No principle of 
private property would therefore be violated if the State 
appropriated at least part of that increase in wealth for the 
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benefit of the population as a whole. Mill was motivated in 
his schemes for land reform by his belief in the possibility 
of a social revolution which could only be forestalled by 
serious social reform, a position very similar to that of Hyndman 
in 1881. His Land Tenure Reform Association, founded in 1870, 
opened up the political debate and a Land Law Reform League was d 
formed in 1880 with Bradlaugh as President. these prepared the 
way for Henry George's campaign in the early 1880's. 
The debate about land reform was probably the only force 
capable of creating a mass audience for Socialism in the early 
1880s. It was intimately connected with Ireland and the problem 
of absenteeism and rack-renting whilst the monopoly of English 
land and political power by a small group of landowners made it 
especially vulnerable to Radical attack. A long-standing Radical 
tradition held that the land was capable of supporting all and 
that the masses of urban unemployed were in effect, labourers 
turned off the land by grasping landlords. Thus George's 
Progress and Poverty, published in Brit4in in January 1881, con- 
tained nothing new for English readers- it combined the ideas 
of natural rights, Ricardo's and Mill's theories of rent, and 
the schemes of Thomas Spence and Patrick Dove. Yet the book 
sold a spectacular 100,000 copies in a year, the key to its 
success lying in its popular, eloquent style and its simple 
panacea for distress, the 'single tax' on rent. More importantl3 
his arguments broke the spell of laissez-faire, introducing many 
for the first time to serious criticism of the economic system 
and leading some on to anti-capitalist ideas and thus Socialism. 
Tom Mann later recalled that George was 'the real stimulus 
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that helped me to a prolonged and continuous study of social 
economics', 
11 
whilst Max Beer estimated that 'Four-fifths of 
the socialist leaders of Great Britain in the 'eighties had 
passed through the school of Henry George'. 
12 
Furthermore 
George provided analogies of several key Marxian doctrines 
such as the increasing misery of the proletariat and the con- 
d 
tradictions inherent in capitalism, whilst his law of rent was 
the moral and economic equivalent of Marx's law of surplus value. 
Both systems of thoughtargued that industrial society led to 
working-class alienation. As George argued in Progress and 
Poverty, a man 
Producing goods in which he has no share, working with 
tools he cannot hope to own.... compelled to ever 
closer more continuous labour than the savage.... loses 
the essential quality of manhood.... He becomes a slave, 
a machine, a commodity. 
13 
It is doubtful if George had read Marx but only William Morris 
of the English Marxists would show a similar awareness of 
alienation. 
The 1870s and early 1880s therefore produced 'a growing 
ferment of social criticism and radical democratic ideas which 
14 It would gave rise to the revival of socialist thought.... ' 
be a logical progression, for example, from the 
idea of 'unearned 
increment' to surplus value, to the idea that capital as well 
as land was a monopoly. There were a number of 
'straws in the 
wind' pointing to a Socialist revival. The Guild of 
St. Matthew, 
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formed in 1877, was an attempt to develop a Christian Socialist 
Movement; William Harrison Riley, an old member of the IWMA, 
studied Marx and issued a monthly, The Socialist, in Sheffield. 
Ernest Belfort Bax, a journalist, wrote articles on Marxism in 
Modern Thought in 1879. Early in that year John Sketchley 
formed a Midland Social Democratic Association in Birmingham 
with a programme including abolition of the monarchy, the Lords d 
and the State Church. It corresponded with people all over the 
country, one correspondent in Chesterfield urging a national 
organisation of trades for protection 'against the tyranny of 
capital, with a view to the ultimate suppression of the capitalis 
class' and another from Guildford suggesting 'the organisation 
of the whole southern counties on a Social-Democratic basis. '15 
Even Joseph Chamberlain's programme differed from that of the 
Democratic Federation only in terms of land nationalisation. 
More important, however, was the political culture developed 
in the London clubs of the 1870s. Stan Shipley has vividly 
recreated this milieu, 'which produced an atmosphere in which 
an avowedly Socialist movement could emerge. '16 Here old 
Chartists mingled with younger radicals and continental refugees 
to form 'a highly self-conscious political cadre, ' many of whose 
members held influential positions in the London trade societies. 
The major impetus for Socialist ideas came from the 
Stratford Dialectical and Radical Club and the Labour 
Emancipation League in East London, and from the Rose Street 
Club, the Manhood Suffrage League and the Marylebone Central 
Democratic Association in the West. The Rose Street Club traced 
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its origins back to the formation of the Communistische 
Arbeiter Bildungs Verein in 1840 and was the headquarters of 
the continental Socialist refugees. After the collapse of the 
First International the club was 'the spot where the light was 
kept burning, ' 
17 
though there were few English members. Of far 
greater importance for English Socialism was the Manhood Suffrage 
League, one of the most advanced and influential of the metro- 
politan clubs, founded in the mid-1870s by survivors of the 
O'Brienite Movement, some of whom would later become leading 
agents in the formation of the Social-Democratic Federation. 
Marx had said when comparing them to the British trade unionists 
in the IWMA, that they were 'more revolutionary, firmer on the 
land question,. less nationalistic, and not susceptible to 
bourgeois bribery in one form or another. ' 
18 
From Bronterre 
O'Brien these men developed a class conflict analysis of society 
long before they read Marx; he taught them the need to use 
political means to achieve social ends, to combine trade-union 
activities and political agitation. His demands for universal 
suffrage, for nationalisation of the land and mines, the trans- 
port system, gas and water supplies, were propagandised by his 
supporters long before they were taken up by the SDF. Indeed 
one section, the International Democratic Association, refused 
to affiliate to the First International because 'they had not 
19 believed it went far enough. ' 
The Soho O'Brienites were a very small group of 
revolutionaries but, as Stan Shipley has argued their beliefs 
did not set them apart from their fellow artisans. The chief 
d 
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concern of the Murrays, Townshend and others was to use learning 
as a weapon in the class struggle, and the MSL provided them 
with a stage from which to air their views. The club's programme 
for the second half of 1881 shows that Socialism had become a 
live issue; Adam Weiler, an old ally of Marx, lectured on "The 
Communist Manifesto", 
20 
James Benny on "Socialism, Communism 
and the Organisation of Labour , 
21, 
T. Raleigh on "German 
Socialism"22, Edwin Dunn on "Who are the Revolutionists and 
What are their aims? "23, Mr. Sheppard on "Socialism"24, and 
at the end of the year Hyndman discussed "Progress and Poverty'. 
25 
Members of the League became particular-lyinfluential in the 
Marylebone Central Democratic Association, which in 1881 adopted 
a programme more advanced than that of the Democratic 
Federation, and practically took over the Reverend Henry Solly's 
Social and Political Education League. This provided a plat- 
form for Socialist agitators and later functioned as a "front" 
organisation for the SDF. Well might Shipley argue that the 
spadework for the SDF was done by the Manhood Suffrage League, 
which later provided three members of the SDF executive, James 
Murray, R. D. Butler and James MacDonald. 
A phenomenon of the late 1870s and early 1880s in London 
was the transition of many from Secularism to Socialism, the 
result of impatience with established methods of Secularist 
activity and anger at the movement's reluctance to commit itself 
to a definite political creed. The key point, as Edward Royle 
has noted, was that ' The debate .... took place not 
between 
Secularist and Socialist societies, but within Secularism 
itself, 
d 
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before there were many socialist societies in existence. ' 
26 
Thomas Okey, a Spitalfields basket weaver and member of the Hall 
of Science, later recalled that 
.... during the 'seventies and 'eighties of last 
century, indications were obvious both on the plat- 
form and in the audience of the Hall of Science that 
the Marxian bible, or rather the earlier communist 
manifesto (1848) of Marx and Engels.... had begun to 
leaven English democratic thought. 
27 
This phenomenon is well illustrated by the development of the 
Stratford Dialectical and Radical Club out of the Stratford 
branch of the NSS in 1880. 
In January 1878 this branch attempted to form the nucleus 
of a new Radical Party; it was listening to a lecture on 
Socialism as early as July of that year and finally split from 
the NSS in 1880 because, said one member, of the 'urgent necessity 
of advocating "this worldism" (social questions) rather than 
continuing our anti-theological propaganda. ' 
28 
There was also 
some disquiet at the parliamentary performance of Bradlaugh 
after his election at Northampton in 1880. The club met at the 
Telegraph in Leyton Road, Stratford, where the landlord was 
Captain Tom Lemon, later to be on the executive of the Democratic 
Federation. Its defence of Johann Most, editor of Freheit29, 
its opposition to coercion in Ireland even after the Phoenix 
Park murders of 1882, and its role in the formation of the 
Democratic Federation, all demonstrated the club's advanced 
political position. From its open-air meetings on Mile End 
d 
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Waste in 1881 emerged the Labour Emancipation League, ' the 
first Socialist organisation in London with any influence' , 
30 
The League provided a common organisation for many of the indi- 
viduals already active in London and acted as a halfway house, 
in which the theories of the old guard and of the new pioneers 
both found expression. Much of its programme was a repetition 
of old Chartist and Radical demands but the final two clauses 
were a bridge to modern Socialism. 'As Labour is the foundation 
of all wealth' , began clause eight, so must that wealth 'be 
equitably shared by All' , whilst clause nine called for the 
nationalisation of the 'Instruments of Production and the Means 
of Employment' . Spurred on by its indefatigable secretary Joseph 
Lane the League formed a number of branches in London's East 
End, and its agitation attracted attention from another newly- 
formed organisation, the Democratic Federation. However, the 
LEL was a predominantly working-class organisation and at that 
time its programme was more advanced than that of Hyndman's 
body. Significantly, when the Radical clubs split from the 
Democratic Federation in 1883, LEL members ensured that 'almost 
alone .... the Stratford Radical Club stuck to the growing 
31 
advanced movement. ' 
These developments explain London's primacy in the early years 
of the SDF's history. Elsewhere isolated individuals such 
as Sketchley in Birmingham, Riley and Jonathan Taylor in 
Sheffield, Thomas Barclay in Leicester, were groping their way 
towards a Socialist analysis of society, but in the London of 
the 1870s a small but influential group of workers, holding 
d 
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strategic positions in the clubs and trade societies, played 
a key role in the transition from Radicalism to Socialism. Long 
before Marx's work was widely available, long before the public- 
ation of Progress and Poverty, the Murrays, Townshend, Frank Kitz 
and others were formed in their Socialist opinions. Their role 
has been largely unnoticed because, as Shipley comments, historians 
like the Webbs 'overestimate the importance of the printed word 
as against the spoken', 
32 
yet their discussions of the theories 
of Bronterre O'Brien, of Robert Owen, of Marx and others 
'produced an atmosphere in which an avowedly Socialist move- 
ment could emerge. ' 
33 
The General Election of 1880 demonstrated the emphatic hold of 
the Liberal Party over the working-class vote. Only three 
working men were elected to Parliament, all as Liberals, and 
the death of Alexander McDonald the following year reduced 
Labour strength at Westminster to two M. Ps, Henry Broadhurst 
and Thomas Burt. Gladstone's personality and the trade depres- 
sion combined to give the Liberals a clear majority of seventy- 
two seats in Parliament, and Radical expectations were high in 
view of Gladstone's promisesduring the Midlothian campaign. 
Disillusionment soon set in. The economic slump, which had 
begun in 1875, showed no signs of alleviating. Its effects were 
felt especially in London with the decline of the shipbuilding 
industry and increasing pressures on the small-scale industry so 
important as a source of employment. However, it was not social 
reform but the Gladstone government's policy of coercion in 
d 
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Ireland which spurred the Radicals into action. 
Late in 1880 F. W. Soutter founded a weekly paper, the 
Radical, to support the Anti-Coercion Association. The paper 
combined its Irish agitation with strong demands for increased 
labour representation in Parliament. Many Radicals found little 
to choose between Whigs and Tories and they increasingly despaired 
of the Liberal Government. 'This Government', wrote one, 'during 
its twelve months tenure of office has done more to render the 
cause of Liberalism ridiculous and obnoxious, hateful and con- 
temptible, than any one of its predecessors during the last 
century. '34 Disillusioned Radicalism suggested to some the 
basis for a new organisation, to none more so than Henry Mayers 
Hyndman. 
Hyndman's career has been well documented by Chushichi Tsuzuki. 
Born on the 7 March 1842, the son of a wealthy London merchant, 
he was a most improbable Socialist. Privately tutored, Hyndman 
then went to Cambridge where classical political economy, 
utilitarianism and positivism provided him with the intellectual 
background from which he later advanced to Socialism. His 
contact with the Italian Risorgimento, as a war correspondent 
for the Pall Mall Gazette, was an early influence which he 
later described as 'the turning point of his life. '35 In 1868 
he assisted Boyd Kinnear in the Fifeshire by-election, an 
experience which gave him 'an abiding contempt for our.... pseudo- 
democracy. '36 Similarly influential was a visit to Australia 
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in 1869 where he 'first began to grasp in earnest... -communal 
theories' because he 'never could endure the idea that the land 
of a country should belong to a mere handful of people whose 
forbears had obtained it either by force or fraud.... ' 
37 
Hyndman developed a deep concern for India in the 1870s and in 
October 1878 published an article on 'The Bankruptcy of India' 
in the Nineteenth Century. This interest led him to champion 
the idea of a liberal empire, a close union of 'democratic 
colonies', which he would later translate into a 'Socialist 
commonwealth' led by Britain and setting an example to the rest 
of the world. The article brought Hyndman a wider audience, 
which was widened still further when the debate over the 
Eastern Question brought him into contact with Socialist refugees 
in London; through one, Karl Hirsch, he met Marx early in 1880. 
In March of that year Hyndman decided to stand in the general 
election as an independent candidate for Marylebone. 
At this time Hyndman was very much the archetypal middle- 
class reformer, a sympathiser with Randolph Churchill and his 
Tory Democracy and indeed out of step with much of Radical 
opinion. He opposed Gladstone's pro-Russian policy, was against 
Home Rule for Ireland and the Disestablishment of the Church 
of England and went no further than 'An extension of household 
suffrage to the counties' and 'a large redistribution of seats'. 
Furthermore he was proud of England's empire and supported an 
enlarged navy to protect her food supplies. 'In short, 
' said 
Hyndman to the Marylebone electors 'I am earnestly bent upon 
reform at home and resolute to maintain the power and dignity 
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of England abroad. ' 
38 
There were few signs here of a future 
' revolutionary' Socialist and indeed Gladstone, an elector in 
the constituency, denounced him as a Tory. Hyndman was still 
essentially Conservative; he had high hopes of Disraeli as an 
agent of social reform and would always retain a fear of 'the 
empty-headed fools of democracy who imagine, or pretend, that 
because men should be socially equal therefore leadership and 
initiative and in a sense authority become unnecessary. 
39 
Small wonder then that when he approached Joseph Lane in a 
search for working-class support Lane told him that he was 
wasting his time. 
Land nationalisation he thought too extreme; was 
opposed to Home Rule, on the suffrage question he 
made a remark I have never forgotten or forgiven. 
He asked me if I meant to say that a loafer in the 
East End of London was to be placed on an equality 
with myself. No, the very farthest he would go was 
that every man who could read and write should have 
a vote .... 
40 
Only one meeting was held in support of Hyndman's candidature 
and he withdrew from the contest. Labelled 'jingo' by the 
Radicals for his anti-Russian views, there seemed little hope 
of Hyndman forming a new party on the left. Yet this episode 
was the prelude 'to a political career which increasingly 
absorbed his energies and his wealth. ' 
41 Hyndman's inadequacy 
at Marylebone led him to seek new ideas. He met Rudolf Meyer, 
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a German agrarian Socialist, and studied Chartism. He 
developed an interest in the work of Lassalle, whom he saw 
essentially as a national socialist aiming to raise his country 
to greatness and glory 'via Socialism. In many ways Hyndman was 
to assign himself the role of a British Lassalle, combining his 
Socialism with patriotic aspirations. Moreover, after the 
1880s both Hyndman and the SDF adopted the Lassallean road to 
Socialism via the ballot box. 
By mid-1880 then, 
as a result of my studies on India, my conviction 
as to the hopelessness of Liberalism and 
Radicalism, my reading up of the Chartist move- 
ment, and my acquaintance with foreign revolution- 
"ists, I had come very near to being an avowed 
Socialist. 
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Hyndman's hatred of capitalism, however, was still largely 
sentimental and 'Nothing beyond mitigating its abominations 
seemed possible. 
' 43 This attitude was changed when he read 
the French edition of Capital whilst he was en route to America. 
Cheerfully admitting that he did not fully grasp the significance 
of all Marx's theories, Hyndman was nonetheless convinced by 
Marx's analysis of the inevitability of the transition from 
capitalism to Socialism. This seemed to provide him with a 
sound basis for his hitherto incoherent ideas. Also, Hyndman's 
visit to America had led him to realise that democratic institit- 
ions were no guarantee of economic progress, whilst the support 
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of the American Irish for Home Rule seemed to portend troubles 
to come. On his return to England he began to visit Marx on 
a regular basis. Marx's 'genius, his vast erudition and his 
masterly survey of human life'44 had made a vast impression 
on Hyndman, but Marx for his part was rather doubtful about 
Hyndman and his plans for a peaceful revolution brought about 
'by a thoroughly educated industrial democracy. '45 This 
distrust deepened in January 1881 with the publication of 
Hyndman's article 'The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch' in the 
influential monthly The Nineteenth Century. Drawing upon 
conversations with Marx about the Continental revolutionary move- 
ment Hyndman had used the information in a distinctly anti- 
revolutionary sense. 'From that time onwards, ' says Max Beer, 
'Marx looked with suspicion upon Hyndman, and regarded him as 
a news-hunting busybody. ' 
46 
Readers of the article must have been somewhat incredulous 
of the picture painted by Hyndman. 'Never, perhaps, ' he said, 
'has the certainty of approaching trouble, social and political, 
been more manifest than it is today. The issues are more com- 
plicated than ever before, and that they can be settled without 
grave disturbance is scarcely credible. '47 Such a scenario 
seemed hardly relevant to an England bathed in social harmony, 
yet the depression which had begun in 1875 had greatly worsened 
the distress of the urban poor. Hyndman aimed to jolt his 
readers out of their sense of complacency and warn them of the 
dangers to come if action was not taken. Still a Tory Radical 
by inclination he viewed with alarm the revolutionary movements 
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on the Continent, motivated by a programme which 'to most of 
us Englishmen seems a very midsummer madness. '48 Their methods 
were not appropriate to an England which had 'long had nearly 
all that the people of the Continent of Europe are still striving 
for. '49 The state management of postal and telegraph services 
and the increasing control locally of gas and water supplies 
were seen by Hyndman as signposts to Socialism,; incredibly he 
saw even the Poor Law as 'distinctly communistic'. In his view 
the ruling class could stave off revolution by making concessions: 
if they would only be aware of 'the graver features in our home 
life'. the resentment over the rights connected with property, 
the conditions in London and the Northern towns, and the Irish 
question then, thought Hyndman, 'we shall be able to satisfy 
the legitimate claims of the many without trenching upon the 
rights or the privileges of the few. '50 His patriotic 
sentiments to the fore, Hyndman could then envisage England 
leading the way 'as she did with democracy, to social 
reorganisation. ' 
51 
The views contained in this article were well calculated 
to appeal to Radical sentiments; they were the ideas of Radical 
collectivism, to be pursued by constitutional means under 
enlightened leadership. Such arguments were not new, nor were 
they intended to be so. Hyndman was aiming at the audience 
contained within the London Radical Clubs, hoping to permeate 
them with Socialist ideas. Where he parted company with 
Radicalism was in his emphasis upon economic action by the State, 
but otherwise his arguments in favour of collectivism were based 
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on the moral values of Radicalism. Capitalism was immoral, 
a system of 'monopoly' built on special privilege. Viewed 
retrospectively his arguments were almost Fabian: - the gradual 
extension of state power at the expense of capitalism. In fact 
Hyndman's position at that time was midway between the new 
Radicalism of the 1870s and the later Radical Socialism of the 
Fabians and the ILP. Within months of the publication of the 
'Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch' the Democratic Federation was 
formed. 
'Towards the close of 1880 and the beginning of 1881', 
said Hyndman, 
there was a growing feeling that an effort should 
be made to rally together into a party the really 
advanced men and women who were in revolt against 
the obvious betrayal of all democratic principles 
at home and abroad by Mr Gladstone's Government. 
52 
A visit to Disraeli had convinced him that reform via the Tory 
party was not possible and in the spring of 1881 he took the 
initiative. The founding meetings of the Democratic Federation 
have been well detailed by Mira Wilkins, 
53 but certain points 
are worthy of emphasis. The first two meetings, at the Rose 
Street Club, Soho, and the Westminster Palace Hotel, brought 
together a considerable cross-section of Radical opinion which 
favoured the formation of a new organisation, but on the basis 
of a very limited programme: direct representation of Labour, 
manhood suffrage and payment of M. Ps. were agreed upon. Joseph 
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Cowen, the Radical Member for Newcastle, seemed a popular choice 
to head any such organisation. Before the third meeting however 
Hyndman had asserted himself and friction resulted which 
threatened to wreck the new party before it got off the ground. 
Cowen did not attend this meeting although it is untrue to say, 
as some have suggested, that he thereby dissociated himself 
from the Federation. 
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More significantly the Radical press 
ignored the gathering. In fairness to Hyndman it should be 
noted that many radicals were hostile simply because of his 
relative newness to the movement. Even Jack Williams, a most 
loyal supporter of Hyndman in later years, recalled that 'most 
of us there were a bit suspicious of him as a middle-class man 
at first. '55 Clearly Hyndman's egoism had alienated many 
potential supporters. Undoubtedly his 'ultra-jingo' reputation 
deterred many more. These were portents for the future. 
Nonetheless Hyndman was a man of ability with a forceful person- 
ality and sufficient support remained for a founding conference 
to be held on 8 June at the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, 
where less than two decades later the Labour Representation 
Committee was founded. 
They met, said Hyndman, 'to consider why, at an unprecedented 
period in the history of the country, there was so little 
harmony between the various Radical bodies. '56 That soon became 
apparent, for many present obviously represented only sectional 
interests. There was disagreement over the suffrage, with 
Hyndman favouring manhood suffrage but adult suffrage, backed 
by Herbert Burrows and Helen Taylor, winning the day. That 
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Hyndman stood to the right of many delegates was further 
demonstrated by his reaction to a proposal calling for the 
abolition of the monarchy. He threatened to vacate the chair 
rather than assent to such disloyalty. Such views so dismayed 
J. Morrison Davidson and Andreas Scheu that they left the hall, 
whilst the Radical regarded the incident as further evidence 
of middle-class leadership and the corrupting element of 
patronage. '57 Yet there was great enthusiasm for land nation- 
alisation and on the question of Irish legislative independence 
there was complete unanimity. This was proposed by a Nottingham 
delegate, seconded by J. J. Winks, later secretary of the DF 
and supported by the Irish M. P., Justin McCarthy. Upon its 
acceptance the Reverend Harold Rylett, an executive member of 
the Land League, invited two delegates to visit Ireland as 
guests of that body. These events anticipated the orientation 
of much of the Democratic Federation's early work. 
There was no mention of Socialism; the Federation's 
programme was Radical, with the exception of land nationalisation 
all its clauses being political rather than social. Indeed 
Hyndman had neither the power nor the desire to move the 
Federation towards Socialism. As already noted his views were 
distinctly to the right of many. At the meeting he had dis- 
tributed to delegates copies of his book, England for All, 
which further emphasises this point. In some respects indeed 
its arguments fell short even of the agreed programme, advocating 
land reform rather than nationalisation, reform rather than 
abolition of the House of Lords, and failing to mention 
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legislative independence for Ireland. In the book Hyndman 
continued to place his faith in the 'truer patriotism of the 
upper class' which would enable England to demonstrate to the 
rest of the world that it was possible to have a peaceful 
revolution. What that revolution entailed was unclear, for 
Hyndman advocated social reform and state control of the railways, 
mines and factories, whilst writing of the demon of Socialism. 
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England for All was, as Tsuzuki has commented, a textbook of 
English 'Tory Democracy' rather than Continental Social 
Democracy. Yet it contained two chapters on labour and capital 
which attempted to summarize Marx. 
It is well known that Marx was annoyed at what he regarded as 
a plagiarism by Hyndman. The real cause of his annoyance, how- 
ever, was the fact that Hyndman had attempted to harness 
Marx's theories to an immediate policy of his own. A summary 
of Capital, he thought, was out of place in the programme of a 
party which was not a distinct, independent, working-class party. 
More importantly Marx's distaste was shared to a much greater 
degree by Engels. Hyndman and Engels never met but their 
hostility would significantly affect the development of the 
Movement. At this time Engels had grounds for believing that 
other avenues were open for the advance of British Socialism. 
He had been invited to write a series of articles in the Labour 
Standard, organ of the London Trades Council, in which he 
emphasised the need for a political workers' party in England. 
These articles had a significant effect upon a number of young 
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and active trades unionists such as James MacDonald, later 
secretary of the London Trades Council. 
59 
A 'Democratic 
League of Great Britain and Ireland' was formed in Manchester 
in April and a group of 'Social-Democrats' meeting at Hamilton 
in June had resolved to form a Scottish Labour Party with a 
programme including the nationalisation of industry. Engels 
regarded these developments as far more promising than the 
'centre of organisation' which was the declared objective of 
Hyndman's Democratic Federation. Yet within a year 'Hyndman 
was a complete and thorough-going revolutionary socialist'60 
and he had taken the Federation with him. 
His transformation can be traced through the history of 
England for All. In September 1881 two new editions appeared, 
one a cheap edition aimed at reaching a mass market. It had 
been modified to conform with decisions reached at the 
Democratic Federation's founding conference and, significantly, 
the phrase 'demon of Socialism' was omitted. His Marxism was 
not a coherent doctrine and the deficiencies demonstrated in 
England for All would persist into the theory of the SDF. The 
book lacked a conceptual framework, failed to define terms and 
did not provide a reasoned argument either morally or historic- 
ally. There was a conflict, for example, between the Marxist 
view of class and Hyndman's picture of 'the nation' as providing 
some sort of consensus. Similarly he argued at times the 
orthodox Marxist viewpoint of the State as a class instrument, 
yet elsewhere saw it acting in the interests of the nation as 
a whole. Hyndman's summary of Marx concentrated solely on 
38. 
economics, ignoring Marx's sociology, history and the dialectic. 
Even the economics were somewhat simplistic, positing the iron 
law of wages which Marx had already rejected and presenting a 
theory of surplus value which he could have obtained from the 
early English Socialists. The overwhelming impression is of an 
attack on capitalism couched in moral terms and in this sense, 
as Marx himself agreed, the book made good propaganda. England 
For All introduced many later Socialists to Marx. Thus Edward 
Carpenter recalled that 'The instant I read that chapter in 
"England for All" - the mass of floating impressions, senti- 
ments, ideals etc. in my mind fell into shape - and I had a 
61 
clear line of social reconstruction before me. ' 
Hyndman had formed his 'centre of organisation', a nucleus 
consisting largely of middle-class intellectuals. His own ideas 
had crystallised from an incoherent hatred of capitalism into 
a somewhat idiosyncratic but definite revolutionary Socialism. 
He had now to introduce his message to a wider audience and 
persuade others to accept his scheme of social reconstruction. 
39. 
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CHAPTER II 
FROM RADICALISM TO SOCIALISM: 'A COLLECTION OF ODDITIES'. 
In its early years the Democratic Foundation's activities were 
dominated by the Irish question, an orientation which was 
undoubtedly responsible for bringing the Federation to public 
notice. However, its attacks on the Government and its alle- 
gation that coercion in Ireland was merely a precursor of 
coercion at home alienated many of its early supporters. Indeed 
much of the Federation's Radical support melted away in September 
1881 when it supported a Land League candidate against the 
Liberal nominee in the Tyrone by-election. Only the Stratford 
Radical Club remained loyal, the others believing that the 
Federation had acted in the Tory interest. Hyndman was once 
more denounced as 'a Tory in disguise'. 
I The Radical exodus 
left a very small organisation indeed. One Conservative journal 
wrote jokingly of 'The Democratic Federation, as Mr. Hyndman 
will persist in calling himself'2 and Kropotkin later remembered 
of a Socialist gathering in the autumn of 1881 that 'Mrs Hyndman 
had received all the Congress in her house'. 
3 Engels could, 
very reasonably, dismiss the Federation as 'of no account 
whatever. '4 
Could the DF build support on the basis of hostility to 
the Liberal Government? This was a major problem, one which 
was to dog it throughout the 1880s. In directing its attack 
against the Liberal Party the Federation risked alienating 
those Radicals upon whose support it was counting. Yet to 
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concentrate its fire upon the Tory Party would also have 
proved counter-productive. As the Liberal Party was the 
working man's party and de facto the anti-Tory party there 
would then have been no good reason for Radicals to move to 
the Federation. Therefore the Federation's attack on the 
Liberal Party as simply another capitalist party and, moreover, 
one duping the workers into acceptance of the status quo had to 
be communicated more effectively. Thus the propaganda continued 
and fresh efforts were made to improve the organisation. In 
addition to debates within the Radical clubs5 'it now also 
became necessary to reach the people by open-air meetings at 
the corners of the street', 
6 
a method of agitation to be 
i increasingly utilised in the coming years. The Federation's 
first open-air meeting, to defend the Irish Land League, was 
held in Hyde Park on 23 October 1881. Other activities included 
participation in the Freheit defence committee, a public meeting 
to argue for the abolition of the House of Lords, and a meeting 
after the Trades Union Congress where, 'for about the first 
time since the Chartist Movement, the right of the people to 
the collective ownership of the soil' was proclaimed. 
7 
Organisationally advances were made with the affiliation of 
the Manchester group, 'The Democratic League of Great Britain 
and Ireland', and the establishment of six provincial groups 
by the time of the first Annual Conference. 
The Federation's programme was essentially political but 
Hyndman was now busily working to spread Socialist ideas . 
Thus the meetings and addresses given by members were often of 
4 5. 
a wider character than the programme would suggest. J. F. 
Murray, for example, lectured to Battersea Liberal Club on 
21 August, 1881, on 'The Principles of Social-Democracy', 
Hyndman to the Poplar Land League on 4 December on 'The Tyranny 
of Capital in England and America', and Frank Kitz on 8 January, 
1882, to the Federation's Number One branch on 'Aims of the 
Socialists'. Such efforts though were still secondary to the 
Irish propaganda, which received a major setback with the 
Phoenix Park murders on 6 May 1882. H. W. Lee later remembered 
the difficulties of campaigning for Irish Freedom at a time when 
'nothing was too bad to be said of and done to the Irish 
Land Leaguers'. 8 But, nothing daunted, the Federation reacted 
immediately when the Government introduced a new Coercion 
Bill. Calling a demonstration in Hyde Park for Sunday 11 June, 
their handbills accused the Government of establishing 'a 
despotism worse than anything known in these islands since 
the days of the infamous Star Chamber'. 
9 
In spite of heavy 
rain a crowd estimated at anything between 30,000 and 80,000 
gathered to hear speakers denounce coercion in Ireland. Such 
crowds proved the DF correct in its assumption that the Irish 
issue would provide it with a ready-made audience, but both 
then and in the future the single-issue campaign failed to pro- 
duce a significant number of recruits. Hyndman alienated the 
most likely by his vehement attacks on political Radicalism and 
by his insistence that the Liberal Party was the main stumbling- 
block to reform. He thus aborted his own planned alliance of 
Irish Nationalists and English Radicals, which could well have 
been politically significant. Instead the Federation was drawn 
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into the wake of Henry George's tour of Britian in the summer 
of 1882 and eventually to a declaration of Socialism. 
At this time Hyndman and George had much in common on 
immediate policy if not in their ultimate aims. Thus it was 
not surprising that George's tour was instrumental in winning 
a number of middle-class Radicals to the Democratic Federation 
in 1882 and 1883. Henry Hyde Champion was an ex-artillery 
officer, having resigned his commission after the Egyptian War 
of 1881-82. Progress and Poverty so impressed James Leigh 
Joynes, a Master at Eton, that he travelled to Ireland with 
Henry George in the summer of 1882. His subsequent account 
of events there led to his dismissal from Eton. R. P. B. Frost, 
an old schoolfriend of Champion, joined these two in the spring 
of 1883 to organise the Land Reform Union, and in June they 
launched The Christian Socialist as its monthly organ. This 
was the first avowedly Socialist journal in England since the 
1850s. They were joined by recruits from the Secularist 
Movement such as Herbert Burrows and Ernest Belfort Bax and 
were immeasurably strengthened by the adherence of William 
Morris in January 1883. These men were willing to devote their 
time and money to the Federation. They gave it an articulate 
leadership, a wider audience via the pages of The Christian 
Socialist, and, later, Today, and they were also instrumental 
L 3. a ýr"ýý iýtaý-aism. in turning the part, 
The first hints of a definite Socialist policy had 
appeared at the Federation's Conference on 31 May 1882, with 
the declaration that 'the Federation has consistently opposed 
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the landlord and capitalist parties who atpresent control 
the machinery of state.... Those whose labour makes the wealth 
of these islands must rely on themselves alone. ' 
10 
These 
tendencies were confirmed by the party's intervention on issues 
other than Ireland. Members and sympathisers occupied the 
platform at Holborn Town Hall in November 1882 to oppose 
Morley's plan for an insurance scheme to be paid for out of 
workers' wages, which Hyndman called 'compulsory thrift and 
forced insurance. ' 
11 
A further meeting on 19 December was 
similarly infiltrated, with a Federation handbill proclaiming 
that 
All men and women who work for a master give back to 
their employers the value of their wages in the first 
two or three hours of the day's work. All the rest 
of the production is taken for nothing.... 
12 
Within the hall the resolution proposing compulsory insurance 
was overwhelmingly defeated by a DF amendment arguing that the 
only mea^s oc preventing pauperism was 'by securing for the 
producing classes the fruits of their labour. '13 Encouraged 
by such events William Morris joined the party early in 1883, 
14 'hoping that it would declare for Socialism'. He was not 
to be disappointed. A series of conferences in February and 
March discussed a Socialist programme, with Hyndman delivering 
six lectures on 'Practical Proposals for Pressing Needs' , the 
palliatives which were needed to produce a healthy and better 
educated working class ready to fight for Socialism. These 
included free school meals, the eight-hour working day and 
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nationalisation of the mines and railways. The Federation 
lecture list demonstrated an increasingly Socialist bias, as 
a glance at the Clerkenwell branch programme for Spring 1883 
confirms. 
APRIL 15 
APRIL 22 
APRIL 29 
MAY 6 
MAY 13 
MAY 20 
William Morris 'Art and Democracy 
J. L. Joynes 'Socialism' 
Steward Glenny 'Socialism as a Law of 
Economic Development' 
P. Hennessy 'Where Are We Drifting 
To ' 
Steward Glenny 'Modern Socialism' 
Steward Glenny 
MAY 27 H. H. Champion 
JUNE 3 H. W. Roland 
'Modern Socialism' 
'Christian Socialism, 
'Signs of Socialistic 
Advance' 
These trends culminated in a declaration of principles at 
the Second Annual Conference in June, which were then published 
as a pamphlet, Socialism Made Plain. 
Elementary though it was in its statement of Socialist 
principles this manifesto was in reality the official declaratiofl 
of the Democratic Federation as an avowed and irreconcilable 
Socialist organisation., 
15 
It achieved the largest sale of 
any Socialist publication in the next decade, over one hundred 
thousand copies. Socialism Made Plain, said Harry Lee, 
'was the pamphlet which first turned my attention to Socialism 
.... Doubtless it has had a similar effect on others. ' 
16 
49. 
Conversely most of the non-Socialists now resigned, even 
Dr. G. B. Clark, M. P., who had been associated with the First 
International, but to compensate a few working-class recruits 
were made, men such as Quelch and Burns. Briefly summarised 
the pamphlet argued that social and political power was mono- 
polised by landlords and capitalists, who lived off the labour 
of the workers. The result was poverty for the working class, 
wealth for the few, coercion in Ireland and disaster in India. 
Just as the production of wealth was a collective effort so 
the Federation demanded that exchange and distribution be 
placed on a collective basis. Meanwhile it was argued that 
the party's palliatives had to be adopted as 'stepping stones 
to a happier period', producing a working class determined 
'to take control, finally, of the entire social and political 
machinery of the State in which class distinctions and class 
privileges shall cease to be. ' 
17 
Socialism Made Plain was published at a time of growing 
discontent, when the gulf between rich and poor seemed notice- 
ably greater than ever before. 
18 'Every other movement, ' 
commented one observer, seemed to be 'aiming at a radical 
revolution in the existing order of things' with 'the Social 
Democratic Associations of the East End of London .... most 
active. ' 
19 
The Federation stepped up its outdoor propaganda, 
successfully fighting off the attempted suppression of their 
meetings at Peckham Rye and in Southwark Park, whilst continuing 
to carry the Socialist message to the Radical Clubs. Then, 
in 
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November, Hyndman published The Historical Basis of Socialism 
in England. This time he acknowledged Marx's influence, but 
the work revealed the still confused nature of Hyndman's 
Socialism and his very narrow interpretation of Marx. He was 
still motivated by a conception of imperialism, whereby the 
English speaking and perhaps Teutonic peoples would lead the 
way to Socialism, a theory later referred to by a fellow 
Socialist as his 'racial predilections., 
20 
Hyndman's Marxism, 
as demonstrated in The Historical Basis, was in fact a dubious 
mixture of economic history and economic theory, ignoring the 
philosophical and sociological aspects of Marx. The economic 
theory was somewhat archaic in that it emphasised the iron law 
of wages, already rejected by Marx, and used the Radical demand 
for the workers' right to the 'whole produce of their labour' 
which Marx regarded as unscientific because of its inherent 
individualism. More heretical still was Hyndman's attempt to 
synthesise Marx, Rodbertus and Lassalle. Both he and Rodbertus 
conceived of Socialism in nationalist terms, both were State 
Socialists of the paternal variety. Hyndman combined this 
with xenophobia; he had, for example, been instrumental in 
September 1882 in carrying a resolution opposing Chinese 
immigration on the grounds that they 'always remained a 
distinct race wherever they went.... They could swamp us indus- 
21 
trially and crowd us out of almost every occupation..... ' 
He also adopted positions on the Lassallean model with regard 
to political tactics; outright hostility to Liberal politicians, 
a tendency to flirt with representatives of the ruling class, 
and an optimistic view of the possibilities of parliamentary 
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democracy. Yet, suspect though his Marxism might be, Hyndman 
was making excellent propaganda, 'providing arsenals of fact 
and argument for the pioneers. '22 The Socialist message was 
spreading beyond its hitherto narrow confines. 
The Federation made considerable impact with its 
opposition to State-aided emigration as a panacea for distress, 
using the by now well-tried tactics of packing meetings in 
order to propose their own viewpoint. It argued that national- 
isation of the land should precede any emigration scheme, for 
there was a vast area of uncultivated land at home sufficient 
to provide for all; moreover, the state-aided scheme would 
simply remove the healthy and leave the sickly, and if applied 
at all it should begin with 'the useless class of landlords, 
capitalists and their hangers on., 
23 
This campaign was but 
one in a ceaseless round of activity in the latter half of 
1883 which succeeded in pushing the Federation into the public 
eye, but it did little to increase membership. The number of 
branches was few, the bulk of the membership of little more 
than two hundred consisting of individuals from widely scattered 
parts of London. The strongest branch was that in Marylebone, 
where James MacDonald had brought over the Central Democratic 
Association, and Clerkenwell was also active. Although largely 
middle class in character, there were a small number of very 
gifted working men within the SDF. Harry Quelch the London meat 
porter, Harry Lee and Jack Williams could be included in their 
ranks. Yet, as William Morris commented, these men `were 
there by dint of their special intelligence, or of their 
eccentricity, not as working men simply-' 
24 Amidst the general 
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apathy of the working class, and contrary to the Radical loyalty 
to the Liberal Government, members of the Democratic Federation 
were very much 'a collection of oddities., 
25 
Some had joined 
the Federation because of their disgust at Gladstonian policy 
in Ireland, others because of their detestation of imperialism 
in Egypt. Some joined through feelings of guilt over the 
increasing distress at home. Jack Williams was motivated by 
the memory of the extreme poverty of his childhood, as was Tom 
Barclay of Leicester. A few, such as Hyndman, had read Marx 
and were convinced that capitalism was nearing its final crisis. 
Some old Chartists anticipated a revival of the movement of 
their youth. Common to all was hatred, a hatred of capitalism 
and the leisured class it spawned at the expense of the masses; 
in Morris's case hatred of a system which had no room for art, 
a system which devastated the countryside. Socialism inspired 
these oddities with hope for the future, an optimism shared by 
Hyndman, who was in buoyant mood at the beginning of 1884. 
Hyndman saw events in Ireland and the increasing 
popularity of land nationalisation as signs that there would 
soon be ' an organised Social Democracy in these islands .' 
26 
He even went as far as to predict 1889 as the year of the 
revolution. Although he later tried to dismiss this prediction 
as a mere gesture of encouragement to his members, 
27 
there 
is no doubt that Hyndman and others adopted an almost millag%nial 
approach to Socialist work in the 1880s. They genuinely 
believed in the imminence of revolution and regarded the 
preparation of the working class for that eventuality as a 
matter of extreme urgency. The problem was that whilst 
acquainting the well-educated with Socialist principles was 
9 3 
comparatively easy, 
28 
a working-class audience was far harder 
to obtain. With that in mind, in January 1884, the Federation 
launched its own weekly journal, Justice, thanks to a donation 
of £300 from Edward Carpenter. But a wholesale newsagents' 
boycott restricted circulation, forcing the Federation onto 
the streets to sell the paper. They made a curious spectacle 
on the Strand and Fleet Street, 'Morris in his soft hat and 
blue suit, Champion, Frost and Joynes in the morning garments 
of the well-to-do, several working men comrades and (Hyndman) 
in the new frock-coat, with a tall hat and good gloves., 
Nonetheless this and a reduction in price from twopence to a 
penny trebled circulation in the first three months. The launch 
of Justice was important, but Federation fortunes received an 
even greater boost in April with a debate between Hyndman and 
Bradlaugh. 
Bradlaugh undoubtedly had the better of the debate. He 
forced Hyndman onto the defensive with his accusations that the 
Socialists were importing an alien creed into Britain and 
inciting violence through their speeches. Yet it is not the 
details of the debate which are important; the very fact that 
it took place demonstrated the growing impact of the Socialist 
message and showed how worried Bradlaugh was by its increasing 
influence within the radical and secularist milieu. As 
Edward Royle has commented, debates 'Like modern football 
matches... offered temporary excitement and entertainment' , 
but more importantly the set debate was 'The most spectacular 
form of propagandism' in the late nineteenth centurylattracting 
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large audiences and considerable press coverage. 
30 
Consequently the Hyndman-Bradlaugh debate acted as a catalyst 
within the Secularist Movement. It was discussed at NSS 
branches up and down the country, at Dewsbury, Bolton, Glasgow, 
Newcastle and Battersea, a branch which then acted as 'midwife 
to the Socialism of the area. '31 John Burns and Tom Mann were 
both attracted to the SDF as a result of the controversy. 
Five thousand copies of the debate were sold out by mid-June 
and Harry Snell in Nottingham was but one of those who made 
the transition from Secularism to Socialism after he 'had made 
a careful study of the debates between Bradlaugh and Henry 
Mayers Hyndman. '32 Sidney Gimson, a Leicester Secularist, later 
admitted that 'the discussion of Individualism and Socialism 
went on furiously and, though I was on the other side, I must 
admit that Socialism was rapidly gaining converts. ' 
33 
With 
penetration of the Radical clubs proceeding apace the 
Democratic Federation was achieving its aim of reaching the 
politically aware working class. 
The heightening economic depression in 1884 allowed the 
Federation to intervene directly in the industrial field for 
the first time, and thereby spread the Socialist message to 
the provinces. In February three members of the executive, 
Joynes, Williams and MacDonald, were sent to Blackburn to 
agitate in support of the weavers' strike. Hyndman was quick 
to point out that, "A man or a woman thrown into poverty 
by 
the action of capitalists, is apt to learn the principles of 
Justice very quickly ., 
34 
They drew large crowds to their 
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meetings, and when Hyndman and Morris visited the town at 
the end of the month over two thousand people were present to 
hear them. The inaugural branch meeting in March saw the 
enrolment of sixty members, mainly weavers. Although the 
strike was eventually lost Justice commented that ' The field 
is a large one, and not the least promising part is 
Lancashire, ' 
35 
a prediction which would later be amply borne 
out. A similar intervention was made in the miners' strike in 
South Staffordshire in July, and a branch was formed at Dudley. 
These successes were backed up by increasing open-air 
propaganda in London and the selling of Justice wherever the 
opportunity arose. At the Edinburgh franchise demonstration 
on the 12 July, for example, 400 copies were sold and a 
similar demonstration at Holmfirth in Yorkshire was also 
covered. Letters from Bradford and Norwich indicated that 
branches were about to b 
spreading, 
36 
said Morris 
the organisation finally 
changing its name to the 
immediate result was the 
e formed. 'Undoubtedly the hope is 
and, at its fourth Annual Conference, 
declared openly for Socialism, 
Social-Democratic Federation. One 
affiliation of the Labour Emancipation 
League and the adoption of most of its programme. Proposals 
for nationalisation were no longer limited to the railways, 
banks and land but now included all ' the means of production, 
distribution and exchange. ' Understandably the Federation's 
radical constitutional proposals were still prominent because 
the 1884 Franchise Act was not yet operational, but they were 
further democratised by additions from the LEL list such as the 
citizen army and advocacy of a referendum to decide on peace and 
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war. Significantly Hyndman was ousted from the position of 
permanent president when Lane, supported by Morris, Scheu and 
others, placed the Executive Council in control of the 
organisation. 
Yet this Executive remained overwhelmingly 
middle class, dominated by those able and often wealthy members 
who had been instrumental in keeping the Federation afloat 
during the past three years but who lacked practical organising 
experience. 
This naivety probably explains the unanimous conference 
resolution 'that no political action should be taken in the 
way of putting forward candidates at elections, or in any way 
countenancing the present political system, ' It was certainly 
a factor in the issuing of the SDF manifesto to Trade Unions 
in September. This manifesto lambasted the unions as an 
aristocracy of labour content to use 'the middle class capit- 
alistic House of Commons' as their mouthpiece. It accused them 
of class collaboration: - 'You have made friends with the Mammon 
of Unrighteousness in the shape of the employing class, ' whilst 
'your less fortunate brethren are suffering and dying by your 
side. ' It also denounced them for discouraging strikes, an 
issue on which the SDF was somewhat ambivalent at this time. 
Although it regarded strikes as unwise - 'Until the time comes 
when strikes can be organised and universal throughout not one 
country but many, it is wiser for the workers to suffer, to 
protest, and to remember. ' 
37 
- when they occurred the 
SDF 
supported them, as at Blackburn, and seized the opportunity 
to 
spread its propaganda. A special strike committee was 
formed, 
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which could report on 13 September that it was in touch with 
events in Sunderland, Glasgow, Aberdeen, South Staffordshire, 
Hanley, Blackburn and Clitheroe. The SDF has been severely 
criticised for its anti-union attitudes, yet at this stage in 
its history it was probably correct to expose their collaboration- 
ist nature; the charges levelled against the TUC were undoubtedly 
true and the SDF, attempting to build an alternative to the two 
major parties, had little to lose by their publication. The 
advent of new unionism would necessitate a very different 
orientation. 
Meanwhile, progress was maintained. The Scottish Land 
and Labour League, centred on Edinburgh, became the Scottish 
section of the SDF and assisted the reorganisation of a branch 
in Glasgow. Branches were formed at Norwich, Leeds and Hull 
and there was even a short-lived attempt to form a Junior 
Democratic Federation with its own monthly magazine. More 
lasting and beneficial for the Federation were its campaigns 
for free school meals and the unemployed. Jonathan Taylor in 
Sheffield was the main protagonist of free school meals and 
all branches were urged to press the matter; this many did and 
valuable publicity was gained. The unemployed agitation was to 
prove one of the SDF's most enduring efforts but in the winter 
of 1884 the organisation was feeling its way in terms of tactics 
and publicity. Nonetheless, under the banner of 'Work For All - 
Overwork for None' , meetings and parades were 
held all over 
London, particularly in the East End, resulting in a number of 
new branches. 
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The sheer pace and scale of the Federation's activities 
in fact overstretched its limited organisation and finance. 
Branches such as Marylebone claimed one hundred and fifty 
members yet only one-third paid the penny subscription and 
fewer still took an active part in the propaganda. Many of the 
outdoor stations, started through the enthusiasm of local 
members, were forced to close through lack of speakers . 
Indefatigable organisers like Jack Williams and George Clifton 
launched new branches only to find them collapsing unless they 
personally returned to service them. More importantly the 
financial situation of the party and Justice was desperate. The 
paper's main outlet was the open-air meeting and its fortunes 
fluctuated according to the number of these, but even at the 
height of the summer campaign it operated at a loss. Publicity 
parades in the West End of London and a propaganda fund based on 
weekly subscriptions did little to reduce the Federation's 
reliance on the personal resources of such as Hyndman and 
Morris. Yet overall 1884 had been a year of progress. Branches 
had been established in the provinces, links between political 
and industrial activity formed. The Federation had important 
footholds in the Land Reform Union and the Secularist movement, 
and had recruited prominent radicals. Samuel Bennett, one of 
the editors of The Radical, formally announced his enrolment 
thus :- 
Hitherto we have been a disjointed army of Advanced 
Liberals, Radicals, Land Nationalisers, Republicans. 
Now, for the first time, there seems a chance of a 
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small united phalanx being formed under the 
banner of Socialism. It is the logical 
38 
conclusion.... 
Bennett's small united phalanx was, regrettably, short-lived, 
for at the very end of the year a disastrous schism occurred. 
At this time most Socialists accepted a certain body of 
principles which today would be termed Marxist. However, 
agreement on the general aims of Socialism did not extend to the 
methods necessary for its achievement. The early Socialists 
were pioneers and they were impatient for the moment of 
revolution. But how was it to be brought about? In simple 
terms the ' right' of the party favoured the parliamentary road 
to Socialism, whilst the ' left' wanted a peaceful social 
agitation aimed at a genuine revolution which would make a 
clean sweep of degraded capitalist culture. Overlaying this 
division was the tendency of many Federation members to use the 
rhetoric of violent revolution. Hyndman was particularly prone 
to this; his phraseology, referred to by Morris as a 'turnip 
bogie", had already alienated Helen Taylor and others steeped 
in a Radical past, and it grated too on his left-wing opponents 
for Hyndman was undoubtedly the leader of the 'right" within the 
SDF. He supported parliamentarianism and a programme of 
"palliatives", whereas Andreas Scheu and William Morris agreed 
with J. L. Mahon that 
The social inequality, the existence of a privileged 
and a poor class, is caused not by any inadequate 
extension of the franchise... but by the class 
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appropriation of the means and material of 
making wealth.... Parliament is a mere sham of 
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governing. 
Foreign policy was a further cause of friction. Hyndman's 
view of England as the vanguard of the Socialist Movement 
antagonised those to whom Socialism and internationalism were 
synonymous. Eleanor Marx wrote to Wilhelm Liebknecht in 
January 1885 that 'one of our chief points of conflict with 
Hyndman is that whereas we wish to make this a really inter- 
national movement ... Mr. Hyndman, whenever he could do so 
with impunity, has endeavoured to set English workmen against 
foreigners. v40 Scheu and Bax similarly opposed 'the old Adam 
of Jingoism' 
41 in Hyndman, who also exhibited a distinct anti- 
semitism, revealed in such remarks as ' that damned Jew' and 
'Jew Englishman' 
Genuine political differences were exacerbated by personal 
antagonisms. B ax was later to comment that theoretical 
differences were nowhere near as great as he and other dis- 
sidents had imagined; it is impossible to resist the conclusion 
that the personal element... was largely at the back of the 
secessian. '42 Certainly Morris, Engels and others were 
exasperated by what they regarded as Hyndman's dictatorial 
behaviour, his treatment of the Federation as a personal 
possession. Conversely Hyndman detested Engels, whom he 
regarded as an arch-manipulator using the international move- 
ment for his own ends, and was therefore suspicious of Aveling 
and Eleanor Marx, Engels' close associates. Between Hyndman 
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and Andreas Scheu there was little love lost. Scheu had 
founded the Scottish Land and Labour League because he felt 
that the SDF was neglecting local sympathy for crofter 
agitation and for the Irish Land League. This infuriated Hyndman 
and the truth of the matter is that both sides had some justi- 
fication for their attitudes. There is abundant evidence of 
Hyndman's shortcomings but it is less widely realised that he 
had good reasons for his suspicions of Engels and his group, 
who purveyed what Sheila Rowbotham has called 'a cliquish 
rectitude. ' 
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Whereas men like Morris assumed a basic comrade- 
ship between different sections of the left, Marx and Engels 
had developed a very different style of politics. Having 
decided a line that line would then be unilaterally imposed, 
regardless of the views of the Socialists on the spot. Thus 
Engels played an active, albeit clandestine, role in the pre- 
parations for the split in the party. Eleanor Marx, writing 
to her sister Laura, pointed out that it was after consultation 
with Engels that they had decided to form a new organisation 
and rejoiced that 'The General has promised, now we are rid 
, 44 of the unclean elements in the Federation, to help us. 
Furthermore she expected, through Engels, to have German 
support, for the widening rift was a reflection too of divisions 
within the continental movement, where 'possibilists 
' urged 
an interim 'bourgeois' alliance for immediate reforms, similar 
to the palliatives favoured by Hyndman. 
The problem for those opposing Hyndman was that he, as 
editor of Justice, dictated the day-to-day policy of the SDF. 
62 . 
Indeed he would go to any length to ensure his control of the 
organisation. When Scheu's Scottish Land and Labour League 
attempted to form a branch in Glasgow, Hyndman pre-empted him 
on a flying visit to Scotland, establishing an SDF branch there 
with W. J. Nairn as secretary. His opponents despaired and, 
despite obtaining a majority on the executive, decided to resign. 
They felt, in Morris's words, that 'the old organisation was 
not worth having. ' 
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On Monday 29 December the dissidents 
announced the formation of the Socialist League, and in their 
manifesto explained their decision to resign. The chief points 
were that within the SDF there had been, 'a tendency to political 
opportunism... towards national assertion... to attempts at 
arbitrary rule. '46 These criticisms foretold the future of 
the SDF, for even at this early stage Hyndman's dominance of 
the party was apparent, his chauvinism and anti-semitism creat- 
ing discord. They would occasion further splits; in seceding 
from the SDF and setting up a rival organisation Morris and his 
comrades were setting a precedent. Dissidents rarely stayed 
within the party to fight for their position; this can partly 
be explained by the intransigence of the Hyndmanite 'old guard' 
but it proved to be a tactical mistake, weakening an already 
tiny movement without establishing a viable alternative. 
Lacking a mass movement to propel it forward the party tended 
to dissipate its energies in factionalism. 
What impact did the departure of the Socialist League 
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members have upon the SDF? The League took the Merton Abbey, 
Hammersmith, Woolwich and Leeds branches from the SDF, along 
with the LEL and the Scottish Land and Labour League, and it 
established a successful branch at Norwich. The League's total 
membership however never rose much above five hundred. From 
the beginning it lacked unity; some of its members were mere 
anti-Hyndmanites, others thought it premature for a Socialist 
organisation to perform the duties of a political party and 
considered its task simply to be the education of the working 
classes; yet others were anti-parliamentarian or outright 
anarchists. That it survived at all was due largely to the 
herculean efforts and charisma of Morris. He was gradually 
outmanoeuvred by the anarchists, became disillusioned and 
resigned in the autumn of 1890. His departure ensured the 
virtual demise of the League. Its significance lay in the fact 
that it signalled the emergence of a genuine division within 
the British revolutionary movement. Morris detested what he 
saw as Hyndman's orientation towards'a sort of Bismarckian 
State Socialism', whilst the economically deterministic Hyndman 
had little time for the ethical concerns of Morris. Genuinely 
enthralled by what he saw as the revolutionary inevitability 
of the period Hyndman was merely 
that revolution by whatever mean 
ironic that Morris, the 'Marxist 
claimed by the reformist ILP and 
whilst the SDF, which claimed to 
Marxist party, finished its days 
concerned with preparing for 
s necessary. It is somewhat 
dreamer', should later be 
left wing of the Labour Party 
be, and was, recognised as the 
on the right of the Labour 
movement. 
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Still, at the end of 1884 the SDF was in disarray. Morris, 
writing to Joynes on Christmas Day, highlighted its problem: 
/Hyndman's/ aim has been to make the movement seem 
big, to frighten the powers that be with a turnip 
bogie which perhaps he almost believes in himself: 
hence all that insane talk of forcible revolution, 
when we know that the workers in England are not 
even touched by the movement; hence the founding of 
branches which melt away into mere names, the neglect 
of organisation for fruitless agitation; and worst 
of all, hence, discreditable intrigue and sowing of 
suspicion among those who are working for the party. 
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These faults were perhaps excusable in a young and enthusiastic 
organisation feeling its way yet believing that time was against 
it. As Hubert. Bland later commented, 
The type of man who has the intellectual and moral 
courage to join a new and unpopular movement has also 
fully developed the faults of his qualities - 
obstinacy, vanity, a sort of prickly originality, 
and a quick impatience of contradiction. 
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The Federation emerged from the split weakened both 
financially and intellectually, but its members consciously 
closed ranks behind Hyndman. John Burns echoed the thoughts 
of many when he said that Hyndman 'at least had shown some 
sincerity for socialist principles by advocating them at 
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street corners on sixty-six consectutive Sundays. '49 At 
least the party had gained homogeneity under an acknowledged 
leadership, which gave it the advantage over the Socialist 
League. Quelch later felt that the division had, in fact, 
been beneficial. 'It put those who were left on their mettle 
and made some of us active propagandists who but for this dis- 
agreeable event might never have become so. 
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Solidarity 
was certainly needed at this time. Morris's departure had 
sorely depleted the Federation's finances and Justice was, at 
that time, losing £10 per week. Fund-raising proved inadequate 
and the SDF had, therefore, to rely on voluntary labour to 
produce the paper. Harry Lee has recorded the remarkable 
loyalty and unstinting sacrifices of those volunteers who, for 
15 months, gave up their spare time to ensure publication of 
Justice. The difficulties under which they laboured meant an 
inevitable deterioration in the quality of the paper. As Lee 
remembered, 'Justice was, in fact, of more interest to active 
members of the SDF than even to sympathisers among the public 
to whom it should have made a special appeal. ' 
51 This fault 
remained, to hamper the SDF in its attempts to reach a wider 
audience. The paper was more a weekly magazine of Socialist 
theory and history than an agitator amongst and organiser of 
the workers; it tended to remote propagandist posturing, to 
internal debate, rather than addressing itself to the daily 
concerns of the workers whose attention it sought. Ten years 
later W. J. Nairn voiced a similar complaint. Justice, he 
said, is a 'Socialist paper written by Socialists for 
Socialists. There is very little in its columns to induce one 
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to continue buying it who is not a convinced Socialist'. 
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Unattractive in appearance, sterile and dogmatic in form, it 
failed to be a revolutionary newspaper. Yet the episode 
demonstrates the Federation's durability, the dedication of 
its members and, importantly, it signified the growth of a 
cadre of working-class members, based in the skilled trades of 
compositing and cabinet making. The departure of William 
Morris and his supporters was not as severe a blow as it might 
have been. 
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CHAPTER III. 
A LESSON IN STREET FIGHTING. 
Financial difficulties apart the SDF entered 1885 exuding an 
air of optimism. A Justice editorial was confident that members 
would 'live to see the reward for the work done. '1 The paper 
pointed to the spread of Socialist ideas which could 'be traced 
by a comparison of the subjects argued in workmen's clubs all over 
England in the past year with those discussed two or three years 
ago. '2 The point was valid. After an effective and controversiae 
intervention at the 'Industrial Remuneration Conference' John 
Burns lost his job, a testimony to the dangers involved in 
Socialist agitation in these early days. But at the heart of 
the Federation's activity was its campaign for the unemployed, 
and here it demonstrated a surer grasp of reality than 
in other 
areas . As Justice emphasised, 
... to tell starving men that the 
land is theirs, helps 
them no better than to assure them that the moon 
is at 
their disposal for the asking.... What presses more... 
is the immediate employment, at sufficient wages, of 
men who demand work and justice, not charity and 
3 
patronage. 
The work of the Clerkenwell branch 
is indicative of the 
efforts made. It distributed leaflets at 
lodging houses, 
workhouses, coffee stalls, dock and factory gates, 
churches 
and charity kitchens; organised nightly meetings of 
the unemp- 
loyed; conducted a census to determine the 
true figures of 
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unemployment. At a London demonstration in February, Hyndman 
accused the government of murder and threatened that if it 
didn't act now 'it would be their last chance for the workers 
would have to take other means. '4 This veiled threat typified 
Hyndman's belief at this time that large demonstrations accom- 
panied by threats of violence would force reform, and alarm was 
certainly stirred in some quarters . Lord Brabazon wrote to 
The Times warning of the SDF's increasing influence over 'the 
starving multitudes. ` 
Yet only a month later Harry Quelch, writing in Justice, 
demonstrated clearly the essential dichotomy of the Federation's 
philosophy. He argued forcibly that political activity was 
vital for Socialists, that they must stand for election to 
administrative and legislative bodies. To those who regarded 
such moves as opportunism he pointed out 'that any change, social 
or political, must necessarily help to break down the present 
system, and thereby help on the revolution. '5 Quelch's article 
prepared the way for an extraordinary conference in April which 
reinstated Clauses 1-6 and Clause 11 of the old Democratic 
Federation programme. Hyndman felt that 'with a political 
programme we develop into a party rather than a clique. '6 A 
dual strategy of mass extra-parliamentary agitation and electoral 
activity is not, of course, of itself contradictory. A 
conscious decision to pursue such a course could have increased 
SDF influence. Unfortunately the leadership was never sure which 
line to pursue, tending to ad hoc decisions as the situation 
arose. This confused the membership, leading to discontent on 
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both left and right of the party. Two events encapsulated the 
SDF's inherent weakness. 
The Dod Street free speech controversy demonstrated the 
real gains to be made from a single-issue campaign. Radical 
clubs and the Socialist League joined forces with the Federation 
J1 
in what became something of a cause celebre in the East End, 
culminating in a remarkably quick victory. Whilst the estab- 
lishment press was horrified at what The Times termed 'successful 
law-breaking', Reynolds' Newspaper celebrated a 'signal victory 
for free speech' and argued that 'The workers owe the Socialists 
a great debt for their courageous and public-spirited action. '7 
As a result the SDF enhanced its reputation in Radical working- 
class circles and increased its membership in the East End of 
London. Outside London too the Federation progressed, with new 
branches at Walsall, Oldham, and Pendlebury, and a second and 
third being added to the existing one in Nottingham. But at 
the end of the year, encouraged by Jonathan Taylor's election 
to the School Board in Sheffield and the success of the Salford 
branch in having four members elected onto the Guardians and 
one to the School Board, a definite political orientation was 
adopted with disastrous results. 
Superficially 1885 appeared a good year to test the 
political water. The new Reform Act had enfranchised many 
agricultural workers and more urban workers; the Gladstone 
administration had lost much of its prestige over the Irish 
question and the Egyptian war; Joseph Chamberlain led the Radical 
wing of the Liberal Party in revolt and Randolph Churchill 
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campaigned for the urban working-class vote under the banner 
of 'Tory Democracy'. Disowned though they were by their 
respective party leaders their activities emphasised 'the fact 
that the 1884 extensions of the electorate meant the end of 
the already moribund principle of government non-intervention 
in the economic sphere. '8 Hence Sir William Harcourt's famous 
phrase 'We are all Socialists now, and hence the SDF's decision 
to contest three constituencies in the general election. A 
party with less than 1,000 members could hardly hope to win a 
parliamentary seat, but Hyndman hoped to expose what he regarded 
as the lying and cheating of the Liberals, split their vote 
and bring the Radicals over to the Socialist camp. 
9 
In the 
long term this would leave a straight fight between Socialists 
and their real enemies, the Tories. 
Propagandist candidatures would prove very useful to the SDF 
in later years and could have done so here, as the performance of 
John Burns in Nottingham demonstrated. Nottingham, a party 
stronghold with three branches, had been 'nursed' by Burns for 
some time and he polled a very respectable 598 votes in the face 
of organised harassment and accusations that he was a Tory 
agent. 
10 
But in London the two constituencies chosen were the 
highly improbable ones of Hampstead and Kennington, where Jack 
Williams and John Fielding polled 27 and 32 votes respectively. 
These results exposed the Federation to ridicule but more import- 
antly Hyndman and Champion, acting independently of their 
executive, had obtained the funds for the contests from the 
Conservative Party via Maltman Barry, ex-Marxist and member of 
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the First International. Inevitably a storm of criticism was 
unleashed when this emerged. Some accused the SDF of cor- 
ruption, others attacked what they regarded as a gross tactical 
error. Fabian and Socialist League criticism was to be expected 
but even that staunch SDFer Jack Williams was moved to argue 
that 'We cannot trust the middle-class men of our movement any 
longer. '11 Membership slumped, some following C. L. Fitzgerald 
into the short-lived Socialist Union. Justice had to be 
reduced to four pages as subscriptions declined. The effect 
of this episode was, in Harry Lee's opinion, 'worse than that 
of the split which led to the formation of the Socialist League, 
for added to the loss of members was the feeling of depression 
among those who remained. ' 
12 
The SDF appeared to have des- 
troyed any advances made in the previous two years. 
Much of the ire directed at the party was aimed at its 
acceptance of 'Tory gold', a criticism which Tom Mann and 
others regarded as 'puritanical nonsense': in the pursuit of 
Socialism the source of funds was irrelevant. The strategy of 
voting Tory to split the Liberal Party could be similarly 
defended: O'Connor had advised Chartists to vote Tory to defeat 
the Whigs, there was a strong working-class Tory vote in 
Lancashire, and some Radicals had voted Tory in 1874 in disgust 
at Liberal resistance to trade-union legislation. Hyndman's 
and Champion's mistake lay not in taking the money but 
in using 
it to finance two patently hopeless contests. Such derisory 
results made the Federation a laughing-stock. As Engels 
remarked, the crux of the matter was the discrediting of the 
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Socialists 'in the eyes of the only class from which they can 
recruit adherents - i. e. the great Radical working mass. '13 
Harry Snell assessed the debacle quite simply: 'Whatever may 
be the ethical status of the transaction it was as deplorable 
an illustration of feeble strategy as political leaders had 
ever provided. ' 
14 Almost inevitably SDF strategy veered again. 
Increasingly effective in its unemployed agitation in 
London, the SDF called for a major demonstration in Trafalgar 
Square on Monday 8 February 1886. The police, alarmed at the 
size of the crowd and worried that heckling from members of the 
Fair Trade League15 would lead to disturbances, rerouted the 
demonstration to Hyde Park where they hoped to disperse the 
crowd more easily. But en route to the park a small section 
of the crowd, provoked by catcalling from the Reform Club and 
the Carlton Club on Pall Mall, smashed windows in the clubs and 
then looted shops in St. James' Street and Piccadilly. These 
events were magnified out of all proportion by the press as the 
'West End Riots', resulting in enormous publicity for the SDF. 
This was further boosted by the subsequent trial of Hyndman, 
Burns, Champion and Williams on charges of seditious conspiracy, 
a trial which Burns in particular used to great effect as a 
political platform. The four were acquitted and left the court 
with their reputations, and that of the SDF, greatly enhanced. 
Bax accurately assessed the situation when he said that 'the 
whole affair of the riots, from beginning to end, was a tremen- 
16 
dous achievement for Socialism, especially the S. D. F. ' 
Understandably these events, coming so soon after the election 
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fiasco, reinforced the apocalyptic bent of the Federation. 
On the day after the riots Hyndman and Champion gave an amazing 
interview to the Pall Mall Gazette, full of veiled threats to 
the Establishment. When asked what they would do if the 
government still refused to initiate relief works for the 
unemployed Hyndman replied: 'Probably we shall disappear for 
six months altogether and then you shall hear of us in a much 
more serious fashion.... One thing is certain... we dare not 
go back even if we would. ' Champion, heightening the melodrama, 
said that he knew 
two men who each might be guaranteed to kill Hyndman 
if he sells the cause.... We do not care for our 
lives, and when you find a band of resolute men who 
are willing to die in defence of their cause you may 
depend upon it this trouble will not soon be over- 
past.... 
17 
Hyndman was not alone in seeing the events of February 1886 as 
'The beginning of the great English Revolution of the Nineteenth 
Century. ' 18 
The 'riots' may have catapulted the Federation into the 
public eye but the steady 'slog' of local unemployed agitation 
was also beginning to produce results. The SDF demand for 
municipal and state aid was revolutionary and thus its deput- 
ations to government offices had little effect, but demands to 
the local authorities, particularly when they coincided with 
vestry and School Board elections, helped to expose the corruptio 
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of local government and pave the way for the Local Government 
Act of 1888. Church parades, an old Chartist practice, were 
also revived, culminating in a great procession to St. Paul's 
Cathedral on 27 February 1887. These were effective demonstr- 
ations 'in days when respectable citizens were expected to be 
seen attending the public worship of an officially Christian 
19 
God. ' 
This unemployed agitation coincided with the campaign for 
free speech in London, in which the Socialists combined with 
London Radicalism. They planned a major demonstration on the 
day of the Lord Mayor's Show in November 1886, an event ridiculed 
by Quelch as 'Bumble's Beanfeast' .0 When the authorities 
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banned both the unemployed march and a meeting in Trafalgar 
Square, surrounding the Square with 6,000 police, the SDF again 
scored a considerable propaganda success. John Ward and Tom 
Mann broke through the police lines to deliver speeches from 
the foot of Nelson's Column. Street politics seemed to be 
paying dividends, arousing interest outside the capital. An 
interested onlooker at Trafalgar Square was Ben Turner, a mill- 
worker from Huddersfield who had been sent to London by his 
fellow workers to report on the SDF agitation; he joined the 
SDF at the end of the year. In London itself the movement was 
growing apace. At the beginning of 1886 the metropolis had 
nine branches but by the end of the year it claimed 21. Batterse 
alone claimed 500 members 
21 
, and 
four clubs had been established. 
The Ipswich Free Press reported the London Radical Clubs as 
'saturated with Socialistic opinions* 122 and even 
Engels had to 
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admit that the SDF had developed 'a very powerful tail. 23 
Hyndman was euphoric and quite convinced that political 
action was after all of little value. 'It is the immediate 
duty of every Social-Democrat to neglect politics, ' he said; 
'we have much more chance of getting revolutionary political 
change through vehement social agitation, than we have of 
obtaining any great social change through mere political action. ' 
24 In Tunbridge Wells, Limehouse and Bermondsey the unemployed 
were taken on by the municipality for snow clearing and at the 
sewage works. Thus the local press talked of the SDF with 
respect. Quelch became a local celebrity in Bermondsey, dubbed 
'Quelch the Tyrant Queller' by the South London Press. 
25 
Equally important was an apparent breakthrough in Northumberland, 
where the miners went on strike for four months at the beginning 
of 1887. Old Radical and Chartist traditions lingered on in 
the Northumberland coalfield, where economic realities provided 
ready audiences for debates on economic theory. The miners' 
faith in an extension of the franchise as the solution to 
their problems had been rudely shaken by the performance of 
their M. P. s and in 1887 they voted against paying Burt's 
parliamentary salary. The area seemed ripe for SDF intervention. 
Jack Williams, Tom Mann and others travelled north and inter- 
vened very successfully in the strike, forming ten branches 
by the end of July. Elsewhere in the provinces, Salford, 
Bolton and Edinburgh branches were also flourishing, whilst 
Blackburn had stabilised after a series of crises. At the 
Annual Conference for 1887 48 branches were reported and at the 
end of the year Justice, now paying its way, was 
increased 
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THE UNEMPLOYED OF THE 
HOLBORN UNION 
WILL ASSEMBLE 
On Clerk8llwell Grtn, 
AT TWO O'CLOCK 
On Saturday, 1st January, 1887, 
And, under the direction of the 
Clerkenwell Branch, Social-Democratic Federation, 
WILL THEN 
larch to the Workhollso 
To Demand Relief. 
THE STARVING POOR OF OLD ENGLAND. 
TrM-'" Union Jack. " 
Let them brag until in the face they are black. And the hard-worked servants on the railway line, That over oceans they hold their sway, Of the Flag of Old England, the Union Jack, 
Who get little by the sweat of their brow. 
'Tis said that the labourer is worthy his hire, 
About which I've something to say, 'Tis said that it floats o'er the free, but it waves 
But of whom does he get it we'd like to enquire. 
Not of any mill-owner, or farmer, or squire. Over thousands of hard-worked ill-paid British Who grind down the poor of Old England I 
slaves, 
Who are driven to pauper and suicide graves, -Chorus. The starving poor of old England 
Old England's a dear native land in its way Cxoavý- 
'Tis th 
For those who have plenty of gold. 
e poor, the poor, the tun have to pay, The poor who are starvin ever da 
( They thieve all the land on the sides of the way. 
And hea u th ir ri h ld g y y, Who starve and die *on the Queen's highway, 
p p e c es unto ; 
i 'Tis dear to the rich, but too dear for the poor. The starving poor of Old England I When hunger stalks in at every door, 
There's the slaves of the needle and the staves of 
But not much longer these evils we'll endure, 
, the mine We the working-men of Old England I . postmen and sons of the plough. -Chorur. 
ü<; .. A HANDBILL WHICH SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. 
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once more to eight pages . Jonathan Taylor, a veteran of some 
30 years social and political agitation, could remember no 
movement in which the progress has been so rapid as the 
progress of the Social-Democratic Federation. ' 
26 
The culmination of almost two years of agitation around 
the issues of unemployment and free speech came in November 
1887, when the SDF was once more catapulted into the headlines 
on what came to be known as 'Bloody Sunday`. Sir Charles 
Warren, the Police Commissioner, had banned all public meetings 
in Trafalgar Square. To test that ban the Metropolitan 
Federation of Radical Clubs, backed by the SDF and the 
Socialist League, had called a demonstration against coercion in 
Ireland for 13 November. The events of that day are well-known. 
The authorities were well prepared, with 4,000 police and 600 
troops at their disposal; many of the contingents of demon- 
strators were intercepted before they even reached Trafalgar 
Square; over 200 people were treated in hospital and 150 
arrested, including John Burns. A week later a protest meeting 
in Hyde Park resulted in the death of Alfred Linnell and the 
largest funeral procession in London since that of the Duke 
of Wellington in 1852. Hyndman was convinced that revolution 
was imminent. 'Strength breeds strength and numbers encourage 
numbers more' , 
27 
he said. John Burns also thought initially 
that 'a revolutionary epoch has commenced we may ere long 
be face to face with revolution. 
28 
Yet 'Bloody Sunday', far from being the first battle of 
the revolution, was rather the end of the first phase of 
the 
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Socialist movement, the conclusion of its infancy. It 
destroyed for many the illusion that the revolution was just 
around the corner and demonstrated clearly the utter futility 
of insurrectionary methods. As William Morris realised, 
'Sir Charles Warren has given us a lesson in street-fighting. '29 
H. H. Champion had come to a similar conclusion a year earlier, 
arguing that 'the role of street fighting was over'30 because 
of the modern weaponry at the disposal of the state. Burns, 
his revolutionary ardour cooled, was forced to agree and Tom 
Mann had always doubted the possibility of violent revolution 
in England. There were those too who contrasted Hyndman's 
absence during the events of 'Bloody Sunday' with his vitriolic 
speeches. 
31 
His 'turnip bogey' had failed to intimidate the 
state into making concessions and it had deterred potential 
recruits. At the end of 1887 the SDF's huge expenditure of 
energy had failed to attract large numbers of new members; 
its influence had proved illusory, its support based on single 
issue campaigns, where all offers of assistance are welcome, 
rather than an acceptance of its Socialist philosophy. Once 
again the question of tactics became a burning issue within 
the party, Champion and Mann in particular questioning its 
strategy. Mann struck at the heart of the problem when he 
pleaded for consistency, 'asking our comrades not to preach 
32 
constitutionalism one half hour and oppose it the next. ' 
Their arguments with Hyndman highlighted the confused orient- 
ation of the SDF, and Mann's activities in the mid-1880s are a 
clear demonstration of the problems which this confusion caused 
in terms of organisation, particularly outside London. 
83. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
TO MAKE TWELVE O'CLOCK AT ELEVEN. 
After 1887 the worst of the depression was over and the numbers 
of unemployed decreased. The SDF, which had concentrated its 
agitation on this issue, was therefore forced to scale down its 
activities or risk anti-climax. As William Morris commented, 
ironically but pertinently, 'they must always be getting up 
some fresh excitement, or else making the thing stale and at 
last ridiculous; so that they are rather in the position of a 
hard-pressed manager of a theatre - what are they to do next? '1 
The party's failure to develop a consistent policy made this 
a pressing question, one which provoked a rupture between 
Hyndman and several leading party members, including H. H. 
Champion. 
Champion, one-time Hyndman loyalist and first secretary 
of the SDF, had taken a leading role in the unemployed campaigns 
and at the time of the West End riots was much impressed by 
insurrectionary possibilities. The events of 1886 and 1887 
had convinced him of the power of the state and led him to seek 
a more practical policy. In May 1887 he started a monthly 
paper, Common Sense, which advocated the formation of a Labour 
Party by strengthening the independent forces within the Labour 
Electoral Committee, an organisation established by the TUC 
in 
1886. Champion attacked the 'vacillating tactics and absence 
of definite policy' of the SDF2 and emphasised the enormity of 
the gap between the party's ambition of 'overthrowing class 
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domination' and its meagre membership. Like Engels he urged 
the subordination of Socialist consciousness to the immediate 
struggles of the workers; Socialists should demonstrate to the 
working class how self-activity could be translated into progress 
towards Socialism. The reaction from Hyndman and others to 
these arguments soon convinced Champion that there was little 
hope of the SDF coming to grips with reality. Herbert Burrows 
argued that the party was 'in danger of tending too much towards 
realism and too little towards idealism'. The eight-hour bill, 
adult suffrage and the like were not the Social Revolution and 
'time spent on them as isolated parts of a programme is so much 
time taken from the vastly more important work of making people 
3 Social-Democrats by teaching them Social-Democracy' . As 
A. P. Hazell succintly remarked, 'Virtue is its own reward'. 
4 
A belief in the righteousness of their cause and in the inevit- 
ability of revolution led automatically to the view that 
activities along the lines advocated by Champion, building 
bridges to the working class, were a waste of time. Yet Champions 
was not an isolated voice. John L. Mahon was concentrating his 
efforts on the Northumbrian coalfield; John Burns, rapidly 
moderating his views, was building a base in Battersea; most 
significantly Tom Mann was also becoming disenchanted with SDF 
orientation. His career in the late 1880s demonstrates clearly 
his differences with the leadership, but it also provides a 
very necessary counter-balance to the picture of SDF success 
propagated through conference reports and the pages of Justice 
in those years. Equally importantly, it counteracts the 
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tendency to examine the SDF through the distorting lens of the 
activities and opinions of its leadership. 
Mann had crossed swords with Hyndman soon after joining 
the Federation, when he had urged cooperation with the trade 
unions. As he later recalled, this brought Hyndman to his feet 
in a rage. 'What were these precious unions? By whom were 
they led? By the most stodgy-brained, dull-witted, and slow- 
going time-servers in the country. '5 Mann agreed with Hyndman's 
indictment of the craft unions, but he could not understand his 
dismissal of trade union work; the increasingly uttered assum- 
ption that all trade unionists were alike would, he realised, 
alienate them from the SDF. The key to trade-union work, as 
Mann saw it, was the propaganda for the eight-hour day, a 
measure to benefit all which wouldbreak down the barriers between 
skilled and unskilled workers, reduce unemployment and give the 
working class increased leisure time. This demand was in the 
SDF programme, but it was paid little more than lip-service. 
Interestingly enough, when Mann raised the issue at a Battersea 
branch meeting it was belittled by none other than John Burns. 
Tom ploughed a lonely furrow, organising an Eight Hour 
League in Battersea and issuing his first pamphlet, What a 
compulsory eight-hour working day means to the workers. The 
Federation ignored the pamphlet, provoking him into retaliation. 
'Surely one should not have to appeal in vain to brother 
Socialists for co-operation in a measure of this kind'6, he 
wrote in Justice, but his appeal fell on deaf ears. Harry 
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Quelch and others were busy organising drill instructions as a 
means of disciplining their members on the unemployed marches, 
and they saw no reason to expend their energy on what they 
regarded as a lost cause. Even when the official party line 
softened somewhat in 1887 in response to increasing support for 
the eight-hour day no serious effort was made to involve the 
Federation as an organisation, and the party seemed oblivious 
to the rising tide of discontent within the TUC. The struggle 
for the eight-hour day would become increasingly important in 
the Labour movement, the touchstone of new unionism, enshrined 
as TUC policy in 1890 and proposed as a solution to unemployment. 
It would turn Liberal trade unionists into trade union collect- 
ivists. Yet the SDF's leaders regarded the campaign as a 
diversion from the struggle for Socialism; the flexible attitude 
of 1884 had hardened into a lofty contempt for the unions which 
disillusioned militants like Mann. During the whirlwind months 
of 1886 and 1887 his doubts were pushed to the back of his 
mind, but as the frenetic activity of the unemployed demon- 
strations subsided they resurfaced. 
Superficially the Northumbrian campaign had been one of 
the SDF success stories of 1887, with 10 branches being 
reported at that year's conference and 18 at the beginning of 
1888. Mann's energy and capability as an organiser were un- 
doubtedly responsible for much of this success. His Memoirs 
record the hard grind of a Socialist agitator in this period. 
In London he rose at 5 a. m. to be at work for 6: - 
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Every weekend I was busy on propaganda work, 
usually speaking three times on the Sunday - 
twice in the open air and once indoors. Often 
the round would be near the Bricklayer's Arms, 
Old Kent Road, at 11 a. m; Victoria Park in the 
East End, 3.30 p. m; and indoors at some branch 
meeting or other public gathering in the evening, 
rarely reaching home before 11 p. m; to be up at 
5 next morning.? 
At Newcastle in May 1887 he was addressing as many as 11 
meetings a week, three on Sundays and then around the pit 
villages during the week. A perusal of branch reports in 
Justice indicates a similar punishing routine for other 
activists but such enthusiasm can only be sustained by success, 
and by the end of the year Mann was rather disillusioned by 
events in the North-East. 
Once the miners' strike was over the task was one of 
consolidation and in Newcastle Mann was quite successful in 
this task. He caused a local sensation by organising a series 
of church parades, which persuaded the council to provide 
some employment and to take up his suggestion of tree planting 
on Town Moor. He established a branch which had three members 
elected to the Newcastle School Board at the beginning of 1889. 
But outside Newcastle the branches quickly withered as the 
miners returned to work; Ashington branch, for example, began 
with 150 members but eventually collapsed. One reason for 
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this was that many members were unemployed and could not 
afford subscriptions; others were forced to leave the area 
in search of work. The abiding lesson, however, was that 
single-issue campaigns bred momentary success but did not 
generate long-term recruitment. Local organisers of any 
ability were hard to come by and the party nationally could 
not afford to subsidise full-time organisers. Thus Tom Mann 
was forced to seek employment, and was twice victimised for his 
political activities. Harry Lee later remembered how Mann had 
been forced to sell his books and other belongings in order to 
survive. 
8 
Local difficulties, though, were only part of the 
story. The national leadership of the SDF provided very little 
support for Mann in what should have been seen as a key area 
for expansion; there were even accusations that Mann was a 
paid agitator living off the movement, 
9 
and he rapidly became 
disenchanted with the internal wranglings which retarded the 
movement's progress. In despair he asked Burns, 
Do you think the S. D. F. as an organisation will ever 
develop to considerable proportions? I confess it 
looks horribly slow work. I can't see much headway 
that's been made the last eighteen months as an 
organisation.... Men will not pay to an inactive 
organisation.... Justice will not sell, no matter 
10 how skilfully its handled.... ' 
Eventually Tom left Newcastle for Bolton at the invitation 
of a branch greatly stimulated by the recent engineers' strike. 
He was offered a newsagents' and tobacconists' shop to finance 
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his activities as branch organiser and again he achieved 
amazing initial results Within three months Bolton branch 
membership rose from 50 to 170, and his work in Blackburn, 
Darwen and surrounding districts was similarly successful. 
Blackburn, the earliest of the Lancashire branches, provides a 
typical example of a provincial branch in the 1880s. Founded 
during the weavers' strike in 1884 with an initial membership 
of 60, by 1887 it struggled to exist, boasting only six members. 
These faced overwhelming difficulties; as one later recalled, 
'any visiting speaker used to take farewell of his family; there 
was a strong possibility he would be brought home in a shuttle', 
because in 1888 
the few socialists of Blackburn were routed Sunday 
after Sunday from the Market Place. An organised 
gang of roughs headed by an ex-police sergeant had 
to give both speakers and what few members were there 
a taste of "Lancashire heels.? tH 
Mann's visits stabilised the branch so that it 'became 
respected where they formerly had to be constantly ready for 
fisticuff work', 
12 
and Justice reported in May 1889, after a 
successful demonstration, 'that the S. D. F. had regained on a 
much more extended scale all the pristine vigour of its early 
days'. 13 
Prospects then seemed rosy in industrial Lancashire, widely 
regarded as a Tory working-class citadel. In many cases Tory 
votes were cast purely in opposition to their Liberal 
factory 
92. 
masters and Mann reported 'a number of Tories prepared to go to 
14 
any lengths on labour questions'. An early convert of his 
was Charles Glyde, later an eminent Bradford Socialist and 
town councillor. Glyde remembered Tom's speeches as 'marvels 
of eloquence and power' which drew huge crowds to the Town Hall 
Steps in Bolton. This led to police charges of obstruction and 
a free speech campaign which was won 'hands down... they dared 
not prosecute him, he never received a summons; he vindicated 
and won the right of public meetings on the Town Hall Steps-' 
15 
Bolton branch seemingly flourished; its hall was open every 
night, it had a Shelley debating society with 30 members, a 
stores for tea, drapery and clothing and a co-operative 
workshop. Yet, as in the North-East, appearances were deceptive 
and Mann again grew disillusioned. 
The tobacco shop failed to pay its way, whilst the branch 
suffered internal dissensions parallelling those at a national 
level. When, for example, Mann provided one member with some 
literature concerning the National Labour Electoral Association 
he was castigated for acting to the detriment of the SDF; when 
sales of Justice fellhis shop bore the loss and therefore Tom 
handed responsibility for the paper to the branch committee, 
suggesting they order less - this was taken in London as a 
sign of animosity to the party. Mann was similarly depressed 
by the Manchester branch: - 'there is no branch there worth 
speaking about except to condemn it', he wrote to Burns. 
The Manchester branch is illustrative of the difficulties 
involved in creating an accurate picture of SDF fortunes. The 
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pages of Justice suggest a very active branch under the tutelage 
of J. Hunter Watts, ceaseless propaganda helping to form new 
branches at Bury and Pendleton, to revive that at Oldham, and 
to carry the message into Derbyshire. In September 1888 Watts 
was reporting the largest meetings ever. 
16 
But Mann painted 
a very different picture: - 
Watts seemed to think it desirable to work with a few 
young bundle handkerchief men who really don't care a 
damn for Socialism or any other ism except what may 
tickle them for a wee while. I am determined not to 
work with such riffraff. I'll see the whole thing in 
blazes rather than be a more street corner cheap jack 
17 
and entertain a few insignificant nothings.... ' 
The truth of the matter probably lay between the two. 
An analysis of branch subscriptions shows that Manchester had 
only ten paying members that year, far less then its reports 
to Justice would indicate. In common with many other branches 
a few members were carrying the bulk of the work and Mann was 
undoubtedly unfair to decry their efforts. The problem was, and 
is with many revolutionary organisations operating in unpromising 
circumstances, that the activity became self-justificatory, the 
party a way of life, the members inward looking. Mann's 
reference to Watts as 'a mere street corner cheap Jack' indicates 
his view of SDF policy at that time. To a man active in his 
union, attending international trade union conferences and 
propounding the eight-hour day, the mere propagandising of the 
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Federation seemed sterile. He refused to attend the annual 
conference in 1888, yet at that conference differences came to 
a head. 
The clashes tended to be between the provincial delegates 
and those from London, although the former were weakened by the 
fact that few branches could afford to send delegates to a 
London conference. Some asked a London member to represent them 
but even then fewer than half the party's branches had delegates. 
This partly explains the London domination of the Federation, 
to remedy which a delegate council had replaced the executive 
council in 1887. Southwark branch now proposed to reinstate 
the executive, arguing that a delegate council was ineffective, 
particularly in an emergency. The provinces protested loudly, 
complaining of a lack of democracy, with Tanner of Birmingham 
arguing that 'it was impossible for an executive council of 
London men to know what would best apply to the provinces', 
18 
a salient comment in the light of Mann's experiences. Tanner 
argued in vain, and he did so again when a resolution was 
carried forbidding parliamentary candidatures unless they were 
as 'definitely avowed Social-Democrats with the consent of the 
parliamentary committee' . 
19 
Local autonomy was not to be 
permitted. Hyndman and his supporters should have heeded Lee's 
report to the Conference, which provided salutary listening. 
Membership and the number of branches had declined, the problem 
being that 'there is wanting that nucleus of a few speakers 
and 
organisers in each town which is absolutely necessary 
to keep 
a good branch afloat' . 
20 William Morris had recognised this at 
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the time of his defection, commenting on 'the founding of 
branches which melt away into mere names. '21 Only where full- 
time organisers were in the field could continuity be guaran- 
teed and the SDF could not afford to employ them. Many areas 
relied on visiting speakers, hence the exhausting itinerary 
of many prominent members, and increasingly there were complaints 
in Justice of speakers failing to turn up. Branches where 
capable local leaders emerged - Burns in Battersea, George 
Tabbron in Salford, Tanner in Birmingham - were the exception 
not the rule. Lee optimistically closed his report with these 
words: - `It is the men and women who remain with and do the 
everyday routine work of the organisation... who will carry on 
the Social-Democratic movement in the face of all difficulties 
and dangers. '22 The problem was that Mann, Champion and others 
were beginning to doubt whether the results of their efforts 
were worthwhile. 
A gesture was made to the opposition at the beginning of 
September when the SDF issued a Parliamentary Manifesto in 
favour of 'direct political and parliamentary action' but, as 
ever, there was a sting in the tail. Only candidates who 
supported the class war were to be supported; Liberals and 
Radicals were anathema, worse enemies of the Socialists even 
than the Tories . And there was no repudiation of 
violence 
As another Birmingham member, Haddon, commented, the manifesto 
was contradictory and therefore ineffective. Either they should 
wait for the conversion of a majority to Socialism or they 
should organise along the lines suggested by Champion. 
This 
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was now impossible. Hyndman had openly attacked Champion in 
Justice, accusing him of consorting with 'unscrupulous 
intriguers', a reference to Maltman Barry, and questioning 
whether he was 'a fit and proper person to sit on the committees 
of the S. D. F. ' 
23 
Although censured by the General Council for 
using the party paper 'to circulate a one-sided expression of 
personal opinion'24 Hyndman was undaunted and, supported by 
the new executive, continued his attacks on Champion. He con- 
demned him for 'disgraceful trafficking with a notorious agent 
of reaction', and in November Champion was expelled from the 
SDF. These events demonstrated Hyndman's quasi-dictatorial 
control of the party at this time and his virtual dismissal 
of events outside London. 
Burns and Mann remained in the Federation a while longer 
but eventually they too drifted away. As Tsuzuki has commented, 
this meant 'that the men who were later to come to the fore in 
both industrial and political leadership of the working class 
25 
were initially hostile to Hyndman and hence the SDF. ' 
Meanwhile the party was increasingly isolated, membership 
declined and sales of Justice slumped; the Pall Mall Gazette 
referred to the 'stagnation' of the Socialist movement. 
26 
Hyndman responded, almost inevitably, with a further change of 
orientation but this time he espoused a more practical policy 
which seemingly offered some hopes of success. 
In 1888 Hyndman wrote A Commune for London which, 
in spite 
of Fabian claims to the contrary, was the first argument 
for 
municipal Socialism. He again concentrated on London, the 
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economic and political centre of England, which he envisaged 
leading the way to Socialism. His main demands were for annual 
election by adult suffrage to all offices and for the 
Metropolitan police to be directly accountable to the people. 
Hyndman also argued for giving the new corporation power to 
provide public works for the unemployed, a network of social 
services and to employ direct labour. This concentration on 
municipal politics was emphasised by Herbert Burrows: 'The 
Socialism of the future will be the Socialism of the municipality 
and it is in this direction that our most strenuous efforts 
should be made. '27 The Fabians and the ILP were not, therefore, 
the sole proponents of the municipal Socialist cause and the 
SDF repeatedly returned to the theme. William Morris and 
Belfort Bax in 189328 praised municipal enterprise as a means 
of decentralising control and offsetting the trend towards 
bureaucracy. Ten years later Theodore Rothstein listed the 
advantages of municipal enterprise as being a deterrent to 
monopoly, a source of revenue for public use, a practical 
demonstration of the advantages of public ownership and a 
training ground for Socialists. The difference between the 
Fabians and the ILP on the one hand and the SDF on the other 
was one of emphasis. Whereas the former saw municipalisation 
as part of a wider, gradualist parliamentary road to Socialism, 
which did not require the abolition of capitalism, the 
SDF 
treated it as a transitional programme, a stepping stone 
to 
the ultimate goal of control over the means of production, 
distribution and exchange. Nonetheless, concluded 
Rothstein, 
the local authorities could be used as a source of 
'democratic 
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and non-capitalist power against the State' . 
29 
The new pragmatism found further expression with the 
formation of a Central Democratic Committee for the London 
School Board elections in November, the SDF joining forces with 
the Metropolitan Radical Federation, the London Secular Society 
and the Fabians. Of seven SDF candidates three were elected 
and thus heartened the party prepared for elections to the new 
London County Council, issuing a list of 14 points to be put 
to all candidates and standing four of its own. Burns was 
elected by a majority of 800 over his nearest opponent, a result 
greeted with rapture. 'England is at last on the move', 
exulted Justice, for the SDF now had representatives on the 
London County Council, the London School Board, on the Tottenham 
and Newcastle School Boards and on Walsall Municipal Council. 
30 
The euphoria was again rather premature. John Burns was 
not a typical SDFer and the other Federation candidates had 
polled poorly. Progressive Radicalism had re-emerged as a 
political force in 1889 after its heavy defeats by the Tories 
in 1885 and 1886. Stung by this a London Liberal and Radical 
Union had been founded in 1887, backed by The Star, which 
campaigned for a new and progressive Liberalism. The real 
lesson of the 1889 election, says Paul Thompson, was that 'the 
Progressives, by standing on a thoroughly radical programme, 
had been able totake the wind out of the Socialist sails. '31 
The SDF strategy of detaching Radicals from the Liberal Party 
was far from realisation, although the party's propaganda had 
obviously made some impact on the capital in the 1880s. 
99. 
Nonetheless, municipal Socialism was the new 'enthusiasm' 
of the Social-Democratic Federation, ironically so in view of the 
calumny heaped upon Champion. Both Hyndman and Bax accused him 
of trying 'to make twelve o'clock at eleven' 
32 
by intriguing 
with Tories to bring about reforms in his own day, Hyndman 
conveniently forgetting his own role in the 'Tory gold' affair. 
Yet it seemed that Hyndman himself was becoming sceptical of 
arriving at 'twelve o'clock', the inevitability of which he had 
proclaimed for a decade. At the end of 1888 the revolutionary 
rhetoric had given way, albeit temporarily, to a more pragmatic 
approach which promised more tangible gains. Hyndman had long 
heralded 1889 as the year of revolution; the events of that 
year would provide the SDF with a much more favourable environ- 
ment in which to operate. 
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CHAPTER V. 
A TINY CARAVAN OF MISSIONARIES. 
Although the SDF began 1889 in financial difficulties, with 
Justice once more limited to four pages, Hyndman was typically 
optimistic of success. Yet, in a year which saw the greatest 
explosion of working-class unrest for fifty years, the 
Federation failed to make the progress which he anticipated. 
It remained a small grouping isolated from the mainstream of 
the Labour movement. Why was the party unable to take advant- 
age of the undoubted opportunities of that year? 
Early in 1889 Hyndman called upon the party to work for 
the election of SDF Members of Parliament, but Herbert Burrows 
emerged from a London aggregate in May to report continued 
differences of opinion over the question of political activity. 
Burrows argued that it was preferable for an Eight-Hour Bill 
to be postponed rather than elect to Parliament its non- 
Socialist supporters, men who would then proceed to vote for 
anti-Socialist legislation. He still saw the SDF's task as 
one of education, of the formation of public opinion in 
readiness for the coming revolution. 'Get as many of our 
palliatives as we can', he said, 'but do not accept them when 
mixed up with anti-Socialist measures which will simply 
neutralise them'. 
' 
The London meeting had decided to heckle 
any candidate who did not support the class war and advocated 
a policy of abstention in any constituency with a strong SDF 
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presence, a policy which could only work to the advantage of 
the Tories. Burrows supported municipal, as opposed to 
national, electoral activity, an argument with some force in 
view of the vagaries of the franchise arrangements, and he 
claimed the support of the majority of London members for this 
point of view. 
A similar ambiguity existed in the Federation's 
relationship with the international movement. Hyndman had 
always been antagonistic towards the German Socialist Party, 
which he accused of attempting to dominate its weaker counter- 
parts. The SDF policy was that national parties should adopt 
their own tactics according to the circumstances in their own 
country. In 1888 the Federation urged support, somewhat 
surprisingly in the light of its antipathy towards trade 
unionism, for an International Conference on the Eight-Hour 
Day, called by the TUC and the French Possibilists. This 
position ignored the exclusion of the German Socialists from 
the Conference, justified on the grounds that they were not 
bona fide trade unionists. The dispute carried over into 
1889, when two rival congresses were planned in Paris. One, 
the International Socialist Labour Congress, was convened by 
the Marxists and was open to all Socialist and working-class 
representatives - it became the founding conference of the 
Second International. The other, 'Possibilist', International 
Workers Congress had been decided upon by the London conference 
the year before and its terms of reference would exclude many 
Marxists. Divisions amongst French Socialists were largely 
responsible for this situation, 
2 but the events surrounding 
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the congresses also demonstrated clearly the petty squabbles 
which plagued the British Socialists and Hyndman's erratic 
leadership. 
Hyndman associated himself with the Possibilists, 
essentially because of his personal animosity towards the 
German Socialists, Engels and the Avelings, yet they were 
engaged in the self-same parliamentary manoeuvring which he 
had repeatedly condemned in Broadhurst, Burt and other English 
trade union leaders. He thus prevented a united British 
delegation to Paris, for Mann, Champion and even Keir Hardie 
were attending the Marxist conference 'to stand out against 
Broadhurst and Co. and show that not all the English workers 
are at the tail of these gentlemen. '3 The upshot was an unseemly 
public dispute between Hyndman and Engels which only served to 
discredit the Socialists. 
4 
Eventually 15 SDF branches were 
represented at the Possibilist congress, 
5 
and they were instru- 
mental in preventing the suggested amalgamation of the two con- 
ferences. John Burns, who was eligible to attend both, hit at 
the crux of the matter: 
The most amusing, nay villainous part of this business 
was that the objections to fusion came not from men... 
who represented vast organisations, but from men like 
Hyndman, sent by 28 persons, and by Burrows, who was 
so doubtful of the bona fides of the Clerkenwell 
branch of the SDF as to get a double-barrelled man- 
date from some other people who knew nothing of 
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Socialism and if they did would have sent someone else. 
6 
Burns himself eventually attended the Marxist congress. Even 
more ironically the Marxists declared the Eight-Hour Day the 
most important item on their agenda and called for inter- 
national demonstrations in its support on May Day 1890, whilst 
the SDF, attending the rival congress, had consistently 
questioned the relevance of such a demand. The election of 
William Morris as the British representative on the International 
Executive of the Second International, when the Socialist 
League was on the point of collapse, merely emphasised the 
confusion which epitomised the whole episode. 
The intrigues of the International Socialist movement had 
only a minimal impact upon the mass of British workers, but 
the rising tide of labour unrest which culminated in the 
great dock strike of 1889 was far more significant, both for 
the British working class and for the SDF. The Federation 
had 'won its spurs' during the Bryant and May's match girls 
strike the previous year, the work of Herbert Burrows in 
particular earning the plaudits of onlookers. 
7 
When Will 
Thorne, a member of the Canning Town branch of the SDF, took 
the lead in the formation of the National Union of Gas Workers 
and General Labourers early in 1889 things looked even more 
promising. The union won the Eight-Hour Day in the London 
Gasworks without resort to a strike and Thorrbewas overwhelmingly 
elected as its first General Secretary. Another SDF member, 
Lewis Lyons, was organising successfully amongst the clothing 
workers of the East End and had established a considerable 
reputation for his part in the 'anti-sweating' agitation. 
8 
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Yet these three had worked very much on their own initiative, 
with little organised SDF intervention, although Justice did 
publicise the campaigns once they were underway. The walk-out 
of labourers at the South-West India Dock on 12 August pre- 
cipitated a chain of events which demonstrated very clearly the 
failure of the party leadership to recognise the significance 
of these labour upheavals. 
The events of the dock strike have been amply documented. 
To echo Yvonne Kapp, 'Its immortalisation rests too secure, 
and in better hands, to justify an account here of this 
triumphant action by the most desperate, dehumanised and insecure 
of all workers. '9 The sheer self-sacrifice and unending work 
of many SDF members cannot be denied, whether it be Quelch on 
the South Side, lesser known members such as Harris of Canning 
Town and Thornton of Deptford, or the two members of the 
Battersea branch victimised for their agitation. 
10 
But as an 
organisation the Federation never proclaimed whole-hearted 
support for the strike. 'Petty gains are of little value', 
11 
said one editorial, and 'A strike is only guerilla warfare for 
very small results' 
12 
advised another. Such comments could 
perhaps have been glossed over given the work of individual party 
members, but once the strike was ended Justice launched its 
attack. 'Was such a ridiculous mockery of success worth a 
month's starvation and misery? ' demanded the paper as H. W. 
l3 
Hobart lectured the dockers on the 'Errors of the Strike. 
' 
The flood of dockers and other workers into the Dock, Wharf and 
Riverside Labourers' Union should have been answer enough, 
but 
the SDF failed to differentiate between this 'new unionism' 
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and the old. In so doing it abdicated political leadership 
and reverted to an essentially barren propagandism. 'Better 
we shall never see the fruit of our labour than... reap it at 
the cost of principle. Again we proclaim the Class War, raise 
the Red Flag on high and shout for the Social Revolution'14 
was Justice's negative comment on the dock strike. It attacked 
Burns and Mann for refusing to allow the Red Flag at the dock 
gates and on demonstrations which, as Engels later remarked, 
'would have ruined the whole movement and, instead of gaining 
over the dockers, would have driven them back into the arms 
of the Capitalists. ' 
15 
Engels recognised that from the 
experience of struggle workers could develop Socialist ideas, 
and he pointed out that they had chosen openly declared 
Socialists as their leaders. 'Undoubtedly the East Enders have 
committed colossal blunders', he said, but 'so have their pre- 
decessors, and so do the doctrinaire Socialists who pooh-pooh 
them. 16 An even sadder indictment of Hyndman and the party 
leadership is that the Radical press also assessed the importance 
of this mass movement far more accurately than they. As 
Reynolds' Newspaper commented: 
Every movement that tends to the increase of the 
knowledge of the masses as to their rights is a 
democratic agency that works upwards to the ideal. 
This great strike is one of those movements, and the 17 
most important that has been seen in the generation. 
The dock strike completed the alienation of Burns 
from the SDF 
and deterred Tom Mann from any further work with the party, 
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although he never formally resigned. The real tragedy was that 
the Federation had been in a position if not to influence the 
course of events then at least to march with them. At the 
beginning of the year it had been awarded the accolade of 'the 
most vital social movement of the day', 
18 
and praised 'for 
having forced public opinion on some of the chief topics of the 
day. ' 
19 Its members were bombarded with requests to as$, i st 
in the organisation of the brickmakers, barmen, postmen, bakers, 
tramwaymen and others for, it was said, most of the credit 
for advances in London trade unionism was 'due in great measure 
to the unremitting exertions of the members of the Social 
Democratic Federation. '20 If the Socialist propaganda had not 
created a mass party it had made 
the unskilled labourers of London and other places 
tL conscious of their state of degrcdation... the 
numbers of meetings conducted by Socialists which 
have taken place every week for the last eight or 
ten years ... have been the real education which 
has 
led up to the demand for a more decent and comfort- 
able style of living. 
21 
Yet the SDF had achieved this position almost by default. 
22 
Quelch, organising the South Side Labour Protection League, 
and Jack Williams his National Federation of Labour Unions23 
were succeeding in spite of rather than because of 
SDF policy. 
At its 1889 Conference, hard on the heels of the successful 
gasworkers' campaign for the Eight-Hour Day and shortly 
before 
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the dockers' epic battle, the party had adopted a nine- 
point programme which failed to mention trade unionism. Six 
executive committees were appointed to oversee every aspect 
of the SDF's activities, but industry was omitted. Others 
would take up the mantle which Hyndman and the SDF rejected. 
The SDF's history in the 1880s has been examined in detail 
because during those years the party developed modes of thought 
and action which help to explain much of its later history. 
At the close of the decade membership was stagnant and leading 
figures disillusioned; the Federation seemingly justified 
Pelling's dismissal as 'a weedy growth'. However, a concent- 
ration on its mistakes must be tempered by some recognition of 
its achievements . 
Throughout the 1880s the Social-Democratic Federation 
was an extremely small organisation, P. A. Watmough estimating 
an average paying membership of 580, the bulk of which was 
concentrated in London. 
24 
This figure is probably a con- 
servative estimate, but in any event would give a false impres- 
sion of the Federation's influence during this period. 
25 Some 
branches failed to pay their dues regularly and others failed 
to pay at all; some deliberately underestimated their member- 
ship in an attempt to build up branch finances. 
26 
Financial 
membership of any political organisation is, in truth, only the 
tip of the iceberg in reflecting the total support for or 
influence of those organisations. The SDF's financial problems 
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were acute throughout this period and individual branches must 
have been hard pressed to make ends meet, hence the apparent 
falsification of dues by many. Moreover many of the members 
were attracted during the unemployed agitation, the Federation's 
major battle during the 1880s. Annie Besant, commenting on 
the Deptford branch in 1888, pointed out that the members were 
'mostly of the very poor; I should say fully one half of them 
are men who are out of work each winter. '27 Another observer, 
this time in Clerkenwell, remembered 'a poor lot... a sort of 
gathering of down and outs'. 
28 
These would not have been able 
to pay regular, if any, dues and many would have been transient 
members, enrolling during the excitement of a free speech battle 
or unemployed demonstration and falling away as activity died 
down. Such a phenomenon is common to all revolutionary organis- 
ations, indeed to all political parties, but the point is that 
considerable numbers of people did come into contact with the 
SDF and Socialist ideas. Engels later estimated that 100,000 
had passed through the SDF ranks in its first decade, a not 
unreasonable conjecture. 
29 
A concentration on paying member- 
ship ignores the extensive periphery developed by the Federation, 
which attracted very large crowds to its demonstrations. 
If the bulk of the membership was either transitory or 
peripheral the backbone of the party was of a very different 
character. The middle-class leadership, devoting both time 
and money to the cause, has often been remarked upon, but by 
the end of the decade a hard-core of artisan members had devel- 
oped, very similar to that prominent in London and provincial 
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Radicalism. Many were outstanding representatives of that 
autodidactic tradition commented upon by Maclntyre, 
30 
men 
such as Harry Quelch, Tom Mann and Jack Williams. Typical of 
the austere approach of these members was their choice of meeting 
place, often a coffee bar or hired rooms. Although the SDF did 
not accept the view that temperance was the cure for social 
evil it frequently railed against the evils of alcohol and often 
questioned the advisability of meeting in public houses. 
31 
The quality of membership was as important as the numbers 
recruited in these early years, for the Socialists were operating 
in a uniformly hostile environment: 
The Socialist had no money for either organisation 
or ammunition; he had no Press, no approving public, 
and he could not meet his opponent on equal terms 
.... He was accused of advocating sex, anarchy and 
free love, and outraged piety gathered up its skirts 
when he passed. He was the Ishmael of the smug 
Victorian world. 
32 
Members were victimised and ostracised, calumnied and mocked; 
small wonder then that many fell by the wayside. 
Yet the SDF had had high hopes of moving 'the masses'. 
Justice reverberated with calls to 'awaken', 'activate', 
'educate' and 'inspire' them. Fired by a belief in the 
inevitability of Socialism, many were deeply disappointed at 
their failure to reach the hearts and minds of the public. 
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William Morris bemoaned 'The frightful ignorance and want of 
impressibility of the average English workman'. 
33 
Tom Mann was 
similarly discouraged: 
Many would come along with the remark that "they had 
some concern for constitutional procedure", or they 
feared "society might be unhinged", or "we must give 
the employers a chance", or "I reckon something ought 
to be done but I belong to the Liberal Party". Yet 
many of these men would not be getting more than 
twenty-two shillings a week. 
34 
Repeated reactions such as these could turn despair into rage 
and, in the case of Harry Quelch, a near contempt for the 
mentality of the ordinary worker. His Literary Remains exhibit 
an air of gloomy antagonism towards 'the bone-headed working 
man' which erupted on occasions, as when he called on 'the 
people to come out of their bug-hutches and slums and fight 
for Socialism' 9 
35 
only to be assaulted by a member of the crowd. 
Quelch took from Hyndman this tone of arrogance, which 
was often portrayed in Justice. The Federation appeared to 
preach at the workers, to exhibit an air of pessimism which 
was further exaggerated by Hyndman's inflexibility. NeverthelesS 
to take this as typical of SDF attitudes is unfair. Annie 
Besant thought that 'none save those who worked with them knew 
how much of real nobility, of heroic self-sacrifice, of constant 
self-denial, of brotherly affection, there is among the 
Social -Democrats '. 
36 
Mann's efforts in Newcastle, Bolton and 
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London were typical of many, their lapses into despair therefore 
the more understandable. Had their 'heroic self-sacrifice' 
achieved nothing? 
Pelling's view of the Social-Democratic Federation as 'a 
stage army' in the 18EOs is representative of most historians. 
The economic depression and the schism in the Liberal Party 
had provided an opportunity for growth which it had failed to 
grasp. Given that revolution was not a realistic proposition 
during this period the party, through its own mistakes, minimised 
its impact. Four accusations are commonly levelled at the SDF. 
First, that Hyndman's leadership and idiosyncratic personal 
views were a hindrance to its success. Secondly, that it 
attempted to impose an alien creed, Marxism, on the English 
working-class. It is charged with being hostile to the trade 
unions and, finally, with exhibiting an ambiguous attitude 
towards politics which confused its audience. Are these 
arguments valid? 
Hyndman's autocratic leadership of the Federation undoubt- 
edly created discord within its ranks. Morris, Champion, Burns, 
Mann and others left rather than submit to what they regarded 
as dictatorship. But, if his anti-Semitic and jingo utterances 
alienated the party's internationalists, they can hardly be 
blamed for the SDF's failure to attract a wider membership. 
In the heyday of imperialism his nationalist conception of 
Socialism, his calls for a big navy, and his vision of England 
leading the way to Socialism were as likely to attract as repel 
would-be recruits. Robert Blatchford held similar views yet 
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attracted thousands of Socialists to his Clarion movement. 
Of far more significance was his almost proprietorial control 
of the party, his intolerance of debate. At a time when 
Socialist theory was still being formulated, when debate was 
essential, Hyndman narrowed the avenues open to the party. 
His inflexibility left dissidents with limited options but it 
should be noted that Morris and his supporters were in a position 
to overcome Hyndmanite domination at the end of 1884 but failed 
to grasp the opportunity. In seceding from the SDF they ensured 
Hyndman's pre-eminence and must therefore share any blame for 
the party's future direction. Morris, Bax and Eleanor Marx 
could have done a great deal to counteract Hyndman's attitude 
to the unions, his jingoistic tendencies, and they could un- 
doubtedly have tempered the somewhat sterile nature of his 
Marxism. 
The SDF's Marxism has long been a subject of controversy. 
As the pioneer Marxist organisation in Britain the Federation 
confronted the problems faced by all pioneers in their attempts 
to break new ground. There were few Marxist texts available; 
indeed, a list of Socialist literature for workers in Justice 
at the end of 1884 contained no Marx! It was, therefore, the 
Federation's task to interpret Marxism for the class they were 
aiming to reach, and Hyndman's efforts in this field were 
invaluable. His Historic Basis of Socialism, his collaborations 
with Morris, the Socialist Catechism of Joynes and the 
serialisations of The Communist Manifesto and Wage, 
Labour 
and Capital in Justice first brought Marx, hitherto read only 
by the erudite few, to a wider British audience. 
Furthermore, 
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the SDF's emphasis on the class war was not alien to a working 
population faced by economic depression; it was implicit in the 
daily struggles of men such as Ben Tillett, Tom Mann, Jack 
Williams and John Burns. Stanley Pierson37 has argued that the 
Federation attempted to adapt Marxism to indigenous patterns 
of thought and certainly, in its early years, the party referred 
as often to Bronterre O'Brien as to Karl Marx. A student of 
Justice cannot fail to notice the distinct similarity between 
much of the propaganda and the ideas characteristic of revolut- 
ionary Owenism of the mid-1830s. There is the same opposition 
to separate action by individual trade unions as opposed to one 
vast amalgamation of labour. Many working-class SDF members 
held to Owen's ideas that workers must 'own their own factories' 
38 
rather than they be administered by officials of the community 
at large. And above all there is the same faith in the proximity 
of a sudden and inevitable revolution. As Paul Thompson has 
demonstrated, London Socialists, rooted in the secular materi- 
alist tradition, found far more affinity with Marxism than with 
the later ethical Socialism of the ILP. 
39 
The arguable failure 
of the Social-Democratic Federation in the 1880s cannot, there- 
fore, be blamed on an attempt to impose 'a sour creed, imported 
from abroad' . What can be said 
is that the party's own 
interpretation of Marx was, in some areas, suspect. 
Engels was quick to point out that the SDF 'managed to 
transform our theory into the rigid dogma of an orthodox 
sect' . 
40 
The writings of Marx and Engels were not 
intended to 
become a doctrine; they were a critique, providing a theory and 
a guide to action. Their theory was developed 
in response to 
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specific challenges and situations, and the whole point of the 
dialectic was that things develop in the course of conflict, 
during the class struggle. But, to echo Henry Collins, the 
SDF 'had the tendency to repeat and the reluctance to 
develop' . 
41 
The very title of Joynes's Socialist Catechism 
suggests a body of established truth to be learned rather than 
abasisfor further development. This pamphlet, for many 
British Socialists their first introduction to Marxism, had at 
its heart the notion of the 'iron law of wages', which Marx 
had long since repudiated. Critics of the SDF, however, ignore 
the fact that exponents of Marxism had themselves but limited 
access to the works of Marx. His earlier philosophical and 
historical works, the Grundrisse for example, were unavailable. 
In a sense Collins is unfair to condemn the Federation, whose 
problem was that its message was not getting through. It was 
therefore forced to repeat and sloganise. Limited to the 
materialist conception of history and believing that Marx 
guaranteed the ultimate triumph of Socialism, many justified 
their abstention from certain areas of working-class activity 
on the grounds that they were irrelevant, that history could 
not be rushed. In the words of Stephen Yeo, 
It was a matter 
Prepare for it" 
context, it was 
beliefs and asp 
to pawn them to 
of "The 
not how 
just as 
irations 
pay for 
Social Revolution and How to 
to manufacture it. In that 
well to hold to one's central 
religiously: there was no need 
the revolution. 
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This was particularly true of the party's attitude to the 
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trade unions. 
The SDF manifesto of 1884 accused the unions of class 
collaboration, of aiming to improve the position of the 
favoured few affiliated to the TUC at the expense of the masses. 
This was a valid accusation and the Federation, attempting to 
present an alternative to the two major parties, was correct 
to expose the elitist nature of the TUC. The party's attitude 
is even more understandable when one considers the nature of 
trade unionism in London, the SDF stronghold in the 1880s and 
early 1890s. Its unstable population and characteristic small- 
scale sweated trades made it, according to Ben Tillett, 'the 
ever great problem... the sphinx of Labour'. Although from 
1860 through to the late 1880s London trade unionism was com- 
paratively strong in terms of numbers compared to the rest of 
the country, the point was that it was dominated by the junta, 
the leaders of the craft unions. During periods of recession 
these craft unions were very often all that remained. Hyndman 
and other SDFers objected to their anti-political outlook, the 
view that trade unions as units should not take part in politics, 
coupled with the almost slavish adherence to Liberalism of 
their leaders. After 1889 the upsurge of new unionism left 
London much weaker in relation to the provinces, but by this 
time the SDF suspicion of the unions had hardened into a 
general belief in their uselessness. Adherence to the 'iron 
law of wages' led to the supposition that unions could in no 
way affect their level of wages under existing capitalist 
conditions. It followed therefore that strikes were ineffective 
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and pointless, 'a lowering of the flag, a departure from 
active propaganda and a waste 
43 
of energy'. SDF members were 
encouraged to explain to their fellow union members that strike 
pay would be better spent on Socialist propaganda. Thus, 
despite the initiatives of individual members, there was no 
organised intervention in the major struggles of 1889. 
Hyndman could have learned a lesson from Engels, who was 
enthusiastic about such events because they were genuine 
workers' movements. Engels believed that the limited fight 
for better wages and hours would develop into a wider movement 
for political power. Observing the SDF's failure to comprehend 
this, he remarked in 1891 that 
the people who, more or less, have the correct 
theory as to the dogmatic side of it, become a 
mere sect because they cannot conceive that living 
theory of action, of working with the working class 
at every possible stage of its development, other- 
wise than as a collection of dogmas... recited like 
a formula or a Catholic prayer. 
44 
The SDF's narrow and dogmatic interpretation of Marxism led it 
to withdraw from the arena most likely to yield success and 
lost it valuable members in the shape of Burns, Mann and 
Champion. It should be noted though that Quelch, Williams 
and other active trade unionists remained loyal to Hyndman. 
A concentration on the unemployed, whom even Hyndman admitted 
could not make a revolution, was a valuable propaganda exercise 
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in the short term but a tactical error which restricted the 
Federation to a marginal role in the Labour movement, propagan- 
dising from the outside. 
A similar confusion existed in the political sphere. 
Preaching class war and declaring the imminence of the revolution 
the SDF expended a considerable amount of energy on electoral 
campaigns. Even as they chided the unions for fighting for 
improved wages and conditions the leadership advanced a pro- 
gramme of palliatives to be achieved through parliamentary action 
The result was dissension on both left and right of the party. 
Yet the Federation's policy, if clearly thought out, was a 
viable one. A combination of palliatives and revolutionary 
propaganda was a practical mix and parliamentary elections 
were an invaluable platform for propaganda. The pure pro- 
pagandists of the Socialist League were utopian in outlook. 
How many have to be converted before Socialism becomes a 
possibility? The problem was that SDF policy was not con- 
sciously thought out and inconsistency was the byword. Hyndman 
tended to see revolution around every corner and veered from 
one extreme to the other with the ebbs and flows of the 
movement. In their defence it must be emphasised that the early 
Socialists were, in a sense, working 'blind'; there were no 
precedents to guide them. Motivated by an almost messianic 
belief in the inevitability of revolution, the condition of 
capitalism in the mid 1880s led them to believe that the 
revolution was close at hand. The revolutionary hyperbole of 
1886-87 and Hyndman's reiterated faith in 1889 as the year 
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of Socialist triumph thus become understandable. Harder to 
excuse are the Federation's tactical errors. The running of 
candidates in hopeless constituencies left the party open to 
ridicule, whilst the concentration of their fire upon the 
Liberals rather than the Tories, the instructions to members to 
vote Tory where there was no SDF candidate, simply antagonised 
most enfranchised working men. They saw advanced Radicalism 
as their most fertile recruiting ground, 
45 
yet simultaneously 
alienated those they hoped to attract. In regarding the defeat 
of Liberalism as an essential prerequisite of Socialist advance 
the SDF was not unique. It continued the Chartist tradition 
that the Whigs were the real enemies who had to be swept out of 
the way and both the Clarion movement and the ILP would voice 
similar policies. 
46 
The Liberal Party was seen as a fraud, 
blinding the workers to the realities of capitalism, whereas 
the Tories were open and obvious class enemies. Defeat 
Liberalism, went the argument, and one would then face a 
straight fight with the Tories, Capitalism versus Socialism. 
Theoretically arguable this was politically disastrous. Working 
with the Radicals and presenting themselves as the advanced 
fighters for the working class, as at the time of the free 
speech agitation, allowed the SDF to argue its case and expose 
the deficiencies of Radicalism. By attacking the Radicals 
the SDF simply alienated the majority of Liberal working men. 
Deficient in its Marxism, inconsistent in its policies, 
hostile to the trade unions, the SDF failed to build mass 
support within the working class during the 1880s. Many of 
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its failures are explicable or at least understandable, but in 
retrospect better leadership could have made the party more 
influential. Hyndman has long been seen as the stumbling block 
to SDF progress and undoubtedly his personal characteristics 
alienated many. Tom Bell thought him 'a vain, egotistical old 
peacock', 
47 
but to emphasise his faults is to ignore the very 
valuable role he performed in these pioneering days. As Tom 
Mann recalled, 
The tall hat, the frock coat and the long beard 
often drew the curious-minded, who would not have 
spent time listening to one in workman's attire 
.... It was no small matter to know that in our 
advocacy of the principles we had learned to love, 
which on so many occasions brought forth stinging 
criticisms from the Press, Hyndman's ability to 
state the case comprehensively, logically and 
argumentatively was at our disposal, and was of very 
great value indeed. 
48 
Mann, no supporter of Hyndman's, was convinced that 'he did 
much valuable work at the particular time when that special 
work was needed', 
49 
whilst George Lansbury's biographer has 
pointed out that no-one 'had the direct effect on his mind that 
Hyndman had'. 50 He provided the introduction to Socialism 
for 
many in the 1880s and thereafter. 
Against heavy odds and in spite of its own errors 
the 
Social-Democratic Federation had established a small but 
durable 
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presence. It had formed an effective organisation in the newly 
settled working-class districts of London such as Battersea, 
Peckham and Wandsworth, and had maintained and stabilised a base 
in Lancashire. Its leadership of the unemployed had won the 
respect of many; its free speech campaigns had culminated in 
several important victories; it had taken the lead in pressing 
for free school meals. Such propaganda had brought thousands 
into contact with Socialist ideas, and it was no accident that 
many of the leading protagonists of new unionism were either 
members of or had passed through the SDF. If the Federation 
had not mobilised working-class opinion towards Socialism it 
had turned many minds towards a broad-based working-class 
movement. 'In more senses than one the early work of the 
Federation lies at the root of the whole Socialist expansion 
of the years which were to come'. 
51 
Mistakes were inevitable, 
given that the movement was in its infancy, but the SDF had 
survived. It entered the 1890s as 'a tiny caravan of 
missionaries struggling through a quagmire of theoretical and 
practical difficulties'. 
52 
These difficulties persisted and 
the debate over strategy continued, but during the next decade 
the Social-Democratic Federation emerged as a viable Socialist 
party, with particularly strong roots in the East End of London, 
in Lancashire, and in provincial centres such as Reading and 
Northampton. At the turn of the century, however, it was 
confronted with a new dilemma. The emergence of a trade-union 
based Labour Party posed new problems for the SDF. 
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PART II. 
REFORM OR REVOLUTION? 
128. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The emergence of the SDF in the 1880s had coincided with the 
bleakest years of the depression in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. This depression, allied to chronic over- 
crowding in London and harsh winters, seemed to fulfil the 
Socialist prophecy that the final crisis of capitalism was 
imminent and it fuelled the apocalyptic bent of the SDF in the 
mid 1880s. Consequently the Federation operated in a manner 
which approximated most closely to the conventional stereotype. 
It developed a strategy of campaigns outside the sphere of 
trade unionism, based on the unemployed, and an apparently 
enthusiastic response strengthened still further the SDF's 
shortened timescale of revolution. However, as Gareth Stedman 
Jones has pointedout, 
I 
the crowds attending Socialist rallies 
were not industrial workers but the casual poor and they were 
motivated not by Socialism but by need; their violence was 
fuelled not by revolutionary theory but by desperation. The 
SDF faced fundamental problems in building a Socialist movement 
upon such a base, whilst a city like London posed severe problems 
in itself. 2 Furthermore the Federations very limited penetration 
of the provinces narrowed its perspective considerably. 
As the upheavals of these years subsided the SDF began to 
address itself to the question of strategy. The years 1888 and 
1889 were ones of debate within the party, a debate coloured 
by personal animosities but nonetheless genuinely democratic, 
for the SDF was far from being the rigid, monolithic organisation 
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often depicted. Burrows argued for municipal politics, 
Hyndman for parliamentary candidatures, and Tom Mann proposed 
an alternative, trade union orientated policy. The issues 
were argued out in the branches and in the columns of Justice, 
only for the SDF to find itself overtaken by the events of 
1889 on the London docks. Consequently the Federation had to 
respond to a new situation. 
The success of the dock strike gave a great impetus to 
trade unionism throughout the country. Many of today's unions 
were founded between 1888 and 1892, as were many Trades Councils, 
and 'Even the oldest and most autocratic Unions were affected 
by the revivalist fervour of the new leaders . The SDF could 
'3 
no longer ignore the unions. Indeed, many of the characteristics 
of new unionism stemmed from the party's militants who were 
active in the movement. During the 1890s the relationship 
between the Social-Democratic Federation and the trade unions 
was a hotly contested issue, and three distinct groupings 
emerged. The anti-union proponents argued that trade unions 
were a distraction from Socialist agitation and that they 
signified an implicit recognition of capitalism. Although they 
gradually lost support within the party prior to 1897 their 
abusive tone tended to dominate the pages of Justice and thus 
give a somewhat distorted picture of SDF policy during this 
vital decade. Moreover, they had the support of Hyndman, the 
most visible presence in the Federation. Events towards the 
end of the decade saw a resurgence of their influence, with 
far-reaching implications for the SDF. A 'centrist' group 
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emerged around the influential figures of Quelch, Burrows and 
Hobart, active union members themselves and also Socialists well 
versed in the writings of Marx and Engels. Quelch, as editor 
of Justice, did his utmost to counter the anti-union or 
'impossibilist' attack. He argued that trade unions contained 
at least something of the principles of collectivism and were 
useful educational agencies. However, at best, the unions 
made capitalism a little more tolerable, and the task of the 
SDF was to raise the battle to a political level. This 
'orthodox-Marxist' position, as it has been termed, 
4 
would 
eventually triumph as the Federation's leadership soughtdesper- 
ately to maintain party unity in the early years of the twentieth 
century. The supporters of trade unions took up their analysis 
where the 'orthodox-Marxists' left off. They argued that the 
unions should be the first focus of attention for Socialists 
because they embodied many Socialist principles in their daily 
activities. The SDF should not merely wait for the revolution 
but work actively both to promote it and achieve reforms. 
Supporters of this strategy were particularly influential in 
Lancashire, where traditional working-class Conservatism gave 
them a political space in which to operate and where their 
experiences on the industrial front taught them the value of 
close links with the unions. 
These divisions within the Social-Democratic Federation 
were not rigid, nor clearly defined. The Quelch group moved 
closer to the pro-unionists in the mid 1890s, leading the SDF 
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to its first official pronouncement on trade union policy in 
1897 and into the Labour Representation Committee in 1900. 
Yet union defeats, both on the industrial front and in the 
courts, led to a resurgence of anti-union sentiment, to the 
possibility of a schism in the party and thus to a reversal of 
policy. Leading SDFers cannot be categorised simplistically 
into these tendencies. Hyndman was consistently opposed to 
trade unions yet he faced heavy and sustained criticism from 
others in the anti-union camp, the so-called 'impossibilists'. 
/ Theodore Rothstein was a leading left-wing oppon. nt of Hyndman, 
but he strongly supported union activity and was implacably 
hostile to the 'impossibilists'. Together with Ernest Belfort 
Bax he strove to create a Marxist synthesis of industrial and 
political activity which would expand SDF influence within the 
Labour movement. Nonetheless, the identification of these 
three tendencies within the Federation does much to explain its 
activities and policies in this period, and it emphasises the 
fact that the SDF was a democratic party, a decentralised 
organisation with considerable branch autonomy. This counter- 
vails the prevailing stereotype, but it could be argued that 
the resulting absence of a coherent and consistent policy was 
a source of confusion both to members and to those whom the 
SDF hoped to influence. 
The explosion of trade union membership in the early 
1890s lent tremendous weight to the movement for working-class 
independence in politics. The strikes of this period 
demonstrated to many Liberal workers that Liberal employers 
132. 
were no better than any other. These same employers prevented 
local Liberal caucuses from adopting working-class parliamentary 
candidates. Such experiences led to an alliance of Socialist 
ideas with a mass movement, and a consequent mushrooming of 
political activity, particularly in the North of England. As 
a result the SDF found itself with a competitor on the left 
when, in 1893, the Independent Labour Party was formed, pre- 
senting an alternative 'ethical' Socialism to the Marxism of 
the S DF . 
It would be a mistake to view the ILP as a direct rival 
to the SDF, particularly in the early years. The ILP was 
more 'an extension of the Socialist movement into new geo- 
graphical areas', 
5 
areas which the SDF had been unable to reach 
for financial and organisational reasons. Where the two did 
co-exist it is easy to forget, in the light of later events, that 
the SDF was in fact instrumental in the formation of many local 
Independent Labour Party branches before the ILP adopted a 
national organisation. The vitriolic disputes between the 
leaders of the two parties disguise the considerable co-operation 
which existed at local level, extending to dual membership and 
joint organisation. The tendency to view the SDF as sectarian 
ignores the fact that it was the ILP leadership, responding to 
electoral failure in 1895 and the TUC's blunting of Socialist 
influence in the same year, which moved towards the politics of 
pragmatism and the progressive alliance and away from a 
joint 
Socialist 
policy. A consequent rank and file revolt 
led to the 
development 
of a serious alternative to ILP policy, 
the 'one 
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Socialist Party' or Socialist Unity option. This was given 
considerable momentum by the propaganda of Robert Blatchford 
and the Clarion and led to Socialist unity talks, which broke 
down largely because Hardie and Glasier of the ILP feared that 
fusion with the SDF would jeopardise their chances of a trade 
union alliance. Thus the question of Socialist unity overlaps 
that of the attitude of the SDF towards trade unionism, parti- 
cularly as the strongest support within the SDF for both trade 
unions and Socialist unity came from Lancashire, an area where 
both the Federation and the ILP were strong. 
The 'Labourist' tradition has pushed the Socialist unity 
campaigns to the margins of history in the same way that it has 
relegated the SDF to the status of a sect. Yet the history of 
the Labour movement in London and Lancashire suggests that the 
ILP was not necessarily the 'natural' vehicle for British 
Socialism, whilst the votes cast for Harry Quelch at Dewsbury 
in 1902 and for Edward Hartley at East Bradford in 1906, both 
standing in very unfavourable circumstances, showed that the 
SDF could poll well outside its strongholds. The Dewsbury 
branch of the SDF highlights the vagaries of Socialist history. 
It was one of the few branches to establish a durable presence 
in Yorkshire, and its career suggests that if the Federation had 
been able to propagandise in the county prior to the formation 
of the ILP it might well have been more successful. The 
Dewsbury by-election campaign in 1902 encapsulates the SDF 
experience in the late 1890s and early twentieth century. It 
demonstrated both a deep-seated enthusiasm for Socialism as 
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opposed to the Labour Alliance and the possibilities of a 
Socialist unity strategy. Conversely it was illustrative of 
the sharpening tension within the movement, for Quelch's 
candidature divided the labour forces both locally and nationally 
and widened the gulf between the SDF and the ILP. The by-electio 
highlighted the dilemma of the SDF in trying to define its 
role outside the LRC and exacerbated divisions within the party 
between its reformist and revolutionary wings. The mid and 
late 1890s were in many ways the high-water mark of the SDF's 
history but events at a national level, the emergence of the 
Labour Representation Committee, signalled its ultimate 
decline . 
135. 
NOTES . 
1. G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London, (1984). 
2. Ibid., p. 346. 
3. S. and B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, (1912 
edition) , p. 393. 
4. V. Rabinovitch, 'British Marxist Socialism and Trade 
Unionism: The Attitudes, Experiences and Activities of 
the Social-Democratic Federation 1884-1901', Unpublished 
D. Phil. Sussex, 1977. Rabinovitch uses the term 'orthodox- 
Marxist' to describe the group around Quelch, and I am 
indebted to his work for clarifying some of my own ideas 
in this area. 
5. Ibid., p. 22 . 
136. 
CHAPTER VI. 
THE S. D. F. AND THE TRADE UNIONS. 
The Social-Democratic Federation, although an avowedly Marxist 
party, placed considerable emphasis on its line of descent 
from English thought, partly to counteract what Hyndman and 
others saw as the undue influence of the German party on the 
International Socialist movement. Ernest. Jones, Robert Owen, 
I 
and Bronterre O'Brien were all singled out as mentors by the 
SDF, and R. P. B. Frost pointed out that the term 'social- 
democrat' was first used in the Poor Man's Guardian of 1834, 
some thirty years before its German usage. 
2 This attempt to 
nurture a specifically British identity was given further weight 
by the scarcity of English translations of Marxist texts. 
When Socialism Made Plain was published by the Federation none 
of the works of Marx or Engels was then available in English. 
Repeated appeals to Engels proved fruitless and eventually the 
SDF published Wage, Labour and Capital, the first ten chapters 
of Capital, and the Poverty of Philosophy, without his 
authorisation. Thrown back on their own resources the SDF 
published some 40 pamphlets prior to 1901, allied to theoretical 
articles in Justice and, of course, the longer works of Hyndman, 
Bax and others. Thus a distinctive, if somewhat idiosyncratic, 
Social-Democratic ideological framework was to emerge. The 
SDF did not simply purvey a stereotyped Marxist dogma; 
it 
adopted Marxism as a tool of analysis. On the question of trade 
unions, however, the tool was somewhat limited. This 
fact, 
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allied to the desire of Hyndman and others not to appear slavish 
devotees of Marx, meant a confused and somewhat hesitant 
approach to the trade unions. As late as 1906 Harry Quelch 
was emphasising the Federation's debt to 'the glorious old 
physical-force Chartists' who, he said, had recognised the 
dangers of 'mere organisation as a wage-slave'. Thus, 'in 
this matter of trade unionism and its probable results to the 
wage-slaves as a class, the Chartists saw much further than 
the great German theorist'. 
3 
The Marxist texts available to the Federation had, in 
fact, little to say about trade unions, and Marx and Engels 
had a distinctly pessimistic view of their role in the 
development of Socialism. Wage Labour and Capital, which was 
translated by J. L. Joynes and serialised in Justice in late 
1884, concentrated on the wage minimum which insisted that 
wages equalled the basic cost of existence and production and 
seldom rose above it. Trade unions could not have a substantial 
economic or social influence on the activities of capital nor 
on the extent to which capital determined the level of living 
standards. This analysis, slightly modified, remained remark- 
ably consistent through the years. The first volume of Capital 
was partially translated in Today, beginning in October 1885, 
with the authorised English edition appearing in 1887. Marx's 
most sophisticated economic text stated very clearly that 
unions could exercise at best a marginal influence on wages 
and working conditions, although it did allow scope 
for positive 
union activity in certain specific situations such as periods 
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of rapid economic expansion when labour was in demand. However, 
the overall message was unmistakeable: only the contradictions 
inherent in the capitalist system, aided by political action, 
could lead to Socialism. This analysis provided the European 
Marxists of the Second International with a common set of 
assumptions about the increasing immiseration of the working- 
class, the inexorable growth of capital, and the consequent 
weaknesses of trade unions. It was not modified by the 
Communist Manifesto, serialised in Justice in 1888, although 
the Manifesto did provide some positive insights. Unions were 
seen as building organisation and solidarity, but the real 
gains were to be made on the political not the economic front. 
These three works help to explain the attitude of the 
SDF towards trade unionism in the 1880s, and they provided a 
basic framework of SDF analysis for most of its history, but 
it is during its first decade that the Federation came closest 
to the anti-ution stereotype. The party was formed at a time 
of apparent union weakness and apathy, when the old-style 
unions with their emphasis on friendly benefits and negotiation 
still held sway, and when their leaders were strongly anti- 
Socialist. It was formed in and centred on London, where the 
unions were relatively weak. SDF strategy therefore con- 
centrated on campaigns in other spheres and, prior to 1888, 
the unions were discussed only in general terms and usually 
critically. Tom Mann was, of course, one exception and 
his 
activities in Lancashire, where Trade Unions were relatively 
strong, enabled SDF expansion. But generally unions were seen 
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as an aristocracy of labour, an obstacle to Socialism, whilst 
strikes were self-defeating, playing into the hands of the 
capitalists. 
4 
Yet even in this early period there was no 
consistent official line. Whilst Hyndman could argue that 
all unions 'have ceased to be advantageous in their present 
shape'5, other members urged workers to join unions and 
W. Jones, of the London Trades Council, suggested that 'Trade 
Unions are good in every possible way' .6A generally critical 
tone did prevail though, as the SDF attacked the slow growth 
of union membership and their failure to organise the unskilled. 
In the heady months of 1886 and 1887 trade unions seemed 
irrelevant to the struggle for Socialism. The French, German 
and American parties reached much the same conclusion, although 
of course the unions in those countries operated under far 
severer restrictions than those in Britain. Even Engels com- 
mented that 'They form an aristocracy among the working class; 
they have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a relatively 
? 
comfortable position, and they accept it as final'. Convinced 
of the imminence of revolution, aware of Marx's strictures 
upon trade unionism, the SDF assigned little importance to the 
industrial front in the mid 1880s. Emphasising as they did 
their line of descent from earlier English Socialists they 
would perhaps have echoed Ernest Jones' comment that 'All 
trade unions are lamentable fallacies, whether they embrace 
1,000 or 1,000,000. All co-operative efforts are a waste, 
misdirection of time, means and energy under our present 
governmental system. ' 
$ 
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Given such views it is hardly surprising that the SDF's 
antipathy was reciprocated by union leaders such as Howell 
and Burt. They regarded the SDF as mischievous agitators, 
fundamentally opposed to trade unionism, and acting with 
Tory backing, a view which the 'Tory Gold' scandal did little 
to dispel. By early 1888 however, as the unemployed agitation 
subsided due to state repression and an improving economy, 
the SDF was forced to reconsider its strategy. Both traditional 
political methods and the industrial organisation of the workers 
began to receive closer attention. James Blackwell commented 
that 'There is no reason why Trade Unionists, who have shown 
the way in organisation, should not be the vanguard in 
settling the unemployed question and establishing Social- 
Democracy. ' 
9 
Tom Mann was firmly orientated towards organisation at 
the workplace, and with other SDFers who were active in their 
unions he vigorously promoted the Eight-Hour Day. He formed 
an Eight-Hour League which was exceedingly influential amongst 
London unions. The Eight-Hour Day had been one of the 
palliatives advanced in Socialism Made Plain and Hyndman had 
been responsible for pushing it as a means of improving workers' 
health and giving them increased leisure time for education. 
However, he and his supporters doubted the value of existing 
unions in promoting such a measure and objected to 
Mann's 
concentration on a single issue, which they saw as a 
diversion 
from the primary task of promoting Socialism-10 
'Why bother 
about catching a sprat where the same expenditure of 
time 
will hook a mackerel? ' 
11 
asked A. P. Hazell of the London 
Compositors. Nonetheless, as the debate continued the pro- 
unionists were gaining strength, encouraged by growing union 
support for the Eight Hours Movement. As Reynolds' Newspaper 
commented, 'Successes such as these in so short a time ought 
to stimulate the Social-Democratic Federation to further 
experiments in the field of practical politics'. 
12 
Certainly the pages of Justice showed an increasing concern 
with labour matters. The paper was enlarged to eight pages at 
the end of 1887 and incorporated a full page of labour notes 
edited by H. W. Hobart. In the provinces SDFers were active 
on the Birmingham Trades Council and the Newcastle Trades 
Council, and Tom Mann was sent north to organise around the 
miners' strike. 
13 
Yet the uncertainty remained. Hobart was 
undoubtedly a militant trade unionist but he had little time 
for minor gains through protracted disputes. Hyndman was still 
firmly opposed to trade unions and, when he replaced Quelch 
as editor of Justice in the summer of 1889, the paper reverted 
to its earlier sniping tone: 
... if one half the money spent... for strikes were 
used consciously to further the cause of Socialism 
the gains... would be infinitely greater and more 
permanent. A rise of wages can, under existing 
' 
circumstances, only be temporary. 
Hyndman's pre-eminence in the SDF meant that most trade unionists 
would have accepted his views as party orthodoxy. They would 
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not have noticed the internal debate continuing in Justice 
and the branches, a debate given renewed stimulus by the dock 
strike. 
During the strike the Federation was supportive, and 
individual members extremely active, but the strike's con- 
clusion unleashed a flood of criticism. Much of this was of 
a personal nature. Many members deeply resented the prominence 
given to Burns, Mann, and Champion when the East London branches 
had spent four years propagandising the dockland. According 
to Annie Besant, Burns and others were 'gathering the fruits 
of the hard work done at the dockgates in the... early winter 
mornings by Burrows, Williams and other members. ' 
15 
The 
leaders of the strike disclaimed their connection with Socialism 
even though they were reaping the benefits of years of 
Socialist agitation. Their actions seemed to prove that a 
concentration on trade unions meant an abandonment of Socialism. 
Consequently there were frequent references to these 'traitors' 
and Jim Connell was moved to write The Red Flag, symbolising 
both the hopes and the fears of the early British Socialists. 
These personal animosities blinded the SDF to the importance 
of the strike, 
16 but they could not ignore the wave of new 
unionism which succeeded it. Whilst their Marxist texts gave 
no clear answers as to the role of trade unions, the growth 
of their membership at least provided a mass audience for the 
propagandising of Socialist ideas. Thus a detailed debate 
ensued in the 1890s, leading to the emergence of three 
tendencies within the party. 
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Hyndman's anti-trade union viewpoint was straightforward. 
The result of the dockers' victory would simply be cost- 
inflation; wage rises would only lead to rent and other price 
increases. Even if the new unions managed to gain shorter 
working hours this would lead to the introduction of new 
machinery and the employment of fewer workers. Hyndman's 
supporters also stressed the unskilled unions' vulnerability 
to blacklegging, a key weapon in the employers' armoury. In 
other words any gains would be illusory and short-lived. If 
that was the case then a concentration on trade union work 
was self-defeating and a distraction from the main task of 
Socialist propaganda. It was 'a lowering of the flag, a 
departure from active propaganda, and a waste of energy' argued 
Thomas Fitzpatrick, 
17 
and Hazell thought that comrades who 
poured their energies into new unionism 'spent the greater 
part of their energies in vain' and would do better to form 
an SDF branch. 
18 
Hyndman summed up this argument by suggesting 
that 'the amount of energy and self-sacrifice expended upon 
even a successful strike would bring about ten times the result 
19 if devoted to political action. ' 
The ultimate thrust of this tendency was to point out 
that unions were, de facto, 'a recognition of capitalism and 
the right to exploit'. After all, most strikes were settled 
by arbitration and who were the arbitrators? 'Why, simply 
capitalists. ' 20 
The centrist or 'orthodox Marxist' viewpoint 
approximated to what Marx and Engels actually said about trade 
144. 
unions. Its leading proponents, Quelch, Burrows and Hobart, 
were all active in the new union movement. Burrows, immediately 
after the dock strike, commented that 'The new trade unionism 
is Socialist in its origin and it is based on that which, to 
the older trade unionists, had about it an ominous foreign 
sound, the "Solidarity of labour"'. 
21 
He equated the movement 
with 'a blind Samson, just recovering his strength. '22 Theirs 
was a cautious optimism and they saw limitations to the value 
of the new unions. These doubts were best expressed by Harry 
Quelch. He resumed the editorship of Justice in 1892, the 
termination of his stewardship of the South Side Labour 
Protection League reflecting his view that ultimately Socialist 
agitation must take precedence over union activity. In a 
pamphlet entitled Trade Unionism, Co-operation and Social- 
Democracy Quelch outlined the basic position of this group. 
Trade unionism, he argued, was apart from Socialism yet it 
contained 'something of the principle of collectivism'. It 
was the duty of every SDF member to belong to a union because 
they were useful educational bodies . 
It is chiefly... as an educational influence, as a 
means for sufficiently improving his position, as 
to make the workman discontented with that position, 
that trade-unionism is useful from a Social-Democratic 
point of view. 
23 
Quelch further admitted that the unions could achieve limited 
gains when trade was good, although he warned that for every 
step forward there was one step back. Ultimately though the 
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justification for unions was that they were 'a means for 
securing a weapon', for they represented the workers as a 
political force. What they had to do was to use the power 
which organisation gave them to seize control of the political 
machinery. Thus the political struggle susperseded the economic, 
for in the same pamphlet Quelch pointed out that during a strike 
'the want and suffering, the ruin and desolation are all on one 
side'. He confronted the same paradox as Marx and Engels: how 
could a class suffering economic defeat develop the conscious- 
ness necessary for political victory? Both Burrows and Hobart 
drew a clear distinction between union reformism and Socialism. 
Hobart, however, stressed the need for militancy at all times, 
for reforms could be won by aggressive tactics. The working 
class, he argued, could learn their lesson only through direct 
struggle. The Quelchites were groping their way towards a 
synthesis of political and industrial struggle, education and 
direct action, which, if adopted as a consistent policy, could 
have made the SDF a more potent force. 
The pro-union grouping within the SDF went one step 
further. They argued that the unions embodied Socialist 
principles in their day-to-day activities and should therefore 
be the prime focus of attention, because of their central role 
in the working-class struggle. Bax saw in the New Unions 
'the Socialist party in the becoming, the element which 
is 
being absorbed by Socialism'. He also pointed to the fate of 
utopian Socialism, where 'The working class movement as such 
went on without any obvious connection with the contemporary 
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theoretical speculations and utopian experiments'. 
24 
His 
underlying rationale was that unions could achieve significant 
reforms, and to simply wait and propagandise for the revolution 
was ridiculous. Another supporter of this tendency, Margaretta 
Hicks, put it thus: 'It is worse than waiting for Heaven. 
Unless we do... something now we shall all be dead and buried 
long before any improvement is made .... The Revolution will 
come when we have worked for it. '25 
The dividing line between the 'orthodox Marxists' and 
the pro-unionists was a very thin one and the distinction 
was often blurred. Essentially the supporters of Quelch feared 
that a concentration on trade union work would relegate the 
propagation of Socialism to a secondary role. Their position 
tended to waver with the ebb and flow of the industrial struggle, 
and they thus became a pivotal force within the party as it 
struggled towards a trade union policy during the 1890s. 
At the SDF Conference in 1890 H. W. Lee, the party 
secretary, complained that Socialism had been 'driven into the 
background', and the following year he warned against Social 
Democrats 'in any way forsaking the movement for trade 
unionism' 
26 
Another member emphasised that whilst the unions 
should be permeated with Socialism the SDF should not 
'sacrifice 
to mere trade organisation that energy and enthusiasm which 
ought to be devoted to the spread of Social Democracy'. 
27 
These reservations seemed justified by the economic 
downturn 
of the early 1890s and the decline in union membership. 
28 The 
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SDF resumed its unemployed agitation but, significantly, it did 
not attempt to bypass the trade union movement this time, 
arguing that success depended on co-operation between those in 
and out of work. The party also intervened in the miners' 
strike in the North East in 1892. Unfortunately, its failure 
to develop a coherent policy was again demonstrated by its 
continued insistence on the uselessness of strikes and the need 
for a social revolution. Meanwhile the anti-unionists were 
becoming increasingly vocal, asserting the need for a politically 
led Socialist revolution in the face of the growth of employers' 
federations and organised blacklegging. There was a heated 
clash at the SDF's 1894 Conference, where Hyndman fought against 
inviting the trade unions to an International Congress to be 
held in London in 1896. Their presence, he said, 'would not 
advance the cause of International Socialism'. 
29 Hunter Watts 
retaliated by urging that 'they should meet the organised workers 
and discuss with them what methods could be adopted to take 
hold of the instruments of industry'. 
30 A compromise resolution 
suggested a separate Socialist Congress prior to the Workers' 
Congress, though this never materialised. 
The debate within the SDF was a tribute to the party's 
internal democracy and a demonstration of the increasing 
maturity of its political thought. Its failure to reach a 
decision, however, led to confusion and friction with other 
labour bodies, and the high profile of the anti-union camp 
damaged the party's credibility. Quelch clearly recognised 
this and considerably softened the tone of Justice after 
he 
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resumed his position as editor. 
31 
Nonetheless, as the debate 
became more heated, party unity was threatened. This threat 
was averted because in 1896 and 1897 the Quelch group moved 
closer to the pro-union tendency, thus leaving the anti-union 
element isolated. The failure of the unemployed agitation to 
achieve significant results was partly responsible for this 
shift in position, as was the economic revival which began in 
1896 and created a more favourable climate for union activity. 
A further factor was the burgeoning strength of the Federation 
in the provinces, particularly in Lancashire where many members 
were active union militants and where the unions were relatively 
strong. They provided a significant challenge to the influence 
of the 'old guard', centred in London. Finally the 1896 
International Congress, held in London, exerted a considerable 
impact on SDF opinion. Wilhelm Liebknecht and others praised 
British trade unions and the Congress adopted a resolution 
asserting the need for strong unions as a complementary weapon 
to legislative action. The resolution did not make it clear 
whether industrial or political action should have priority, 
nor was it binding, but certainly the opponents of trade unions 
within the SDF found themselves on the defensive. The 
'orthodox Marxists' now adopted a more activist approach to the 
unions, with Quelch again taking the lead. There should, he 
said, be 'friendly helpfulness' between the SDF and the trade 
union movement, for whilst 'it may be difficult to work with 
it... it is impossible to do anything without it' . 
32 Trade 
union members were obviously the best elements of the working 
class, who had taken the first step on the way to Socialism. 
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Therefore, 'If there is not a field of action for Social- 
Democracy in trade unionism what is there outside? '33 Although 
Quelch did qualify his views somewhat by insisting that 
electoral alliances between unions and Socialist parties were 
not practical, he had now developed a far more positive attitude 
than that expressed in his pamphlet of 1890, and it provided 
the basis for the compromise reached at the Federation's Annual 
Conference of 1897. 
Conference advised members to join trade unions by 46 
votes to 2, and to 'work harmoniously with trade unionists and 
cooperators as representing organisations having for their 
object the improvement of the status of the workers'. This 
very general endorsement was followed by a reaffirmation of 
the ultimate Socialist goal, 'the socialisation of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange', which reassured 
the anti-unionists that the SDF was not abandoning its Socialist 
faith. Finally, the resolution laid claim to the political 
support of all trade unionists, implying that only the SDF 
could truly serve the interests of the working class. Thus 
a mid-path was steered between conflicting viewpoints. 'This 
flexible statement enabled an umbrella of unity to be maintained, 
covering the differences of emphasis which were still voiced 
in SDF ranks' . 
34 
Scepticism about the value of trade unions as a basis 
for 
Socialist advance was not restricted to the SDF. Such 
diverse 
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members of the Socialist movement as Blatchford, James 
Ramsay MacDonald and Glasier were all agreed on the limitations 
of trade union 'sectionalism'. Similarly, distrust of the 
strike weapon was near universal, 'part of the mainstream of 
35 
British Socialist thought' . This tradition was almost 
obliterated, however, by the subsequent union domination of the 
Labour Party, whereas the SDF's reputation for being anti-trade 
union has persisted. Hobsbawm accuses the Federation of being 
'flatly hostile to the trade unions?; 
36 
Collins condemns it for 
its 'peculiar position... in relation to trade unions'. Alex 
37 
Callinicos, in a sweeping critique, dismisses the SDF for its 
'propagandism' which, he argues, 'runs contrary to the Marxist 
tradition' . 
38 
Such criticism is merited, but the critics of 
the SDF err in assuming that the party had a coherent policy 
towards the unions, for in truth it had none. Its initial 
hostility to trade unionism is easily explicable in terms of 
the ideological ancestry of British Socialism, the character 
of trade unionism when the Federation was founded, and the 
writings of Marx then available to its members. The depressed 
economic conditions of the 1880s seemed to justify a concent- 
ration on unemployed agitation rather than strike action, and 
the increased opportunities opened up by local government 
reform were attractive to a party which took seriously the 
possibility of municipal power independent of the capitalist 
state. The range of attitudes developed in the 1880s thus 
prevented the SDF from seizing the opportunities offered by the 
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upsurge of New Unionism. It was indeed 'tepid and equivocal , 
39 
towards the Dock strike, it failed to see that limited fights 
such as this could develop into a wider movement for political 
power. Callinicos's criticism of the SDF as 'propagandist', 
of accepting the separation of politics and economics and 
prioritising the propagation of Socialist ideas independent 
of any mass struggle, would therefore be justified at this 
stage. 
What the critics do not recognise is that these events 
sparked a long and sustained debate within the party about the 
nature and role of trade unions and about the Federation's 
relationship to them. Far from being a centralised, monolithic 
organisation the SDF was highly democratic and its branches 
had considerable autonomy. Hyndman, contrary to popular 
perception, was unable to impose his will as he wished. During 
the 1890s his anti-union views, which clearly merit Callinicos's 
critique, lost ground within the party. The tragedy was that 
on this question internal democracy prevented a satisfactory 
resolution to the debate. In the absence of a clear policy 
trade union and labour leaders simply assumed that Hyndman's 
views were congruent with those of the party. This misappre- 
hension, coupled with the continuing failure of the SDF to 
resolve its internal debate, led ultimately to the Federation's 
disastrous decision to withdraw from the Labour Representation 
Committee. But in 1897 this was far from being the inevitable 
conclusion. The SDF had moved towards a more flexible strategic 
approach, a synthesis rather than separation of 
industrial 
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and political organisation. This year saw also the culmination 
of a lengthy struggle to unite the Social-Democratic Federation 
and the Independent Labour Party 
into one Socialist Party. 
The ILP had pursued the policy of an alliance with the unions 
since its electoral defeat of 1895; with the SDF now approach- 
ing the unions more positively Socialist Unity would have given 
the British Socialist movement significant influence within the 
wider Labour arena. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
SOCIALIST UNITY. 
William Morris was responsible for the first attempt to unite 
the Socialist forces in Britain. He had withdrawn from the 
Socialist League shortly before its demise and thereafter 
pondered the best means of advance for the movement. Rejecting 
his earlier extreme anti-parliamentarianism, Morris was now 
prepared to accept the value of the fight for limited gains. 
To that end he dreamed 'of a real Socialist Party at once 
united and free', 
1 
an objective to which he devoted much of the 
rest of his life. In December 1892, Morris's Hammersmith 
Socialist Society approached the two effective Socialist organis- 
ations in London, the Fabians and the SDF, with a view to form- 
ing a Socialist Federation. A committee was formed, consisting 
of five delegates from each body, and on the 1st of May 1893 
it issued the Manifesto of the Joint Committee of Socialist 
Bodies. This manifesto declared that 'all who can fairly be 
called Socialists are agreed in their main principles of thought 
and action', and stated that their aim was the communal owner- 
ship of the means of production and exchange. This projected 
alliance was short-lived, for it had collapsed by the end of 
July. The Fabians had been deterred by a statement of revolution 
ary principles far more explicit than they had expected. For 
its part the SDF welcomed the manifesto's statement of 
principles but felt that what was needed also was political 
discipline based on a reorganisation of Socialist forces, and 
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there was 'only one Socialist organisation in these islands 
which practises that discipline and that is the Social- 
2 
Democratic Federation'. Consequently members of the other 
bodies should join the SDF. However, a more fundamental weak- 
ness of these unity negotiations was that they had ignored the 
existence of the Independent Labour Party, formed in January 
1893 and already a potent force in the North of England. 
The ILP had emerged from the industrial unrest at the 
turn of the decade, an unrest which had not resulted in any 
accession of strength to the Socialist forces. A number of 
independent Socialists and Labour leaders had come to the con- 
clusion that before the working class could be mobilised into 
a mass Socialist party it would be necessary to organise them 
for independent Labour politics. This viewpoint was reinforced 
by the increasing anachronism of the Liberal Party acting as 
the vehicle for working-class demands. Not only did the Party 
seem unable to adapt its arguments to the rapidly changing 
economic conditions of the 1880s and 1890s, but its refusal 
to countenance working-class parliamentary candidates dis- 
appointed and frustrated the aspirations and expectations of 
many activists. Additionally, the Liberal split of 1886, leading 
to two decades of Conservative dominance, led to recurrent 
debates about the future of the Liberal Party and to dreams 
of political realignment. The SDF's repeated insistence upon 
the imminent demise of Liberalism, which would leave the 
field 
clear for a straight fight between Capital and Labour, was 
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paralleled in Blatchford's Clarion and in much early ILP 
thinking. The exemplar of this demand for an independent 
Labour political strategy was James Keir Hardie. At the Trade 
Union Congress of 1887 he had protested strongly against Labour 
representatives identifying themselves with the Liberals. In 
1888 he had stood as independent Labour candidate in the Mid- 
Lanark by-election, and a few months later Hardie was instru- 
mental in the formation of the Scottish Labour Party. 
Hardie's views found support in another stronghold of 
independent Labour politics, the West Riding of Yorkshire, 
where the Liberal Party continued to dominate. Factors such as 
Home Rule and ethnic and religious divisions, which caused 
support to switch to the Conservatives in other parts of the 
country, were absent here. Consequently leading Liberals 
could afford to be totally unsympathetic both to Labour 
candidates and to Labour demands in an area where trade unions 
were weak. This factor, allied to a tradition of working-class 
radicalism, provided the point of departure for the ILP in 
Yorkshire. The catalyst was the Manningham Mills strike of 1890- 
91 in Bradford, whilst events in Halifax, where two labour pro- 
pagandists were sacked by Liberal employers, did little to 
inspire confidence in the Liberal Party. Similarly, working- 
class and middle-class Radicals in the Colne Valley had little 
faith in a Liberal Association with James, later Sir James, 
Kitson as its candidate. A further impetus to the movement 
came from the mushrooming development of Trades Councils, most 
of recent creation and therefore with no Liberal 
legacy. 
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It is revealing that in West Yorkshire the title of 
'Labour Union' was adopted by the new bodies in Bradford, 
Keighley, Halifax and elsewhere. As David Howell has commented, 
they were formed not on the basis of political principle but to 
safeguard the interests of one particular section of the 
community. 
3 Their platforms could therefore have been accom- 
modated within progressive Liberalism. That they were not was 
due partly to the unbending attitudes of local Liberal caucuses 
and partly to the Socialist attachments of local leaders like 
Tom Maguire, Fred Jowett and, to a lesser extent, Ben Turner. 
Nonetheless, says Howell, 
Many of the critics carried much of the Liberal ethos 
with them; their additions were typically a special 
emphasis on labour questions, some sort of commit- 
ment to Socialism, and perhaps most crucial of all, 
a strong attachment to an independent political 
organisation. 
4 
Fuelled by the propaganda of Robert Blatchford in 
The Clarion, 5 buoyed by the success of Hardie and Burns in the 
general election of 1892, these trends crystallised in January 
1893 when, at a conference in Bradford, the various Labour 
organisations came together to form the ILP. 
The SDF had been hostile to the idea of an independent 
labour party from the outset. In June of the preceding year 
Quelch had stressed that all trade unions could do what the 
miners had done i. e. organise to elect their own M. P. s, 
but 
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this simply meant absorption into the ranks of the Liberals 
or Tories. The need was for a revolutionary party, not one 
to make the domination of capital more tolerable. 
6 
Any Labour 
Party, he argued, would be simply a 'fortuitous concourse of 
heterogeneous political atoms... a bear garden. '7 The SDF 
Conference of that year proclaimed an attitude of 'benevolent 
neutrality' to any such party, but shortly before the ILP's 
inaugural conference Quelch renewed his attack. Any real 
independent Labour party, he said, should be a Social-Democratic 
Party and he warned that, 'He who is not with us is against 
us. '8 Harry Lee scathingly condemned the conference: the ILP 
had been formed on a negative basis with no definite principles; 
Socialism was not even mentioned in the title of the party. 
'We know that the attempt will fail', 
9 
said Lee. Hyndman 
actively opposed the admission of ILP representatives to the 
Joint Committee and thereby ensured the failure of this initial 
attempt at Socialist unity. Attempts were made to damn the 
ILP by association with the Engels 'clique', which was anathema 
to the 'old guard' of the SDF. 
I have always regarded the formation of the 
Independent Labour Party as another of the many 
attempts which have from time to time been made 
to head back the genuine Social-Democratic move- 
ment in Great Britain, 
wrote Tattler. 10 Equally dismissive was the accusation that 
the ILP was simply 'a recrudescence of the Labour Electoral 
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Associations and Leagues... which have since died a natural 
death or have become mere appendages of the Liberal Party. ' 1l 
The attitudes and pronouncements of the SDF leadership, 
however, did not reflect what was happening at the grassroots 
A concentration on the editorial comment in Justice or the 
opinions of Hyndman and Quelch produces a distorted picture of 
SDF activity, as it does concerning the party's relationship 
with the trade unions. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in Lancashire, where SDF branches had developed considerable 
autonomy. Here they played an influential role in the form- 
ation of the ILP in several areas. Jeffrey Hill has argued 
that 'The idea of a labour alliance may well have had its 
earliest manifestation in Salford during the early nineties. '12 
The Salford branch of the SDF had been prominent in the upsurge 
of 'new unionism' in the area and was thus in contact with other 
labour groups. Goaded by the refusal of the Liberal Union to 
consider Trades Council candidates for municipal seats these 
groups coalesced to form the Salford Labour Electoral 
Association in the summer of 1891. This unity was short-lived, 
as personal and ideological disputes rent the Association. 
W. K. Hall, the SDF candidate for South Salford, played down 
his Marxism and stood essentially as an advanced Liberal in 
an attempt at reconciliation, but his defeat signalled the 
demise of the Association. The Manchester ILP was formed 
shortly afterwards in what was clearly an attempt to restore 
Labour and Socialist unity. As Hill has emphasised, 
'one of 
the most active sources of support for the creation of an ILP 
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in this area, and one which historians have tended to overlook, 
13 
was the Social Democratic Federation. ' At the inaugural 
conference at St. James's Hall in May 1892 five SDFers were 
prominent on the platform and the Federation remained closely 
allied to the ILP, at times 'so close as to make any distinctions 
14 
between them almost imperceptible. ' Similar initiatives 
could be seen elsewhere, at Accrington, Nelson and Blackburn 
for example, and the six SDF delegates at the ILP's founding 
conference in Bradford were all from Lancashire. It is hardly 
surprising therefore that the first attempts at a national 
amalgamation of the two parties came from Lancashire. 
The period after 1893 was one of growth for the Socialist 
movement. Justice reported a doubling of bona fida paying 
members and increased circulation figures, and the SDF exceeded 
two thousand members in 1894. The ILP grew rapidly in its 
first two years, but, as Rabinovitch has suggested, the two 
parties tended to flourish in separate geographical areas. 
Whereas the SDF was strong in London the ILP could make little 
headway there; conversely one third of ILP strength was centred 
in Yorkshire, Bradford alone claiming two thousand members in 
1893. But the SDF could not report a single branch in 
Yorkshire. Lancashire was the major exception to this trend, 
providing the SDF with its main provincial base but also 
allowing the ILP to sink strong roots. It exhibited two 
features characteristic of the movement at this time. Dual 
membership of the two bodies was common but there were many 
Socialists who remained unattached, swelling the numbers at 
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demonstrations but refusing to join one of the existing parties. 
They were often avid readers of The Clarion, adherents of what 
Stephen Yeo has referred to as 'The Religion of Socialism. ' 
In 1894 Robert Blatchford wrote excitedly that 'Five years 
ago there were not 500 socialists in Manchester. Now there 
must be 30,000. ' 
15 
If only these 'unattached' could be enrolled 
into the movement then Socialist unity seemed a distinct 
possibility. 
The Second Annual Conference of the ILP, in 1894, debated 
a Lancashire resolution in favour of amalgamation with the SDF. 
This proposal originated both from the fact that some ILP 
branches in the county were struggling to hold their own against 
strong SDF opposition and from a genuine enthusiasm for unity. 
The resolution was defeated largely because the SDF posed no 
significant threat to the ILP elsewhere, especially in its 
stronghold of West Yorkshire, and therefore party activists had 
little understanding of the Lancashire position. They were 
wary too of identifying themselves so closely with a Socialist 
position at this early stage in the party's history. Robert 
Blatchford was undismayed; encouraged by the success of his 
Clarion movement and the phenomenal sales of his penny pamphlet, 
Merrie England, he was convinced that thousands of unattached 
Socialists were ready to join a unified party. In July 1894 he 
launched a Socialist unity campaign, based on the premise that 
all Socialists agreed on root-principles and should therefore 
'recognise 
each other's right to liberty in all matters of 
detail, banding ourselves together under the broad principle 
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16 
of Socialism. ' The response disappointed him. The 
leadership of the SDF could not agree that it shared the 
same basic principles as the ILP, which Quelch saw as 'a sort 
of half-way house' for those who might otherwise have joined 
17 
a real Socialist party. If the ILP members were really 
Socialists, he said, 'then it was nothing short of treason to 
their principles to start another organisation. '18 With SDF 
membership increasing there seemed little need for unity. 
Keir Hardie was equally emphatic in rejecting the idea and 
optimistic about the ILP future: 
As an organisation for uniting all the forces into 
a solid fighting phalanx the I. L. P. fits the bill 
.... Two years hence, and every section of the 
workers will be united, marching to victory under 
the banner of the I. L. P. 
19 
If the leaders of the two parties were intransigent 
Blatchford's appeal did touch a chord with some of the rank 
and file. ILP support, unsurprisingly, was strongest in 
Lancashire with the Darlington, Crewe, Droylsden and Middleton 
branches voting in favour of unity in December 1894. Similarly 
SDF support was strongest where the ILP held sway, the newly- 
formed Leeds branch of the Federation declaring 'That it is 
desirable to form a National Socialist Party'. 
20 The ILP in 
Yorkshire, however, was almost uniformly hostile. In October 
1894 the party's Yorkshire Divisional Council rejected a move 
to change its name to the 'National Socialist Party' , fearful 
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of jeopardising its links with the trade unions, and the vote 
was reinforced by the NAC in December of that year. Blatchford 
attempted to circumvent this opposition by appealing directly 
to the membership of both parties, urging SDFers to join the 
ILP and vice-versa. In this way, he said, 'old prejudices 
will die out and the ideas of the two organisations will 
become assimilated'. 
21 
The response was limited and by the 
beginning of 1895 the campaign appeared to have subsided. 
Even Tom Mann, more sympathetic than most, wrote that: 
no one Socialist platform has yet proved to be 
sufficiently broad to admit of all sorts and 
conditions of Socialists using the same platform 
for the advocacy of their respective views and 
methods. 
and he advised Blatchford 'to let the matter lie in 
2 
abeyance'. 
2 
The failure of this attempt to unite the Socialist 
forces can be explained easily enough. As the pioneering 
Socialist organisation the SDF was jealous of its position; 
whilst members in Lancashire and elsewhere were prepared to 
assist the growth of independent labour politics as a step on 
the way to Socialism they saw no need for another Socialist 
organisation. Indeed many doubted the Socialist credentials 
of the ILP and questioned the ethical/religious base of 
its 
philosophy. As the SDF appeared to be flourishing, reporting 
40 new branches in 1895 including six in the hitherto barren 
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area of Yorkshire, there seemed little reason to flirt with 
what was at best a quasi-Socialist party. For its part the 
ILP was euphoric at its apparently rapid progress, with its 
sights set firmly on the coming general election after four 
exceptionally good by-election results. Hardie, pursuing his 
campaign for trade-union support, saw Socialist unity as a 
hindrance and the SDF's Marxism as a positive drawback. 
The pre-eminent position of the Yorkshire region in ILP councils 
meant that unity with the SDF was never seriously considered 
at that time. Yetit was the ILP which initiated the next 
attempt at rapprochement. 
1895 was in many ways a crucial year for the British 
Socialist movement. All 29 ILP candidates were defeated at 
the general election, although with hindsight the results 
were very reasonable for a first attempt, some 40,000 votes 
being polled. Nevertheless the party's confidence was severely 
shaken and membership fell from 35,000 to 20,000 in the following 
year. Two somewhat contradictory results ensued. The party 
leadership became more convinced than ever of the necessity 
for pragmatic politics, of the need to form a progressive 
alliance to capture parliamentary seats, and this could only 
be achieved by pushing the ultimate Socialist goal further 
into the future. Events at the Trades Union Congress in 1 895 
reinforced this belief. The Socialists had scored increasing 
successes there since 1890, culminating in 1894 with the 
passing of a resolution in favour of the nationalisation of 
the means of production, distribution and exchange. Such gains 
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had been largely illusory, for the Parliamentary Committee 
remained dominated by Liberals and they now retaliated, 
introducing the block vote and excluding from the Congress 
Trades Council delegates and all those not working at their 
trade or who were not permanent union officials. The Socialist 
influence was blunted and thus the ILP became even more 
ready to compromise with progressive trade-union opinion. The 
leadership now viewed the establishment of Socialism on a much 
longer timescale which, as David Howell has pointed out, 
rendered them 'subject to conservative influences'. 
24 
Many 
of the rank and file, on the other hand, began to question the 
whole direction of this policy. They reverted to the emphasis 
upon 'making Socialists', which was essentially the SDF 
rationale. The campaign to unite the ILP and SDF was revived, 
striking a chord even in West Yorkshire, where the Keighley 
ILP voted in favour of one Socialist party on 6 February 1896. 
After 1895 there were, if one excludes the possibility of 
a return to the Liberal fold, two distinct lines of advance 
open to the British Socialist movement. The debate between 
the protagonists of the Labour Alliance and those of Socialist 
unity would, in one way or another, dominate the Socialist 
milieu until the outbreak of the First World War. For the 
moment the advocates of one Socialist party were in the ascend- 
ancy in the ILP, many of them anxious to assert rank and file 
democracy in the face of what they saw as a move towards 
centralisation and bureaucracy within the party. Hardie, 
sensitive to the changing mood, prepared to compromise and 
he 
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suggested an annual conference of all Socialist organisations, 
trade unions and co-operative bodies. The Easter Conference 
of 1896 instructed the NAC to issue invitations to just such 
a conference. Initial SDF reaction was hostile; it was felt 
that the ILP was only talking about some form of unity because 
of its own internal difficulties. The SDF, still preoccupied 
with internal debates about strategy, was not prepared to 
co-operate with non-Socialist bodies at this stage and noted 
that the ILP rule forbidding all intrigue with 'Capitalist 
political factions' had been rescinded, thus making unity 
'much more improbable for the moment'. 
25 
James Leatham pointed 
out that the Federation was doing well and was at last free 
from debt. 
26 
Thus, at its August Conference, the SDF rejected 
the idea of one Socialist party by 75 votes to 13. 
Events soon disposed the SDF to change its position. 
Its financial solvency was short-lived, largely due to 
expenditure on the Southampton by-election; rank and file 
pressure for unity mounted, as letters to Justice testify, and 
the increasing prominence of the pro-union tendency within the 
Federation led to a less hostile view of ILP strategy. The 
early months of 1897 saw a remarkable transformation in SDF 
attitudes. Quelch remarked of the ILP that 'At present, in 
principle and aim, it is almost at one with the S. D. F. I, and 
he congratulated it upon its 'distinct tendency to a more 
definite Socialist position and programme. ' 
27 Five SDF delegates 
attended an informal conference of the two parties on 
29 July, 
where Keir Hardie proposed the resolution that 
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it is desirable in the interests of the Socialist 
movement that the S. D. F. and I. L. P. be united in 
one organisation provided it is found that there is 
no question of principle to keep them apart. 
28 
A joint committee of arrangement was established pending 
a decision on points of differences such as the new name of 
the party, and a further committee was appointed for the purpose 
of arbitration on electoral disputes. Finally, the executives 
of the two bodies agreed that a referendum of the joint member- 
ship be held. In what was, admittedly, a low poll the members 
voted 5,158 to 886 in favour of fusion. Yet that decision was 
never implemented and the campaign for Socialist unity was 
halted in its tracks by the refusal of the ILP Conference to 
ratify the decision. 
The reasons for the breakdown are complex, but clearly 
the ILP leadership was largely to blame. Whilst Hyndman and 
Quelch may have been lukewarm over the matter, leading one 
member to comment that 'if leaders of the S. D. F. are in earnest 
by all means let the official organ express it', 
29 Hardie and 
Glasier were positively antagonistic. Immediately after the 
vote Hardie waded into the attack in the ILP News. 
It may be that there is something in the methods of 
propaganda, if not the principle of the S. D. F., that 
not only render it somewhat antipathetic to our 
members, but out of touch and harmony with the feel- 
ings and ideals of the mass of the people.... It might 
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be, therefore, that the introduction of its spirit 
and methods of attack would check rather than help 
forward our movement. 
30 
His vision of Socialism was radically different to that of 
the SDF. 'They protested', he said, 
against the economic side of Socialism being 
pressed to the front. The reforms they called 
Socialist reforms were but the outward expression 
of the inner principle. What was Socialism then? 
It was brotherhood, fraternity, love thy neighbour 
as thyself, peace on earth, goodwill towards men, 
and glory to God in the highest. 
31 
Hardie therefore urged, in view of the small number of members 
voting, that the matter should be thoroughly discussed at 
the ILP Annual Conference and meanwhile he and Glasier campaigned 
vigorously for an alternative strategy, that of federation. 
At the Birmingham Conference the NAC argued that differences 
between the two parties were such that fusion would simply 
lead to 'harassing and paralysing internal strife', 
32 
and 
Hardie accused the SDF of seeking to absorb the ILP. However 
it was Bruce Glasier, with a masterly piece of rhetoric, who 
swayed the Conference to the NAC's position. The kernel of his 
case was that 
the ways of the S. D. F. are not our ways. If I may 
say so, the ways of the S. D. F. are more doctrinaire, 
more Calvinistic, more aggressively sectarian than 
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the I. L. P. The S. D. F. has failed to touch the 
heart of the people. Its strange disregard of the 
religions, morals and aesthetic sentiments of the 
people is an overwhelming defect. 
33 
This savage attack was an almost classical statement of later 
Labour orthodoxy with regards to the Marxist tradition, yet 
it bore little resemblance to the truth. If the SDF had 
failed 'to touch the heart of the people' then so had the ILP 
The Federation had, in fact, no position on religion or 
morality, which it regarded as a matter of individual choice. 
The Federation's Calvinism, if such existed, was more than 
matched by the religious enthusiams of Snowden and Hardie, 
whilst its relative success in London and Lancashire proved 
the lie to any charges of sectarianism. Nonetheless the com- 
bined weight of Hardie and Glasier persuaded Conference to 
ballot the members on the options of fusion or federation, 
with the proviso that a three-fourths majority was required if 
fusion was to take place. Moreover the question was loaded, 
the members being asked to vote either for federation or for 
'dissolution of the I. L. P. and fusion with the S. D. F. ', once 
more suggesting the idea of absorption. 
Participation in the ballot was again low, 2,397 votes 
being cast for federation and 1,695 for fusion. Not surprisingly 
Hardie accepted this and ILP policy now became that of federation 
Quelch was furious. 'Can it be', he asked, 
that some of the leaders of the I. L. P. calculated 
upon the presumed disinclination of the S. D. F. to 
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amalgamate, and were terribly disappointed to find 
that the S. D. F. were quite ready to act in a con- 
ciliatory and statesmanlike spirit? 
34 
This view obviously found favour with some ILPers. 'It seems 
to me a most ridiculous proceeding', wrote one, 'to submit a 
question to a vote of the members, and then, when it is found 
that the vote does not coincide with the "secret wishes of the 
chiefs", to override it altogether'. 
35 
Why had the ILP leader- 
ship acted in this way? 
After the 1895 general election Hardie's prestige and 
influence had waned, whilst that of Blatchford had increased. 
The whole style and tone of Blatchford and his Clarion was in 
sharp contrast to the more sober and unadventurous Labour Leader 
of Hardie, and Blatchford's support for Socialist unity clashed 
sharply with Hardie's appeal to trade-union sympathies. Support 
for Hardie's policy appeared to be in the balance, and thus his 
somewhat vague resolution in favour of unity at the informal 
Conference of 1897 can be interpreted as a sop to the Blatchford 
supporters within the ILP. Meanwhile changes on the ILP Council 
were strengthening his position. The direct link with 'New 
Unionism' was severed as Tom Mann and Pete Curran resigned to 
devote their energies to union organisation. They were replaced 
by a new type of Council member, full-time propagandists and 
journalists such as Snowden, Glasier and Ramsay MacDonald. 
Although there were sometimes quite sharp political differences 
between these newcomers and Hardie 
36 
they posed no real challenge 
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to his authority. After theILP's1896 Conference the federal 
structure of the party had been abolished to nullify the fact 
that Socialist unity forces had gained control of a number of 
the county federations. As a consequence of these developments 
Hardie now felt more secure and able to postpone the idea of 
fusion. In a speech to the Thornhill Lees ILP he argued that 
he had changed his mind because 'he was afraid there might be 
internal strife if the two bodies came together', 
37 
but in truth 
he had probably opposed the idea all along. As Henry Pelling 
has commented, 
Following Hardie's lead... the I. L. P. Council 
regarded the whole question... in the light of the 
much more important problem of how to secure the 
assistattce of the trade unions and co-operative 
societies in a joint movement for independent 
labour representation. Fusion with the S. D. F., it 
was thought, would prejudice the solution of this 
problem. ' 
38 
The argument about absorption by the SDF was essentially a red 
herring; after all the ILP had three times as many members and 
no details of the fusion process had been worked out. Of more 
significance was the quite phenomenal influence exercised 
by 
the ILP in West Yorkshire on the movement nationally. Over 
one-quarter of the paying members came from the West Riding and 
half of these from Bradford and Halifax. Here opposition to 
fusion was strong, understandably, for there was 
little or no 
173. 
SDF opposition. 
39 
Both Bradford and Halifax ILP branches had 
strong links with the trade union movement and had already 
started down the road Hardie was advocating. Thus, as early 
as 1896, the Bradford Labour Echo had argued that 
The time has not come for the thorough fusion of 
forces which the creation of such a party would 
demand.... The formation of such a party before the 
time was ripe for it would bring nothing but mischief . 
40 
And there the matter rested. John Penny, the ILP secretary, 
wrote several letters to Lee of the SDF urging discussions on 
the question of federation but the SDF would have none of it: 
Federation is for those who, being divided on points 
of principle, desire to combine for purposes on which 
they are agreed. Fusion is for those who, agreeing in 
principle and in tactics, desire to act together as one- 
great army of Socialists . 
41 
The ILP undoubtedly lost members as a result of the affair. 
The Morley branch seceded, the Dewsbury branches of the ILP 
and SDF fused, and the Bristol SDF and ILP amalgamated to form 
a Socialist Council. Alec Grey of the Watford branch summed 
up the feelings of many when he attacked the NAC for 
'dishonesty 
and self-seeking', for demonstrating 'such insincerity on so 
important a matter'. 
42 
But the protests soon died away and 
Hardie had his way. The ILP leaders had decided that 
the two 
parties were not agreed 'in principle and in tactics', 
that 
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Socialist unity would alienate the trade unions. Yet the 
collapse of the unity talks more or giess coincided with the 
success of the pro-union tendency within the SDF. As a result 
the federation which the SDF had rejected became a reality in 
1900 with the formation of the Labour Representation Committee. 
Relations between the two parties within the LRC, however, 
remained as strained as ever. The breakdown of Socialist unity 
talks in the 1890s meant that the possibility of a British 
Socialist movement, integrating the moral concerns of the ILP 
with the scientific Marxism of the SDF, was lost. 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
THE LABOUR REPRESENTATION COMMITTEE. 
Apart from its brief 'insurrectionary' phase in the mid-1880s 
the Social-Democratic Federation had always taken seriously the 
political process. It had emerged in a political system where 
the legitimacy and credibility of electoral politics was clearly 
established, where repression of the Bismarckian type was un- 
known, and it genuinely believed both in Parliament and in the 
possibility of using it to win social reforms under capitalism. 
The inclusion of these reforms, or 'palliatives', in the party 
programme was one of the reasons for the defection of Morris 
and others in 1884. Their arguments were that such reforms 
were a mirage because the ruling class would refuse them or, 
if they were achieved, they were undesirable because capitalism 
would thereby be made more acceptable to the workers. This 
was never the SDF viewpoint. A list of 'stepping stones' to 
Socialism had been included in Socialism Made Plain and the list 
was incorporated in the SDF programme, alongside a series of 
democratic reforms such as adult suffrage and payment of M. P. s 
which would enable Socialists to take control of Parliament. 
These 'palliatives' were justified for three reasons. Better 
working and living conditions would 'raise the physical, moral 
and mental status of the working class' and 'better fit them 
for the struggle for their emancipation'. 
1 They would hasten 
that emancipation by shifting the balance between private and 
public sector to the benefit of the latter. Thirdly, as most 
workers were at subsistence level, taxation came 
from surplus 
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value. Any social reforms financed by such taxation were 
therefore a way of redistributing real incomes. 
Such views followed the tradition of Marx, who considered 
a peaceful revolution in England a distinct possibility. They 
were also extended into the municipal arena, where the increased 
powers of elected school boards and local authorities after 
1888 gave the SDF an opportunity to exert pressure for 
'palliatives' such as school meals with some chance of success. 
The more generous municipal franchise, and the cumulative 
system of voting for School Boards, provided openings for the 
Federation which parliamentary contests did not. Hyndman's 
pamphlet, A Commune For London, argued the case for municip- 
alisation, 
2 
although there were dissenting voices within the 
party and arguments as to whether emphasis should be given to 
municipal or parliamentary politics. The dangers of a con- 
centration on electioneering were also realised, Dan Irving 
reminding members that 'The Socialist representative must not 
cease to be an agitator because he has left the street corner 
for the board room. '3 A lack of success at the polls during 
the 1890s led to some disillusionment and a tendency to revert 
to propagandism but generally the SDF line remained constant. 
As Harry Quelch argued, 'the conquest of political power as a 
means to economic emancipation is the watchword of the 
inter- 
national Social-Democracy. '4 He had accepted that 'it is 
impossible to continually march men up a hill simply to march 
them down again' and he now favoured 'Steady, determined, 
persistent organised effort, directed as well at the 
local 
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bodies as at Parliament'. 
5 
Electoral failures were blamed on 
SDF organisation rather than SDF policy. Thus Hyndman, 
temporarily resigning from the Executive in 1901, accused the 
party of being 'wholly destitute of political aptitude. ' 
Constituencies were worked upon to a certain point, he said, 
'and then no steps whatever are taken to secure permanent 
advantages for revolutionary Social-Democracy from the time, 
trouble and money expended on them.... The canvassing, which 
is an indispensable preliminary to success, is persistently 
neglected' .6 
There were undoubtedly weaknesses in the SDF's electoral 
organisation, although many, if not most, of these were attri- 
butable to lack of finance and members. One can also question 
the theoretical soundness of Hyndman's view of the State as 
'the organised form of the community, to intervene in order to 
protect, for the national benefit, the lives and health of 
the workers.. . 
(and] to mitigate the class war' . Nonetheless, 
viewed in that way the conquest of Parliament seemed an 
obviously attractive route to Socialism. As John Tamlyn of 
the Burnley branch put it, 
We are Parliamentarians. If individualism has used 
Parliament to break up and spoil the community 
Socialists, starting with another conception of 
society, may use Parliament to bind it up again and 
reinstate the people in their rights.... The bad or 
good is not in the Parliament, but in the people who 
use it. 
8 
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The SDF had, therefore, a dual strategy. Its task was to use 
education as a means of conquering political power, to make 
Socialists; political campaigns served as a vehicle for pro- 
paganda and thus education, leading to a take over of the 
political institutions of the State. The question was, what 
could be done until this process produced sufficient Socialist 
voters? 
The SDF election manifestoes for both the 1892 and 1895 
general elections called upon the workers to abstain from voting 
where there was no genuine Socialist candidate. However, such 
revolutionary 'purism' provided no obvious gains for the SDF. 
9 
Consequently the latter years of the decade saw a heated debate 
on the question of electoral tactics. The International Congress 
resolution of 1896, calling for political independence and 
equal hostility to all bourgeois parties, was welcomed by the 
Federation. Yet there was also a growing conviction that the 
Liberal Party was close to extinction and an unrealistic 
expectation that if its demise could somehow be hastened, 
'If the Liberal Party were out of the way, we could soon make 
short work of the Tory Party'. 
10 
Moreover, three-cornered 
parliamentary contests were proving futile and expensive for 
the SDF. A growing body of opinion within the party advocated 
voting Tory in order to smash the Liberal Party, leaving the 
way clear for a straight fight between capital and labour. 
After all, hadn't Marx and Engels predicted the disappearance 
of the Liberal Party? Quelch voiced a further argument, common 
in ILP circles too, 
181. 
By posing in many instances as more than half a 
Socialist, the Liberal often gains support from 
people whose sympathies are really with us, and 
thereby does much to retard our movement. If, in 
addition to this, the Liberals persist in excluding 
us from all representation and using their pro- 
fessed sympathy with our views to that end, our 
policy is clear, and that is everywhere to vote 
against them. 
11 
He proposed a resolution to that effect at the Federation's 
Annual Conference in 1898, but it met with considerable 
opposition. Many members agreed with Bernstein, who had 
accused the SDF of acting as a 'door-opener' for the Tories 
and of sacrificing workers' immediate interests for a far-off 
utopia. 
12 
E. Morton of Sheffield and John Moore of Rochdale 
urged an electoral deal with the Liberals as the best way 
forward. Consequently, to preserve unity, a Dan Irving amend- 
ment was adopted, allowing the Executive to choose a policy 
according to the needs of the moment. 
13 Such a compromise 
satisfied neither side and the debate continued. Effectively 
the SDF was left with no policy, and prior to the 1899 
Conference the Executive urged a definite decision and asked 
branches to mandate their delegates. By 51 votes to 31 a line 
of opposition to the Liberals was carried, not as a matter of 
principle but as one of tactics, 'to overcome the obstacle 
in 
14 
the shape of the Liberal Party, which bars our progress'. 
Yet even this did not still the controversy; one writer proteste( 
1 82 
, 
that if the Tories were elected the likelihood of war would 
be increased and working-class jingoism would result. 
15 
Prominent members such as Andreas Scheu and J. B. Askew voiced 
similar discontent. Twelve months later party policy was once 
more reversed, much to Quelch's dismay, and abstention was 
urged on working-class voters where there was no Socialist or 
advanced Radical candidate. 
16 
In truth the longed-for collapse 
of the Liberal Party had come no closer, for reasons which 
Norman and Jeanne Mackenzie have pinpointed. 
It was too decentralised to be captured, too 
fragmented for a decisive split, too conflicted 
to offer any` hope of unity in the fom$eeable 
r 
future. Yet it was still strong enough to sur- 
vive as the only practicable alternative to the 
Tories. It sprawled across British politics, 
unable to get on or get out of the way. 
'7 
This confusion over electoral policy, coupled with the 
manifest failure of the SDF to achieve successes of its own, 
made the idea of an independent Labour party more appealing. 
Voting for Labour candidates seemed a more attractive proposition 
than abstaining or voting Tory and the party's more positive 
attitude to trade unions, as enunciated at its 1897 Conference, 
pointed in the same direction. Similarly the increasing 
influence of the Lancashire branches and the lessons of the 
Labour party on West Ham Council pulled the Federation 
towards 
such a policy. As the nineteenth century drew to a close 
183. 
the self-evident decline of the Socialist movement from its 
peak in the mid-1890s was demonstrated by what Harry Snell 
called a reversal to 'aimless enthusiasm'. 
18 
There was, says 
Stephen Yeo, 'A felt sense of failure, of being out of touch 
and unable to embrace the majority of the working class'. 
19 
Participation in a Socialist and Trade Union alliance might 
solve that dilemma. Thus the Executive of the Social-Democratic 
Federation decided to participate in the conference of February 
1900 which realised Keir Hardie's ambitions and led to the 
formation of the Labour Representation Committee. 
The events of the conference were foreshadowed by the 
presence of 19 SDF delegates at its Scottish counterpart, the 
inaugural gathering of the Scottish Workers' Parliamentary 
Committee, in January. Here the SDF amendment in favour of 
'the socialisation of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange' was defeated by what one correspondent termed 
the 'Burgess/Hardie axis'. 
20 
George Yates of the Leith branch 
felt that 'Once is enough in the history of the S. D. F. in 
Scotland', 21 but he and another SDFer took their places on the 
executive of the new body. In spite of the disappointments of 
the Scottish conference the SDF executive looked forward to 
participation in the Labour Representation Committee, sure that 
'whatever may be immediately agreed upon Socialism must 
ultimately be the gainer'. Whilst immediate results might 
not be forthcoming it would provide a forum for Socialist views 
and would at least 'be of material service to the working- 
class movement as a whole' . 
22 
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The formation of the Labour Representation Committee 
meant that an independent 'labour' party had finally emerged 
and, seemingly, the cause of Socialist unity had also been 
advanced, for both the ILP and SDF affiliated to the new body. 
In relation to their numbers the Socialist parties wielded 
considerable influence, having five out of twelve seats on 
the Executive23 and the probability of support from Socialists 
among the union representatives. Yet the divisions within 
their ranks loomed as large as ever and indeed were exacerbated 
by events at the conference. James MacDonald's resolution 
calling for a recognition of the class war and the adoption 
of a Socialist objective was defeated by 59 votes to 35, with 
the ILP delegates voting against on the grounds that such a 
resolution at this early stage would alienate the unions. The 
SDF was furious, attacking the ILP for 'that display of 
treachery to which we have, unfortunately, by this time become 
accustomed', and commenting 
that the delegates of an avowed Socialist 
organisation... should deliberately and boastfully 
repudiate the principles they were presumably sent 
to support is as incomprehensible as it is 
deplorable. 24 
The SDF was further upset by what it regarded as the 
duplicity of the ILP over the appointment of James Ramsay 
MacDonald as secretary of the LRC, accusing them of 
deliber- 
ately confusing the delegates to the detriment of the 
Federation's candidate James MacDonald. 
25 There is little 
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evidence to support this claim but an acrimonious exchange 
of letters followed and it was obvious that the SDF and ILP 
were now further apart than ever. 
At this stage it was the SDF's attitude towards the 
trade unions which was of more vital importance, and the 
Federation's initial response to the LRC had been favourable: 
All that the Conference has to concern itself with 
is the best means of securing representation of the 
working class in the House of Commons, independent 
of the Capitalist parties.... this in itself is 
a recognition of the class struggle. 
26 
Such an attitude was in marked contrast to earlier SDF 
strictures and clearly signalled that the policy laid down 
at the 1897 Conference still held. If maintained it would 
undoubtedly have extended the party's influence within the 
wider working-class movement, in the short term at least. But 
at their Annual Conference in August 1901, less than eighteen 
months after the formation of the LRC, the SDF delegates voted 
54-14 in favour of secession. Harry Quelch spoke vehemently 
for this course of action reasoning, somewhat tortuously, that 
as the bulk of the unions had not yet affiliated to the 
Committee it would be a mistake to antagonise them. H. W. Lee 
was more honest when he wrote later that 'We were being committed 
to the support of men and measures with whom and which we did 
not agree'. 
27 
Lee, Hyndman and the majority of the 'Old Guard' 
of the SDF came to regret the decision to withdraw from the 
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Labour Representation Committee. Few Labour historians 
have dissented from Lee's view 'that the decision was a sad 
mistake' , and they 
have accepted his conclusion that 
All the propaganda that we did afterwards, all the 
influence we were able to bring to bear in a 
Socialist direction, would have been very much 
greater indeed had we carried it on and exercised 
it as an integral part of the L. R. C., and not as 
an outside body at which many supporters of 
Independent Labour Representation looked a trifle 
askance because of our withdrawal from the L. R. C. 
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The SDF's decision was a fundamental error, but criticism 
of the party must be tempered by an awareness of the context 
in which the decision was made and the pressures confronting 
these Socialist activists of the early twentieth century. 
Lee's views were voiced when the Labour Party had become the 
main vehicle of working-class aspirations, when he himself had 
moved politically to the right. They reflected much changed 
circumstances. In 1901 options were still open, or so it 
seemed to the SDFers . Trade unions 
had not rallied to the 
LRC in any great numbers . Of 
its two M. P. s, Keir Hardie and 
Richard Bell of the Railway Servants, Bell was a Liberal on all 
questions except those related to his union. His views were 
indistinguishable from those of the eight 'Lib-Labs' 
in the 
House and lent little credence to the LRC's claim to 
independence. The failure to adopt a Socialist basis meant 
that the Labour Representation committee seemed indistinguish- 
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able from earlier attempts at Labour electoral associations . 
Even more important at this stage were internal developments 
within the Social-Democratic Federation. The decision to with- 
draw from the LRC reflected a further eruption of the 'reform 
versus revolution' debate which had been waged inside the 
party since its formation, and the most significant factor 
influencing the vote was the spectre of schism raised by the 
so-called 'impossibilist' revolt. 
The revolt within the SDF was a reflection of a wider 
international controversy over the Socialist attitude to war 
and the question of whether or not Socialism would be achieved 
by constitutional reform or by violent revolution. This latter 
issue came to a head at the Congress of the Second International 
in September 1900, where delegates fiercely debated the pro- 
priety of Millerand and two other French Socialists joining the 
French government. Karl Kautsky eventually proposed a reso- 
lution which condemned, in general terms, Socialist partici- 
pation in capitalist governments but which argued that it might 
be justified in exceptional circumstances. The British 
delegation, with one dissentient, supported this resolution 
and it was subsequently passed. 
29 
George Yates, of the Leith 
branch of the SDF, was the dissenting voice. Yates, a 
prominent Scottish critic of SDF policy, sided with the left 
opposition at the Congress and returned to Scotland determined 
to continue the struggle against reformism. He found a ready 
response in certain Scottish branches and later in London, for 
dissatisfaction 
with the leadership and policy of the 
SDF was 
widespread. 
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One bone of 
the Boer War. 
30 
vote Tory rather 
friction stemmed 
Guard' around Hy 
middle class; it 
contention was the Federation's response to 
Another was the decision to ask members to 
than Liberal in 1899. A further source of 
from the domination of the party by the 'Old 
ndman. The executive was middle-aged and 
had been in control of the Federation ever 
since its foundation and it also controlled the party organ 
Justice. 
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The dominance of Hyndman and his supporters irked 
many of the younger, working-class members 
32 
and, for the first 
time since the days of the Socialist League, the leadership 
was confronted by an increasingly vocal opposition. It was an 
opposition which had developed a distinctive political line, 
which regarded itself as a serious Marxist current in a party 
which had lapsed into reformism. They objected to what they 
saw as attempts at illusory short cuts to Socialism, the 
discarding of principles in the hope of immediate gain. Thus 
the electoral forays, the attempted alliance with the unions 
in the LRC, the unity talks with the ILP, a distinctly anti- 
Marxist body. Yates and others, scorning this compromising 
attitude, were increasingly attracted to the ideas of Daniel 
de Leon and the American Socialist Labour Party. Links between 
Scottish SDFers and the American Socialists had been estab- 
lished in 1898 when J. P. Douall of the Edinburgh branch had 
visited the United States and returned with some SLP literature. 
Some members were impressed by de Leon's exposition of 
Socialism, by his advocacy of industrial unionism as opposed 
to 
electoral struggle. His criticism of the Socialist parties 
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of the Second International as the 'labour lieutenants of 
capitalism', failing to challenge the existing power structure, 
seemed a percipient view of the SDF's role in the LRC. Thus, 
by the end of 1900, 'the American S. L. P. with its weekly and 
daily People and De Leon's pamphlets had exercised considerable 
influence on the S. D. F. branches in Scotland. '33 A further 
influence on the Scottish 'impossibilists' was James Connolly 
of the Irish Socialist Republican Party (IRSP). Connolly, one- 
time member of the SDF in Edinburgh, had long been exasperated 
by what he regarded as the compromising policies of that body. 
The final straw for him came at the Paris Congress when Hyndman 
objected to separate representation for the IRSP on the grounds 
that Ireland was part of Great Britain, not an independent 
country. Although Congress rejected this argument Connolly saw 
it as proof of the extent to which the SDF's Socialism had been 
eroded by imperialism. 'The position taken up at Paris', 
he said, 'was opposed to the whole tradition and policy of the 
S. D. F. 
34 
Connolly had close personal contacts with Yates, 
who had visited Dublin in 1897 to assist the Irish Socialists 
in their demonstrations against the Diamond jubilee celebrations. 
As Connolly's paper, the Workers' Republic, received financial 
assistance from de Leon there is no doubt that Connolly himself 
was influenced by de Leonite ideas. These strands merged in 
May 1901 when Connolly arrived in Scotland for a lecture tour, 
making a major impact as 'one of the best propagandists we 
have '. 35 
By the time of Connolly's arrival in Scotland the critics 
Of SDF policy had become increasingly outspoken. R. McDonald 
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of the Glasgow branch accused the Federation of 'criminal 
weakness, pusillanimity and shame', of having 'truckled to 
36 
I. L. P. and the pure and simple unions' .6 Leonard Cotton 
of oxford complained of 'a tendency amongst us to admit anyone 
as a comrade if he adopted our label and consented to swallow 
a little municipal sewage by way of credentials'. 
37 
Another 
member urged that they should 'purge the S. D. F. of the diplomats 
or others who imagine they are going to win by saying soft 
things to false friends or perchance are trying to build per- 
sonal reputations of municipal statemanship on the ruins of 
revolutionary Social-Democracy'. 
38 
As Tsuzuki has commented, 
The impossibilists were impartial in their attacks 
on all union and socialist leaders as 'fakirs' - 
whether they belonged to the official S. D. F., the 
I. L. P., the L. R. C., or the trade unions, all provided 
abundant material for their bitter criticism. 
39 
They began to talk openly of a rupture with the S. D. F. Cotton 
'would rather have a small party all pulling one way, than a 
large party pulling in all directions but the right one', 
40 
whilst C. Geis warned that to avoid the possibility of future 
faction SDFers should raise themselves 'to the highest level 
of intolerance' .1 
4 
The opposition's first success came in Scotland where a 
Yates motion to the Scottish District Council of the SDF 
proposing their withdrawal from the Scottish Workers' 
Parliamentary Election committee was carried by 17 votes 
to 
6. J. Carstairs Matheson of Falkirk, a schoolmaster whom 
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justice had previously described as 'one of the best educated 
and best informed men in the whole movement', 
42 
moved a further 
resolution proposing hostility to any alliance 'with the 
Independent Labour Party, trade unionists, co-operators, 
vegetarians, anti-vaccinators, the Young Men's Christ 
Association' or any other body opposed to the class war. 
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This was comfortably defeated but Matheson's bracketing of 
trade unions with such fringe organisations demonstrated clearly 
the implacable hostility of the 'impossibilists' to SDF policy. 
The response of the SDF leadership was muted and conciliatory. 
A 'Tattler' article attempted a weak defence of the Federation's 
position, arguing that a revolutionary Socialist 'must deal 
with things as they come along, he must be practical'. 
44 
Dora 
Montefiore suggested that 'Socialism may contain two sides, 
the revolutionary and the evolutionary side, and yet both 
sides are Socialism'. 
45 
What was most significant though was 
a hardening line towards the unions and the LRC. 
The SDF did not regard the first Annual Conference of 
the LRC as a great success; it was not 'hopefully suggestive 
of a vigorous effort to establish a real independent fighting 
arty'. 
46 
Four months later justice accused working class party' . 
46 
the trade unions of acting as 'mere decoy ducks of the 
capitalists' and deplored the lack of principle behind 
labour 
representation. 47 A long 'Tattler' article before the SDF 
Conference warned against any alliance with the unions although 
supporting 'occasional co-operation for a definite object' 
and a Quelch editorial in the week prior to the conference 
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rammed the message home. 'It is our mission to bring the 
other sections of the working class movement forward. We 
can do this best by holding ourselves free as a party while 
serving the trade unions as individuals'. 
48 
Accepting the trade 
unions as allies, the SDF would be handicapped 'by the back- 
wardness of those whom we seek to help'. 
49 
As the leadership strove to minimise the dissent Quelch's 
role was pivotal. Hyndman at this time was somewhat detached 
from SDF activities and he announced his resignation from the 
Executive shortly before the 1901 Conference. Ostensibly his 
reasons were dissatisfaction with the British working class as 
a potential revolutionary force and disillusionment with the 
SDF's progress. Weariness undoubtedly contributed to his 
resignation, as did personal financial problems, but Hyndman 
was very much aware of mounting criticism within the party, 
exemplified by the election of Theodore Rothstein to the 
Executive at the head of the poll. 
50 
His was in many senses 
a political withdrawal, a refusal to identify with either 
side in the debate. Whatever the reason Quelch, editor of 
Justice, assumed a much larger voice in SDF councils and his 
'orthodox-Marxist' tendency reasserted itself, retreating from 
the alliance with the pro-union forces which had enabled the 
SDF to enter the LRC. Quelch and the centre grouping were not 
motivated solely by the prospect of internal division within 
the SDF. The major industrial defeats of 1897 and 1898 - 
the Penrhyn slatemen, the engineers and the South Wales miners - 
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had already sown doubts as to the wisdom of their shift of 
position prior to the 1897 Conference. A casual glance at 
Justice during the engineers strike, for example, would have 
elicited little information about the strike and Quelch's 
editorials resumed the familiar hectoring tone, expressing 
support for the strike in one breath but pointing out that 
strikes were an 'unmixed evil' the next. Scepticism about 
the efficacy of trade unionism was reinforced by the publication 
of a previously unavailable Marxist text, Value, Price and 
Profit. This work concluded that capitalism tended to reduce 
wages to their minimum level and that the only solution was 
working-class political action leading to legislative inter- 
ference. Furthermore, many Socialist were impressed by the 
growth of trusts and cartels in this period, a development 
which they saw as further weakening the capacity of the trade 
unions to influence events. A corollary of this was that 
'trustification' prepared the way for Socialism, because 
industrial organisation on such a huge scale would allow 
Socialists to administer industry on behalf of the State after 
their takeover. For these reasons the 'orthodox-Marxists' 
were susceptible to the 'impossibilist' arguments. 
Why didn't the Federation simply expel what was, after 
all, a very small and divisive minority? 
51 Although they were 
few in number the 'impossibilists' were exceedingly vocal and 
an increasingly influential minority in certain areas. 
Jack 
Kent in London had been SDF lecture secretary and was on the 
Executive, as was Leonard Cotton in Oxford. The 
Scottish 
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dissenters had captured the Leith and Falkirk branches, 
severely disrupted the Edinburgh and Glasgow branches, and 
were able to control the District Council. They had the backing 
of William Gee, the Scottish organiser, as well as James 
Connolly. Their adherence to de Leonite ideology gave them a 
coherent theory which was proving attractive to many outside 
their ranks. Thus, although few in number, the expulsion of 
these members would have had a disproportionate effect on an 
organisation which, although it claimed 9,000 members, probably 
had only 1,000 activists in 50 functioning branches at that time. 
Also the leadership still remembered the events of 1884 and 
must have been acutely aware of the bitter feuding rending the 
American and French parties. The dissidents were, in part, 
simply a further expression of the long-term internal debate 
over the direction of SDF policy, and their views on trade 
unions were certainly not without support within the party. 
Thus the 'impossibilists' would eventually bring to a head the 
reform or revolution debate, but in the short term their 
challenge led to a withdrawal from the Labour Representation 
Committee. The achievements of the committee, it was felt, did 
not justify remaining in membership at the cost of internal 
repture within the SDF. 
The SDF's 21st Annual Conference, held at Birmingham on 
the 4th and 5th of August 1901, was a vituperative gathering. 
Opposition to party policy manifested itself in a Leonard 
Cotton resolution censuring those who supported Kautsky at 
the International Congress. He was supported by Matheson, who 
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protested at the 'wave of moderation' which had swept the 
Socialist movement, and by Gee, who complained that the class 
struggle had been abandoned in the Kautsky resolution. Yet, 
as Quelch was well aware, the real target of the largely 
Scottish opposition was the party leadership. He condemned those 
'certain members of working-class organisations eager to show 
their gratitude by casting aside men who, like Hyndman, had 
devoted their lives to the cause', and attacked them for 
attempting 'to sidetrack the Socialist movement in this country 
into the impossibilism which seventeen years ago led to the 
formation and, later, to the collapse of the Socialist League'. 
52 
The SDF, said Quelch, 'were not impossibilists and circumstances 
must determine our policy'. 
53 
His speech had the desired effect 
and the 'impossibilist' resolution was heavily defeated. 
Undeterred, Yates then challenged the leadership over the 
control of Justice. Although the official voice of the SDF 
the paper was owned by the Twentieth Century Press, in which 
Hyndman and his supporters had a majority shareholding. Yates 
suggested that the party should take over the paper as a means 
of reducing Hyndmanite hegemony, but this too was voted down, 
by 41 votes to 17. His motion opposing any further unity 
negotiations with the ILP was also lost. But on one issue the 
dissidents achieved success. In an attempt to maintain party 
unity Quelch proposed for the Executive that the SDF should 
withdraw from the Labour Representation Committee. The pretext 
was the low union membership affiliated to the LRC, and 
Quelch 
emphasised that withdrawal was not synonymous with antagonism 
to the trade unions. Thus a Falkirk resolution repudiating 
all 
political alliances with non-Socialist organisations was 
lost, 
but by 54 votes to 14, the delegates approved the Executive 
motion. The flexible line adopted in 1897 had been overcome 
by events and the consensus had shifted to the 'orthodox-Marxist' 
viewpoint; there was to be limited co-operation in the economic 
sphere, individual members had roles to play in their trade 
unions, but a formal alliance for political objectives was 
rejected as undermining the independence of the SDF. 
Such a compromise was fraught with difficulty. It prevented 
the adoption of any consistent strategy, whether pro or anti- 
union. Many SDFers were heavily involved in their unionp, yet 
at the very moment when the Labour movement was developing a 
serious political commitment the Federation rejected an alliance 
which its own members had helped to promote. Preoccupied with 
its own internal debates the Federation removed itself from the 
decision-making process at a crucial moment, thus contributing 
to the marginalisation of the Socialist option in the face of 
the Labour Alliance. Yet simultaneously the SDF found itself 
vulnerable to attack from the left as a consequence of its 
failure to develop a consistent revolutionary strategy. After 
its first twenty years the SDF had still to resolve its funda- 
mental dilemma - how best to marry its revolutionary aims with 
its reformist practice. J. Carstairs Matheson, the Falkirk 
schoolmaster, posed the problem very clearly. There was no 
room for the SDF as a reform party, he said, for there were 
too many rivals. 'Still less possible is it to be at once a 
reform and a revolutionary party... a revolutionary programme 
is the only practicable and consistent position 
if we are to 
escape political annihilation. 
54 
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The SDF's response to its predicament was to return 
Socialist unity to the agenda. David Howell has argued that 
the united Socialist option had, by this time, been effectively 
ruled out by the emergence of the Labour Representation 
Committee. 'The logic of national events... combined with local 
developments... to erode the United Socialist alternative, even 
in an environment where it had developed a significant 
presence'. 
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Similarly Stephen Yeo suggests that by the turn 
of the century Socialist unity had become less likely because 
the fervour and commitment of the 1890s, the air of optimism 
fuelled by a belief in imminent change, had dissipated in the 
face of the resilience of British capitalism and the retrench- 
ment of the Liberal Party. This led the ILP cabal of Hardie, 
Snowden, Glasier and MacDonald to take effective control of the 
party and steer it on the path of a broad Labour alliance at the 
expense of Socialist commitment. What is certain is that the 
SDF facilitated this course of events by its withdrawal from 
the LRC, thereby effectively reducing Socialist influence within 
the Labour movement and at the same time making unity with the 
ILP even less likely. Party activists were thereby placed in 
an invidious position. If they remained in the local Labour 
committees which had sprung up around the country, and which 
very often they had helped to form, they then found themselves 
at odds with national party policy; on the other hand 
if they 
withdrew they exposed themselves to the very charges of 
'impossibilism' 
and 'wrecking' which Quelch had been at pains 
to refute at the 1901 Conference. The sheer inconsistency of 
the SDF position, neither reformist nor revolutionary, rendered 
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effective action impossible. Nowhere was the dilemma more 
acutely felt than in Lancashire, the Federation's main pro- 
vincial centre, where the consequences of withdrawal from the 
LRC were clearly visible. 
199 . 
NOTES. 
E. B. Bax and H. Quelch, A New Catechism of Socialism, 
(6th edition, 1909), pp. 38-40. 
2. See Chapter IV. 
3. Clarion, 31 August 1901. 
4. Justice, 1 October 1898. 
5. Ibid., 9 January 1897. See also George Lansbury, arguing 
for SDFers to gain seats on the Boards of Guardians, in 
the Social-Democrat, January 1897. 
6. Justice, 10 August 1901. 
7. H. M. Hyndman to A. M. Simons, quoted in S. Pierson, 
British Socialists: The Journey from Fantasy to Politics. 
(1979), pp. 81-82. 
8. Justice, 29 January 1898. 
9. See, for example, the letter from a Lancashire member re 
the Middleton by-election in Justice, 20 November 1897. 
10. Ibid., 2 July 1892. 
11. Ibid., 3 June 1899. 
12. Ibid., 10 August 1895. 
13. This policy was similar to the ILP's local option arrange- 
went. 
14. Justice, 12 August 1899. 
15. Ibid. 
, 19 August 1899 . 
16. Ibid., 11 August 1900. 
17. N. and J. Mackenzie, The First Fabians, (1977) , pp . 
232- 
233. 
18. Ethical World, 8 October 1896. 
200. 
19. S. Yeo, Religion and Voluntary Organisations in Crisis, 
(1976), p. 262. 
20. Justice, 13 January 1900. 
21 . Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Two SDF, two ILP and one Fabian. The SDF representatives 
were Harry Quelch and James MacDonald. 
24. Justice, 3 March 1900. 
25. Lee and Archbold, op. cit., p. 106; H. M. Hyndman, Further 
Reminiscences, (1912), p. 269. 
26. Justice, 24 February 1900. 
27. Lee and Archbold, op. cit., p. 159. 
28. Ibid., pp .1 58-160 . 
29. The SDF had originally opposed Millerand's action, but 
Hyndman in particular had moderated his line, arguing that 
those on the spot knew best. See Justice, 2 September 
1899 and 16 June 1900. 
30. See Chapter II. 
31. Hence criticism of Quelch as editor at the 1899 Conference. 
32. By the turn of the century the membership of the SDF was 
largely working class although middle and lower-middle 
class members, particularly that intermediate strata of 
shopkeepers, clerks, schoolteachers and tradesmen, were 
still prominent in the organisation and administration of 
branches. See Maclntyre, op. cit., p. 93. 
33. C. Tsuzuki, 'The Impossibilist Revolt in Britain', 
International Review of Social History, volume I, 
1956, 
p. 384. 
34. Justice, 25 May 1901. 
35. Ibid., 13 July 1901. 
36. Ibid., 24 November 1900. 
37. Ibid., 29 December 1900. 
38. Ibid., 5 January 1901. 
39. Tsuzuki, 'The Impossibilist Revolt in Britain' op cit , . ., 
p. 390. 
40. Justice, 29 December 1900. 
41. Ibid., 4 May 1901. 
42. Ibid., 24 January 1901. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., 1 June 1901. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid., 9 February 1901. 
47. Ibid., 6 July 1901. 
48. Ibid., 3 August 1901. 
49. Ibid. 
50. See Tsuzuki, H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism, pp. 134 
and 140-142. 
51. Rabinovitch, op. cit., has estimated a maximum of 320 
members out of a total of 9 , 000, but even this would 
appear to be an over-estimate. The SDF lost some 80 
members to the Socialist Labour Party and 88 to the 
Socialist Party of Great Britain when these organisations 
were formed. 
52. Justice, 10 August 1901- 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid., 17 August 1901. 
55. D. Howell, 'Was the Labour Party Inevitable', The Bulletin 
of the North West Labour History Society, 1984, p. 17. 
CHAPTER IX. 
THE SDF IN LANCASHIRE. 
The SDF in the 1880s was a London-based and London-orientated 
party, and the capital assumed a central role in the Federation's 
strategy. Hyndman expressed this very clearly in an article 
in Today, where he argued that revolutionaries must strike at 
the nerve centre of British capitalism. The capture of London, 
he argued, 'the financial and commercial heart of Europe', 
would have tremendous repercussions both in England and Europe. 
He re-emphasised the opinion that London would lead the way to 
Socialism in his pamphlet, A Commune for London, and London 
Socialists continued to play a leading role in the Social- 
Democratic Federation throughout its history. Indeed, by the 
turn of the century the London Social-Democrats constituted a 
potent force in the capital. SDF fortunes in London have been 
comprehensively reviewed by Paul Thompson and therefore do not 
merit detailed study here. 
2 
Nonetheless its achievements in 
the capital should be noted. 
In the mid 1880s the party's Marxist Socialism replaced 
Secularism as the creed of the politically minded working man. 
Secularist strength in London was halved between 1885 and 1889. 
The attractiveness of the SDF's propaganda forced the Liberals 
to adopt the best and most practicable items of its programme 
for the first London County Council elections, and consequently 
SDF influence was temporarily restricted. During the trade 
union boom of 1889-92 SDFers were active in the unions and 
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instrumental in turning them towards independent Labour 
politics. The membership of the London Trades Council trebled 
in those years and it shifted to a militant standpoint, issuing 
a joint manifesto for all Labour candidates, including the 
SDF, for the 1892 County Council elections. Nine Labour men 
were elected and with the addition of three aldermen, including 
Ben Tillett, they formed a distinct 'Labour bench' whose 
political demands were all taken from the SDF. This influential 
position was partly negated by the Federation's reluctance to 
countenance a new party based upon the working class rather 
than a political creed, but even so by 1899 the SDF had over 
40 London branches, the best of them in working-class districts. 
The Federation dominated the Trades Council and the Gasworkers' 
union, had H. W. Hobart and Fred Knee on the Compositors 
Committee, and Knee as secretary of the influential Workman's 
National Housing Council. In West Ham and Bow and Bromley the 
SDF was the motivating force in strong local Labour Parties, 
one of which captured the West Ham Borough Council in 1898. 
The Independent Labour Party was unable to attract the support 
of any prominent London Labour leaders, the Labour Churches 
never took root, and support for the Liberals declined due to 
the Government's failure to keep its election promises, and 
its inability to find a solution to unemployment. 
'Here at 
least', says Thompson, 'the Social Democrats had effectively 
won the political leadership of the working class from the 
Liberals 
,'3 
A concentration on the SDF in London does not provide 
a balanced picture of the Federation's history. 
it reinforces 
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the tendency to view the party through the ideas and activities 
of the leadership. Also, it is incorrect to suggest that 
Hyndman and his supporters looked solely to London. From its 
earliest days the SDF's leading figures had been impressed by 
what they saw as the revolutionary potential of the industrial 
workers in the North of England. Hyndman thought that conditions 
in the northern towns provided the perfect arena for class con- 
flict for there was 'no middle class to break the force of 
collision between the capitalist and those whom he employs. '4 
This was an overly simplistic analysis, ignoring the diverse 
and complex social structure of Lancashire with its pervasive 
working-class Toryism, but it led to one of the Federation's 
earliest provincial initiatives, at Blackburn in 1884.5 Branches 
were soon formed at Blackburn, Oldham, Rochdale, Darwen and 
Salford, but the SDF's presence in Lancashire was far from 
established and their existence was precarious indeed. Why 
did the SDF struggle to sink firm roots in Lancashire in the 
1880's? 
The essential problem was that the early branches were not 
natural outgrowths of working-class politics in the county. 
They were heavily dependent on London for both speakers and 
organisers, a 'grafted political limb' says Jeffrey Hill, and 
'there was thus imported into Lancashire a number of metro- 
politan attitudes which might not have been appropriate 
for 
the northern environment' .6 As J. 
R. Widdup, a leading Burnley 
member in the 1890s, later commented, 'because of the 
differences 
in the character and historical traditions of the people 
there, 
205 . 
methods of propaganda which would be successful in the South 
might produce little result 
7 in the North'. Consequently the 
SDF struggled to survive in Lancashire in the mid 1880s. The 
Blackburn branch was, at one time, reduced to six members, 
Oldham collapsed completely, and only the dispatch of two 
Londoners to the province rescued the organisation. John 
Hunter Watts, a recruit to the SDF from the Secularist move- 
ment, organised the Salford branch into an energetic, campaign- 
ing body, concentrating on the question of unemployment. Its 
'street politics' included open-air meetings, demonstrations 
and marches, both to publicise the plight of the unemployed 
and to press for municipal reforms. The latter was to become 
a major and lasting concern of the SDF in Lancashire but at 
this time, overly influenced by the London leadership, the 
Lancashire SDF regarded the politics of demonstration and 
protest as the only viable form of action. 'Neglect politics 
and use every available means to force temporary proposals 
upon the ruling class', said Hyndman, and of course the SDF 
was then overtly sceptical of the value of trade unions. It 
had used the Blackburn weavers' strike as an opportunity to 
denounce the sectional interests of the unions, and this 
remained its position for much of the 1880s. 
The second organiser to arrive in Lancashire, Tom Mann, 
held very different views. He was responsible for expanding 
the Bolton branch's membership from 50 to 170, and for rescuing 
the Blackburn and Darwen branches from their almost moribund 
state. An eloquent speaker, as Charlie Glyde recalled, 
8 Mann's 
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focus of attention was the trade union movement, the organised 
ranks of the working class. The class struggle occurred at the 
point of production and here therefore the Socialists should 
concentrate their activities. Socialist consciousness would 
arise from specific struggles. Mann also persuaded the branch 
to put up six candidates for the municipal elections in September 
1887 and to ask for Trades Council support, although this was 
not forthcoming. Hardly surprisingly then, he viewed with dis- 
taste what he regarded as Hunter Watts' revolutionary posturing, 
his 'bundle-handkerchief men' and 'street-corner cheap jacks'. 
He also resented London interference in the affairs of the 
provincial branches. Eventually, disillusioned by what he saw 
as the sterile propagandism of the SDF, Mann drifted away9 
but his emphasis upon Socialist permeation of the unions, 
municipal electioneering and branch autonomy remained to 
influence the Lancashire SDF. 
Thus, in the 1880s, the SDF was mainly concerned with 
keeping its own branches alive. As H. W. Lee reported to the 
Annual Conference in 1888, the area was a disappointment for 
'more work has been put into that district than any other. 
' 
What was lacking, he said, was 'that nucleus of a few speakers 
and organisers in each town which is absolutely necessary to 
keep a good branch afloat'. 
10 Activity consisted largely of 
Propaganda, spreading the gospel, leaving the Federation 
isolated 
at a time when many local Trades Councils were 
beginning to 
develop a specifically 'Labour' consciousness and aiming 
for 
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Labour representation via the ballot box. As James Mawdsley, 
Conservative leader of the Cotton Spinners, explained: 
There is ample room for our efforts in regard to 
legitimate social reform and in the improvement 
of the conditions under which we live and work, 
without troubling our minds with the unworkable 
theories of Mr. Hyndman.... 
11 
Nonetheless, the SDF survived and its fortunes began to improve. 
Darwen reported that 'things are looking up a little', that the 
branch now had half a dozen speakers who could hold their own 
for half an hour or so and that audiences were increasing 
where 'Twelve months ago sympathisers were few and far between. ' 
12 Salford too had developed a cadre of members, men such as 
Tabbron, Horrocks and Evans, who took advantage of the advent 
of new unionism to extend the influence of the branch. 
Horrocks, Tabbron and W. K. Hall, 'a miner with an ascetic 
' 13 appearance and a cool, argumentative speaking style, were 
instrumental in establishing the local gasworkers branch, which 
soon gained the eight-hour day and wage increases. Horrocks 
became the union's organising secretary for Lancashire. 
Another member, Purves, was active amongst the dockers and 
Leonard Hall, a member of the SDF at that time, became an 
official of the Navvies' Union. Branch membership increased, 
14 
attendances at outdoor meetings improved and Tabbron was elected 
county borough auditor. With Rochdale also reporting encour- 
aging results and Joe Shufflebotham reorganising the Bolton 
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branch the outlook in Lancashire seemed brighter. Leonard 
Hall certainly thought so. At one time, he said, 'I was 
accustomed to be laughed at in Lancashire; arrested in Barrow; 
bricked, chased, and anathematised in Blackburn. ' Now, he 
reported, the crowds were more likely to turn on the interrupters 
15 The Salford SDF took advantage of this. Its work at the 
Manchester and Salford gasworks in the summer of 1889 had drawn 
it into the orbit of the local Trades Council and, thereby, 
into the conflict between Labour and the Manchester Liberal 
Union over the latter's refusal to countenance Labour 
representation. In August 1891 the Salford Labour Electoral 
Association was formed, comprising representatives from the 
Trades Council, the new unions, and the SDF. However, the 
only factor unifying these disparate elements was hostility 
to official Liberalism, and friction soon developed between 
the Radicals and the SDF. The result was a divided movement 
at the municipal elections of 1891. Alf Settle of the SDF, 
standing in Ordsall ward where he had polled well the year 
before, was opposed by the Radical secretary of the Carters 
and Lorrymen's Union and was defeated. Further wrangling 
followed over the parliamentary candidature for South Salford. 
W. K. Hall, the SDF candidate, was totally unacceptable to 
many non-Socialists and although he attempted to win over his 
opponents by standing on an essentially Radical programme 
he 
was soundly defeated at the polls and the Labour Electoral 
Association soon collapsed. Nothing daunted, the SDF co-operated 
shortly afterwards in the formation of the Manchester ILP as 
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a further attempt at promoting Labour unity, which accounts, 
says Jeffrey Hill, for the Manchester ILP's 'strongly leftist 
16 
preoccupations'. 
The Salford branch of the SDF had moved away from the 
street campaigning of the 1880s towards participation in a 
Labour alliance. Although its early attempts were fraught with 
difficulty it persevered and eventually became a constituent 
part of the Manchester Independent Labour Party, strongly 
influencing its ideology and style of campaigning. In this 
it had pointed the way for other branches and it did so at a 
time when the SDF was breaking out of its South-East Lancashire 
base and gaining support in the rapidly growing towns of the 
North-Eastern part of the county. Here the Social-Democratic 
Federation was to establish its most durable stronghold. 
In June 1891 Herbert Burrows arrived in Nelson to inaugurate 
a branch of the SDF. He spoke on 'The Meaning of Socialism', 
adapting his message to the traditional concerns of the Liberal 
textile workers in his audience. Neither teetotallism nor 
trade unionism was the answer to their problems, said Burrows, 
for both were an implicit recognition of capitalism. The 
workers must demand the Eight-Hour day and universal suffrage 
as the first steps on the road to emancipation. He met with 
a good response, a branch some 30 strong being organised. 
Shortly afterwards members of this branch visited Burnley and 
met with even more success . By mid-1893 
Burnley could report 
over 600 members, making it by far the largest SDF 
branch, and 
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the Federation's Annual Conference was held in the town. 
Other branches were established in the surrounding districts, 
at Padiham, Colne and Brierfield. What factors led to this 
quite startling success in North-East Lancashire? 
Nelson and Burnley in the 1880s have been likened to 'frontier 
towns'. 
17 The district experienced rapid economic growth, 
which was accompanied by a population boom. Nelson, for example, 
expanded from a town of 4,000 in the 1860s to one of over 
20,000 by 1890. Much of this growth could be accounted for by 
an influx into the area of thousands of migrant workers, parti- 
cularly from the Yorkshire Dales, Cowling, Keighley and the 
Pennine uplands. The relative newness of industrial growth 
had considerable repercussions on the political life of the 
area. It meant that the trade unions were less incorporated 
into the traditions of co-operation and collective bargaining 
which tended to defuse conflict in the spinning industry for 
example. The weavers of Nelson and Burnley were to prove far 
more receptive to Socialist propaganda than the elitist spinners 
with their tendency to Toryism. Similarly in mining, Burnley's 
other major industry, the unions had a fluctuating history, and 
a stable branch of the Lancashire Miners' Federation was only 
formed as late as 1888. Consequently the leadership of the 
unions was never fully in control of its members, and rank and 
file militancy could be exploited by the SDF. A factor 
encouraging militancy was the absence of that personal relation 
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ship between employer and employee which characterised 
industrial relations in Blackburn, where industry was much 
better established. This was a consequence of the extensive 
migration into the area and many of these immigrants brought 
with them radical traditions which were grafted on to existing 
democratic traditions which flourished locally. Such militancy 
was further encouraged by the appalling living conditions 
resulting from rapid industrialisation. Housing conditions 
and child mortality rates were significantly worse than in the 
older cotton towns. At the turn of the century the infant 
death rate in Burnley was as high as the national average for 
India, 
18 
and the town was hugely overcrowded owing to the abuses 
of unplanned growth. The appalling resultsof child labour 
and the half-time system were also very visible in Burnley. 
Thus the Socialist critique had considerable weight behind it 
and Hyndman could effectively liken the town to 'One of the 
hideous hells of Dante' . 
19 
The dominant Liberal ethos in Burnley rested on the twin 
pillars of personal regeneration and self-improvement. Yet 
this cultivation of moral improvement worked two ways. For 
many in the SDF membership of a temperance group was the first 
step on the way to political consciousness, whilst the revival 
of the Socialist ideal of emancipation through education was 
an unintended consequence of late nineteenth century educational 
change. Self-improvement became linked with a wider emphasis 
on economic change, where individual and collective 
betterment 
could co-exist. Two members of the Burnley SDF exemplify 
these 
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relationships. Dan Irving, the branch organiser, was an 
ex-Nonconformist, temperance man and member of the Bristol 
Liberal Operatives Association; John Sparling, secretary of the 
Burnley Miners, was an ex-bible class teacher and Sunday School 
superintendent. There were therefore, in North-East Lancashire, 
various groups 'who reacted to particular blends of economic 
and cultural experience by going beyond Radicalism to some form 
of Socialist commitment'. 
20 
One group much neglected by 
historians is the female workforce of the weaving sheds, for in 
this area women played a vital role in the growth of Socialism. 
Their experiences at home and in the workplace, their position 
of near equality, 'could provoke social enquiry, union activism 
and Socialist commitment', says Jill Liddington. 
21 
The factor 
which enabled the Social-Democratic Federation to exploit the 
opportunities available was the enormous ability of its 
organisers, Pan Irving in particular. 
At the end of 1890 Leonard Hall had complained that the SDF 
executive had fallen prey to the 
cockney superstition that London is not only the 
hub of the insular movement, but also that the 
provinces in general, and perhaps Lancashire in 
particular, are the veriest of accidental gnats 
upon the jelly. 
22 
If this were so, they were soon impressed by the remarkable 
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growth of the SDF in North-East Lancashire. A year after 
Hall's complaint J. Hunter Watts had revived Hyndman's argu- 
ment of the early 1880s that Lancashire provided the best 
prospects for the SDF, rather unrealistically suggesting that 
there the demise of capitalism was imminent and also that there 
the workers were 'not wedded to Radicalism' . 
23 
Quelch re- 
inforced the message a few months later. Social-Democrats, 
he said, must give more attention to North and North-East 
Lancashire for they had become 'thoroughly permeated with 
Social-Democratic principles and nowhere does the movement 
display more hopeful prospects'. 
24 
Encouraged by the early 
success of the Burnley SDF in gaining a seat on the School 
Board, the Executive sent Joe Terrett to the area as organiser. 
Terrett used the name A. G. Wolfe whilst in Lancashire. 
A member of the gasworkers and only twenty years old, he had 
worked for the SDF in London and tramped all over the country 
lecturing on Socialism. He was a tireless organiser and, when 
joined by Dan Irving as full-time secretary of the Burnley 
branch, the SDF had two powerful propagandists. They brought 
an aggressive, campaigning approach to Lancashire Socialism, 
but also instilled discipline and organisation into the party, 
as the following report shows. 
A committee of thirty-six members was appointed and 
the committee was divided into twelve threes: three 
for each ward of the town. The duty of these three 
members is to go to private addresses of each member 
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of the Party in the ward to collect his weekly 
subscription and to leave his copy of Justice. 
Moreover, the collector had to note members' other affiliations. 
Thus , 
By means of this information and industriously 
whipping up the members, the SDF has been able 
to place Socialists upon the Committee of the 
Weavers' Association and also upon the Committee 
of the Co-operative Society. 
25 
A further vital factor for the SDF was the publication 
of a weekly Socialist newspaper, the Burnley Socialist and 
North-East Lancashire Labour News. Its editor was J. R. 
Widdup26 and it achieved a circulation of 2 , 000, thus keeping 
the SDF in the public eye. 
27 
Of overriding importance in 
extending SDF political influence was its developing relation- 
ship with the trade unions. Its Eight-Hour campaign of 1 892 
had won the support of both the Burnley and Nelson Weavers' 
Associations 
. Indeed the programme of the 
Burnley Weavers' 
in 1892 included a resolution in favour of 'the socialisation 
of the means of production, distribution and exchange, to be 
controlled by a democratic state in the interests of the 
entire community', and it further stated that the 'political 
and financial support of the Society shall be used towards the 
creation of an Independent Socialist Party'. But above all 
else it was the miners' lockout of 1893 which gave the 
Burnley 
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SDF a permanent hold on the town. Working conditions in the 
pits around Burnley were bad, profit margins low, and consequently 
long hours and low pay were the norm. Furthermore, the coal 
owners were anti-union. Issues such as these provided an 
opportunity for Socialist agitation but additionally ethnic 
and religious differences amongst the miners meant a division 
of political allegiance between Liberals and Tories. Political 
solidarity could not, therefore, be achieved under a Lib-Lab 
banner and the SDF had a political space to occupy. Terrett 
effectively campaigned amongst the miners during the lock-out, 
and with local mills closed through lack of fuel found a further 
response amongst the weavers. As a result John Markham of the 
SDF became weavers' vice-president, John Sparling secretary of 
the Burnley miners and James Roberts secretary of the Trades 
Council. Later in the year the SDF put forward five candidates 
in the municipal elections on a platform of social reform and 
independent Labour. Sparling and John Tempest of the Twisters 
and Drawers were successful. By the end of 1893 the Federation 
had gained an influential role in working-class politics and 
a Socialist-led Labour Party seemed a distinct possibility. 
However, the aggressive approach of Terrett and Irving 
was not universally popular. Selina Cooper recalled that 
during her term on the Burnley Guardians Irving could sometimes 
be an embarassing ally, 'with his habit of addressing 
individuals 
as if they were public meetings and of losing his temper with 
his opponents' . 
28 
Keir Hardie attacked them in the Labour 
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Leader for attempting to wreck the Accrington ILP and form 
an SDF branch, leading Terrett to retort that 'We have got 
as much right to push our propaganda among you as among Liberals 
and Tories. On the other hand so have you with us. And so 
29 
you do'. 
In Burnley itself the attempt to capture the Weavers' 
Association as a base for Labour representation provoked a 
Lib-Lab counter-attack, which demonstrated that the SDF, although 
powerful, still had much to do. The SDF, by packing the 
Association's meeting with its members, had succeeded in push- 
ing through a resolution supporting Labour representation in 
1894. In addition it had removed from the Liberal-led Executive 
the power to choose the Association's delegates to the TUC. 
The Liberals reacted swiftly to the SDF assault on their 
previously pre-eminent position; adopting similar tactics to 
the SDF they managed to nullify most of the SDF gains. Labour 
disunity was emphasised by the fact that at the 1894 municipal 
elections there were ten Labour candidates of varying persu- 
asions, and none of them was successful. Significantly Robert 
Stanhope, one of the Lib-Lab leaders of the Trades Council, 
was elected as a Liberal. In Burnley the willingness of the 
Liberal party to consider working-class representation maintained, 
ties between Liberals and Labour, and the fact that Philip 
Stanhope, the town's Liberal M. P., was an extreme Radical also 
retarded the shift of the Lib-Labs to independence. Stanhope 
supported the Eight-Hour Day, manhood suffrage, payment of M. 
P. s 
and land nationalisation. Thus, when opposed by Hyndman at the 
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1895 elections, he argued that he was 'a better Socialist 
than any in the Socialist Party', fighting 'in the interests 
of Labour ... to raise the standard of life'. 
30 
In this context 
Hyndman scored 1,498 votes out of 12,085 in a three-cornered 
fight, a not insignificant effort. It is worth noting that 
some local members felt the candidature premature at this 
stage. Widdup, for example, attacked the centre for draining 
the resources of the local SDF, 
31 
and the pressure on its 
finances was shown by the collapse of the Burnley Socialist 
shortly afterwards. The resilience of the Lib-Labs and a 
council policy of municipalism led to the loss of the two 
SDF council seats by 1896, although as some compensation Irving 
did get on the School Board. These events led to a reaction 
within the Burnley SDF against the 'Labour alliance' policy. 
John Sparling was expelled from the branch in 1896 for standing 
as a Labour candidate and another member castigated the Trades 
Council as 'thoroughly reactionary'. Yet these were rare 
aberrations in what was otherwise a consistent policy. From 
this time onwards there were two bodies seeking the working- 
class vote in Burnley, each intent on an alliance with the 
trade unions and, as Jeffrey Hill suggests, 'it is worth noting 
the extent to which it was the SDF which sought to heal the 
breach'. 32 
The failure of the SDF attempt to form a Socialist-ied 
Labour Party in Burnley does not disprove Hill's argument that 
SUF success in Lancashire Was :: ue largely to 
its policy and 
practice of Labour alliance. The attempt to 
form such an 
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alliance gave the Federation considerable input into the trade 
unions and it was these links which enabled the SDF to present 
the Liberals with a serious challenge over two decades. In 
Burnley too the strength of Lib-Labism meant that the SDF 
developed an aggressive stance. It presented a serious ideo- 
logical alternative to Liberalism and, as Trodd has noted, 
33 
was a party of definite intellectual hue appealing largely 
to ex-Radicals and Lib-Labs unhappy at the skewed relationship 
with the Liberal Party. Contrastingly, in Nelson and Blackburn 
the SDF was far more successful in its search for an alliance 
of Socialists and trade unionists and the branches there 
developed very differently. 
There had been a small Lib-Lab group representing the Nelson 
weavers on the town council since 1890, and the Trades Council 
was developing an increasingly independent frame of mind and 
planning a Labour paper. This was due partly to growing dis- 
illusionment with the local Liberal party and also to consider- 
able dissatisfaction with the local M. P., W. J. Kay-Shuttleworth. 
A Labour candidate was mooted for the 1892 election, although 
never actually brought forward, but discontent increased when 
the Liberals refused to consider working-class candidates for 
the 1892 municipal elections. This atmosphere proved conducive 
to the growth of the SDF branch, founded in June 1891, which 
had already gained kudos for its struggles to establish the 
right of free speech. The slump in the cotton industry and 
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consequent rising unemployment gave it a further outlet for 
campaigning and SDFers gained local notoriety by forcing their 
way into a meeting of the Guardians Relief Committee demanding 
work rather than charity. Thus, when an ILP branch was formed 
in December 1892 prior to the formation of the national body, 
the SDF was fully involved and in an influential position. At 
the ILP's inaugural national conference in Bradford two of the 
three Nelson representatives, Ernest Johnson and C. W. Parratt, 
were SDF men. The two parties joined forces with the Trades 
Council at the municipal elections of 1893, running five 
candidates of whom two were successful. In the same year Ernest 
Johnson was elected to the Nelson School Board along with two 
other Trades Council representatives. As the local paper pointed 
out, 
Comrade Johnson is where he is because the socialist 
is well organised and therefore instead of wasting 
their strength in vain and useless rivalry they kept 
together and what is more to the purpose, worked 
together. 
34 
This liaison continued throughout the 1890s and into the 
twentieth century, with jointly-sponsored candidates being 
successful on both the town council and the Guardians. The 
Nelson weavers had supported the Socialist resolution at the 
1897 Trades Union Congress, and by the turn of the century 
it 
is true to say that Socialism had played an important role 
in 
forming the basis of a Nelson Labour Party. 
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Blackburn had been the initial point of entry for the 
SDF in Lancashire, but the branch had struggled through most 
of the 1880s in the face of organised attacks on its meetings 
by gangs of Tory working men. The visit of Tom Mann in 1888 
stabilised the situation and the appointment of Tom Hurley as 
organiser in 1890 revitalised the party. A locally-born 
Irishman who could tap some support from the Catholic community, 
Hurley was a good orator who adapted SDF Socialism to appeal 
to the strong working-class Tory element in the town. Generally 
in Lancashire working-class Toryism stemmed from a popular bias 
against the largely Liberal employers, but in Blackburn it was 
based on the paternalism of the local family firms, an elite 
of wealthy cotton manufacturers who prided themselves on their 
community consciousness. Blackburn had a reputation for 'clog 
Toryism', its working class characterised as 'drinking, roistering 
Blackburners nearly all of them of the Cockfighting-Church-and- 
State-Glorious Constitution Party' , 
35 
who threw dead cats at 
Socialist orators. Consequently Blackburn Socialism was less 
intellectual than its Burnley or Nelson counterparts, concent- 
rating on local issues such as workhouse conditions or union 
rates and even propagandising in Lancashire dialect. Hurley's 
complaint that 'the articles which appeared in Justice were 
sometimes beyond the understanding of Young Socialists who 
had 
just come into the movement'36 reflected this approach. 
The fact that the Blackburn branch of the SDF needed to 
draw support from Tory working men led it to 
develop and maintain 
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an overt and abrasive hostility to the Liberals. Those from 
the radical wing of Liberalism who were attracted to Socialism 
tended to join the ILP, which emerged from the remnants of the 
town's Fabian Society in 1893, whereas the SDF was better fitted 
than the ILP to appeal to Blackburn working-class Toryism. It 
was not teetotal, and sympathised with the Anglican opposition 
to the Puritanism of Nonconformity. The ILP's Fabian origins 
caused some initial SDF apprehension that the ILPers would 
'carry their jellyfish Fabianism with them', but cooperation 
between the two bodies soon became the normal order of the day. 
They worked together in a Tenants Defence League, on an 
Unemployed Demonstration Committee and in local elections, and 
they also produced a monthly newspaper, The Blackburn Labour 
Journal. 
Economic and political developments in Blackburn encouraged 
Socialist progress. The Liberal party was actively hostile to 
Labour representation, leading the Trades Council to declare 
its independence as early as 1892. In 1897 the Liberals refused 
to stand candidates against Tory opposition in the municipal 
elections, a tacit Liberal-Tory alliance which pushed Lib-Labs 
like Joe Johnson, the Spinner's secretary, into the independent 
Labour forces. Opposition on Blackburn council to such 
demands 
as fair contracts and minimum wages for corporation workers 
caused further working-class resentment. Foreign competition 
led to a slump in the cotton industry, resulting 
in short-time 
working and unemployment. The trade unions grew 
in strength as 
a result and the Tories, feeling threatened, shed their pater- 
nalism and appealed to the middle-class vote 
by adopting a hosti 
1) 1) 1) 
attitude to Labour and social reform. Consequently the Tory 
working-class vote became vulnerable to the Socialist-led 
Labour forces. Elsewhere the introduction of new technology 
fostered SDF influence in the Typographical Association and 
the Sheet Metal Workers' Union, and the party also developed 
a strong base in the newer unskilled unions, particularly those 
of the gasworkers and window cleaners. The increasing strength 
of the Socialist forces was reflected in the electoral campaigns 
of Hurley. In 1892 he polled only 268 votes in a municipal 
contest; in 1895 he topped the poll for the School Board and in 
1898 he was elected to the Council, winning a seat from the 
Tory-sponsored secretary of the Weavers' Protection Society. 
Six SDF/ILP candidates gained a total of 3,027 votes in 1899 
and by 1900 there were four Trades Council, two SDF and two 
ILP councillors, with one ILPer and one SDFer on the Guardians. 
Hurley had also been elected public auditor. These gains 
culminated in Philip Snowden's parliamentary candidature in 
1900. Snowden stood as a 'Labour and Socialist' candidate, with 
Albert Brookes of the SDF as his treasurer. As Jeffrey Hill has 
commented, the SDF's triangular alliance37 with the Trades 
Council and the ILP had, by 1900, 
out-stripped the Liberals as the chief opponent of 
a very powerful brand of local Toryism; it laid the 
basis for Philip Snowden's spectacular LRC campaigns 
of 1900 and 1906 which finally broke the Tories' 
long- 
standing monopoly of parliamentary representation 
in 
the borough. 38 
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This combination of Socialist and non-Socialist forces 
to present an independent Labour viewpoint was a crucial 
factor in the relative success of the SDF in Lancashire. It 
was never a smooth and unhindered process; there was a Lib- 
Lab counter-attack in Burnley, whilst the Blackburn Trades 
Council expelled an executive member in 1895 for 'trying to force 
down the throats of the Executive his own Socialist ideas in 
and out of season'. The general hostility of the textile unions 
as a body often caused strained Labour/Socialist relations. 
Nonetheless, 
What was emerging on a broad front was an open-minded, 
not to say pragmatic, form of social-democracy in 
which a willingness to change, to dispense with dogma 
and, above all, to seek genuine contacts with the 
labour movement was clearly evident. 
39 
Yet this characterisation of the Social-Democratic Federation 
tells only half the story, for the Lancashire branches were 
also amongst the strongest advocates of Socialist unity in the 
1890s. The. history of the Socialist movement in this period 
is often posited in terms of Labour alliance or Socialist unity, 
but the two were not mutually exclusive. In one sense they 
were interdependent because it obviously made sense for the 
Socialists to be a united force if they were effectively 
to 
seek cooperation from the trade unions. A second motivating 
factor was simply the relative strengths of the 
local bodies; 
unity was often imperative for survival where either 
the ILP or 
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the SDF was considerably weaker than the other. This explains 
the furore in Accrington; contrastingly in Burnley the ILP 
branch was not formed until 1898 and was completely over- 
shadowed by the SDF, and in Blackburn the three SDF branches 
boasted 300 members in 1900 as opposed to the ILP's 75. 
Furthermore joint membership was common, many Socialists ignoring 
national controversies in favour of an enthusiastic and wide- 
ranging espousal of Socialist principles. Such an approach was 
certainly stimulated by Robert Blatchford's Clarion, which was 
very influential in Lancashire. A third explanation can be 
found in the extended time-scale of the Labour alliance policy. 
The postponement of the social revolution to a more distant 
future, the concentration upon the gaining of positions on 
municipal and trade union bodies followed by the grind of 
committee work, frustrated many activists. As one disappointed 
member commented, Socialist politics in the late 1890s seemed 
'hum-drum and commonplace compared to the good old days of 
fourteen years ago'. 
40 
The vision of a new world had made 
Socialism 'an adventure - you were up against all t' social 
conventions, t'press, t'police, church and state, an' sometimes 
your own family as well. ' 
41 
To move from that sense of 
adventure to near respectability on Boards of Guardians and town 
councils was a far cry from 'The Religion of Socialism' explored 
by Stephen Yeo. Many would have echoed Hunter Watts'' plea to 
confine ourselves to the propaganda of Socialism at 
the street corner if success at the polling booth 
is 
to render us too respectable to take part in the rough- 
42 
and-tumble fight against capitalist domination. 
After the diappointing results of the 1895 general election 
there was a slump in the Socialist movement. Trade union 
support still seemed a distant objective and therefore Socialist 
unity was seen as a return to the crusading days, a revival of 
the idea of Socialism as a separate culture, a total way of life. 
Here the pervasive influence of Blatchford and Clarion Socialism 
in Lancashire Labour politics was important. As David Howell 
argues, Blatchford offered access to the 'cake and ale culture 
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of urban Lancashire'. Blatchford's emphasis on hostility to 
both major parties was essential in an area which differed from 
national trends because of its strong working-class Toryism. 
His criticism of the leaderships of both the SDF and the ILP, of 
the bureaucracies which he considered were strangling the move- 
ment, touched achord in Lancashire where the rank and file of 
both parties worked side by side. Thus Socialist unity and 
Labour alliance were mutually reinforcing aspects of the same 
policy. The alliance was pragmatic politics, to extend 
Socialist influence within the Labour movement and to achieve 
the social reforms or `palliatives' which the SDF believed 
essential as stepping stones to revolution. Nonetheless the 
long-term aim remained to convert individuals to Socialism, 
and Socialist unity can be seen as an impatient response to 
that time-scale. Rochdale provides an example of the inter- 
relation between the two. 
Rochdale was the largest single-member borough 
in south 
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Lancashire, a predominantly textile town, and a stronghold of 
Liberalism. The massive Liberal hegemony in the borough 
produced an indifference to working-class demands which was 
a major factor in the emergence of both the SDF and the ILP. 
The SDF branch was formed in 1887 with only three members, 
renting a cellar at two shillings per week for its meetings. 
In common with other Lancashire branches at the time it struggled 
to survive, relying on the occasional speaker imported from 
Manchester and concentrating its activities around public meetings 
to protest at the level of unemployment. Indeed its main claim 
to fame was that it had the oldest living SDFer, a Mrs. Holmes, 
who was a member of a family running a Socialist public house. 
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The branch's first foray into municipal politics came in November 
1890 when it stood three candidates on an eight-point programme 
which included the Eight-Hour Day, trade union rates for 
corporation workers and free, secular education. This essentially 
Labour programme was aimed at winning trade-union support, and 
a feature of Rochdale Social-Democracy was its links with trade 
unionism. Although the polls were extremely disappointing, 
45 
the SDF was not discouraged. Its candidate for the School 
Board in 1891 fared much better under the cumulative voting 
system and polled 6,349 votes, leading the branch to proclaim 
that they had become 'a recognizable party in this town and we 
have every prospect of doing good work in the future, as we 
are financially in a good position and our membership still 
increases. 46 
In May 1892 the Federation approached the Trades 
Council 
227. 
to ask for a joint platform at the next elections. The 
response is unknown, but Trades Council dissatisfaction with 
Liberal attitudes towards Labour caused them to put forward two 
candidates on a programme which included the Eight-Hour Day 
and municipalisation, whilst the SDF had only one candidate. 
The municipal results in 1892 were considerably better than on 
47 
the previous occasion and provided the impetus first for 
a local Fabian Society and then for a branch of the ILP. Its 
raison d''etre was hostility to the Liberals for as James Firth, 
a leading Trades Councillor, said, 'on the great questions 
affecting the working classes both political parties were at 
one'. 
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The committee of the new ILP acknowledged 'kindredship 
with the Socialists' and the two bodies cooperated in organising 
a Keir Hardie meeting in December 1892. 
Over the next three years the ILP and SDF mounted a combined 
assault upon the Liberal Party in Rochdale. In the 1894 muni- 
cipal elections ILP intervention cost the Liberals a seat and 
the SDF came close to unseating a Liberal in another ward. The 
Liberal response was to detach the Trades Council from the 
Socialists with what the Rochdale Times called 'an avalanche of 
promises', 
49 
and at the same time to appoint leading Trades 
Council members to the Executive of the Reform Association. 
This effectively halted Trades Council 
it did not prevent Labour criticism of 
by landlords and capitalists and large 
class demands 
. SDF and ILP membership 
influence, 
and at the general election 
political activity but 
a Liberal Party dominated 
ly impervious to working- 
increased, as did their 
in 1895 they united 
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behind George Barnes of the ILP as parliamentary candidate. 
Barnes stood on the basis that both parties were equally in- 
different to working-class interests, and to the amazement of 
the Liberals his intervention cost them the seat. 
50 
SDF and ILP co-operation was maintained after the election. 
They shared a newspaper, The Rochdale Labour News, and established,,. 
a joint election committee. The alliance continuously sought 
the support of the Trades Council and the local unions, in 
spite of frustration with their Liberal attachment. 'What the 
workers need', said one SDFer, 'is not Labour representation 
but Socialist representation. '51 But the Socialists' efforts 
were thwarted by the Liberal policy of nominating leading 
trades unionists as their municipal candidates and thereby 
dividing the Trades Council. Pelling has suggested that this 
led to an SDF Socialism of the uncompromising type 
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but is 
this true? Although frustrated with local trade unionism the 
SDF recognised that mere anti-Liberal propaganda was insufficient 
and that a broader base in the trade unions was needed. Setbacks 
at the polls in 1897 confirmed this. Yet at the same time the 
logic of events in Rochdale contributed to support for Socialist 
unity. In May 1898 the Labour News declared for fusion and in 
March of that year the ILP had cancelled a meeting because 
Hyndman was in the town visiting the SDF. The two bodies 
joined 
forces to support Thomas Hacking of the SDF in Wardleworth West 
Ward at the municipal elections of the same year. Hacking was 
a leading member of the Trades Council and stood with 
its support 
He was organiser of the Bakers and Confectionery operatives 
for 
229. 
15 years and also active in organising the bleaching and dying 
trades. The Liberal Party refused to allow him a free run and 
stood a so-called 'Progressive' against him in the shape of a 
seventy three year old ex-cotton manufacturer. As a result the 
ILP suspended its 'fourth clause' and urged the electorate to 
vote Tory in other wards. Hacking won, to become the SDF's 
first councillor, and a Liberal was defeated in Castleton East 
ward. Soon afterwards R. Thompson of the SDF was elected 
Borough Auditor. Heartened by these results the Socialist 
forces decided to contest the 1900 Parliamentary election with 
Allan Clarke, ex-millworker and early SDFer but now a member of 
the ILP, as their candidate. The Liberals retaliated with a 
local candidate, Gordon Harvey, who stressed his Radicalism; 
his election programme demonstrated the extent of the trans- 
formation wrought by Socialism, as he attempted to steal their 
thunder. Yet, in spite of a badly organised campaign by Clarke, 
he gathered 901 votes, sufficient to deprive the Liberals of 
the seat again. 
Thus in Rochdale the SDF had not been able to create a 
formal Labour alliance but it had constituted one vital part of 
an effective Socialist force within the town. This had been 
achieved because its continued efforts to forge a trade union 
alliance had enabled it to develop significant links with 
trade unionists. Its avowed anti-Liberalism had also gained 
it 
support. The events of the 1890s, however, led the 
Rochdale 
Socialists to draw the moral that Socialist as opposed 
to Labour 
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success was possible. As Thomas Whittaker argued after the 
1900 election the 'Socialist vote pure and simple had increased 
by five hundred since the last election. '53 The defeat of 
Philip Snowden in Blackburn was interpreted as showing that 
Liberals would vote Tory rather than Socialist and this some- 
what naive assessment made the Rochdale comrades determined to 
maintain their independence. In this they had the support of 
the ILP branch, and it is worth noting that the Federation's 
dominance of the alliance was achieved in spite of an ILP 
membership of 300, which made it one of the largest branches 
in the county. This in itself militates against any notion of 
SDF intransigence or dogmatism. 
Tsuzuki has classified the Lancashire members of the SDF as 
belonging to the right-wing of the party, owing to their attempts 
to forge links with the trade unions and their concentration on 
municipal electioneering. This is an over-simplistic view of 
SDF ideology in Lancashire. What characterised the party there, 
above all else, was it flexibility. It was prepared to tailor 
its approach to its environment and respond to specific trends 
in the locality. 'A search through local Socialist literature 
for indications of SDF dogmatism and isolation from the main 
currents of working-class life would be an unrewarding experience 
says David Howell. 54 Members could embrace both Socialist 
unity and Labour alliance, unemployed demonstrations and council 
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elections. Yet the undeniable trend was towards the formation 
of Labour alliances, and even if the attempt was unsuccessful 
it meant that the SDF developed links with individual trade 
unionists and considerable influence upon individual trade unions, 
Essentially the SDF acted as a catalyst for the Labour movement 
in Lancashire. In Burnley, Nelson and other parts of the 
county it began what was to be the long process of Liberal 
disestablishment, demonstrating to the working-class electorate 
that Liberal values which had remained unchanged for decades 
did not perhaps represent their best interests. In Blackburn 
the Federation proved attractive to a section of the working- 
class Tory electorate as the community base of Tory paternalism 
crumbled. Whether appealing to Liberal or Tory working men, 
the significance of the SDF lay 'in the permeation of socialist 
ideas that ultimately demanded a shift in the local power 
structure'. 
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In the long term the beneficiary was the Labour 
Representation Committee but during the 1890s the Federation 
enjoyed something of a golden age, which suggested to many of 
its activists that a new society was attainable. This, in part, 
explains the enthusiasm for Socialist unity. 
The ILP, arriving relatively late on the Lancashire scene, 
was heavily influenced by SDF tactics and theory and the two 
were often indistinguishable. After national unity negotiations 
had broken down, Charles Higham of the Blackburn ILP could 
point out that 
in Blackburn, Nelson, Rochdale, Ashton and several 
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other places, the local branches of the I. L. P. 
and S, D. F. already work cordially side by side 
and for elections and many propaganda purposes 
are already virtually federated together. 
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Co-operation with the ILP and SDF tactics generally in 
Lancashire were not meant to imply an abandonment of revolutionar 
principles, hence Dan Irvings warning to SDFers who were 
elected to public bodies not to lose sight of their ultimate 
objective. The watering down of the Socialist commitment was 
certainly the danger inherent in the Lancashire approach, but 
SDFers there viewed Labour representation and social reform 
not only as part of the campaign to gain the SDF palliatives 
but also as a means of making Socialists. The Lancashire SDFers 
perhaps viewed the revolution on a somewhat longer time-scale 
than members elsewhere. As Hill comments, they had '... come 
to terms with the region's social and economic structure, 
accepting the fact of trade unionism and attempting to syn- 
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thesise a policy out of the ballot box and the union card. ' 
Trodd's argument that SDF intervention in the unions 'was not 
related in any effective way to the broader scheme of social- 
democratic theorising'58 has some validity but this simply 
reflects the confused thinking of the national body. The major 
proportion of the Lancashire membership more realistically 
recognised that unions operated at the strategic position of 
the point of production and that Socialists must operate 
there 
if they were to foster wider class-consciousness. 
Their 
increasing influence within Federation circles 
helped to 
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persuade the party, however hesitatingly, to affiliate to the 
Labour Representation Committee. The secession from that 
organisation 18 months later caused dismay in the Lancashire 
branches and their s were the loudest voices in favour of 
reaffiliation. This was hardly surprising as the split caused 
something of a slump in SDF fortunes in the county, so much so 
that by 1901 Hyndman was castigating the Blackburn and Burnley 
branches as 'wholly destitute of political aptitude', whilst 
the Lancashire District Council was dissolved in May 190259 
because of the lack of support from the branches. 
The Lancashire branches generally, though Rochdale was an 
exception, did not favour Socialist unity as an alternative to 
the Labour alliance; they saw both as complementary facets of a 
single strategy. However, after the SDF's withdrawal from the 
LRC the Federation nationally supported ILP/SDF unity rather than 
an alliance of Socialists and Labour. The 1902 Dewsbury by- 
election was seen as evidence of the viability of this strategy. 
A study of the Yorkshire branches of the SDF, and Dewsbury in 
particular, provides a stark contrast to the history of the 
party in Lancashire and serves yet again to illustrate the 
diverse nature of the Federation. In West Yorkshire we see 
clearly a picture of the SDF as a propagandist organisation, 
isolated from the wider Labour movement and therefore more akin 
to the conventional stereotype. In Dewsbury the 
difficulties 
caused by withdrawal from the LRC are plainly visible, 
but the 
branch there demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Social-Democratic Federation and its dependence upon 
the 
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rest of the Labour movement 
despite its assertive independence. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE S. D. F. IN YORKSHIRE AND THE DEWSBURY 
BY-ELECTION OF 1902. 
James Bartley, writing in The Clarion, recalled an early attempt 
to form a Socialist society in Bradford in 1872. They were, he 
remembered, 'a little coterie.... Socialists in a strictly 
literary or academic sense' with some attpchment to the ideas 
of Louis Blanc. 
I 
Until the early 1880s they met to debate 
Socialist theory and occasionally to hear a lecturer speaking, 
for example on the revolutions of 1848. Then, 'About 1883 
echoes of the Democratic Federation began to be heard'. In 
February of the following year William Morris spoke at the 
Temperance Hall in Bradford on 'Useful Work versus Useless 
Toil'. Morris was disappointed at his reception. referring to 
the workers of Bradford as 'a sad set of Philistines', 
2 
but 
his meeting stimulated discussion and 'two or three "advanced" 
men'3 acquired Federation literature. At a session of the 
Bradford Parliamentary Debating Society George Minty spoke in 
favour of forming a branch of the Democratic Federation. A 
preliminary meeting was held in June 1884 and another a fort- 
night later but there is no evidence to suggest that a branch 
was ever formed. The accolade of the earliest branch 
in 
Yorkshire fell to Leeds, a Morris visit again providing the 
stimulus. He was followed by J. L. Mahon lecturing on 
'The 
method of robbing the workers' to a meeting attended 
by 'friends' 
from Bradford, and a Leeds branch of the Social-Democratic 
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Federation was formed in September with Tom Maguire as 
secretary. The branch boasted an initial membership of 25, 
with a strange mixture of members from St. Anne's Roman Catholic 
Church and refugees from Secularism. In November 1884 a 
Hull branch was formed, but hopes of further expansion in 
Yorkshire were dashed by the secession from the Federation of 
William Morris and his adherents. The early Socialists in the 
West Riding of Yorkshire had been heavily influenced by Morris 
and the Leeds SDF, having requested more information on the 
split, followed him into the Socialist League. Minty, Fred 
Jowett, Paul Bland, Fred Pickles and other sympathisers in 
Bradford similarly threw in their lot with the League. The 
Hull branch remained as the only bastion of the SDF in Yorkshire 
and it collapsed at the end of 1885. 
The 1880s was a barren period for the Federation in 
Yorkshire, punctuated by isolated attempts at propaganda. 
Jonathan Taylor of Sheffield was a prominent member, on the 
SDF executive and heavily involved with the agitation for free 
school meals, but he operated through the local Socialist 
Society rather than an SDF branch. Ben Turner of Batley, trade 
union organiser and later ILP member, joined the Federation 
in 
1886 after a visit to London to witness an unemployed 
demonstration. He was an isolated iidividual 
however, whose 
chief Socialist contacts were with the Leeds Socialist 
League 
in its anarchist phase, and he was an atypical 
SDF member, far 
to the right of the party in much of his thinking. 
Turner was 
probably involved in attempts to propagandise 
Huddersfield in 
241. 
1887 and 1888 
4 but nothing came of it, whilst a more concerted 
effort to intervene in the Yorkshire miners' strike in 1885 
met with similar results. The miners' agent at Denaby Main 
colliery reported that the fear of victimisation was too strong 
5 
to permit the formation of an SDF branch. There is no great 
mystery about the failure of the Federation to make inroads into 
Yorkshire in these early years. Quite simply, it could not 
afford to send organisers and lecturers to the county on a 
regular basis. The party was perenially short of money and 
suffered from a chronic lack of speakers; those it had were 
heavily over-committed and branches were continually complaining 
to Justice about the failure to provide them with propagandists. 
In such circumstances resources had to be concentrated where 
inroads had already been made or where the outlook appeared most 
promising. Yorkshire at this time, outside the mining districts, 
proved a difficult area for trade union organisers let alone 
Socialist agitators. Turner remembered Bradford as 'the most 
heartbreaking district for Trade Union organising that ever I 
came across', 
6 
and reflected that 'the soul of Leeds never 
seemed to be aroused' . In 
his autobiography, About Myself, he 
recalled the great difficulties that he and Allen Gee experienced 
organising unions in the textile areas of West Yorkshire. 
The first major effort at expansion in Yorkshire came 
in 
the early 1890s. Probably at the behest of Jonathan Taylor the 
SDF held its Annual Conference at Sheffield in 1891, with the 
obvious intention of stimulating the movement 
in the county. 
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A series of open-air meetings was held in the city and 
delegates also travelled to Halifax to address a crowd of over 
2,000. This propaganda proved singularly unsuccessful and 
the attempted branch in Sheffield soon feel through. However, 
the SDF Executive was clearly determined to gain a foothold in 
Yorkshire. Justice had displayed considerable interest in the 
Manningham Mills strike of 1890-91 and in the subsequent growth 
of Labour Unions in Bradford and neighbouring towns. It drew 
the conclusion that there 
the class war manifests itself daily on the field of 
industrial organisation. There the workers could 
at any moment lay hands upon factories, mines, works 
and railways, and the capitalists would not have the 
ghost of a chance of successfully resisting them. What 
is needed now is further education and most thorough 
organisation (fort there is an immense amount of 
what may be called floating Socialism .... 
8 
Later in the year the SDF journal bewailed the lack of funds 
to enable organisers to be sent to Yorkshire, 
9 
but the party's 
expansion in neighbouring Lancashire finally provided the 
opportunity. It was announced that A. G. Wolfe, the Burnley 
organiser, would commence a Yorkshire propaganda tour 
in 
January 1893. 
Wolfe conducted 27 meetings in Yorkshire during the 
first 
six months of that year, visiting the major centres of 
Bradford, 
Huddersfield 
and Sheffield, the textile towns of the 
Heavy 
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Woollen District and outlying areas such as Barnoldswick, 
Earby and Skipton. Initial results were again discouraging and 
at the Annual Conference that year Wolfe's failure was excused 
on the grounds that he had been forced to stay in Lancashire 
due to the bad weather and rationalised as a consequence of 
the fact that the county was a new area for propaganda. The 
real reason was, once again, the lack of finance, 
10 
but even- 
tually Wolfe's persistence paid dividends. Having visited 
Sheffield for a week in September a branch was formed, and it 
proved so successful that in November Wolfe was appointed per- 
manent organiser. In December 1893 an Earby branch was announced 
and January of the following year saw the reformation of the 
Leeds branch with Will Page, an ex-Walworth and Salford stalwart, 
playing a leading role. Yet Sheffield was the undoubted star 
in the SDF firmament. Under Wolfe's tutelage it proudly 
claimed 178 members by March 1894, and the original Central 
branch wassoon boosted by offshoots at Ecclesall, Attercliffe 
and Heeley. Such success proved illusory, for in June of that 
year Wolfe was dismissed as organiser 'for indiscreet 
behaviour. '11 He defected to the ILP and took most of the 
Sheffield membership with him. The reasons for this rupture 
are unclear but the events demonstrate all too clearly the 
vicissitudes of the Socialist movement. As an organiser 
in 
Lancashire Wolfe had been accused by Keir Hardie of trying to 
split the ILP in Accrington and other towns and convert the 
branches to the SDF. He had replied that Lancashire was an 
SDF centre and that he would not have acted thus 
in Yorkshire, 
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whilst defending his right topropagandise for the Federation 
12 
wherever he wished. Quite obviously the situation had been 
reversed in Sheffield, where the ILP had made determined efforts 
to woo over this Federation stronghold in its midst. There 
were also personal difficulties reminiscent of Tom Mann's pro- 
blems in Bolton. 
13 
Wolfe complained of 'S. D. F. intolerance and 
jealousy' and accused the SDF of dismissing him 'practically 
14 
to gratify Hyndman's spite'. Whatever the truth of the matter 
only the Heeley branch survived, but the Federation obviously 
retained some hold on the minds of many Sheffield Socialists, 
for, at the School Board elections in November, there was 
strong criticism of the ILP District Committee for supporting 
the president of the Trades Council rather than Wolfe, and it 
was reported that the SDF regained many members . 
15 
For the 
remainder of the decade the branch maintained a somewhat 
erratic existence. Jonathan Taylor was elected to the pro- 
vincial section of the Executive in 1896 but it was found 
necessary to re-establish the branch in 1899. As Justice 
accurately commented: 'The S. D. F. has had a good many tries to 
found a strong branch at the latter important town but, although 
successful for a time, the branch has not kept going. ' 
16 
The problems in Sheffield were symptomatic of the problems 
in Yorkshire as a whole. Just as in the 1880s the SDF had 
been 
pre-empted by the Socialist League so in the 1890s it found 
itself confronted by the ILP. When the Federation made its 
first concerted effort to establish a Yorkshire base, 
in 1893, 
it found the ILP already in the field. 
The Independent 
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Labour Party's founding conference had been held at Bradford 
and Yorkshire was its major stronghold. Its ethical Socialism 
had proved a powerful attraction to the remnants of the Socialist 
Leaguers, and its policy of an alliance with the trade unions 
appealed to such as Fred Jowett, Tom Maguire and Willie Drew, 
active in the new unions which had sprung up in Leeds, Bradford 
and elsewhere. Thus, of 120 delegates to the Bradford con- 
ference 48 came from Yorkshire and two years later the county 
could boast 102 of the 305 ILP branches. Consequently the SDF 
found itself with a lack of political space in which to operate. 
This problem was exacerbated by its reputation as an anti- 
trade union body. ILP success in West Yorkshire was due largely 
to its connection with the unions. As Laybourn and Reynolds have 
pointed out, although many of the pioneers of the movement were 
Socialists it started 'as a movement of Labour Unions'. 
17 
Furthermore, 'What transformed the small Socialist societies 
of the 1880s into a burgeoning Labour movement was the support 
which came from trade unions and trades councils' . 
18 
E. P. 
Thompson has also pointed out the connection between the 
Trades Councils and the ILP. 
19 
The SDF, suspicious of the unions 
doubtful of their efficacy as a vehicle for working-class 
aspirations, and with no settled policy towards them prior to 
1897, found itself without a ready audience for its message. 
Essentially the Social-Democratic Federation had arrived in 
Yorkshire too late; a more determined effort in the 
1880s, 
when Yorkshire trade unionism outside the coalfields was extremel 
weak, might have produced better results. As 
it was the SDF 
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struggled to exist. The West Yorkshire ILP was the stronghold 
of opposition to the idea of Socialist Unity after 1895, most 
branches agreeing with Hardie that the Federation was 'out of 
touch and harmony with the feelings and ideas of the mass of the 
, 
20 
people. The Bradford Labour Echo commented sarcastically 
of the proponents of Socialist Unity, 'May their shadows never 
grow less until this time of bliss arrives. '21 
The SDF achieved its strongest presence initially in 
precisely those areas where trade unionism was weaker and the 
ILP consequently less influential. It maintained a base in 
Leeds, with some 40 members in 1895, and gained a second branch 
there when the Armley Fabian Society came over as a body. A 
third branch was formed at New Wortley in September of that year. 
In Dewsbury the Federation was able to topple the ILP position. 
Elsewhere small branches at Hull., Bingley and Low Bentham lived 
a somewhat precarious existence, very often composed of dis- 
illusioned ILPers who were nonetheless forced to relate to that 
body. Thus it was reported that a branch was to be formed in 
Halifax because the ILP 'needs a little backbone'. 
22 
The 
Bradford members, upon the formation of their branch in August 
1895, wished to 'Let comrades of the I. L. P. of Bradford under- 
stand that this branch of the S. D. F. has not been started 
antagonistic to the I. L. P. `23 
The Bradford branch was founded by Comrade Tungate, who 
had arrived from Coventry in search of work, and 
it commenced 
operations with only six members. One of its first 
initiatives 
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was to support Fred Jowett of the ILP in his election campaign 
for the Manningham Ward, where the Labour Echo reported that 
the SDF branch was working 'with a heartiness that does credit 
, 24 to the members. The branch met every Wednesday in the 
Central Coffee Tavern on Tyrrel Street, following the tradition 
of the early Bradford Socialists who had similarly eschewed 
licensed premises. They aimed a shrewd barb at the ILP when 
they reported that 'We do not intend to start a drinking club 
for the purpose of getting members' '25 
but such convictions 
did not make it any easier to gain recruits. After some six 
months the branch claimed only 28 members, although this 
included Mrs Nott, a Labour Guardian, and was still entirely 
reliant on visiting speakers for propaganda. Hyndman came to 
Bradford in February 1896 and again in October whilst 
Chatterton, the national organiser, visited in July and 
September. It was almost a year after the branch's inauguration 
that it held its first open-air meetings, with J. Hunter Watts 
lecturing in the market place on 'How the Workers are Robbed' 
and 'The Duty of Revolt'. 
26 
As the branch secretary reported, 
they lacked both the speakers and the funds necessary to mount 
an outdoor propaganda campaign. 
27 
Their activities consisted 
almost entirely of indoor lectures and study classes, the 
members discussing Hyndman's Economics of Socialism and forming 
both historical and ethical sections. Not surprisingly recruit- 
ment was slow, and even Hunter Watts' forays produced only two 
new members. It was indeed 'a stiff fight', which 
bred in 
the Bradford members a feeling of superiority 
in the face of 
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adversity; they regarded the struggle as 'a kind of purifier 
that keeps all that is worth keeping and throwsoff all that 
is useless'. 
28 
Chatterton commented in similar vein that 
The Bradford S. D. F. is not so strong (numerically) 
as some other branches, but it is solid to the back- 
bone, and is composed of real live Socialists who 
are worth any number of the other sort. 
29 
Solid it may have been but a branch averaging only 15 
members during its first brief existence and unable to pub- 
licise itself effectively could not hope to compete with an 
ILP membership of 2,000. The SDF had no figures of real 
stature in Bradford. Charles Glyde had been a member of the 
Federation since 1887 but he was more heavily involved with 
the ILP and as an organiser for the Gasworkers and General 
Labourers' Union. Tungate, the original driving force behind 
the branch, left Bradford early in 1896 and his successor 
as secretary, W. J. Simmonds, was also forced to leave the city 
in search of work. This dispersion of its most active members, 
coupled with increasing disillusionment in the face of repeated 
setbacks, caused the collapse of the branch at the end of 
1897. Elsewhere in Yorkshire the outlook was similarly bleak. 
Of the three Leeds branches only Armley maintained an active 
existence, and it struggled to stabilise the membership, with 
the secretary reporting a shortage of local speakers and 
bemoaning the fact that the branch was losing members because 
they were so heavily involved in trade union activities. 
30 
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Low Bentham, Skipton and Sheffield branches clung tenuously 
to life until mid-1898 and then they too collapsed. Those 
who were sympathetic to the SDF undoubtedly followed the 
example of W. P. Redfern of Huddersfield, who reported that 
he had joined the ILP for want of any viable alternative and 
hoped eventually for unity between the parties. 
31 
That seemed 
an unlikely prospect in Yorkshire, where the SDF appeared 
doomed to failure. Yet there was one exception to this gloomy 
scenario. In Dewsbury, where a branch had been formed in 
February 1897, the Social-Democratic Federation mounted an 
authentic challenge to the Independent Labour Party. 
Dewsbury, little more than a small village at the end of the 
eighteenth century, expanded rapidly during the nineteenth 
century due to the growth of the textile industry and, more 
specifically, the invention of shoddy. A temporary slump in 
the industry in mid-century was followed by a boom period in 
the 1860s and 1870s, when the spectacular growth of the woollen 
trade was accompanied by the development of engineering and 
coal mining to serve the staple industry. Dewsbury's rapid 
industrialisation brought inevitable social instability. The 
area was a centre of Luddite activity and a focal point of 
the anti-Poor Law agitation of the 1830s. Fears of a Chartist 
rising caused troops to be stationed in the town throughout 
1840 and they were needed again in 1842 to quell the so-called 
'Plug Riots' 
. 
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Dewsbury then had a radical tradition, and this remained a 
potent factor in the town even after it gained parliamentary 
representation in 1867. The charter incorporating Dewsbury as 
a borough was granted on 11 April 1862 in recognition of the 
town's rapid growth during the nineteenth century. The 
parliamentary borough consisted of Dewsbury, Batley, Soothill, 
Ravensthorpe and parts of Thornhill. At the first election 
for the borough local Liberals nominated Handel Cossham, a 
Bristol Nonconformist and Radical, but his nomination met with 
considerable opposition. Even at this early date the Trades 
Council, formed in the early 1860s, made its mark on local 
politics for at a meeting at the Royal Hotel they pledged to 
work for the return of Ernest Jones. Initially Jones agreed 
to stand but he later withdrew and his supporters thereupon 
invited Mr Serjeant Simon. The contest became a bitter 
struggle between the two Liberals, with local Tories openly 
supporting Simon . This 
division in the Liberal camp con- 
tinued until 1885 and is largely explicable as a power struggle 
within the party between a ruling clique and those who were 
opposed 'to the complete domination of the borough's affairs 
32 
by a few who only desired to perpetuate their own position'. 
The Trades Council intervention was prompted by dislike of 
Cossham, an outsider, and antipathy towards the local Liberal 
elite, feelings which similarly manifested themselves some 
40 years later when Walter Runciman stood as Liberal candidate 
in the 1902 by-election and was opposed by Harry Quelch of 
the SDF. Cossham was narrowly defeated and Serjeant 
Simon 
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became Dewsbury's M. P. for the next 20 years, fighting off a 
gradually more organised Tory party and opposition from within 
the Liberal ranks. Simon eventually reconciled the split in 
the Liberal party by adopting certain radical proposals, such 
as Church disestablishment and the local option, which he had 
earlier condemned. 
The key factor in the Liberal hold on the constituency 
was the strength of Nonconformity, which dominated the 
religious, social and political life of the town. Allied to 
this was a pervasive temperance movement committed to total 
abstinence, which remained a dominant force in local politics 
throughout the century. A third factor was the Irish vote. 
Traditionally bitterly opposed to the Nonconformists the 
Irish regularly voted for the Liberals, despite the efforts 
of the Catholic hierarchy to prevent this because of Radical 
opposition to church schools. This was, of course, simply 
explained. The immigrant community saw itself as Irish first 
and Catholic second, and supported the radical Liberals who 
promised Home Rule for Ireland. They comprised one-tenth of 
the electorate and delivered an estimated 1,100 votes to Simon 
in the 1886 election. Both then and later, at the by-election 
of 1888 caused by Simon's resignation and again in 1892, 
Dewsbury ran counter to national trends in registering a 
consolidated Liberal vote. As Simon's successor, Mark Oldroyd, 
commented in 1888: 
Dewsbury has again spoken and with a distinct 
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voice has declared for Home Rule. You have 
again proved that we have in this parliamentary 
borough a citadel and a stronghold of Liberalism 
which no combination of enemies can assail. 
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The Liberal hegemony in Dewsbury would prove a daunting 
obstacle for Labour, but it bred a complacency which exposed 
it to criticism and eventually outright opposition from 
organised labour. This complacency was exemplified by Mark 
Oldroyd, a well-known and respected local manufacturer, owner 
of 'the largest woollen cloth manufactory in the world', 
34 
who was at the time of his election current mayor of Dewsbury. 
Oldroyd was regarded as something of a model employer and was 
a man of progressive opinions, favouring Home Rule, one man 
one vote, the payment of M. P. s, land reform and the control 
of licensing hours. His address for the 1892 election called 
for the more direct representation of wage earners in 
Parliament. Yet in Dewsbury, as elsewhere in the West Riding 
of Yorkshire, the dominant Liberal clique had ignored the 
trade unions, whilst Oldroyd had courted trouble with the 
Yorkshire Miners by voting against the Eight-Hour Day. 
Working-class resentment was expressed in 1895 with the 
appearance of an ILP candidate, Edward Robertshaw Hartley, 
at the hustings. Hartley's platform was very similar to that 
of Oldroyd, for his candidature signalled a repetition of 
the 
earlier splits in the Radical camp, which were now reflected 
in the contest between a Liberal manufacturer and a 
Labour 
candidate. 
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There had been trade unionism in the Heavy Woollen District 
for over 100 years. 'It died in the 'thirties, reared its 
head again in the 'forties, slept in the 'fifties, and began 
again 
35 
in the , sixties. , The first Trades Council, formed 
in the 1860s, sent a statement to the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Trade Unions; the Council believed in conciliation 
and arbitration, and also played a role in the first election 
for the parliamentary borough of Dewsbury. Trade unionism was, 
I 
however, a weedy growth in the textile districts during the 
1870s and 1880s. The Weavers' Association was forced to 
amalgamate with the Huddersfield and District Power Loom 
Weavers' Association in 1883 after a strike at Mark Oldroyd's 
mill had been soundly defeated. The resurgence of trade 
unionism in the early 1890s was in large measure due to the 
indefatigable energy of Ben Turner. He called the meeting 
which led to the formation of the second Trades Council in 
August 1891 and was also 
the Heavy Woollen branch 
in Janaury 1892. Turner 
Batley Independent Labou 
January 1893, and he was 
of the ILP in Bradford. 
in Dewsbury, with Turner 
an ILP branch was formed 
responsible for the inauguration of 
of the Power-Loom Weavers' Association 
was similarly involved with the 
r Party, which commenced operations 
in 
a delegate to the founding conference 
In October 1893 Keir Hardie spoke 
on the platform, and one month 
later 
at Thornhill Lees and the 
Dewsbury 
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Independent Labour Association was founded with J. S. Cooper, 
a local auctioneer, as president. Interestingly, in the same 
month, A. G. Wolfe of the SDF lectured to the Dewsbury Fabian 
Society on 'The Eight-Hour Question and the Textile Trades'. 
Almost inevitably Turner was at this meeting too. 
The emergence of the Dewsbury ILP was undoubtedly linked 
with the resurgence of trade unionism; as elsewhere in the 
West Riding the Trades Council predated the ILP and activists 
such as Turner were instrumental in bringing the two together. 
There was in Dewsbury too a resentment at the exclusion of 
the working class from the Liberal caucus, contrary to Mark 
Oldroyd's published statements. This was clearly exhibited 
by the secretary of the Soothill Liberal Association who, 
upon his resignation from that body, emphasised that 'he 
attached more importance to the Labour party than anything 
else and with him it was labour first and Liberalism after. '36 
Although the Liberal Party was doing most of what he wanted, 
he said, he couldn't support some Liberals. Oldroyd's 
opposition to the Eight-Hour Day similarly antagonised trade 
unionists. The Dewsbury ILP began by using the textile workers 
club, but by February 1894 it had moved to clubrooms in 
Foundry Street. Only four months later it moved again, to rooms 
in Tithe Barn Street just off the market place. This move 
was necessitated by the rapid expansion of the ILP in the 
area. Branches now existed at Thornhill Lees, Ravensthorpe, 
Batley, and Dewsbury, and Tithe Barn Street was intended to 
be the Central Club for the ILP District Federation. By 
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November 1894 the Central Club boasted 300 members, Thornhill 
Lees 200, Ravensthorpe 2003 and Batley 160.38 The ILP could 
also acclaim early electoral success; running in tandem with 
the Trades Council it had three members on the Town Council, 
one on the Dewsbury Board of Guardians, one on the Earlsheaton 
Board, two on the Thornhill Urban Council, one on the Ravensthorp 
Urban Council, and Turner had been elected to the Batley Council. 
As Turner later commented, 'The Tithebarn Street days, like 
the Foundry Street Days, were days of much progress and 
39 
fire'. 
This picture of early progress was, to a certain extent, 
misleading for support from the Trades Council for a 
Labour/Socialist alliance was not automatically forthcoming. 
It was reported in July 1893 that there was considerable 
controversy at the Trades Council meeting, with some delegates 
arguing that the Council should be non-political. More than 
a year later James Farnhill protested at the ILP rule that 
one could not be a member of a body other than the ILP and he 
subsequently stood as a Liberal candidate in opposition to 
the Trades Council/ILP candidate. 
40 
During 1895 the iron- 
founders, weavers, and engineers actually withdrew from the 
Trades Council because they objected to the introduction of 
politics onto that body. Nonetheless, it was agreed to put 
forward a Labour candidate at the next general election. 
41 
Yet dissatisfaction was not limited entirely to the trade 
union side. Cooper, the Dewsbury ILP president, declined 
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the invitation to stand for parliament as a 'trade union and 
collectivist' candidate because, he protested, he was a 
Socialist and only under that banner would he consent to be 
42 
nominated. The Dewsbury ILP, at a Yorkshire conference some 
two months earlier, had supported a proposal to change the 
party's name to that of National Socialist Party, with Cooper 
arguing that the title of Independent Labour Party deterred 
middle-class men like himself who were good Socialists. His 
view of the party's aim, obviously went far beyond the mere 
pragmatism of electioneering; he talked of a 'Merrie England' 
where Socialists would 'love one another' and 'make other people 
43 
happy' 
These strains within the alliance were exacerbated by 
increasing Liberal-pressure. The Dewsbury Reporter, having 
condemned the ILP candidate at Leicester for splitting the 
radical vote and handing victory to the party of reaction, 
warned the Trades Council that to support a candidate in 
Dewsbury would produce a similar result. Mark Oldroyd also 
launched an attack on Socialism44 and, whilst professing sym- 
pathy for the ILP's aim of promoting workers' interests, urged 
those workers to vote for him as the man best able to fight 
for those interests. 45 The result was a divided Labour move- 
ment. As the Ossett Labour Club reported, there wasn't 'that 
harmony on labour matters that used to prevail'. 
46 The Trades 
Coancil had second thoughts about its decision to put 
forward 
a candidate and the ILP decided, barely a week before the poll, 
to nominate Hartley. 
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Hartley was a Bradford butcher, an ex-Wesleyan activist 
who had been converted to Socialism at the age of thirty. He 
came to prominence in Bradford politics in the early 1890s, at 
a time of severe unemployment, was a founder member of the 
Bradford Labour Union and Ben Tillett's election agent in West 
Bradford at the 1892 election. His election address in Dewsbury 
in 1895 began thus: 
Fellow Workers, you are again called upon to exercise 
the right of the franchise won for you at the cost 
of so much sacrifice on the part of your forefathers. 
Your right to vote implies your equal right to 
return to Parliament a representative of the majority 
of the masses rather than of the classes. 
Hartley's programme included Home Rule for Ireland, abolition 
of the House of Lords, payment of M. Ps, the Eight-Hour day for 
miners and the appropriation of unearned income. The ILP's 
main strength lay in Thornhill Lees and Ravensthorpe, amongst 
the glass-bottle workers and miners. It boasted 1,000 members 
in the borough, of whom 850 were on the electoral roll, and 
claimed that 500 miners had signed a voting pledge and 1,500 
more could be relied upon. If those claims were true then 
obviously the Liberals were in trouble for the first time 
but 
the figures are questionable and Laybourn and Reynolds assess 
ILP membership in the borough at 800.47 The ILP effort was 
concentrated on Thornhill, with Hartley emphasising that 
the 
working class could expect no favours from the two established 
parties. His hopes of success were dashed 
by the decision of 
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the Temperance Union and the Irish National League to plump 
for Oldroyd. Consequently Oldroyd again headed the poll but 
his majority was reduced to 1,500, with the ILP gaining over 
1,000 votes or 10.4 per cent of the poll. 
48 
The reasons for the ILP's comparative failure were 
understandable. It had entered the contest late and, as the 
Dewsbury and District News reported, had not posted a single 
printed injunction although it had circulated a few handbills. 
49 
In common with many Labour candidates Hartley had faced severe 
financial difficulties when compared to his opponents. Labour 
supporters, for example, had to walk to the polls whereas 
Conservatives and Liberals were provided with carriages. 
Victimisation was also apparent, with reports of sackings for 
some Hartley supporters. 
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A significant factor was the 
organisation of the Irish vote for Liberalism, which deprived 
the ILP of potential supporters. At an Irish National League 
meeting in Dewsbury shortly after the election Irish voters 
were urged 'not to allow the shallow principles of the I. L. P. 
nor clerical circulars to turn them aside from the straight 
path that led to Irish freedom', and the ILP was described as 
'the Enemy of Home Rule'. 
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Both Liberal and Irish spokesmen 
accused the ILP of endangering Home Rule by letting 
in the 
Tories. 52 Such propaganda had considerable effect and 
in the 
municipal elections of November 1895 the ILP fared badly, with 
the Irish vote a significant factor in its failure. 
53 The 
Trades Council had also stepped back from a confrontation with 
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Liberalism and it was now reported that the Council 'did not 
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mix with politics . The final factor was that outside Thornhil 
the Independent Labour Party's strength was not as significant 
as it had first appeared. It claimed 500 members in Dewsbury 
in 1895 but, as Ben Turner later recalled, 'The ties were 
slender that bound many to Labour. The rope of sand parted and 
the Tithebarn Street political centre disappeared between beer, 
extravagance of policy and jugglery of personages. '55 Turner, 
echoing a complaint common amongst many Socialist activists 
in the 1890s, blamed the introduction of alcohol into the ILP 
clubs for many of the movement's shortcomings. He argued that 
some members joined simply for the social activities and implied 
that the political impulse which had originated the clubs was 
submerged. Whilst the political activity of the ILP in 
Thornhill Lees continued unabated, Turner's argument had some 
validity in Dewsbury. Within two years of the election the 
ILP branch had disappeared, to be replaced by a branch of the 
Social-Democratic Federation. Certainly the SDF was not as 
temperance-minded as the ILP but the drink issue was not a 
significant factor in this turn of events. The key lies in 
Turner's somewhat embittered reference to 'extravagance of 
policy and jugglery of personages'. Before looking at these 
events however the lessons of the ILP's election campaign of 
1895 must be noted. 
The fledgling organisation in fact polled creditably 
for 
a first attempt, but it faced an uphill struggle. 
Initially, 
a shortage of finance meant a consequent lack of organisation 
- 
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insufficient canvassers, printed material, transport and the 
like. For the next decade at least the two established parties 
possessed a major advantage in this respect. The solid Irish 
vote for Liberalism deprived Hartley of a potential constituency, 
in spite of the fact that the ILP and later the SDF possessed 
impeccable Home Rule credentials. The accusation that the 
third party would open the way for Tory success was difficult 
to refute and undoubtedly deterred many working men, Irish 
or no, from transferring their allegiance from the Liberals. 
The failure to present a solid ILP/Trades Council front was 
also significant for the future. A Liberal counter-attack had 
severely weakened ILP influence on the Trades Council but, 
equally importantly, had caused many to question the legitimacy 
of Trades Council involvement in politics. Conversely a 
number of ILPers were unhappy about the Labour alliance 
strategy pushed by Ben Turner, seeing it as a dilution of 
Socialist principles, and their doubts were intensified by 
such Trades Council prevarication. They would be amenable to 
SDF persuasion and a more forthright Socialist stance. How 
then did the Social- Democratic Federation come to Dewsbury? 
In January 1896 a Socialist public meeting in Dewsbury market 
place was attended by J. R. Widdup of Wigan. This was 
by no 
means Widdup's first appearance in Yorkshire. He had, 
for 
example, chaired a Hyndman meeting in Leeds at the end of 
1894.56 
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As editor of the Burnley SDF's newspaper he was in demand on 
the speaker's circuit and obviously impressed local ILPers, 
for in February 1895 the Dewsbury and Thornhill branches agreed 
to engage him for 'propagandist work in Dewsbury and district'. 
57 As Tom Myers, secretary of the Thornhill Lees ILP, later 
recalled, so successfully did Widdup operate that 'he organised 
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three branches out of existence'. Yet initially he seems to 
have galvanised the ILP into action. The club at Tithebarn 
Street played host to speakers of the calibre of Keir Hardie and 
Enid Stacy , lectures were given to the local co-operative 
Society, a trading department was established - much to the 
consternation of local tradesmen - and Widdup himself lectured 
throughout the Heavy Woollen District. That all was not well 
soon became apparent. The Trades Council protested at the ILP's 
plan to hold a May Day demonstration on the first Sunday in 
May in opposition to their own, and felt it necessary to 
emphasise the clear distinction between the two bodies. Trade 
Unionists in the ILP were rebuked for allowing non trade-unionist, 
to take over. 
59 
A meeting of the Yorkshire ILP Federation in 
April reported trouble in Dewsbury and decided to investigate, 
but quite clearly it was too late for in June of the same year 
the branch changed its name to the Dewsbury and District 
Socialist Society. The Dewsbury Reporter was quite happy to 
comment that 'The Independent Labour Party is not so active in 
the Heavy Woollen District as it used to be. '60 
Widdup's influence had obviously been instrumental 
in 
subverting the ILP position in Dewsbury, and this was 
borne out 
by the formation of a branch of the SDF in the town 
in 
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February 1897. His activities demonstrate the impact that 
one man could have on a locality. Widdup in Dewsbury, Wolfe 
in Sheffield, Tungate in Bradford had all been influential, to 
a greater or lesser extent, on the Socialist movement in these 
localities, and throughout the county branches of both the SDF 
and ILP emerged, collapsed, or changed direction dependent on 
the personality and philosophy of an individual or a small 
group of activists. In Dewsbury, however, there had been 
earlier pointers to these events: the support of the Dewsbury 
ILP for a change in the party's name, Turner's reflection on 
the fragile nature of ILP support in the town, and the obvious 
scepticism of some ILPers as to the value of trade unions. 
For a while the Socialist Society and the Federation co-existed 
as separate political entities, whilst the ILP sent Tom Taylor 
of Barnsley to Dewsbury in April 1897 in an attempt to rebuild 
the branch. He found a few ex-members willing to re-organise 
but was forced to report that the ILP had 'been thrown back 
for some time'. 
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Any revival in the party's fortunes was 
certainly only temporary, for in May of the following year the 
Socialists in Dewsbury reacted to the breakdown of the 
Socialist unity negotiations between the ILP and the SDF with 
this announcement: 
It was seen by the members of the S. D. F. and of 
the I. L. P. Club that the fact of two organisations 
being in existence was a drawback to the general 
Socialist Movement and a meeting of delegates from 
each body was held. 
62 
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These delegates decided to form two sections, a social 
club which all should join and which would continue to be 
named the Dewsbury Socialist Society, and a propaganda section 
which would be a branch of the Social-Democratic Federation; 
membership of this would be voluntary, but the Society would 
be financially responsible for the work carried on by the SDF. 
In fact the SDF had worked assiduously to stabilise its base 
in Dewsbury. Chatterton, the national organiser, visited the 
town in May 1897 along with Lorenzo Quelch. W. G. Pearson 
of the London Trades Council was sent to propaganu ein July 
and thought Dewsbury an ideal centre for Socialism, even 
suggesting that the Federation appoint a permanent organiser. 
In September F. Willis arrived for a week's tour, speaking at 
Dewsbury, Birstall, Thornhill and Ossett. Other visitors 
included Will Thorne, Joe Shufflebotham of Bolton, Penlington 
of Rochdale, and Dan Irving of Burnley. Such a concentration 
of speakers was remarkable for, as Justice bemoaned, there 
were only 14 to cover 40 branches in Lancashire and Yorkshire. 
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Dewsbury was the jewel in the SDF crown as far as Yorkshire was 
concerned and Chatterton reported that 'The Dewsbury S. D. F. 
hold as successful outdoor meetings on an average, as any 
branch in the country. '64 
The ready audience for the SDF in Dewsbury in 1897 and 
1898 could be explained by the depression in the textile 
industry. Trade had been 'worse during the past twelve months 
than for many years'65 and many mills were on short time as 
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the McKinley tariff hit local industry hard. Events outside 
Dewsbury similarly conspired to make trade unionists politically 
aware. Harry Broome, ex-soldier and now dyer and a prominent 
SDFer in these early years, had argued against Trades Council 
66 
involvement with politics in 1896. Now however) 'After the 
engineers' smash up... he thought they would be a political 
party' . 
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Broome could not understand why, after industrial 
defeats of this magnitude, at election time 'the men simply 
sent the master back to Parliament' , 
68 
and he now accepted that 
the Eight-Hour day would come through legislation and not via 
the unions. At a time when political meetings fulfilled the 
role of mass entertainment the Dewsbury Socialists provided a 
succession of speakers with a readily understood message. 
They had taken control of the market place on Sundays, with 
meetings at 11 a. m. and 6.30 p. m., much to the chagrin of other 
organisations who found themselves relegated to a secondary 
position. 
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Penlington of Rochdale spoke on 'The Capitalist 
Tree illustrated by its fruits', with illustrations provided 
on a blackboard. Chew, also of Rochdale, promised a future 
utopia for 
It was the endeavour of the Social-Democratic 
Federation to give the people the land and the 
wealth of the land. When they replaced capit- 
alist monopoly by collective control they would 
be able to realise that life was worth living; 
they would be able to give birth to a noble 
manhood. 
70 
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Will Thorne and Dan Irving on the other hand urged the workers 
of Dewsbury to join their trade unions, Irving saying that 
'they must be organised if they meant to grapple successfully 
with the evils attached to labour., 
71 
These sentiments would 
have been welcomed by Ben Turner who, at this time, had no 
objections to sharing a platform with SDF speakers. He obviously 
recognised the more pragmatic approach towards trade unionism 
adopted at the SDF's annual conference in 1897, whilst will 
Thorne was a well known and respected union organiser. 
Moreover, as the SDF was the only functioning Socialist organ- 
isation in Dewsbury Turner, both as Trades Council secretary, 
and local ILPer, was forced to relate to it. He perhaps 
retained a residual affection for the party as a result of his 
membership in the late 1880s. The Federation also catered 
for the social life of its members. The branch had moved to 
new premises in the Socialist Hall on Wakefield Road at the 
end of 1897 and there lantern shows were held, Christmas teas 
and socials, where songs and mandolin solos were heard, and in 
1899 an Easter Festival with over 100 present. 'The Society 
is now in a very flourishing condition', 
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reported the secretary 
and the SDF Executive obviously agreed, regarding Dewsbury as 
'a place which affords unique opportunities for effective 
Socialist propaganda' . 
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The SDF's concentration on Dewsbury was understandable, 
given its precarious position elsewhere in Yorkshire. 
Only 
Leeds maintained a stable existence, the Armley branch 
being 
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bolstered by the formation of a Central Leeds branch, although 
the Sheffield and Hull branches were reformed during 1899. 
Executive enthusiasm certainly afforded the Dewsbury members 
unique opportunities as a constant stream of speakers visited 
the town. The branch was also fortunate to possess capable 
members of its own, able to propagandise via the market place 
and the local press. Harry Broome, Harry Wood, Friend Lister 
and Tolson Butterworth were all prominent in SDF activities. 
Yet large attendances at meetings and a high public profile 
did not necessarily signify a large membership. The SDF's 
membership figures have been notoriously difficult to assess, 
as P. A. Watmough has demonstrated, 
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and those of the Dewsbury 
branch are no exception. It was an erratic payer of dues and 
if one uses Watmough's method of calculation then Dewsbury never 
had more than 20 fee-paying members before the Quelch election 
campaign and often fewer than 10. Nevertheless reports from 
the Dewsbury Socialist Hall indicate frequent attendances of 
over 100, and the regularity and range of activities in the 
town compared with branches elsewhere suggest a larger member- 
ship. In 1896 the SDI' had introduced a fund to pay the wages 
of Chatterton, the national organiser, assessed at 3d. per 25 
members. This was later continued as the Secretary's Wages 
Fund. Dewsbury contributed to this rather more regularly than 
most branches and if averaged over the period from 1897 to 
1900 its contributions would suggest a branch of some 
50 
members, this figure rising sharply in 1901 with the 
impetus 
of the election campaign. Tom Myers of the Thornhill 
Lees ILP, 
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no friend of the Federation, assessed its membership in 
Dewsbury as 40, a figure repeated by other ILPers. 75 With 
its periphery of social members at the Dewsbury Socialist Club 
the SDF was by no means a negligible political force, although 
obviously nowhere near the stature of the ILP in say Bradford 
or Halifax. Its isolation in Yorkshire was, however, demon- 
strated by the fact that it was forced to join the Lancashire 
District Committee of the Federation. Nonetheless it achieved 
some prominence in the town during 1900. 
At a Trades Council meeting in May 1900 Tom Myers proposed 
'That the Council convene a meeting, and invite representatives 
from the various Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies and 
Socialist bodies in the district, to consider the question of 
labour representation. '76 He was supported by Ben Turner, who 
remarked that he was not in favour of opposing sound Labour 
men like Broadhurst but in Dewsbury there was no such Labour 
man. In all probability there would be a general election 
the following spring and if they were to act then steps should 
be taken as soon as possible. 'The Labour party had plenty of 
corners to rub off, and plenty of knots to remove. But the 
more tolerant they were the better it would be for them. '77 
Turner's attitude was significant. His references to Broadhurst 
and tolerance were indicative of his views on labour represent- 
ation. He was not necessarily in favour of independent 
candidates, preferring a Lib-Lab where possible to avoid 
splitting the working-class vote. Turner's machinations and 
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his later antipathy towards the SDF were at the root of many 
of the subsequent problems. At the Trades Council meeting 
Myers and Turner were also backed by Lewis Gledhill of the 
Yorkshire Miners, an ex-ILPer, who had always put his trade 
unionism before his Socialism, but who now realised that 'They 
had fought the battles at election times on Trade Union lines 
and they had been defeated.... They would be able to get justice 
if they had more working men representatives'. 
78 
Delegates 
unanimously agreed to invite Co-operative Societies, Friendly 
Societies and Socialist organisations to meet a delegation 
from the Trades Council, which included Myers of the ILP and 
Broome of the SDF. The Co-operative and. Friendly Societies 
declined the invitation, the SDF and ILP accepted and) perhaps 
coincidentally, before the conference took place Harry Quelch 
made his first appearance in Dewsbury, speaking both at the 
Socialist Hall and at an open-air meeting in the market place. 
The meeting was convened in the Spiritualist Meeting 
Room in Dewsbury on 7 August 1900, with representatives from 
the Trades Council, SDF, ILP, and the Batley Railway Servants 
in attendance. Mr. Fox of the Batley Co-operative Society 
attended as an observer. Throughout the debates Broome and 
Butterworth of the SDF were prominent. Broome felt strongly 
about 'the treatment meted out to working men in trade 
dis- 
putes' but echoed the standard SDF line in pointing out 
the cost to the unions of striking and argued that the money 
would be better spent on labour representation. In similar 
vein Butterworth used the engineers' lock-out as an 
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illustration of the fallacy of strikes. However, both men 
urged caution. Broome 'thought the question required care- 
ful consideration and did not wish to see the thing rushed at' 
whilst Butterworth thought that 'before they chose any man they 
should get to know his principles and what he was prepared to 
work for'. 
79 
The SDF was clearly afraid that a Lib-Lab would 
be foisted upon the constituency, and the contrast between 
their views and those indicated by Turner earlier pointed to 
later controversy. But at this meeting unanimity again pre- 
vailed and the conference constituted itself a committee to 
draw up a programme for a further meeting on 4 September. 
The SDF was determined to maintain the momentum and, at 
a meeting some two weeks after the conference, Will Thorne 
appeared on the platform with Ben Turner to advocate Labour 
representation. Significantly Quelch also returned to Dewsbury 
on 2 September, lecturing on 'Social Reform and Social 
Democracy' and concentrating on the housing problem, a matter 
of considerable interest in Dewsbury at that time. Both he 
and Thorne eschewed revolutionary rhetoric for practical 
politics and clearly they were aiming for the selection of an 
SDF candidate. These plans came to nothing, for the unexpected 
dissolution of Parliament in September meant that 
'the trade 
unionists and socialists of the district were absolutely un- 
prepared as regarded a candidate... it would take too 
long to 
find the funds required. '80 The Liberal Party could thus 
confidently expect to win Dewsbury once more, but they would 
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not be able to rely upon the wholehearted support of organised 
labour. Both the Trades Council and the Social-Democratic 
Federation sent questionnaires to Mark Oldroyd and the SDF 
challenged him to a debate, a challenge which he initially 
accepted. The ten questions put by the Trades Council gave an 
indication of the reason for their dissatisfaction with Oldroyd 
and Liberal policy. In his replies Oldroyd opposed the Eight- 
Hour Day for miners, nationalisation of the mines and railways, 
and the abolition of fines in mills and mines, which he 
thought would be injurious to discipline. Consequently, the 
Council could not 'see their way to recommend Trade Unionists 
to take any particular action in the forthcoming election. '81 
This view was reinforced by a dislike of Oldroyd's outright 
support for the South African war, expressed on numerous 
occasions in the press and again in reply to the list of 
questions sent by the SDF. 
In the absence of a Labour candidate it was inevitable 
that most working men would vote for Oldroyd, a view expressed 
by the president of the Dewsbury Moor Miners who argued that 
'for a working-class constituency we could not possibly have 
a better man to represent us. '82 There was little opposition 
to the war locally and SDF anti-war meetings had been attacked 
and interrupted. 83 Oldroyd's Tory opponent, Forbes St. John 
Morrow, was an Irish-born London barrister but this carried 
little weight in a constituency where the Irish had consistently 
voted for Home Rule. Indeed the number of Irish voters 
had 
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increased due to the new practice of the landlord paying the 
rates and charging his tenants a gross rental. This could only 
work to Oldroyd's advantage and in the event he achieved his 
84 
largest-ever majority. The events of 1900 were significant 
because they demonstrated a clear determination on the part of 
the Trades Council Executive and the local Socialists to 
pursue a Labour candidature, and immediately after the election 
the SDF continued the attack. Harry Wood castigated Oldroyd 
for backing out of the debate, forecast the imminent demise of 
the Liberal Party, and warned Oldroyd that 'It is a fight to 
the end; yea, even unto death. '85 The fight, when it came, 
was not quite what Wood had envisaged. 
The SDF was exceedingly active in Dewsbury during the early 
months of 1901. Regular open-air meetings were held, visiting 
speakers including the veteran Chartist Sketchley and Quelch. 
In June the organising secretary of the Federation, J. Jones, 
held a month's mission in the area which was, according to 
Justice, the longest period any one organiser had ever spent 
in a single locality. 
86 
Members featured prominently in the 
letters columns of the local press, Wood indulging in a sustained 
attack on the church which he saw as lecturing the poor 
'into 
docile submission to its master class', 
87 
and A. J. Bower 
88 
lecturing readers on the principles of Social-Democracy. 
The branch was recruiting new members who were to play prom- 
inent roles in its later history, men such as Harry Elkin, a 
potman on Dewsbury market, and George Kinsley who owned a 
grocer's shop. Financial support was provided by George 
Jessop, 
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a local tailor and Batley Liberal councillor of Radical views. 
The conviction of Oldroyd and Sons for breaches of the Factory 
Acts provided the SDF with an opportunity for propaganda which 
they were not slow to exploit. They circulated a pamphlet which 
Oldroyd had distributed to his workers, entitled Living Wage, 
a report of a lecture he had given to the Dewsbury Pioneers 
Industrial Society in 1894. Here Oldroyd had emphasised the 
need for young children to receive 'the inestimable blessings 
of their mother's fostering care' yet, as the SDF gleefully 
pointed out, he had now been fined for employing young boys 
after hours. 
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The Federationb impact was demonstrated by a 
worried member of the Liberal Party. 'There is a danger', he 
said, 'of taking things too much for granted. Our opponents 
are not asleep, but are busy sowing tares amongst the wheat. '90 
He advocated a more aggressive policy to combat the SDF. 
All in all the SDF in Dewsbury was in confident mood when, in 
September 1901, Mark Oldroyd announced his resignation on the 
grounds of ill-health. 
The resulting Dewsbury by-election of February 1902 provoked 
a damaging split in the Labour movement and, when Harry Quelch's 
nomination for the SDF was announced, it caused both local 
and national controversy. ILP/LRC orthodoxy viewed the affair 
as yet another example of the SDF's unreliability, accusing 
it 
of 'positively bad faith'. 
91 Quelch's candidature was seen as 
'a very lamentable and futile political escapade' which would 
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prove 'a very bad advertisement for Socialism in the West 
92 
Riding of Yorkshire'. But damage to the Socialist cause was 
not necessarily their major concern. What worried the leaders 
of the ILP was the effect that Quelch might have on the 
emergent Labour Representation Committee. As Lib-Lab M. P. 
Richard Bell argued, the SDF's action was 'not at all con- 
ducive to the best interests of Labour Representation'. 93 
The ILP portrayed the affair as convincing proof, if any proof 
were needed, that Socialist unity was not an alternative to 
Labour representation: 'the entire movement would be reduced to 
the impotence of the present S. D. F. ', said Hazdie. 
94 
Labour 
historians, most of whom accept the SDF as a minor and alien 
intrusion into the British Labour movement, have largely 
followed this line. Laybourn and Reynolds speak of 'The 
spurious claims of the SDF, ' and accuse the Federation of pre- 
empting the issue in deciding to stand Quelch before negotiations 
between the ILP, the Trades Council, and the Federation had 
been concluded. 
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It is true that the SDF declared its 
candidate before the other organisations had reached a final 
decision, but it felt that it had valid reasons for doing so. 
ILP criticism of its actions was motivated primarily by events 
at national level which had little to do with the local 
issue. 
Nonetheless the Federation can justifiably be criticised on 
two counts. In many ways the Dewsbury controversy was reminis- 
cent of the 'Tory Gold' affair, in that it was not so much 
what the party did that told against it but the way 
in which 
it was done. Secondly, the SDF can be accused of naivety 
in 
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expecting unqualified support from either local or national 
Labour leaders after its pre-emptive strike. What the by- 
election did demonstrate was that a Socialist candidate could 
inspire an enthusiastic response from rank and file ILPers and 
from the many unattached Socialists, particularly those con- 
nected with the Clarion movement. In 1901-02 the future of 
the Socialist movement in Britain was very much in the melting 
pot; it was far from certain that the Labour Representation 
Committee would succeed, even in its own limited aims, and 
many genuinely believed that an overtly Socialist party could 
achieve electoral success in the near future. There was 
already evidence that participation in a Labour alliance meant 
a watering down of Socialist commitment, and the Dewsbury 
contest clearly illustrates the tension between the two. To 
interpret the Social-Democratic Federation's intervention in 
Dewsbury in the light of later history merely perpetuates the 
stereotyped myth of sectarianism, but the events surrounding 
the election highlight the problems confronting the SDF in 
attempting to pose a Socialist alternative to the LRC. What 
then happened in Dewsbury between September 1901 and 
February 1902? 
Mark Oldroyd's resignation was announced soon after the social- 
Democratic Federation's decision to withdraw from the Labour 
Representation Committee. The ILP was furious at SDF 
accusations of treachery for its failure to support the 
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Socialist resolution at the LRC's founding conference, and it 
had already decided to have no close contact with the SDF 
executive. The Federation's departure from the LRC reinforced 
that decision, leading J. R. Clynes to comment that 'Minorities 
have their uses, but these methods only ensure a permanency 
for the minority without its even being useful'. 
96 
After the 
breakdown of unity negotiations in 1898 the two parties had 
pursued increasingly divergent courses. As early as 1901 the 
NAC of the ILP was unwilling to sanction contests in Liberal 
strongholds, and the LRC 'successes' in the general election 
of 1900 had occurred largely with Liberal support. 
97 
The 
concept of Socialist unity was now viewed with outright 
hostility and support for an SDF candidate in Dewsbury was 
therefore very unlikely. 
The main charge against the SDF was that they had rushed 
Quelch on the constituency, pre-empting a meeting which was 
going to select a Labour/Socialist candidate. Local Labourites 
were certainly taken by surprise by Oldroyd's resignation, 
but discussions concerning a candidate for Dewsbury had been 
going on for over a year. There is ample evidence that the 
Trades Council was divided over the issue, 
98 
and the NAC of 
the ILP had decided, in the light of the Lanarkshire by-election 
result, that money could be spent more usefully than on another 
electoral contest. Whereas the local SDF had twice suggested 
Quelch as a candidate no other nominee had been forthcoming. 
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Dewsbury had never appeared on the official list of constituencie9 
to be contested by the ILP at the next election, 
99 
although 
local branches were semi-autonomous in this respect. The 
possibility of a Socialist candidate for Dewsbury therefore 
seemed remote. There is no doubt that Ben Turner, Tom Myers and 
other leading local ILPers feared a split on the Trades Council 
if a Socialist were adopted, and they had therefore changed 
their attitude since the idea was first mooted in May 1900.100 
The SDF clearly feared that the Socialist and trade unionist 
candidate first proposed would now be replaced by a Lib-Lab man, 
but this accusation was dismissed. Yet the rubbishing of the 
SDF's fears were disingenuous to say the least. When Oldroyd 
announced his resignation the Trades Council and the ILP de- 
Glared that they were considering running a candidate `unless 
the Liberals adopt one holding advanced views on Labour 
questions'. 
101 
This seemed a distinct possibility, for the 
local Liberal press supported the idea as a means of avoiding 
a dangerous three-cornered contest. 
102 
Further Trades Council 
consultation elicited the names of Sam Woods, W. Steadman 
and George Thorpe, a local co-operator, but Woods, the Wigan 
Miners' agent, seemed the clear favourite. 
103 Overtures were 
obviously made to him because he wrote to Herbert Gladstone, 
the Liberal chief whip, offering himself for nomination. 
Moreover, Keir Hardie advised in the Labour Leader that 
Woods 
should not be opposed by a Labour candidate in Dewsbury. 
There 
is clear evidence too that Ben Turner favoured Woods. Both 
he 
and Lewis Gledhill were reported to be opposed to a 
Labour 
contest 104 
105 
a fact confirmed by Tom Myers after the election. 
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The situation in Dewsbury then reflected, in microcosm, 
events in the Labour movement nationally, It is explicable in 
terms of the hostility between the ILP and the SDF, and in 
terms of the increasing domination of the LRC by the trade 
unions at the expense of the Socialists. The SDF had ample 
reason to fear the selection of a Lib-Lab candidate and there- 
fore, after initial hesitation, decided to nominate their own 
candidate, Harry Quelch. Their mistake was to do so before a 
final decision had been reached by the Trades Council and ILP. 
If Woods had been nominated the SDF could legitimately have 
opposed him with a Socialist candidate, although obviously 
without any claim to Trades Council support. As it was they 
laid themselves open to the charge of attempting to dictate to 
the local Labour movement its choice of candidate. However, 
this proved academic because the Dewsbury Liberals rejected 
Woods in favour of Walter Runciman, a Newcastle shipowner. 
This blatant disregard of Labour claims to representation 
obviously shocked the Trades Council and the ILP, who now sea- 
rched for an alternative candidate. They fell back upon 
Edward Robertshaw Hartley, who had contested the seat for the ILP 
in 1895. Laybourn and Reynolds suggest that 'it was well known 
that the Trades Council and the ILP would support E. R. Hartley', 
106 
but his name was not mentioned officially until the Trades 
Council met on Tuesday 22 October and even then he was simply 
canvassed alongside Woods and Thorpe as a possible candidate. 
After Thorpe had declined the invitation, and after Woods 
had 
been vetoed by the Liberals, the Trades Council decided to 
nominate Hartley, with the support of the Thornhill 
Lees ILP. 
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The selection of Hartley, a well-known local Socialist, 
placed the SDF in a dilemma. He was, after all, an outspoken 
supporter of Socialist unity and critical of the Socialist 
alliance with the trade unions. If the Federation had stayed 
its hand until the Trades Council had reached a final decision 
they could have mounted a powerful joint campaign with Hartley 
in support of the Socialist alternative to the Labour alliance. 
Alternatively, if the SDF had remained within the LRC then 
Quelch might well have won the nomination. However, the die 
was cast and the SDF refused to withdraw in favour of Hartley, 
for Quelch's campaign had now been underway some six weeks. 
A combination of pride and obstinacy on the part of local 
SDFers, coupled with the always fervently held belief that they, 
and not the ILP, were the true Socialist party, ensured that 
Quelch would go to the polls. An LRC sub-committee was con- 
vened to discuss the matter, but the committee was heavily 
weighted against the SDF and the result of the hearing was a 
foregone conclusion. 
107 
The SDF was accused of rushing the 
matter and dismissed as a small body which had no right to 
pre-empt the Trades Council or ILP. The committee asked the 
SDF to withdraw their candidate but Lorenzo Quelch, in Dewsbury 
to organise his brother's campaign, refused. They were, 
he 
said, pledged to their executive and to the public, and 
had 
already received many subscriptions. 
Temporarily there was the possibility of two Labour 
candidates in Dewsbury. Tom Myers said that the ILP would not 
withdraw Hartley as long as the Trades Council supported 
him, 
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and Keir Hardie predicted that if both men went to the poll 
Hartley would attract ten times more votes than Quelch. 108 
But saner counsels prevailed. Owen Connellan, of the Leeds 
Trades Council, realised that the Socialists would cut a most 
ignominious figure at the poll if two candidates stood. 
109 
Glasier, ror the NE. C of the ILP, declared that they would take 
no further part in the election and he anticipated that the 
Thornhill Lees branch would loyally accept that judgement. 110 
Thereafter the ILP concentrated its attack in two areas. 
Interestingly, the accusation of undemocratic practice was 
now shelved in favour of a more straightforward argument that 
the ILP had been there first, that they had run a candidate 
in 1895 and that' they had been responsible for the development 
of Socialism in the constituency. This was, of course, true 
but the 'first come' argument was a far moretrivial one than 
the charges previously levelled against the SDF. In any case 
there had been no branch of the ILP in Dewsbury since 1896, 
so the SDF surely had as much right as the Thornhill Lees ILP 
to stand a candidate. The ILP had never previously concerned 
itself with electoral protocol, yet Philip Snowden's candidacy 
in Blackburn had received full SDF backing. Neither had the 
ILP always bowed to local Labour opinion in its choice of 
constituencies to contest, Pete Curran's ignominious failure 
at Barnsley in October 1897 being a case in point. Secondly, 
the ILP predicted 'a miserable and insignificant vote' 
for 
Quelch and prepared to blame the Social-Democratic Federation 
for the consequences. 
111 
It is difficult to avoid the 
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conclusion that the Independent Labour Party seized upon the 
by-election as an opportunity to inflict a damaging blow upon 
the SDF, whilst the LRC desperately tried to distance itself 
from the contest in order to establish the respectability of 
its credentials as a serious political party. Locally the 
Trades Council, led by Turner, followed suit. He announced 
that they could not support Quelch as 'he had not fulfilled the 
conditions of the Labour Representation Committee with which 
112 
they were affiliated`. There was an undoubted touch of 
hypocrisy in all this, for if they were seriously concerned 
at the possible repercussions of a derisory poll for Quelch 
then a concerted effort to rally behind him would seem to have 
been the answer. The ILP and Trades Council seemed more than 
happy to air their grievances publically. Consequently 
relations on the Trades Council became very strained and Jacks, 
the president, almost came to blows with Harry Broome, who 
threatened to 'speak to Mr. Jacks in the market place. '113 
This dispute certainly demonstrated the isolation of 
the SDF after its withdrawal from the LRC, but it also showed 
the increasing tensions within the ILP consequent upon its 
affiliation to that body. Many Socialists were worried at a 
rumoured trend towards ILP/Liberal understandings in an attempt 
to get members into Parliament. Much to the chagrin of the ILP 
leaders Edward Hartley now announced his support for 
Quelch, 
complaining that 'The great work of the official section of 
the I. L. P. at the present seems not so much to push 
Socialism 
as to try and intrigue some half-a-dozen persons 
into 
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Parliament 
114 '. This, thought Hartley, could only be done at 
'a terribly heavy price - more than we can possibly afford '. 
115 
Events at Dewsbury disgusted him. He couldn't understand the 
hostility of Glasier and Hardie towards the SDF and obviously 
shared the view that there had been behind the scenes manoeuv- 
ring to intrigue a Lib-Lab into the seat. 'This must end', 
he said, or 'my connection must cease with a movement which 
for the sake of getting men into positions will forget all its 
past and all its principles. ' 
116 
Hartley had never been an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Labour alliance, preferring the 
unions to remain separate from the Socialist bodies. Speaking 
for Quelch at the Albert Hall in Dewsbury he also dismissed the 
idea that the ILP had the right to contest the constituency. 
'He had the prior claim to Dewsbury and if he had not there was 
not another Labour man who had. j117 Glasier was outraged at 
Hartley's stance, 
118 
but other ILPers obviously agreed with 
Hartley. Many branches wrote in to support Quelch, including 
those at Ossett and Huddersfield. The Huddersfield ILPers 
publically castigated the leadership for interfering with 
branch affairs in an attempt to rescind a pro-Quelch 
resolution. 
119 
The Clarion also threw its weight behind the 
SDF candidate, seizing the opportunity once more to campaign 
for Socialist unity, and the local Clarion fellowship 
supported Quelch throughout. Many Socialists felt that the 
rights and wrongs of the matter were of little importance 
now; a successful Quelch campaign could strike a blow 
for 
British Socialism. 
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Quelch's campaign was inevitably hampered by the internecine 
warfare outlined above. The Liberal press dismissed him as a 
threat precisely for that reason. 
120 
Yet in spite of this 
handicap he performed very respectably indeed. His contest 
demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of SDF pro- 
paganda and showed that the SDF was not without appeal even 
in the most hostile of environments. It also provides an 
interesting insight into the world of the Socialist propagandist 
at the turn of the century. 
The Federation sent Quelch's brother north soon after 
Oldroyd's resignation, to act as his organiser. A meeting at 
the Dewsbury Socialist Club on 10 October appointed a committee 
of six to oversee the campaign which Harry Quelch had launched 
in the market place four days earlier. He urged the workers 
of Dewsbury to be true to their class. The very fact that he 
was a Social-Democrat, he said, should be sufficient for him 
to claim the votes of the working classes. This was a 
commendable sentiment but a rather naive expectation in view 
of the soured relations between the SDF and other local Labour 
bodies. In an essentially moderate speech aimed at repairing 
the breech Quelch was at pains to emphasise that although the 
SDF wanted revolution they intended to use peaceable means, by 
gaining control of the political machinery of the country. 
Indeed throughout the election Quelch pushed a moderate enough 
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platform, a fact commented upon by the ILP. 
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The usual SDF 
programme of nationalisation, support for the Eight-Hour Day, 
Home Rule, free and secular education and a minimum wage, was 
accompanied by demands for national housing legislation and 
public control of the liquor trade. There was little here to 
distinguish him from an extreme Radical. Surprisingly, in 
view of the fact that Runciman was a pro-war Liberal, the South 
African war did not figure largely in his speeches. He con- 
demned the war as 'unjust, unnecessary and iniquitous', 
122 
but emphasised that he was no 'Little Englander' - Quelch 
supported a democratic rather than an Imperial Federation. 
However, other than the distribution of the SDF's anti-war 
manifesto123 little was done to bring the war to the forefront 
of the election campaign. At this time Hyndman and other 
leading figures in the SDF were drawing back from their openly 
anti-war stance, arguing that the anti-war campaign was a 
124 
distraction from Socialist propaganda. 
In classic SDF style Quelch combined a moderated programme 
with vitriolic rhetoric. He made long and bitter personal 
attacks on Oldroyd's record as M. P. which, in view of the 
latter's illness, was probably counter-productive. A particular 
target was the former M. P. 's conviction for working boys 
in 
contravention of the Factory Act, Quelch frequently repeating 
Oldroyd's declaration that 'he was prepared to go to prison, 
even to eat skilly; rather than surrender the right 
to sweat 
boys', Oldroyd had meant this as a statement of principle 
against government intervention and Quelch's literal 
inter- 
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pretation cut little ice with workers who knew Oldroyd and 
Sons as paternal employers. Quelch also poured scorn on the 
very electors for whose votes he was appealing, castigating 
them for continually electing their masters to represent them. 
Speaking in Batley, he said that 'it was impossible to des- 
cribe the mental development of any elector who would vote for 
such a man' as Runciman, who could not possibly 'benefit the 
125 
class on whose poverty and misery he made his fortune. ' 
The Federation also placed great emphasis on the similarity of 
the Liberal and Tory parties. J. B. Hudson, a visiting speaker 
from Manchester, argued that 'Liberalism was organised 
hypocrisy. The Liberals and Tories were simply two parties 
of the same class who, whenever class or vested interests 
were at stake, would invariably be found rowing in the same 
boat together. '126 Only the SDF provided a genuine alternative 
to the parties of capitalism, stressing as it did 'the intel- 
lectual, the moral and physical well-being of the people... 
127 
a higher, nobler and richer life. ' 
Socialist rhetoric was matched by a determined effort to 
improve their organisation. The committee worked feverishly 
to push Quelch's campaign, booking the Albert Hall every 
Sunday for the holding of mass meetings. Hyndman, Cunningham 
Graham, W. M. Thompson the editor of Reynolds Newspaper, William 
Gee the 'Socialist Dreadnought', Hartley and others were 
brought in to speak for Quelch. Henry Labouchere, 
Liberal 
M. P. for Northampton, wrote in support arguing that 
Quelch 
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offered more opportunity for those who w_-,. nted an end to the 
South African war than did Runciman. 15,000 copies of a 
Quelch biography, 5,000 circulars and 500 resumes of Hyndman's 
career were ordered for circulation. An attempt was also made 
to systematise canvassing, that perennial bugbear of SDF 
128 
electoral hopes, and in mid-December Dan Irving was brought 
in from Burnley to act as Quelch's election agent. The 
historian of Dewsbury parliamentary contests suggests that the 
SDF held few meetings and obtained little success129 but this 
is far from the truth. The constituency was bombarded with 
literature and inundated with speakers, few days passing without 
a meeting of some description. Quelch himself was in Dewsbury 
for over a week in November, a similar period in December, and 
for much of January. Large crowds were attracted to his 
meetings 
130 
and those at the Albert Hall every Sunday were 
always well attended. As the campaign progressed it took on 
the nature of a crusade, both against the existing system and 
for Socialist unity, a point emphasised by many of those 
writing to support Quelch. 
131 
There were, unfortunately, a 
number of obstacles to overcome if the socialists were to con- 
vert moral fervour into votes. 
The fact that leading ILP and LRC representatives, both 
locally and nationally, refused to support Quelch was an 
obvious handicap. The Thornhill Lees ILP even refused 
him the 
use of their rooms for a meeting although they accorded 
Runciman a similar privilege. Such events provided 
the Liberal 
press with an obvious propaganda coup. 
'A man who wants to 
286. 
turn the world upside down has begun his mission by hopelessly 
dividing the independent labour forces' 
132 
gloated the Reporter, 
which made great play of the fact that 'local leaders were 
conspicuous by their absence'. 
133 
These attacks, which inevit- 
ably carried some weight, were matched by accusations of 'Tory 
Gold'. The Leeds and Yorkshire Mercury lambasted a supposed 
'Socialist-Tory Entente', suggesting that it was not the first 
time that 'a so-called Socialist candidate' had found 'funds 
in some mysterious way to carry on a political campaign' . 
134 
The Liberals constantly warned electors that 'Every vote then 
given for Mr. Quelch will be a vote for the Tories '. 
135 
If 
Quelch was not attacked in the press then he was ignored, 
leading him to complain of 'wilful suppression' of his speeches. 
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Quelch also found himself in trouble with local 
Nonconformists over his joint authorship, with Belfort Bax, 
of A New Catechism of Socialism. The passage which aroused 
particular ire was that which suggested that both money and 
marriage were the results of the capitalist social structure 
and would disappear with the abolition of private property. 
This was interpreted as an attack upon 'existing monogamic 
relations' and as an advocacy of free lovq As one outraged 
reader of the Reporter protested, 'When purity and 
family life 
' 137 were destroyed it would be a bad day for this country. 
Such views would not have pleased the Catholic population. 
Already instructed by the Irish National League and the Irish 
M"Ps to vote for Runciman, any waverers would have 
been further 
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disturbed by the pronouncements of Quelch's most eccentric 
supporter, the Reverend H. M. Kennedy, Vicar of Plumpton. He 
had supported Runciman in his Oldham campaigns on the grounds 
that he was a Radical, but now argued that only shipowners 
should vote for him as they would be the only group to benefit 
from his election. Later he suggested that 'English people 
wanted their country to themselves and did not want the Paddies 
in their midst but the Paddies did not want to be on English 
soil if they would only give them their own country'. 
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Such 
comments made Kennedy an easy target for ridicule and did no- 
thing to improve Quelch`s chances, reflecting badly on their 
electoral strategy. 
Quelch was thus handicapped by a divided Labour organ- 
isation, an Irish electorate which traditionally followed the 
instructions of its political leaders, and a hostile press. 
Organisationally too he was at a disadvantage. On nomination 
day he had only 'a mere handful of supporters' compared to the 
Liberals and Tories. The 53 Liberal and 22 Tory nomination 
papers were opposed by only three from the Socialist forces. 
Financially too he suffered. A balance of E8-13-1 at the end 
of November had shrunk to £1-19-6 by early December and 
collections were reportedly poor. 
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In spite of a successful 
fund-raising campaign organised via justice the SDF found 
itself unable to make ends meet and unable to cope with the 
demands placed upon it. Lorenzo Quelch appealed desperately 
for help in organising Batley, where of course Ben Turner would 
have been invaluable, and on polling day it was reported 
that 
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Quelch's committee rooms 'had seemed deserted and he had no 
workers to speak of 
140 
Whilst the large crowds at his 
meetings were encouraging they could be misleading. The 
political meeting was an attraction regardless of the colours 
of thespeaker, and all three candidates were supported by 
public votes at Thornhill Lees for example. 
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Many of Quelch's 
listeners were 'young chaps' who were not entitled to vote, 
said one commentator, and certainly many potential supporters 
were disenfranchised. David Howell has estimated something 
like 4.8 million adult males were excluded from the register 
as late as 1910. A considerable number would have failed to 
register, a factor exacerbated by the SDF's lack of a full-time 
agent in the constituency. A survey in June 1900 had found 
that an electoral register of 13,296 contained only 24 lodgers. 
Many others were not eligible to vote. Ben Turner had noted 
that two thirds of the houses in Dewsbury and Batley were rated 
at less than £15 per annum and their occupants earning less than 
28 shillings per week. 
Understandably local Liberals were hugely confident at the 
beginning of the campaign. Quelch was dismissed as a serious 
threat and scarcely mentioned at the start of the campaign. 
Even at the beginning of January they felt that matters were 
only 'a little complicated' by the Socialist candidate. 
'That 
gentleman can be left to the tender mercies of the I. L. P. and 
the Trades Council', declared the Reporter. 
142 It was felt 
that Liberal organisation had never been so complete, that an 
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overwhelming victory was assured. Yet as January progressed 
signs of alarm were 
increasingly evident. It was emphasised 
that a vote for Quelch would split the Radical vote and let 
in the Tory. Liberals were urged to turn out on the day and 
register their vote. Potential Socialist voters were shown 
that the Radical platform embraced all that was best in Socialism 
Quelch was subjected to violent personal attacks, particularly 
for his supposed views on marriage; he was denounced as a 
'dreamer and fanatic'. This sudden panic was a response to an 
unexpectedly efficient campaign by the Socialists, which was 
wooing many ILPers and Labour men back to the fold. The ILP 
News attacked those who were supporting Quelch 'in violation 
of the decision of the National Council and local branch', 
143 
but even the Thornhill Lees branch had rescinded its earlier 
decision and allowed Quelch to speak. A Trades Council meeting 
on 22 January showed clearly that, whilst many still resented 
the SDF's 'impolitic behaviour', a number of delegates were 
prepared to overlook that and register their votes for the 
Socialist candidate. The Dewsbury Trades Council was severely 
criticised at a meeting of Yorkshire Trades Councils a few 
days later and Turner was grudgingly forced to admit that Quelch 
was an 'able and upright man, and they had not one word to say 
against him. ' 
144 
Runciman's hopes of a solid Labour vote 
in 
his favour seemed premature. Similarly there were signs of 
wavering in the Irish ranks. Michael Davitt had 
issued a 
circular supporting Quelch, in which he compared Ireland 
to 
South Africa. The assassins of Liberty in South 
Africa, he 
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said, 'whether Unionist or Liberal Imperialist will never offer 
to Ireland a measure of Home Rule worth our acceptance', and 
he attacked Runciman's support for the war. Davitt's influence 
may have been on the wane but his voice still carried some 
weight. This was particularly true 
in the Daw Green area of 
Dewsbury and at an Irish National League meeting Councillor 
McCann felt obliged to rebuke Davitt for his intervention, very 
much regretting that 
'there was the slightest disposition to 
disregard the advice they got from Headquarters`. 
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Another 
speaker declared that he wished the INL executive had advised 
them to support Quelch. Much of the credit for this resurgent 
campaign must go to Quelch himself for he fought an exception- 
ally able contest, earning praise from both friend and 
foe. 
He and Hyndman demonstrated all the qualities of the 
Socialist 
pioneers. 
Quelch earned the sobriquet 'bull-dog' for 
his tenacity 
during the Dewsbury by-election. 
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The Yorkshire Post des- 
cribed him at work: 
... thick-set, 
beetle-browed and heavy jawed.... 
Tenacity is writ all over him; it sounds 
in his 
voice; submit him to all the tortures of 
the 
Inquisition, and he will not modify one view or 
depart from his purpose. His voice 
is that of 
the agitator, deep and thick, the Hyde 
Park 
Sunday afternoon kind of voice, unmusical 
but 
147 
unmistakable and far-reaching, 
291. 
Harry Quelch, SDF parliamentary candidate 
for Dewsbury, 1902. 
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Quelch's sincerity and devotion to the cause earned him 
respect even from 
his opponents. Turner regarded him as 
'a fearless but hard political fighter.. . one of the best 
exponents of Socialism in his day and generation. ' 
148 
The 
Liberal press was forced to admit that `If the poll could be 
taken in the middle of one of his addresses he might possibly 
carry the day' for, as one observer recalled 'he could tawk 
couldt'fella.... It wor fair flaysome to hear him. ' 
149 In 
tandem with Hyndman, at Batley's Victoria Hall, for example, 
the message seemed quite irresistible. The two of them, 
'gifted with eloquence, played on the audience as if it had 
been a lute; it was responsive to every emotion that was wafted 
from the platform. '150 Hyndman made a marked but alluring 
contrast to Quelch, a 'benevolent- looking old gentleman' who 
could pass for 'a mild-mannered dean who lives in his 
cathedral's past. '151 As he strode the platform he constantly 
buttoned and unbuttoned his coat and ran his fingers through his 
long beard. Turner commented that 'to hear him expound his 
theories was both picturesque and educative. 1152 The Yorkshire 
Post assessed them perfectly: 
... there is certainly a great deal about 
the men 
themselves to attract you. The Socialist of the 
best class, that class to which Mr. Quelch belongs, 
is no ignorant firebrand. He is an educated man, 
usually self-educated, very often a linguist and 
deeply read in the literature of more than one 
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country. Oratory is one of the special accomp- 
lishments of this class... as public speakers, as 
makers of resonant phrases, as mouthpieces for a 
fine flow of language, they usually take high 
rank... as men with broad sympathies, with keen 
literary tastes, with true concern for the lot 
of those less comfortably endowed than themselves 
they are delightful. 
153 
The message and the way it was delivered attracted support 
in a constituency with a Radical tradition. Quelch's arguments 
against working men sending their capitalist employers to 
Parliament, his attacks on the housing conditions in the 
Dewsbury area, his stated support for trade unionism were per- 
suasive to an increasing number of men who had grown suspicious 
of Liberal platitudes. Socialism had had a presence in the 
town for some nine years, with a certain amount of success, and 
Quelch's ability could build on that. The nature of the 
constituency aided him. 
Political thoughtis especially virile in the small 
towns which surround Dewsbury and Batley. In the 
long winter evenings there is nothing for the men 
to do... but to either read at home or go round to 
the club or the public house.. . into the reading 
rooms of the workmen's clubs you find everywhere 
"... I can only attribute much of the knowledge 
of current day events which is widespread through 
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the constituency to the copious supply of printed 
matter which these institutions afford. This 
knowledge always manifests itself at the meetings 
which are nightly held. 
154 
The packed meetings and the excitement of the campaign 
bred a feeling of anticipation in the Socialist ranks. 'I 
think yet we shall arrive', said Walter Crosland of the Dewsbury 
Clarion Fellowship, 
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whilst Justice regarded the outlook as 
'bright and encouraging... the chances of victory are good. '156 
They were buoyed up by hope, nourished by idealism, rejuvenated 
at the thought of attempting the impossible. Mere propagandising 
could be a thankless task but the election provided a definite 
and realisable goal to aim for. Even their opponents admitted 
that Quelch 'would seem to be gathering support wherever he 
goes. '157 In the event Socialist optimism was ill-founded and 
the odds against Quelch too great, but Snowden's prediction 
that 'He will poll heavier than we feared, 
158 
was borne out. 
In the heaviest poll ever recorded for a Dewsbury election the 
SDF candidate received 1,597 votes, as opposed to 4,512 for 
the Conservative and 5,660 for Runciman. The Liberal majority 
had been reduced by 1,000 which, as the Liberal agent admitted, 
was due almost entirely to Quelch's presence. 
159 Most sur- 
prisingly of all Quelch had polled 517 votes more than Hartley 
had done in 1895, in spite of the divisions 
in the ranks of the 
Labour party. He 'had done better than any of his critics 
had forecast', 160 polling three times Glasier's estimate. 
This 
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reflected the blinkered views of the ILP leaders where the 
SDF was concerned, and it demonstrated that an overtly Socialist 
candidate could command considerable support both in Dewsbury 
and, as Victor Grayson later showed, elsewhere in the country. 
The election campaign certainly boosted the position of the 
SDF in Dewsbury. After the contest Tom Myers was forced to 
admit that 'the standing of the I. L. P. in Dewsbury has gone', 
to be replaced by that of the Social-Democratic Federation. 
'It Was a body of no account', he said, but 'now it is 
recognised. '16' Myers even feared for the future of the ILP 
in Thornhill Lees. There was quite clearly a great deal of 
local hostility towards the ILP leadership, which Myers felt 
would take some time to subside. Thus George Allen, a founder 
member of the ILP, wrote from ILP Cottage in Dewsbury to 
express his disillusionment: 
... the way the Labour Leader has misrepresented 
the 
workers of Dewsbury in this fight has shown, I think, 
that it is not worthy of any support.... I am glad 
that this thing has happened, as it shows where the 
162 
enemies of Socialism are. 
Ben Turner was particularly heavily criticised163 and 
his 
behaviour after the election was revealing. He moderated, 
indeed abandoned, his hostility towards the SDF and declared 
himself anxious to forget the past and to 'join all progressive 
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forces to work amicably together at the next election. '164 
But he also attempted to re-establish his Socialist credentials. 
At one meeting, said Myers, Turner 'went as far as the most 
rabid revolutionary S. D. F. man could expect him to go. '165 
His credibility was obviously weakened, temporarily at least, 
and the SDF had gained respect. 
gamated with the SDF in April166 
The Clarion Fellowship amal- 
and in August 1902 two new 
branches of the Federation were formed, at Ravensthorpe and 
Batley. 
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These were the result of organising work by Friend 
Lister, aided by a grant from the centre, for the Executive 
was obviously very optimistic about the Federation's prospects 
in Dewsbury. In the event there was little evidence of 
activity from these branches, although Batley survived until 
the early months of 1904. Indeed they might simply have 
resulted from a geographical division of the SDF's existing 
forces. Nonetheless their existence reflected the prevalent 
optimism and the healthy state of the Dewsbury branch, which 
scored a further propaganda success when two local clergymen 
became members. 
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The climax of the branch's summer season 
of outdoor propaganda came when it mounted a widely publicised 
garden party in the grounds of Wood Hall, the home of the 
Jessops. SDF speakers such as Quelch and Irving were accompanier. 
by the newly formed Dewsbury Socialist Choir; the fete was given 
the seal of approval by the Dewsbury Temperance Band and the 
Purlwell Wesleyan Choir amongst others, and over 
600 attended. 
The SDF in Dewsbury had come a long way since 
its first meeting, 
five years earlier, in Lister's house. Its new-found status 
29 7. 
was emphasised 
by Lister's election to the provincial section 
of the Executive 
in 1903, achieving third place in the poll. 
He was certainly confident for the future, predicting at least 
four new branches in surrounding towns. As he commented, 'We 
have got the centre firmly established; now let us see if it 
169 
can spread out a bit. ' 
Yet the election had more than local significance. In 
many ways it encapsulated the problems of the Labour and 
Socialist movement nationally. The isolation of the SDF from 
the rest of the movement was clearly demonstrated and this 
was undoubtedly due to its withdrawal from the Labour 
Representation Committee. Whatever the rights and wrongs of 
the Dewsbury affair no amount of rhetoric could hide the fact 
that its relations with the ILP in particular were strained 
almost beyond repair. Conversely the tensions within the 
alliance of Socialists and trade unionists which constituted 
the LRC were also visible. An examination of the Socialist 
and Labour Press reveals an extraordinary amount of interest 
in the Dewsbury contest, and this was demonstrated by the 
support Quelch received from the Clarion Movement in particular 
but also from branches and members of the ILP in defiance of 
NAC instructions. This confirmed Philip Snowden's opinion 
that 'The movement nationally seems just now in something of 
170 a crisis' for only two years after its formation many 
Socialists had become disillusioned with the progress of the 
LRC. They were suspicious of the aims of their trade union 
colleagues, fearful that the Socialist ideal was being 
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relegated further and further into the background. The refusal 
of both the LRC and the ILP to back Quelch confirmed their 
doubts. Many Socialists viewed with distaste the bickerings 
and manoeuvrings of party leaders and yearned for a united 
Socialist movement, irrespective of party label. This stand- 
point was forcefully expressed by 'Dangle', A. M. Thompson 
of the Clarion, who viewed Quelch's performance as 
a crushing blow to the conflicting "Leaders" and 
a triumphant vindication of Socialist Unity.... 
The rank and file of Dewsbury have shown the way; 
Socialists of all denominations have shut their 
eyes for once to the scowlings and nudgings of 
rival party officials and stood shoulder to 
shoulder for Socialism. 
'71 
Thus the Clarion renewed its appeal for Socialist unity, a call 
readily echoed by the SDF. 
The Federation did not regard the result at Dewsbury as 
a failure. Harry Quelch declared that 'We have increased our 
poll by 50 per cent, we have fought a good fight, we 
have kept 
the faith. '172 The SDF was in no way inclined to admit that 
withdrawal from the LRC had weakened its effort; 
it preferred 
to emphasise that over 1,500 votes had been cast 
for Social- 
Democracy pure and simple and drew the conclusion 
that a con- 
solidation of Socialist forces outside the 
LRC was possible. 
Thus its Annual Conference for 1902 reaffirmed the 
decision 
29 9. 
to remain outside the LRC and called for Socialist unity. 
Essentially therefore the Social-Democratic Federation had 
reverted to its propagandist stance of the mid 1890s, attempting 
to build a revolutionary party outside the ranks of the organ- 
ised working class, a position which would leave it stranded 
once more between reformism and revolution. 
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PART III 
'LEFT IN THE CENTRE' - THE 
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION 1901-16. 
310. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The Socialist Movement from the 1880s to the mid-1890s was a 
growing movement, not in the restricted sense of party member- 
ship but in the sense that its message reached out to ever 
wider sections of the population. As William Morris and 
Belfort Bax pointed out in 1893, 'Ten years ago the British 
working classes knew nothing of socialism... that is now so 
much changed... there is no longer any hostility to socialism. '' 
Its circle of involvement was much larger than the actual 
membership would indicate; Edinburgh's 'Labour Day' in 1894, 
for example, was attended by ten thousand marchers and an 
estimated 120,000 spectators. 
2 
Hence Robert Blatchford's 
continual appeals to the 'unattached' through the Clarion, 
plus the mushrooming of Socialist societies independent of 
affiliation. In many cases membership of one party or another 
was an accident of time, place or circumstance, and many 
Socialists were members of more than one organisation. A 
feeling of fellowship pervaded the movement, which meant that 
conflict between various organisations, although frequent, 
was not fratricidal. Many members of the Socialist League 
later returned to the SDF and the two co-operated on many a 
platform; similarly ILPers and SDFers worked side by side 
in 
many areas. Above all else an air of optimism abounded; 
there 
was a belief in imminent change, encouraged by the apparent 
instability of the political system and the belief 
in the 
impending demise of the Liberal Party. The 
Socialist Party 
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would soon take its place in the final conflict between 
Capital and Labour. 
In such an atmosphere the logic of 'Socialist unity' 
seemed irrefutable and it stood its greatest chance of success. 
As Stephen Yeo has suggested, 'Socialism in that period had 
not yet become the prisoner of a particular elaborate party 
machine -a machine which would come to associate its own well 
being with the prospects for Socialism. '3 Rank and file 
pressure on party leaderships in the early days meant a much 
greater democracy within the movement than was later apparent, 
particularly for the ILP. The failure of both the SDF and the 
ILP to make the hoped for advances in the mid-1890s encouraged 
the leaderships to respond to such pressure, spurred on from 
without by Blatchford and his vision of 'the great unattached' 
army to be recruited by a unified Socialist party. The failure 
of the unity attempt can be explained in terms of the changing 
circumstances of the time. British capitalism proved itself, 
as ever, extraordinarily resilient and the expected revolutionary 
situation never materialised. The Liberal Party reorganised 
itself and once more, albeit temporarily, took its place as 
the second party of Capital. Such trends meant that the 
Socialist parties found themselves without a mass movement to 
lead and they therefore retreated into their own particular 
shells. A group interested in bureaucratic consolidation gained 
a commanding position within the ILP and this party 
leadership 
wanted no part of Socialist unity; its conception of 
Socialism 
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differed from that of the SDF and it did not wish to endanger 
its drive for an alliance with the trade unions by associating 
too closely with an avowed revolutionary party: the blame 
for the collapse of unity negotiations in the 1890s can be 
laid fairly and squarely at the door of the ILP cabal of Hardie, 
Snowden, Glasier and MacDonald. 
The SDF's history in the first twenty years of its 
existence dispel the stereotype of an alien intrusion onto the 
British political scene, which struggled to establish any roots. 
Developments both in London and Lancashire militate against the 
notion that the ILP was the natural vehicle for British 
Socialism. In London the SDF provided continuity with secular 
and radical traditions and, as Paul Thompson has pointed out, 
its trade union connections in the capital made it more influ- 
ential than the ILP. Spokesmen for London's working-class 
communities such as George Lansbury and Will Thorne turned to 
the SDF rather than to the ILP. In Lancashire the Federation 
was active before the ILP; it adapted itself to 
local con- 
ditions, and in centres such as Burnley, Blackburn and 
Rochdale established a viable Socialist option. 
As its name 
implies, the SDF was a semi-autonomous rather than a centralised 
body. This was both its strength and 
its weakness. It meant 
that locally branches could respond to events and utilise 
their knowledge of the area, but conversely 
there was no agreed 
national policy. The Federation spent much 
of its time engaged 
in debate, which inevitably reduced 
its effectiveness. 
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Broadly speaking there were two contrasting trends in the SDF, 
one towards concentrating exclusively on local issues and 
'palliatives', the other emphasising the revolutionary object- 
ive, although supporters of this trend were often unclear as 
to the means. The leadership, and Hyndman in particular, failed 
to give a clear lead and often veered between one trend and 
the other, viewing them not in a dialectical synthesis but as 
mutually exclusive. As the Hyndmanites controlled Justice and 
comprised many of the Federation's most prominent figures their 
views were often seen as synonymous with those of the SDF. 
This confusion between the pronouncements of the party nation- 
ally and the reality of its activities locally is largely 
explanatory of the fact that the Social-Democratic Federation 
had entered the Twentieth Century a curiously static body. 
In 1894 Engels estimated that some 100,000 members had 
passed through the ranks of the SDF and this is illustrative 
of the fact that although it could recruit converts it largely 
failed to hold them. T. A. Jackson neatly assessed the problem. 
Members of the SDF, he said, 
thought their duty done when they had told the 
workers with reiterated emphasis that they had 
been and were being robbed systematically, and 
given them an exposition of how the trick had 
been worked. From this the workers were 
invited 
to draw a moral deduction that the robbers ought 
to be stopped, and to reach a practical 
decision 
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to wage a class war upon the robbers. 
4 
When faced with the fact that most workers declined to take 
up the fight many SDFers concluded that 'the bastards aren't 
worth saving 
5 ' and gravitated to other fields. Jackson's view 
is not entirely accurate; it ignores the very real debate waged 
within the party over policy and regional developmentsin areas 
such as Lancashire. But in the absence of a coherent policy 
SDF members tended to fall back upon a 'propagandist' stance 
and this was certainly the position nationally. The formation 
of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 offered the 
SDF a wider audience for its message and the opportunity to 
eschew its educational role in favour of a more activist policy 
within the Labour movement. In 1900 the Socialist movement was 
in a state of transition, very much at the crossroads of its 
history. For a short period the SDF marched hand in hand with 
the ranks of organised Labour but this phase ended with its 
withdrawal from the L RC in 1901. Thereafter it failed to 
offer a clear-cut alternative to the Labour alliance, attempt- 
ing to steer a middle course between reformism and impossibilism, 
its leaders seeking a combination of political practicality 
and theoretical soundness. This middle course failed to satisfy 
many party members. The continued emphasis on palliatives, 
the stress on electoral politics, and the desire for unity with 
the anti-Marxist ILP exasperated an increasingly vocal minor- 
ity within its own ranks who saw the Federation attempting an 
illusory short cut to Socialism. The opposition of the 
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'impossibilists' was exacerbated by their irritation at the 
dominance of the Federation by the middle-aged, middle-class 
'old Guard'. Hyndman's elitist attitudes particularly annoyed 
them, his views encapsulated in the following letter: 
I don't mind saying that I am utterly disgusted with 
workers here in general and with our party in par- 
ticular. Neither deserve to have men of ability 
from the educated classes to serve them. It is a 
waste of life. They are not worth the personal 
sacrifice and continual worry. 
6 
For the first time since the days of the Socialist League 
the hegemony of the Hyndmanites was being challenged. The 
'impossibilists' were instrumental in forcing the decision to 
withdraw from the LRC, but they eventually proved little more 
than an irritant to the leadership, which forced them out of 
the party. The struggle to connect theory and practice reduced 
the SDF to virtual immobility in the early years of the century, 
and it functioned more 'as a kind of conscience within the 
wider Socialist movement's than as a party in its own right. 
Frustration at the lack of progress led to the emergence of 
a more formidable opposition grouping centred around the 
emigre 
Theodore Rothstein. He first voiced criticism of the party's 
direction during the Boer War, aided by Ernest Belfort Bax, 
who wanted to augment Hyndman's narrow economic conception of 
Socialism with a new 'Ethic of Socialism. ' Whilst 
few members 
were prepared to follow Bax in his search for a new moral 
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consciousness, and indeed Rothstein openly opposed his argu- 
ments, many were similarly concerned at the SDF's shortcomings. 
Three issues provided a focus for dissent. The first of these 
was the suffrage, or 'The Woman Question'; the second debate 
concerned the value of industrial action and organisation; the 
third, and potentially most divisive, was that of international 
relations and foreign policy. Under attack the Executive 
revived the Socialist unity campaign as a diversion from the 
party's problems and as a unifying tactic. Its opponents hoped 
to gain new strength from a consolidation of Socialist forces 
and were therefore also enthusiastic for unity. 
External factors also influenced the Federation in favour of 
unity. Stanley P i.. erson has described the period before the 
First World War as a time when the British Socialist movement 
embarked upon a 'Journey from Fantasy to Politics', abandoning 
its hope of a rapid Socialist transformation of society 
in favour 
of a more long-term perspective, adapting itself to political 
reality. Such a transition appalled many Socialists. Revulsion 
at the Labour Party's performance in Parliament after 
1906 
spurred a spirit of revolt within the ILP and among 
Socialists 
generally. This first found expression with the election of 
Victor Grayson to Parliament for the Colne Valley constituency 
on an explicitly Socialist ticket. It was reinforced 
by the 
revived influence of the Clarion, which was 
instrumental in the 
formation of local Socialist Societies 
independent of both SDF 
and ILP. The Federation was further encouraged 
by the growth 
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of opposition within the ILP to party policy, culminating in 
the so-called 'Green Manifesto',, and by the increasing industrial 
unrest. Thus, in 1911, the SDF prepared to launch a new campaign 
for Socialist unity, only to be pre-empted by Victor Grayson, 
who announced his own appeal for a 'British Socialist Party. ' 
The two campaigns eventually merged but harmony was difficult to 
maintain. The various groups which coalesced were divided from 
the start over the policy to be adopted, and united only by 
discontent with their previous organisations and with the pre- 
vailing capitalist system. Although the SDF provided the only 
coherent grouping within the BSP - 'it remained a unit and 
therefore dominated the more loosely-knit hotch-potch of ILPers 
and Clarionites'8 - it too had been divided internally and 
these divisions soon manifested themselves in the new party. 
Furthermore its leadership, the 'Old Guard', proved incapable 
of adapting itself to new ideas, of moving with events. Trapped 
by reflexes developed in a different era the SDF attempted to 
cast the new party in an old mould, and its rejection of indus- 
trial action alienated many new recruits and prevented any 
effective alliance between the mass industrial movement and 
the BSP. Significantly, the ranks of the opposition to the 
Hyndmanites had been considerably strengthened by the formation 
of the new party. 
The failure of the attempt to forge a mass Socialist party 
led to a break with SDF tradition. A long-time opponent 
of a 
Labour alliance the party now moved towards affiliation 
to the 
Labour Party, which was agreed in 1913 and 
finally achieved in 
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1916. In reality this solved what had been the major problem 
throughout its history, the dichotomy between its revolutionary 
phraseology and its essentially reformist practice. Affiliation 
to the Labour Party meant that the SDF demonstrated with 
finality 'the essentially parliamentary basis of their doctrine, 
in fact, inspired more by Kautsky and German Social Democracy 
than by Marx. 
9 Ironically this became clear after Hyndman and 
his supporters had been forced out of the party for, under the 
impact of war, the inherent divisions between the reformist 
and revolutionary wings were strained to breaking point. 
Socialist unity, a long-cherished ambition, had in fact presaged 
the eventual demise of the 'Old Guard' and their creation, the 
Social-Democratic Federation. Its demise was completed by the 
influence of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
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CHAPTER XI. 
PRO-BOERS AND IMPOSSIBILISTS. 
The SDF had always proclaimed an anti-imperialist position, 
championing Home Rule for Ireland and publicising the distress in 
India. However, its stance had been substantially weakened by 
the nationalist idiosyncracies of Hyndman. His hostility towards 
Germany manifested itself also in antipathy towards the German 
1 
Socialist party, whilst his obsessive belief in the need for a 
strong British navy and his vision of the 'Anglo-Saxon race' 
leading the way to Socialism demonstrated a marked divergence from 
the internationalism of Marx. Hyndman's ideas, mapped out in 
England for All, and little altered thereafter, had caused William 
Morris, Bax, Eleanor Marx and others to leave the SDF in December 
1884. They created a further furore with the outbreak of the 
Boer War. 
The danger signals were clearly evident at the time of the 
Jameson Raid in 1896. Although the Federation condemned the 
episode as 'criminal'2, it did so in articles with both anti- 
Semitic and anti-German overtones. 
3 
More startling still was 
the SDF Manifesto on Foreign and Colonial Policy; this in effect 
called for an increase in the strength of the British navy, re- 
assuring its readers that the navy, in contradistinction to the 
army, was not an 'anti-democratic force'. 
4 
The rationale for 
expanding the navy was simple: 'We don't want to 
be starved or 
to be conquered by other powers nor do we wish to 
be deprived of 
our colonies or to shirk our share in international 
difficulties. ' 
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Such a concept of foreign policy was strictly nationalistic-, 
the manifesto never mentioned 'imperialism' nor did it even hint 
at a class view of international relations. Hyndman's influence 
was clear; he had, in a unique way, welded his Socialism to his 
nationalism. To echo Bill Baker, 'he wanted a powerful Britain 
with a big navy so that when she became socialist she could 
spread enlightenment throughout her empire, and use her vast 
influence among the nations in favour of socialism. '6 
There was a swift reaction to such xenophobia. George 
Green of the Brixton branch spoke for many when he complained 
about the 'jingoism' pervading the SDF, and he protested that 
the members hadn't even been consulted before the issue of the 
manifesto. A more formidable opponent for Hyndman was Ernest 
Belfort Bax, who had rejoined the Federation after the demise 
of the Socialist League. A fervent internationalist, Bax had 
been one of the first Socialists to analyse imperialism as a 
major threat to Socialism. In the May Day number of Justice for 
1896 he argued that the search for new markets aimed to compen- 
sate capitalists for their struggles at home, that imperialism 
would therefore tend to extend the life of capitalism. Modern 
war was an economic war, said Bax, with capitalists becoming 
increasingly disinclined to military conflict. Indeed 'rival 
governing classes will stand together' against both the native 
populations and their own working classes. Socialists should 
therefore make common cause with the natives. Bax's position 
was clearly that of International Socialism, Hyndman's view 
strictly `anglo-centric'. A clash was inevitable. 
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In the period between the Jameson Raid and the outbreak 
of the South African war Justice, to its credit, maintained an 
anti-imperialist stance. Its intellectual inconsistencies would 
not have troubled the bulk of the membership, who were more con- 
cerned with events at home. Very perceptively too the paper 
warned, as early as April 1897, that Britain 'was making ready 
7 
for a war in South Africa. ' The outbreak of that war though 
placed Hyndman in a dilemma, for his support for the rights of 
small nations was vitiated by a fear of appearing anti-British. 
In an effort to avoid this impasse Hyndman resurrected his anti- 
Semitism. Thus the war was instigated by 'Jew financial cliques 
and their hangers on', 
8 
stimulated by the 'Jew-jingo press' and 
encouraged by 'these aliens, who in the guise of patriots are 
engaged in hounding on the Government to a criminal war of 
aggression. '9 However much Hyndman might protest that he had 
no animosity towards Jews1° his aim was clear. He intended to 
shift the blame for the war away from British capitalists and 
British politicians by suggesting that they had been duped by 
11 'a gang of millionaire mine owners, chiefly foreign Jews. ' 
The duty of 'native-born Englishmen' was self-evident; they should 
oppose 'the butchering Semites' who had invaded the Transvaal. 
This interpretation of the war shocked many SDF members and 
enraged the Federation's strong Jewish 
emigre element. Theodore 
Rothstein, who had previously complained about 
'the unsavoury 
tendencies... of anti-Semitism' within the SDF, 
12 demanded an 
Executive resolution condemning this 'muddy current'. 
He launched 
a scathing attack on Hyndman" 'We all know well where 
that 
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current comes from', he suggested; from a man 'who, with all 
his talents and virtues, has never been able to shake cff the 
particular bias implanted, perhaps, by education, but certainly 
ßl3 fostered by his milieu. Another Jewish Socialist attacked 
those whose 'race prejudice they have imbibed with their mother's 
milk', and yet another pointed out that it was the Jewish work- 
ing class rather than the Jewish capitalists who would suffer 
14 
most from such anti-Semitism. Belfort Bax, however, once 
more provided the most sustained assault on Hyndman's position. 
'I am pro-Boer', he proclaimed, pouring scorn on the idea that 
a Jewish conspiracy lay behind the war; Englishmen should be 
concerned with their own capitalists first and foremost, for the 
class struggle superseded any national struggle. Socialists had 
to be pro-Boer because they had to resist 'the violence of 
Great Britain and international capitalism. '15 The sheer weight 
of criticism certainly put Hyndman and his supporters on the 
defensive, but there remained an undercurrent of anti-Semitism 
in the SDF, so much so that the Annual Conference of 1900 was 
pressed to pass a resolution condemning such bias. 
16 
Whatever the 'individual fads and fancies' of individual 
SDFers, as J. B. Askew described them, there was no denying tie 
Federation's strong initial public stance against the war. It 
had called a demonstration on 30 June 1899 to protest against 
the 'piratical Jingoism' of the Government, and on the very 
brink 
of war the SDF participated in another demonstration convened 
by the anti-war Radicals. At that meeting the platform speakers 
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were subject to a violent assault from which Hyndman considered 
17 
himself lucky to escape. To oppose the war at open meetings 
required considerable courage but SDF members were heartened 
by the forthright lead they received. In the early weeks of 
1900 Justice came out strongly against the war, in which it saw 
'as much an incident in the class war as any strike or lock-out 
1 18 ever was. Quelch emphasised that class was more important 
than race and that the Boers were 'ipso facto on the side of 
the workers. '19 This anti-war propaganda culminated in the 
issue of an uncompromising manifesto attacking 'The most un- 
necessary and unjust capitalist war of modern times. ' The 
manifesto called for opposition to conscription and the intro- 
duction of a citizen army, and it concluded with this appeal: 
If, then, fight you must, fight here. If you are 
eager to show your courage, display it here. If 
you are determined to establish an adequate franchise, 
demand it here. If you are ready to protect your 
Empire, safeguard it here. If you burn to revenge your 
slaughtered kinsfolk avenge them here. Shake off the 
apathy and indifference which render you powerless, 
even in politics, and take the control of your own 
country into your own hands. 
20 
This was the kind of rhetorical flourish at which 
the SDF 
excelled, and the membership gave the manifesto an enthusiastic 
welcome. It signalled a closing of ranks 
in the face of a 
largely hostile environment. Moreover, 
it established the 
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position of the Social- Democratic Federation as an international- 
ist Socialist party at a time when Blatchford supported the war 
and the Fabians were divided on the issue. The Federation has been 
criticised for failing 
'to carry out any polemic against 
Blatchford's `position or against that of the Fabians. '21 This 
is both untrue and misleading. 'Tattler' attacked Blatchford's 
22 
attitude on several occasions and Justice continually emphasised 
that there were no grounds for differences of opinion amongst 
Socialists on the question of the war. Those few SDFers who 
dissented from the anti-war line found their views mercilessly 
quashed, 
23 
as branch meetings up and down the country carried 
resolutions protesting against the war. More to the point, 
opposition to the war needed to be expressed to as wide an audience 
as possible and not restricted to a dispute between or within 
Socialist parties. Throughout 1900 the pages of Justice were 
dominated by the war; the SDF called its own anti-war meetings 
and participated in others, often providing stewards for organ- 
isations such as the 'Stop-the-War-Committee'. In an attempt 
to counteract the Establishment press pamphlets were 
issued by 
Hyndman, Diack and Statham, explaining the SDF position and 
exposing the truth, as they saw it, of the situation 
in the 
Boer Republics. The party's stance at this time was clear and 
uncompromising, but Theodore Rothstein was convinced that more 
could, and should be done. 
Rothstein saw the war as a means of accelerating 
the decline 
of Liberalism and thereby providing the SDF with an 
opportunity 
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which must be seized. They must, he said, 
leave the sect stage of their political existence 
... cease carrying on the campaign of Freedom in 
the nooks and corners of a small paper and of 
branch meetings.... They must also cast aside 
their methods of mere criticism which disting- 
uish a sect and an outsider and can never by 
itself gain any considerable following and 
develop and elaborate in all its details a 
positive programme capable of being realised 
within the present day conditions and prove it 
to the public. 
24 
In essence Rothstein wanted a more militant campaign against 
the war and not simply a registering of protest. Yet his was 
not simply a comment upon the anti-war agitation but a more 
fundamental criticism of SDF strategy. His trenchant criticism 
of the SDF's incipient sectarianism highlighted the party's 
major weaknesses, its tendency to snipe from the sidelines, 
its failure to synthesise its single-issue campaigns with 
the broader fight for Socialism, and its failure to identify 
issues which might provide a platform for the expansion of 
the 
party. As he pointed out, 
If we wish history to take a certain direction and 
at the same time not to be left out of account 
ourselves, we must actively intercede 
in the chain 
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of events and try to shape them in accordance 
with our wishes and ultimate goal. 
25 
The war, said Rothstein, was the opportunity to regenerate the 
Socialist movement, 'to inflame our souls with a sacred fire'. 
It was an opportunity which presented itself infrequently and 
which the SDF could not afford to ignore. 
Rothstein's argument seems scarcely credible in the face 
of the widely held belief that the Boer War generated over- 
whelming working-class support and enthusiasm for imperialism. 
Hyndman's treatment at the Trafalgar Square demonstration, the 
manhandling of Lloyd George in Birmingham, the exuberant 
celebrations of the relief of Mafeking, attacks on the office 
of the Labour Leader, were presumed manifestations of the un- 
popularity of anti-war supporters. If that were true then a 
campaign such as Rothstein envisaged would never have got off 
the ground. But, as Richard Price has stressed, working-class 
support for this war was essentially a myth. 
26 
The absence of 
mass opposition to the war has been taken as proof of working- 
class support for imperialism, whereas a far more telling 
factor was the inadequacy of the organisations which attempted 
to build that opposition. 'The nature and methods of the anti- 
war committees, the paralytic dissension within the Liberal 
Party, explain the impotence of opposition to the war far more 
satisfactorily than imperial patriotism-' 
27 Price clearly shows 
that interest in the war was widespread, that working-class 
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papers gave it as much space as the others, that their clubs 
debated it, and, overwhelmingly, the anti-war proporents won 
the day. Yet this did not generate a mass movement against the 
war, for the simple reason that the leaders of the agitation 
expressed their objections in moral terms which were not 
suited to appeal to a working-class audience. They argued a 
conspiracy theory in which the war arose from the machinations 
and ambitions of specific capitalists on the Rand, with 
Chamberlain as their tool. Working men, however, other than 
the politically active, did not think in terms of right or 
wrong; their opposition to the war stemmed from the view that 
imperialism conflicted with social reform at home, that money 
spent on the war could have been spent on old age pensions 
or housing. Thus the London Trades Council noted that 'we 
have always during this parliament a Foreign question thrust 
forward with the earnest intention of diverting the attention 
of the country from home affairs. ' 
28 
The anti-war Radicals 
of the South African Conciliation Committee and the Stop-the- 
War Committee rarely related the two issues and Lherefore did 
not speak the language of working-class radicalism. Pro-Boers 
within the Liberal Party accentuated fears of a split in the 
party and failed therefore to establish a base for an anti-war 
crusade. This failure of leadership led to working-class 
apathy on the question and encouraged ambivalent attitudes 
to 
the war; anti-war resolutions co-existed with participation 
in 
jingo 'entertainment', Trades Councils would express opposition 
329. 
to the war but shout down suggestions of British brutality 
which implied an attack on working-class soldiers. Labour 
organs such as the Yorkshire Factory Times therefore attempted 
to remain neutral on the issue. 
Rothstein correctly identified an issue which could be 
exploited, given the political will and leadership. Price 
suggests that one of the reasons for the failure of the anti- 
war committees was their identification with the 'extremism' 
of the SDF, 'which continued to be devoid of any large-scale 
popular following'. 
29 
Yet the Federation had often shown itself 
capable of mobilising support far beyond the confines of its 
own membership for single issue campaigns such as free speech, 
unemployment and the feeding of schoolchildren. In Battersea 
supporters of the war rarely got a hearing and the SDF was 'the 
most active and dynamic element in the anti-war movement. '30 
The failure of the SDF was, in fact, the failure of the anti-war 
movement as a whole, for 
The Socialists never attempted to place the war 
in any wider context; never regarded it as a re- 
suit of the needs of British capitalism as a 
whole. The conspiracy theory appealed to both 
Liberals and Socialists. 
31 
Thus Hyndman's efforts to shift blame for the war on to the 
shoulders of a few, largely Jewish, capitalists chimed 
in well 
with the arguments of the Radicals. A Socialist analysis 
of 
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the war was largely lacking in the pages of Justice after the 
early months of 1900, and the connection with domestic issues 
was rarely made. Yet in the so-called 'Khaki' election of 
1900 Lansbury, standing for the SDF in Bow and Bromley on a 
platform of social reform and opposition to the war, polled 37 
per cent of the votes cast as compared with 33 per cent for the 
32 
Liberal candidate in 1899. That result and the success of 
the anti-war campaign in Battersea demonstrated the potential 
for a broad-based opposition to the war but the Social- 
Democratic Federation, like its Radical counterparts, lacked 
leadership. Hyndman certainly had the charisma to lead such 
a crusade, as his election campaigns in Burnley showed, but 
his analysis of the war was flawed and his commitment dubious. 
Consequently, after its initial anti-war flourish, the 
Federation played down the war and in its later stages, when 
the concentration camps on the Rand and the loss of life amongst 
Boer women and children gave anti-war critics a new credibility, 
it can be held in part responsible for the failure of the anti- 
war movement. 
Rather than adopt a militant campaign against the war the 
SDF seemingly accepted the impossibility of such a task and 
fell back upon the conclusion that fusion with the ILP was the 
solution to the Socialist crisis. 
33 
It was hardly surprising 
that the SDF and ILP should move closer together in 1900, and 
they even ran joint candidates at Rochdale and Blackburn, 
but 
Clarke and Snowden suffered the same fate as the Federation's 
own candidates, Lansbury and Thorne, in East London. 
In the 
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face of the defeat of the anti-war forces at this election 
the abstention of one million Liberal voters went unnoticed. 
Instead the SDF, preoccupied with its declining membership 
figures, began to rethink its policy. As early as May 1900 
the London District Council had considered that 'the S. D. F. 
have successfully vindicated the right of Free Speech' and 
should now return 'to advocating the principles of Social- 
Democracy. ' 
34 
As the war dragged on and a long guerilla 
struggle seemed inevitable Hyndman too began to waver. In a 
letter to Gaylord Wiltshire he wrote that 'I begin to doubt 
whether we shall win this South African War, whether, in fact, 
it will turn out the beginning of the downfall of the British 
Empire. ' 
35 
Such a prospect filled him with alarm and he per- 
suaded the SDF executive to pass a resolution to the effect 
that further anti-war agitation would be a waste of time and 
a distraction from Socialist agitation. 
36 
As he declared in 
Justice, 'the business of the Social-Democratic Federation is 
to spread Socialism, ' which alone could prevent further out- 
breaks of war. 
Hyndman had reverted to the traditional propagandist 
stance of the SDF. Socialism would arrive when the message 
had been sufficiently preached, when enough converts had 
been 
made; issues such as Imperialism could only be solved 
by the 
advent of Socialism and therefore to campaign against 
the war 
was a diversion from the Socialist task. His national 
feelings 
pushed him towards such an attitude. He 
had signed a mani- 
festo against the war put out by the International 
Socialist 
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Bureau, but now felt that this had encouraged a 'strong 
Continental prejudice against England'. Thus he defended the 
British troops in South Africa, pointing out that the atrocities 
committed by Russia in Manchuria, Germany and France in China, 
and France and Belgium in Central Africa 'far surpassed anything 
of which England has been guilty in South Africa. '37 In defence 
of Hyndman it must be emphasised that he was also motivated 
by a feeling that the African natives stood to lose as much at 
the hands of the Boer settlers as they did at the hands of 
British imperialists, and he resolved therefore to agitate for 
the independence of these 'splendid native tribes'. Nonethe- 
less, at a time when the appalling conditions in the South 
African concentration camps were drawing new recruits into the 
pro-Boer camp, Hyndman's attitude seemed an abdication of 
responsibility. The counter-attack was immediate and SDF 
unity was shattered. 
Bax protested at Hyndman's surrender to 'the weak and 
beggarly elements of British chauvinism', but Rothstein, rapidly 
emerging as a powerful opponent of Hyndman, pinpointed the 
fallacies of his argument. Such a conception of Socialism, 
he said, was 
at variance with everything that goes 
by that name 
.... Socialism cannot be spread 
but must be fought 
for and won.... We may preach our doctrines 
from to- 
day till doomsday, but so long as we, from a 
false 
conception of our duties as Socialists, or 
from 
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other causes hold ourselves aloof from 
the momentous issues that agitate society, our 
efforts will be vain and fruitless. 
To Rothstein Hyndman's views were 'so clearly explanative of 
our failures in the past' and they presaged little hope for the 
future. 
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At the Federation's Annual Conference in 1901 
Rothstein was elected top of the poll for the new executive 
and more momentously still Hyndman announced his resignation. 
This was undoubtedly a significant victory for the anti-war, 
internationalist forces, and the first major challenge to 
Hyndman's authority since the days of the Socialist League. 
It was, though, a rather illusory victory and did not indicate 
any fundamental transformation of the SDF. Hyndman's defeat 
was only temporary and in any event his resignation had been 
motivated as much by disillusionment with the results of twenty 
years of Socialist agitation as by his setback over the war. 
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These events demonstrated the heterogeneous nature of the SDF, 
the diversity of views gathered under its banner. They co- 
incided with the 'impossibilist' challenge to the leadership, 
motivated by 'a new generation of members who felt that Hyndman, 
who was now almost sixty, and most of his immediate colleagues 
were too old a leadership for a revolutionary party'. 
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T. A. Jackson certainly felt that Hyndman was as much 
to blame 
for the schism as any issues of principle or policy. 
'We 
were tired of a policy dictated by the old man which varied 
with his moods, ' he said, and criticised Hyndman's amazing 
knack 
of 'rubbing people up the wrong way. '41 
The Scottish District 
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Council was a stronghold of opposition to the war and had also 
spearheaded the campaign against affiliation to the Labour 
Representation Committee. Their views now posed a serious 
threat to party unity. 
Withdrawal from the LRC had been welcomed by the impossibilists 
but it did not signify a victory for their cause; they had been 
defeated on all other counts at the 1901 party conference. But 
that conference had enabled the Scottish dissidents to make 
contact with oppositionists in England, principally in Oxford, 
Reading and London. For the next three years the SDF was 
plagued by internal feuding, as impossibilists and supporters 
of reaffiliation to the LRC attacked party policy. The lines 
of demarcation were not always clearly drawn, partly reflecting 
the muddled thinking of many SDFers, but once again three 
divergent strands of opinion emerged. The impossibilists 
favoured a distinct revolutionary party, one which would est- 
ablish its own, separate, Social-Democratic trade unions. 
Those previously referred to as 'orthodox-Marxists', of whom 
Quelch was pre-eminent, also wanted a vanguard party, free 
from entangling political alliances, but they wished to work 
within existing trade unions, to convert them to Socialism. 
They drew a sharp distinction between the economic and political 
spheres of activity. On the right of the party, which 
does not 
imply a lack of commitment to revolutionary Socialism, were 
those who favoured rejoining the Labour Representation 
Committee 
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so that the Federation could more effectively influence the 
unions. Prominent in this group were Herbert Burrows, A. A. 
Watts, Dan Irving in Burnley and John Moore in Rochdale, with 
powerful support from Max Beer, the German Socialist historian 
and Vorwarts corresponaent in Britain. 
Rothstein launched the debate shortly after the 1901 
Conference. Professing his disappointment at the need to write 
such an article after 20 years of the SDF's existence he 
savagely attacked the 'unholy Scotch current' for their 'treason 
to Socialism' . He argued forcefully for a synthesis of political 
and economic action, for 'Socialism, professing the principle 
of class war, but taking no part in it... is a mere ideal - 
good enough and noble enough to inspire individuals, but 
utterly inaccessible to the masses. '42 The class war was the 
connecting link between Socialism and trade unionism. Rothstein 
admitted that the situation in England was 'highly abnormal', 
largely because in this country's historical development the 
unions had preceded Socialism, but to argue for a perpetuation 
of that split on the grounds of principle was, he fulminated, 
'a total misconception as to what the necessary conditions for 
a successful Socialist movement are'. 
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He regarded the 
impossibilists as political 'virgins, who, for the sake of their 
immaculate chastity, are ever ready to immolate themselves on 
the altar of sterility. '44 Yet, whilst arguing that the Taff 
Vale case provided an ideal opportunity for Socialists to 
improve their relations with the unions, Rothstein stopped short 
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of supporting reaffiliation to the LRC. That would be a 
surrender of principle. The SDF should steer a careful path 
between the 'scylla of boneless opportunism and the charybdis 
'45 of ossified impossibilism. His attack on the impossibilists 
received powerful support from Herbert Burrows, but in attacking 
them Burrows also implicitly criticised much of the SDF's 
policy and activities: 
Faith without works is dead, and unless we are 
prepared to translate our faith into practical 
work by active participation in the political 
actualities of the day, we simply become a sect, 
with a set of dead dogmas instead of a living 
faith; a sect with a fervent enthusiasm and a 
sublime belief in its dogmas, it may be, but 
nevertheless a sect, cut off from the great 
world of men and life by its superior indif- 
ference to life's actualities, and left in a 
splendid isolation to declaim its abstract 
theories to an ever-dwindling number of the 
faithful, 
46 
This, of course, accurately represented the SDF's position 
at this time, for membership had dropped sharply since 
1897. 
Moreover Burrows echoed Rothstein's criticisms of the party's 
attitude to the Boer war, but in so doing drew 
different con- 
clusions. He supported reaffiliation to the LRC as 
the only 
way of participating in the 'political actualities of 
the day' 
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and extending Socialist influence. In this he was supported 
by Max Beer, who predicted great opportunities for the 
Social-Democratic Federation if it would only consider theory 
as a 'living guide' rather than a 'sacred letter', if it would 
cease shouting 'class struggle' yet practically standing aloof 
from it. Marxism, Beer argued, was never meant to become the 
religion of a sect. The trade unions were carrying on the 
class struggle, albeit unconsciously, and the SDF must be on 
their side. Hyndman would be of far more use inside Parliament 
than outside. 
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A. A. Watts expressed it more plainly. 'We 
cannot go out on to the street corner and the market place and 
urge the people to shake off their apathy and choose men of 
their own class to represent them, and then in our unions oppose 
the very action we have been advocating outdoors. '48 
Such views were anathema to the impossibilists. They 
would hear nothing of alliances with capitalist political parties 
which would be 'a desertion of the principle of antagonism. ' 
Principle was their watchword, and individual reforms were 
mere tinkering with the capitalist system. Towards Rothstein 
they were more accommodating. His views were perfectly correct, 
said John Robertson, but they disputed his strategy of 'boring 
from within', which was a mere 'bolstering up the present 
fakir-ridden trade unions. '49 On the grounds that many of 
the working class were disillusioned with the existing trade 
unions they argued for the formation of separate socialist 
trade unions, through which they should attempt to reform 
and 
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bring over the other trade unions. Quelch was scathing in his 
reply. Such a policy would simply antagonise the very people 
they wished to win, he said. What was needed was a conversion 
of the rank and file, then the leadership of the unions could 
be ignored. 
As the debate became more heated William Gee, the Scottish 
organiser, attempted to mediate. He vigorously defended the 
Scottish critics, praising them for their 'inexhaustible 
supply of energy' and their 'intense love for the cause'. 
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He contrasted the militant revolutionary spirit of the New 
York People with the flaccid and moderate tones of Justice. 
Why did a supposedly revolutionary Socialist newspaper praise 
the likes of Keir Hardie, mourn the death of Fred Hammill - 
an inveterate critic of the SDF - and regret the non-election 
of J. Havelock Wilson, the seaman's leader, to Parliament? 
These 'so-called impossibilists' were not wreckers, he said, 
but the most zealous of workers for the cause and the only 
grounds for conflict that he could see was over the question 
of alliances. His efforts were in vain and eventually he 
found his position untenable and he resigned as organiser. 
The first tangible result of the dispute was a schism in the 
ranks of the Edinburgh SDF. Long-standing members such as 
Cocker, Gunn, and John Leslie, an outspoken critic of the 
impossibilists, formed a new Edinburgh East branch of 
the 
Federation so as `to remove the very strained relations which 
have existed for some time in the ranks of the 
Social- 
339. 
Democrats of the city. '51 The tensions in Edinburgh were 
mirrored on a wider scale at the national conference in 1902. 
Attempts by the Burnley and Nelson branches to obtain re- 
affiliation to the LRC were defeated, but a Yates resolution 
arguing for separate Social-Democratic trade unions was thrown 
out by 70 votes to 10. SDF policy remained that of friendly 
relations with the unions, co-operation for immediate objects, 
but no political alliance. Hyndman savaged the impossibilists 
as 'Anarchists in Socialist clothing' who demonstrated the 
'exquisite rancour of the theological mind'. Repeating the 
charge he had levelled at Henry Champion in the 1880s he 
accused them of trying to make '12 o'clock at 11', conveniently 
forgetting that William Morris had charged him with the self 
same thing. 
The leadership did not have things all its own way. 
Three impossibilists were elected to the new Executive - Jack 
Kent, Alexander Anderson and Len Cotton. After the Conference 
closer working links were established between London and 
Scotland. In August 1902 the Scottish District Council 
launched its own paper, The Socialist, which soon proved a 
thorn in the side of the Hyndmanites. Patience finally exhausted 
Percy Friedberg of the Finsbury Park branch, the liaison agent 
between the London and Scottish dissidents, was expelled 
for 
publishing a criticism of the Official Conference Report. 
His branch supported him and were expelled en 
bloc. But the 
London impossibilists were relatively weak and the 
leading 
activists such as Jack Fitzgerald and Con Lehane advised 
others 
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not to follow suit. They decided to adopt the tactics of 
their Scottish comrades and bore from within to capture the 
London District Council. The Scots though were now ready to 
go further. Convinced after the 1902 Conference that the SDF 
could not be transformed from within, they were further enraged 
by the publication of an Open Letter to the King on the occasion 
of Edward VII's coronation, which declared that 'The great 
and growing popularity of the king is not undeserved' and 
which urged him to use his influence for the well-being of 
the English people. The expulsion of Yates at the 1903 
Conference for his attacks on the Executive in The Socialist, 
and the fact that no impossibilist was elected to the Executive, 
hastened their decision. 
In May 1903 The Socialist announced the formation of 
the Socialist Labour Party, a choice of name which emphasised 
its debt to American influence, and the inaugural conference 
was held in Edinburgh in June. The founders had hoped for 
the secession of the entire Scottish membership of the SDF, but 
in the event only the activists on and around the District 
Council did so. There were initially four branches of the new 
party, at Edinburgh, Falkirk, Glasgow and Leith, soon rein- 
forced by Kirkcaldy, Southampton and the Bethnal Green branch 
of the SDF, which was dissolved in June. The majority of the 
London impossibilists did not follow the Bethnal Green example, 
even though Leonard Cotton and Ernest Hunter were also expelled 
at the 1903 Conference. Hunter became the London agent for the 
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Scottish party. Others hesitated; they distrusted the secret 
machinations of the Scottish men and questioned the financial 
stability of The Socialist. They felt that they had not been 
properly consulted and, as Jack Fitzgerald put it, 'The London 
section were no more ready to blindly follow would-be geniuses 
from Scotland than *highly educated" leaders from Queen Anne's 
Gate (Hyndman's residence) ., 
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The London rebels decided to 
continue the struggle to reform the SDF, but they were now 
faced with an intransigent Executive determined to clear the 
party of malcontents. At the 1904 Conference a resolution was 
passed calling upon the impossibilists to apologise for having 
pursued disruptive tactics. They refused and the leading 
members, Hawkins and Fitzgerald, were expelled because of 
their 'campaign of calumny and intrigue against the Executive 
Committee and therefore against the whole organisation by 
which it was elected. '53 London members endorsed this decision 
by 119 votes to 83 and consequently supporters of the two men 
held a meeting on 12 June 1904. There the formation of the 
Socialist Party of Great Britain was announced. 
The SDF lost some 80 members to the Socialist Labour 
Party and 88 to the SPGB. Both the new parties struggled yet 
both survived. The SLP's strength was centred largely 
in 
Scotland, particularly on Clydeside, and the SPGB remained 
largely confined to London. The SLP developed along 
the lines 
of industrial unionism, played an important role 
in the struggle: 
on Clydeside during the First World War, and eventually 
formed 
a major component of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain. 
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The SPGB boasted 142 members upon its formation and declared 
itself 'The beginning of the modern revolutionary movement. '54 
It refused to adopt any palliatives in its programme and in 
effect became a complete 'impossibilist' party which was, as 
Tsuzuki has remarked, 'the logical conclusion of the impossib- 
ilist revolt'. In spite of, or perhaps because of this, the 
party has survived to the present day. As for the Social- 
Democratic Federation it emerged from the revolt somewhat 
shaken, depleted in numbers in Scotland, London and a couple 
of other centres, but with the 'old guard' and centre of the 
party firmly in the saddle. Yet the central dilemmas of the 
party remained unresolved. The question of reform as opposed 
to revolution was no nearer a satisfactory conclusion, the 
relationship of the party to the trade unions remained in the 
air, and Hyndman and his friends retained control. As in 1884 
the SDF had shown its tendency to fissure at moments of crisis 
rather than absorb new principles and ideas or adapt to changed 
circumstances. The impossibilists were purged, the proponents 
of reaffiliation to the Labour Representation Committee had 
rallied to the Executive in the face of the impossibilist 
onslaught and were now quiescent. There seemed little chance 
of a fundamental shift in direction. Indeed the party resur- 
rected two of its traditional themes as focii for agitation. 
The centre was strengthened by the Dewsbury by-election result, 
which was regarded as a good augury for Socialist unity, and 
the rising level of unemployment led the party to renew 
its 
unemployed agitation. Yet the impossibilists had represented 
I 
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a new generation of members, 
less willing 
of Hyndman and company and that alone was 
Rothstein, Gee, and others remained in the 
the 'old guard'. Hazell, the London comp 
up the situation. 
'We have not to change 
55 
said, 'so much as to define 
it'. 
to accept the dictates 
significant. 
party to challenge 
ositor, neatly summed 
our policy', he 
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CHAPTER XII. 
THE RIGHT TO WORK. 
The decision to secede from the LRC left the SDF urgently 
seeking a defined and coherent policy. Federation spokesmen 
rationalised their position as a mid-course between reformism 
and impossibilism, adopting a long-term perspective for the 
attainment of Socialism and counselling their followers to 
be patient. 'The true Socialist policy, like truth', said 
Quelch, 'lies in the middle'. 
1 
They should use direct action 
and political action as complementary facets of a single 
policy, organising to win the working class and build a Social- 
Democratic party. Yet fine-sounding phrases could not dis- 
guise the essential incoherence of the SDF position, and the 
attempt to define a middle road led to both immobility and 
muddle. Between 1901 and 1910 the Federation acted, in 
Pierson's words, as 'a kind of conscience'2 for the wider 
movement but it also struggled with its own conscience in an 
attempt to justify its separate existence. Unemployment was 
the focus of SDF attention in these years, and 
its campaigns 
highlighted the problems it faced operating outside the 
Labour 
Party. The Federation was able to mobilise mass protests and 
force concessions from both local authorities and the 
Government, but it failed to attract new recruits to its own 
organisation in large numbers. It gave the 
lead to the wider 
movement on the question of unemployment only 
to find itself 
pre-empted by the ILP and the Labour Party. 
Once again, as on 
the question of free speech for example, 
the SDF found that 
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single-issue campaigns brought temporary success but no long- 
term gains. In this case the party's failure could be ex- 
plained by its position outside the Labour Party. The refusal 
of MacDonald and Glasier to sanction co-operation with the 
SDF, union suspicions of the Federation, and the fears aroused 
by the sometimes violent demonstrations negated its earlier 
successes. Some compensation was provided by the fact that 
their campaigns did attract dissident ILPers and encouraged 
moves towards the formation of the British Socialist Party. 
In his autobiography Hyndman noted that unemployment had 
always been a prime concern of the SDF. 'Nearly all our 
principal agitations, demonstrations and collisions with the 
"authorities" have arisen from our efforts in this direction. '3 
In its early years the Federation had seen the organisation 
of the unemployed as a short cut to social revolution, using 
the spectre of revolt to frighten the authorities. Their 
campaigns were also concerned with 'palliatives', pressuris- 
ing local authorities to provide improved relief scales, meals 
for schoolchildren and the like as a means of producing a 
fitter and more politically aware working class. As Alan 
Kidd has noted, the SDF showed a 'perceptive (if confused) 
awareness of the decentralised character of much State power 
in the nineteenth century', 
4 
a feature which persisted until 
1909 as far as unemployment was concerned. Historians who 
concentrate on national developments and central government 
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policy ignore the sometimes every effective campaigns 
initiated by the SDF in the localities. Obviously Socialist 
agitation amongst the unemployed fluctuated with the cycle of 
unemployment itself, and the ebbs and flows of the campaigns 
often seemed mere propaganda exercises producing few results 
and even fewer recruits. William Morris had despaired of 
such efforts after Bloody Sunday and, as the dreams of im- 
minent revolution faded, the SDF efforts became much more 
localised affairs, a means of propaganda, of making members, 
and of pressing for palliatives. The Federation's concent- 
ration on municipal electioneering was intimately connected 
with such demonstrations, for Socialists on local councils 
and Boards of Guardians could carry the fight into the 
municipal chambers. 
Initially the SDF's had been very much a lone voice in its 
demands for state intervention to tackle the problem of 
poverty and unemployment. The demand for the Eight-Hour Day, 
for example, first raised by the Federation in the early 
1880s, 
was opposed by many who feared resulting lower wages and 
foreign competition. There was also disagreement over whether 
such a reform would be achieved by legislation or 
by indust- 
rial action. But just as the Eight-Hour Day 
became increasing- 
ly accepted in working-class circles so too was 
there a grow- 
ing recognition that neither the Poor Law nor the charities 
were doing more than scratching the surface of 
the problem of 
poverty. The writings of Jack London, the surveys 
of Booth and 
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Rowntree, the rejection of unfit recruits at the time of the 
Boer War, all contributed to an awarei. ess of the problem, and 
certainly in the Labour movement it was accepted that the 
question of unemployment was fundamental to the whole question 
of poverty. There was, however, no agreed solution. Reform 
of the land laws, labour colonies, schemes of national works 
at times of high unemployment, all had their adherents. But 
few agreed with the Socialists that unemployment was insep- 
arable from the capitalist system and that the abolition of 
capitalism was therefore the only panacea. Nonetheless there 
was a basic assumption that all men possessed a natural right 
to work and that the State, as the operator of the economic 
system, should be responsible for supporting the unemployed 
and thereby removing the stigmas of pauperism and charity. 
It was in this context that the SDF embarked upon its unemp- 
lyed agitation of the early 1900s. 
The demobilisation of soldiers after the Boer War led 
to an upsurge in unemployment, and the SDF was the 
first 
organisation to take up the soldiers cause, organising a 
demonstration in Hyde Park in June 1902. The Government's lack 
of concern over the problem, relegating 
it to a very minor 
position compared to the more pressing concerns of 
housing and 
temperance, prompted the ILP to convene a meeting at 
the end 
of the year. From this emerged the National 
Unemployed 
Committee, a mixture of Radicals and Labour men, which 
aimed 
to agitate for the establishment of a government 
department 
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to deal solely with the provision of work for the unemployed. 
A two-day conference called by the committee in February 1903 
was marked by long and often contradictory speeches and pious 
resolutions. The SDF had not been invited to participate, 
a measure of its isolation at this time, and it regarded the 
conference as irrelevant. It had organised its own London 
committee early in 1903 with the aim of spurring the unemployed 
into action; daily demonstrations were to be held in the West 
End, culminating in a rally in Trafalgar Square on the 14th 
of February, the eve of Parliament's reassembly. The aim, 
said Justice, was that 'pressure from without' would force 
the Government to take action. 
5 
This indeed it did, but not 
that which the Federation anticipated. According to Kenneth 
Brown, 'there can be little doubt that the campaign was success- 
ful in mobilising London's unemployed and in causing a great 
deal of inconvenience to the authorities and the general 
public'. 
6 
Alarmed by the threat to public order and the 
increasing strains on police manpower the Government 
introduced 
a bill banning the collection of money at such demonstrations. 
This money had been shared out amongst the marchers and 
the 
removal of such a 'carrot' undoubtedly reduced the 
SDF's 
effectiveness in organising the unemployed. Perenially short 
of money itself, and also preoccupied with 
its internal debates 
over the value of such short-term objectives, 
the campaign 
fizzled out in the summer of 1903. Yet 
it had not been 
entirely unsuccessful; public awareness 
had been heightened, 
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charitable appeals renewed and the National Unemployed 
Committee was reconvened in October, though partly as a 
response to ILP fears of an SDF takeover of the movement. 
Throughout 1904 unemployment was abnormally high and there 
was every expectation of record figures during the winter of 
1904-05. A number of local authorities, including Bradford 
and Manchester, made provision for this whilst the TUC pres- 
sured both local councils and Government to act. The SDF had 
originally intended to launch a post-Christmas agitation to 
coincide with the opening of Parliament, but in September the 
Federation decided to press for a special session of Parliament 
to deal solely with unemployment. Branches were urged to 
carry out street by street censuses to provide statistical 
evidence to lay before the Government, and to pressurise 
the local authorities to provide additional relief. It was 
anticipated that local events would lead the councils to join 
the clamour for government action. 'Let us break down the 
Poor Law by sending the unemployed to the workhouses to 
demand admission', proclaimed Justice. `Above all, let us 
vigorously proceed with the canvass... we shall simply stagger 
humanity. '7 A conference of London Guardians on 14 October 
was petitioned to support the call for a special session of 
Parliament, and urged to establish labour colonies and the 
Eight-Hour Day. Only five Boards of Guardians could be 
persuaded to support the SDF resolution, and the Federation 
was aghast at the proposals emanating from the conference. 
The scheme envisaged farm colony districts for London, each 
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with its own committee, overseen by a central co-ordinating 
body. The Local Government Board would pay administrative 
expenses and the councils could make a contribution from the 
rates. Three criticisms were voiced by the SDF. They argued 
that the committee system was too slow, that all boroughs 
should share the burden, not simply those where unemployment 
was high, and that the financial arrangements were far too 
loose. Its criticisms were proved well-founded when, at the 
first meeting of the Central Body, it was agreed to raise 
funds through voluntary subscriptions rather than from the 
rates, leading Hyndman to claim that the scheme was designed 
not to work. 
As unrest increased the SDF was much to the fore in the 
localities. In Bradford8 the workhouse was besieged early 
in November by 2,000 people demanding work, and the pressure 
of agitation persuaded the Education Committee to agree 
to 
the feeding of needy schoolchildren. In Leeds nightly pro- 
cessions of the unemployed led to disorderly scenes, window 
smashing and attacks on the police. 
The City Council called 
a special conference to discuss the 
issue and agreed to pro- 
vide work for the unemployed. It also supported 
the call for 
a special session of Parliament. 
9 Such events were repeated 
in towns throughout the country, and in Manchester 
the SDF 
proveditself capable of mobilising a mass movement 
which 'in 
a remarkably short period of time... achieved 
quite striking 
results'. 
10 
The SDF campaign was centred around 
the labour 
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registry, the municipal agency responsible for the collection 
of names for the allocation of relief work. Manchester City 
Council had been reluctant to reopen the registry after the 
winter of 1903, fearing that the assembly of hundreds of 
men at one centre was an invitation to trouble. Two SDF 
activists, Hitchen and Skivington, led demonstrations on 14 
and 16 November 1904 culminating in a deputation to the Lord 
Mayor, and they secured a promise that the labour registry 
would reopen. This early success gained the confidence of the 
unemployed and the SDF was able to mobilise meetings of up 
to 5,000ngn. A threatened march on the Board of Guardians 
produced a temporary increase in outdoor-relief scales from 
four shillings to six shillings, whilst pressure on the local 
authority as over 3,000 men registered for work led to relief 
work for over 600 within a week. 'The SDF campaign to 
pressurise the local authorities into expanding relief pro- 
vision had in the short term proved remarkably successful, 
'11 
and, just as in London in 1886, donations to the Lord Mayor's 
Relief Fund rose sharply. 
However the SDF leadership was anxious to achieve a 
national stage for their propaganda, which aimed 
to identify 
central government responsibility for the unemployed. 
Branches 
were urged to petition local M. Ps and the 
Prime Minister12 
for a special session of Parliament. Meetings were 
held at 
respectable venues to organise public opinion. 
The SDF co- 
operated with the London Trades Council and 
the Parliamentary 
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Committee of the TUC in calling a Guildhall Conference on State 
maintenance. Justice cautioned against violent language at 
unemployed demonstrations. 13 Meanwhile both the ILP and LRC 
had taken up the issue, the ILP with a series of public rallies 
and the LRC with a special conference on unemployment. As 
a result the SDF found itself marginalised. Kenneth Brown 
correctly argues that 
Once the TUC, the ILP and the LRC began to interest 
themselves seriously in the unemployment problem it 
was almost inevitable that the voice of the much 
smaller SDF would be drowned. But this should not 
be allowed to obscure the fact that the campaign 
for a special parliamentary session at the end of 
1904 was started by the Social Democrats. 
14 
Moreover, the rising levels of unemployment and fears of 
violent unrest, fuelled it m st be said by the SDF agitation 
in Bradford, Manchester and elsewhere, prompted the Government 
in January 1905 to decide to introduce an Act of Parliament 
to tackle the problem. Walter Long, President of the Local 
Government Board, and Sir Arthur Clay, a leading figure in 
the Charity Organisation Society, later acknowledged the role 
of the Federation in bringing pressure to bear on the 
Government. 15 Yet the Government's decision similarly 
elbowed the SDF from the limelight, for the SDF had no re- 
presentation in Parliament whereas both the TUC and the ILP 
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had. With some justification the Federation complained at 
its 1905 Conference that it had gained little recognition 
for its efforts on behalf of the unemployed. 
The SDF's national campaign had, to a considerable degree, 
diminished its own effectiveness. Attention was diverted from 
the local arena, and pressure on the local authorities 
relaxed. As Kidd comments, 'It is tempting to wonder what 
would have happened if the SDF had persisted with its campaign 
to pressurise the local authorities rather than switching to 
more "constitutional" channels and national objectives'. 
16 
The question illustrates the Federation's dilemma - was it an 
agitational, revolutionary body or was it to function as a 
conventional political party seeking seats in Parliament and 
operating through the normal channels? For the moment it 
concentrated its efforts on the national campaign by the 
Labour and Socialist movement over the Conservative govern- 
ment's Unemployed Workmen Bill. Although the Labour and 
Socialist parties had a number of criticisms of the Bill the 
fact that, as initially proposed, it involved the raising 
of money from the rates gave some cause for satisfaction. 
According to Quelch the Bill had a twofold significance: it 
accepted the State's responsibility for the unemployed and 
17 
it meant the unification of London for rating purposes. 
The reaction of the Labour movement generally was one of 
cautious optimism. However timid the Bill it at least 
established the principle of State maintenance. But 
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under fire from its own supporters the Government denied any 
such intention. It delayed the second reading of the Bill, 
an act which revived the extra-parliamentary pressure. James 
Gribble of the SDF led a march of unemployed bootmakers from 
Northampton to London, a pioneering Right to Work march, 
which was quickly emulated by a group of Leicester unemployed. 
The Raunds march in particular attracted considerable attention, 
and it marked a reversal to direct action by the SDF. The 
Federation scathingly attacked the performance of the Labour 
M. Ps in Parliament, accusing them of 'pusillanimity and 
cowardice' over the question of unemployment. 'They no longer 
regard themselves as agitators, with the House of Commons as 
their battle-ground', said Justice, they simply used it as 
'a haven of rest'. 
18 
Whatever the merits of the Labour M. Ps, 
direct action proved remarkably effective in July, for a riot 
in Manchester caused the Government to reactivate its Bill and 
to announce a Royal Commission to investigate the Poor Law 
and the whole question of poverty. On 31 July a mass meeting 
of the unemployed was held in Albert Square, Manchester, with 
Victor Grayson as the main speaker. After the meeting 
Skivington and Smith of the SDF led a parade up Market Street, 
blocking it to traffic, whereupon the police attacked and 
dispersed the crowd with batons. According to the Manchester 
Evening Chronicle the scenes had had 'no parallel in the history 
of the city since the dreadful days of Peterloo'. 
19 The riot 
directly influenced the Government, for Balfour of course 
represented a Manchester constituency. The Unemployed 
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Workmen Bill was steered through the Commons on 7 August, 
but with a significant alteration. There was to be no rate 
aid and all money had to be raised from voluntary sources. 
The offer of a Royal Commission was, perhaps, a sop to the 
Labour forces who were certain to be antagonistic to this 
revised version. 
The Manchester riot and its aftermath marked the peak 
of SDF influence in relation to the issue of unemployment. 
For a short while afterwards the Federation basked in the glow 
of unaccustomed popularity. When the ILP launched a National 
Right to Work Council in November 1905, the SDF was invited 
to participate and Quelch and Mrs. Cobden-Sanderson were both 
members. The SDF was instrumental in setting up a London 
Central Workers' Committee which aimed to press local councils 
to exploit the new legislation to its fullest extent. In 
Manchester an Unemployed Committee was established with dele- 
gates from the SDF, the ILP and the Trades Council. The 
Federation was able to get a number of its members on to the 
Distress committees set up to administer the Act, Skivington 
in Manchester and five in West Ham alone. Yet the warning 
signs were, or should have been apparent. Skivington and 
Smith were excluded from the new joint committee in Manchester, 
which was dominated by the ILP. Although Keir Hardie and a 
number of other ILPers supported demonstrations organised by 
the London Central Workers' Committee, Glasier, Snowden and 
MacDonald were opposed to any co-operation with the 
Social- 
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Democrats, believing 'that the matter is only another SDF 
dodge to hamper the LRC'. 
20 
Outside London the SDF was not 
strong enough to mount a national campaign and in the capital 
itself financial difficulties hampered the activities of the 
London Committee, which had to appeal for funds at the end of 
November. Yet during the next three years the SDF experienced 
an upsurge in its fortunes and was able to benefit from dis- 
illusionment with the performance of the Labour Party in 
Parliament. For a short period it was able to recapture the 
initiative on the question of unemployment. 
The political context in which the SDF operated was radically 
altered with the landslide election of the Liberal Government 
in January 1906, and the arrival of 29 Labour M. Ps in the 
Commons. The subsequent change of name from the Labour 
Representation Committee to the Labour Party fuelled expect- 
ations of growth amongst Labour and Socialists alike. For the 
next three years all sections of the movement shared in a 
Socialist revival. Between 1906 and 1908 the SDF added 100 
new branches to its total, claiming 232 in all with some 
12,000 memb ers. Its 21 seats on municipal bodies had risen 
to 124 by 1907. The Federation put two 'Red Vans' in the 
field, emulating those of the Clarion. Encouraged by this 
expansion the Social-Democrats became the Social-Democratic 
Party in 1907, emphasising their determination to 
build a 
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working-class party based on Marxism as a serious alternative 
to the reformism offered by the Labour Party. At election 
times it appealed to the immediate interests of the workers 
in the same manner as the ILP, but its militancy and theo- 
retical seriousness appealed to many and enabled it to com- 
pete with its rival. As William Gallacher said of the ILP's 
ethical Socialism, 'They smacked too much of the Sunday 
School. They were too much like what we were... trying to 
get away from'. 
21 
Nevertheless that ethical Socialism remained 
the most popular variant. The idea of Socialism as fellow- 
ship revived, the Labour Churches were reinvigorated, the 
circulation of the Clarion soared. Nowhere was Socialist 
expansion more marked than in Yorkshire, and here too the SDF 
was able to establish itself on a much firmer basis than 
hitherto. The Bradford branch was re-established and flourished, 
reporting over 100 members in February 1907.22 In Leeds the 
appointment of Bert Killip as organiser in October 1907 led to 
three new branches within six months. Hull could claim 100 
members, 
23 branches were formed in Keighley, Halifax, 
Rotherham, and Birkenshaw, whilst the Federation stabilised 
and expanded its base in Sheffield. Nothing demonstrated more 
clearly this renewed vitality in the British Socialist 
Movement than the election of Victor Grayson as M. P. for the 
Colne Valley constituency in 1907. 
Grayson's victory was rapturously received 
by the rank 
and file of both the ILP and the SDF but his was a contro- 
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versial candidature, aanctioned neither by the Labour Party 
nor by the ILP Council. There was an essential duality within 
the ILP in these years as their Socialist commitment clashed 
with their trade-union alliance. The goal of converting their 
trade union allies was increasingly postponed to a far distant 
future, particularly after the affiliation of the miners to 
the Labour Party, and the overwhelming majority of the 
Liberal Party in Parliament meant a hesitant and often supine 
approach on the part of the Labour M. Ps. Rank and file dis- 
satisfaction increased, and the failure of the Labour Party 
in Parliament over the unemployment issue was a prime cause 
of discontent. As William Morris had predicted in the 1880s, 
the struggle for immediate gains or 'palliatives' would mean 
the postponement or even abandonment of the Socialists' 
ultimate vision. The dual impulses of the ILP began to separ- 
ate under the pressure of its political role and members began 
to choose between the Socialist vision and the trade-union 
alliance. Some, such as H. Russell Smart and the Huddersfield 
ILP, attempted to challenge the leadership, to democratise 
the party, but this too failed. In the face of this disarray 
the SDF saw the chance to take the initiative. The leadership 
was convinced that the ILP's problems demonstrated the wisdom 
of their decision to withdraw from the LRC, and the Labour 
Party's manifest failure to force its Right to Work 
Bill 
through Parliament made it question too the efficacy of 
Parliamentary activity. A renewal of 
its street protests 
brought the Federation new supporters. 
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The greater part of the Social-Democratic Federation's 
political activity between 1905 and 1910 revolved around the 
question of unemployment. After the 1906 election very little 
was done by the new Liberal Government beyond vague expressions 
of sympathy for the unemployed. The expanded Labour group 
had no detailed policy on unemployment simply because it had 
never been in a position to introduce detailed legislation. 
The elevation of John Burns to the Local Government Board 
raised the hopes of some, but for the SDF his was 'the 
crowning act of treachery... he puts the seal upon his treason, 
and accepts the reward of his recreancy' by accepting a 'hand- 
some Judas bribe' from his Liberal paymasters. Sharp 
divisions within the Liberal Cabinet meant a reluctance to act 
and consequently popular discontent once more reasserted itself. 
The SDF, which had previously counselled caution, raised echoes 
of Bloody Sunday as Fred Knee advised the unemployed to 'take 
back some of that which had been taken from them', and Jack 
Williams raged that 'If the capitalist class wanted riots 
then they should have them' . 
25 They initiated a series of 
land-grabs, the occupation of private, uncultivated 
land by 
the unemployed. The first of these was in Manchester early 
in 
July 1906)when Arthur Smith of the SDF led some squatters onto 
church land. Jack Williams was sent northbY the Executive 
to 
take charge of the operation, and Smith 
later repeated the 
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effort at Salford. Both camps were short-lived, the squatters 
being evicted. A similar attempt took place at Leeds, again 
on the initiative of Smith, where a so-called `Libertarian 
camp' was established. This lasted but three days before 
being broken up by an organised gang of local toughs. At 
Plaistow in London Ben Cunningham of the SDF led 14 men onto 
some disused land owned by West Ham Corporation but they too 
were evicted within 3 weeks. 
camp' at Girlington, Bradford. 
More successful was the 'Klondyke 
Organised by Councillor Glyde, 
a member of both the ILP and the SDF, the unemployed took 
possession of land owned by the Midland Railway company on 24 
July 1906. Two days later they were joined by Arthur Smith 
and Alexander Stewart Gray, the prime mover in the land grab 
campaign and a prominent SDF organiser of the unemployed. 
26 
Some 30 men planted lettuce, celery, cauliflowers and turnips 
and even established a chip-chopping department to raise 
revenue, though the main aim was to attract public attention 
and publicise Government inactivity. The revolutionary rhetoric 
continued, with Glyde asserting that 'If the unemployed are 
going to get anything they will have to help themselves to the 
land and "other property"', 
27 but in practice, as a local 
observer noted, the land grabs aimed 'to make the most of the 
opportunities afforded by the presence of curious onlookers of 
carrying on propaganda work. '28 Curious onlookers 
there 
certainly were, Glyde reporting over 100,000 visitors 
to the 
Bradford camp before its demise at the beginning of 
October. 
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But it is clear that many of them regarded the proceedings 
as entertainment, even comedy, and the land grabs were of only 
29 
minor value. Significantly Will Thorne, the Federation's 
only Parliamentary representative, distanced himself from 
the Plaistow land grabbers and Justice gave little prominence 
to these events. The SDF had been willing to take advantage 
of the efforts of its local activists but once the attempts 
proved abortive the Federation returned its gaze to the 
national arena. 
The Liberal Government's failure to include any measure 
concerned with unemployment in the 1907 King's speech finally 
persuaded the Labour Party to introduce its own Bill. It 
proposed a central unemployment committee to plan national 
relief works and the appointment of local commissioners for 
local works. Each local authority was to set up a committee 
to provide work for the unemployed and they were to be 
allowed to use money from the rates to pay the men so employed. 
The third clause stated the key principle, that of the right 
to work, and the Bill was popularly known as the Right To 
Work Bill. There was obviously no chance of success in 1907 
because of the sheer weight of government business, but the 
Labour Party's aim was to publicise the Bill in order to put 
the Liberals under pressure for the 1908 session, the year 
the 1905 Act expired. John Burns condemned the 
Bill as a 
prescription for 'universal pauperism' but many of his cabinet 
colleagues were alarmed, both by the Socialist victories 
at 
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the by-elections in Jarrow and Colne Valley and by the rising 
unemployment figures caused by the financial crisis in the 
U. S. A. and poor harvests in several countries. They were 
pressured too by an effective Labour Party propaganda campaigr, 
aimed partly at boosting its public image and partly at counter- 
acting left wing criticism of its parliamentary ineptitude. 
The SDF, comparatively quiescent since 1905, renewed its 
street campaigns with three major London demonstrations in 
November and December 1907. There were also major clashes with 
the police at a demonstration in Birmingham in January 1908. 
This combination of Labour pressure, public interest and 
unemployed violence obviously worried the Liberals. The 
Cabinet was divided on the issue and 70 Liberals joined Labour 
in opposing the King's speech. Hopes of success were there- 
fore high, and disappointment all the more acute, when the 
Labour Party failed to seize the initiative. Pete Curran 
was successful in the ballot for private members' bills and 
he introduced an Eight Hours Bill, but he and his colleagues 
failed to point out that limited hours would provide more 
employment. As M. P. s awaited the next parliamentary session, 
ministerial changes suggested a new long-term unemployment 
policy from the Government. 
30 
Before 1908 the SDF had been hopeful of the Labour Party, 
arguing that whatever its shortcomings 'it certainly marks 
a 
political cleavage, and is the beginning of a 
definite 
working class Parliamentary movement' . 
31 After the 1908 
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Labour Party Conference at Hull had declared the ultimate 
objective of the party to be the realisation of Socialism 
even Hyndman voted in favour of SDF reaffiliation. 
32 
But 
Labour Party ineptitude over the question of unemployment brought 
swift disillusionment. Initially favourably disposed towards 
the Labour Party Bill because it enshrined the Right to Work 
principle, the Federation now assailed Labour for failing to 
force the bill through Parliament by militant means. 'The 
Labour Party in the House of Commons seems to think that it 
has done its duty merely by introducing the bill', said 
Justice. The Social-Democrats saw Parliament simply as an 
extension of the propaganda platform, and thought it should 
be used as a complement to militant extra-parliamentary 
agitation. They attacked the Labour Party for acting as an 
ordinary bourgeois party, and ceaselessly extolled the example 
of the Irish M. P. s - 'they never forget, and never permit 
others to forget, that they regard themselves as a hostile 
party in a hostile assembly and they never lose sight of 
their ultimate object. '34 Similar criticisms were voiced by the 
ILP Conference in April and by the Yorkshire Federation of 
Trades Councils. As the left wing of the ILP became increas- 
ingly restive, as the tide of industrial unrest 
increased, 
the SDF sought to appeal to the growing numbers of 
disillusioned 
Socialists, a policy which led eventually to the 
formation of 
the British Socialist Party. But, as Stanley Pierson has 
realised, it was a policy 'more reactive 
than creative; it 
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was shaped less by theory than by the rising currents of 
discontent within the Socialist and Labour movements. '35 
Moreover, the anti-parliamentary tendency within the Federation 
reasserted itself. After all, predictions of the collapse 
of capitalism were one way of reconciling their Socialist 
faith with the apparent trends of British social development. 
By August 1908 unemployment had risen to 8.5 per cent 
of the male population, and militancy increased. In Glasgow 
and Bradford troops were placed on standby. Those in 
Bradford were to deal with any violent outbreaks arising from 
the visit to the city of Sydney Buxton, the Postmaster 
General. In the event, although several attempts were made 
to rush St. George's Hall, the police were able to cope quite 
adequately. Nonetheless furious scenes ensued in the council 
chamber as both Glyde and Hartley attempted to move the 
suspension of standing orders to discuss the requisitioning 
of troops. Hartley in particular used violent language. 
'I am a man of peace', he told the Mayor, 'and believe in pro- 
ceeding in a constitutional manner but if you shelve this 
matter in this cowardly manner I warn you that I shall have to 
take other steps; and that is no idle threat'. Later he called 
the Mayor a coward and, addressing the unemployed in the gallery, 
urged that 'For every one of you killed, demand a toll of two 
from the other class; take care that you aim high and hit the 
people who are responsible'. 
36 Similar rhetoric was heard in 
Manchester, where the unemployed were urged to arm themselves 
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with 'knives, pokers and crowbars'. There were violent clashes 
with the police, and on one occasion Fleetwood, an SDF 
activist, was rescued by the crowd from police custody. 
37 
In many areas the SDF unemployed campaigns became also cam- 
paigns for free speech, whilst in the public mind they became 
associated with the question of public order. Even Will 
Thorne was prosecuted for incitement after telling his audience 
to help itself from bakers' shops if short of bread. The 
Federation threatened to 'make the unemployed a menace... 
institute a reign of terror... make the governing classes howl 
with affright at the danger to their skins and their stolen 
wealth '. 
38 
Temporarily the SDF was able to attract influential 
supporters from beyond its own ranks. Victor Grayson, both 
inside and outside Parliament, encouraged the unemployed to 
act for themselves and he was suspended from the Commons on 
16 October 1908 for interrupting the committee stage of the 
Licensing Bill. M. P. s such as Curran, Seddon, Keir Hardie 
and Fred Jowett were prepared to co-operate with the SDF, 
sensing the need for militant pressure from without to back 
their parliamentary campaign. At a joint meeting on 
19 
October 1908 it was agreed to establish a Joint London Right 
to Work Committee to coordinate London activities. Its 
secretary was E. C. Fairchild of the Federation's 
Hackney 
branch. Although a constant critic of the Labour 
Party for 
much of the year the SDF was prepared to work with 
ILP M. P. s. 
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The Federation still hoped for Socialist unity, it supported 
the 'Right To Work' principle and, by mounting a joint campaign, 
it hoped to attract financial support it desperately needed. 
Thus encouraged the SDF organised a series of marches into 
the West End in December and January, which led to considerable 
disruption and the banning of a meeting in Belgrave Square on 
25 January. A dual strategy of street politics and parlia- 
mentary agitation promised much, but the alliance lasted no 
later than February 1909. The key factor was the reaction of 
trade unionists against co-operation with the Social-Democrats; 
many Labour activists disapproved of the violent tactics 
employed by a number of SDFers and influential figures such 
as MacDonald and Snowden were always against working with the 
SDF. When the Federation's Oldham branch wrote to MacDonald 
castigating the Labour Party for its refusal to support 
Grayson over unemployment he retorted by attacking 'the general 
stupidity of the S. D. F. and its incapacity to understand the 
meaning of any political demonstration' and thought the party 
composed merely of 'stupid tub-thumpers'. 
39 
With Grayson 
increasingly acting as a focus for critics of the Labour Party, 
with Curran and Snowden shouted down at Bradford and 
Liverpool when they attempted to defend Labour's unemployment 
policy, 
40 
the ILP element which had been prepared to co- 
operate with the Federation withdrew 
its support. As Brown 
comments, 'they were certainly not prepared to see 
their life's 
work, the creation of an independent working class party, 
destroyed'. 41 
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By 1909 the Labour Party's commitment to the Right to Work 
Bill had begun to dissipate. In many respects its bill had 
been a statement of principle intended to mobilise public opin- 
ion, rather than a clearly defined statement of practical 
policy. More concrete schemes for providing work were appear- 
ing, for example the Government's development bill, passed in 
the autumn of 1909, and many Labour men agreed with the 
Government that curbing the power of the Lords and passing 
Lloyd George's budget were more urgent priorities. Of prime 
importance was the report of the Poor Law Commission early in 
1910, more particularly of the Minority Report42 which was wel- 
corned by all sections of the movement except the SDF. Whereas 
the 'Right to Work Bill' provided a single solution to a 
single problem the Minority Report covered the whole spectrum 
of poverty and contained proposals such as the creation of a 
Labour %inistry and a reduction of hours which had long figured 
in Labour programmes. Significantly there was no reference 
to the right to work, hence SDF opposition, and the Federation 
also objected to the proposal to abolish the Boards of 
Guardians and transfer their powers to the local authorities, 
which they regarded as mere 'bureaucratic democracy'. 
43 
The 
final straw for the SDF came after the January 1910 election. 
With 40 Labour and 80 Irish M. P. s holding the balance of power 
it was widely anticipated that the Labour Party would use 
its 
position to force through the 'Right to Work Bill'. 
Such 
hopes were held in vain. The Labour Party's 
fear of bringing 
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down the Government, its preoccupation with the Osborne judge- 
ment, the feeling that proposed Government legislation made 
the bill much less relevant, all played a part in this decision. 
So too did the relative economic recovery after 1909, a factor 
which further diminished SDF influence. The Labour Party was 
also engaged in monitoring the new Labour exchanges established 
by Beveridge, a system bitterly attacked by the SDF as a state 
organised system of blacklegging but one which many trade 
unionists cautiously welcomed. Such inertia enraged the left. 
Through the Clarion Blatchford raged at the desertion of the 
unemployed, 
44 
and, significantly, Leonard Hall of the ILP NAC 
was also dismayed. Later in the year he helped to write the 
so-called 'Green Manifesto', Let us reform the Labour Party, 
which accused the Labour Party of neglecting the unemployed. 
For Hall and many other ILPers the final straw came in 1911 when 
the Party backed the National Insurance Bill with its con- 
tributory principle. They agreed with the SDF that this was 
a 'mean, petty and ridiculous'45 proposal, that insurance would 
do nothing to solve the problem of unemployment and was simply 
a means of keeping workers at subsistence level until they 
were needed. The Insurance Bill was the catalyst which brought 
some 40 branches of the ILP, together with the Social-Democratic 
Federation, into the British Socialist Party. 
The SDF's unemployment campaigns during the 
first decade 
of the twentieth century demonstrated its strengths 
but also 
highlighted its problems. Always at its best 
in an agitational 
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role the Federation pioneered a number of forms of campaigning 
which were later taken up by the Labour and Socialist movement, 
and particularly by the Communist Party, in the 1930s. The 
unemployed workers' hunger march from Northampton to London 
in 1905 was the first of its kind; the mass action against the 
Boards of Guardians and the Right to Work committees paved the 
way for later activists. In 1904 the SDF was the first organ- 
isation to call for a special session of Parliament, and its 
street campaigns were very successful in drawing public attention 
to the problem of unemployment, in forcing local authorities to 
provide both work and more generous relief, and in compelling 
the Government to act: - 
it kept the matter so effectively in the news in 
1904 that by the autumn Walter Long had summoned 
a London conference, largely to placate the 
rising uneasiness which it had done so much to 
generate. His decision to legislate also owed 
46 
much to the SDF's activity. 
These were surprising successes in view of the 
Federation's 
numerical and financial weaknesses, and they testify 
to the 
dedication of the small number of activists who continually 
mounted the campaigns, many suffering arrest and 
imprisonment. 
More importantly, they demonstrate that at a local 
level the SDF 
could be both a remarkably effective campaigner 
and an innov- 
ative body. Its conception of exploiting 
the 1905 Act to its 
fullest extent, and its realisation that 
local representatives 
373. 
were far more susceptible to popular agitation than national 
governments marked the Federation as a formative influence on 
working-class opinion. Almost inevitably the SDF's leading 
role passed to other bodies - the TUC, the ILP and the LRC - 
once the spotlight shifted to Parliament. Once this had 
happened the lack of a consistent policy hampered the SDF's 
efforts. As it competed for a share of the national stage so 
its local activities were weakened; as it despaired of 
Parliament so it reverted to str¬et politics. It wavered 
between the rhetoric of revolution, seeing the unemployed as 
shock troops to bring the establishment crashing down, and 
the politics of persuasion as it ridiculed any idea that the 
unemployed could cause a revolution. 
47 
In many senses the 
Federation relived its early years, oscillating between one 
extreme and the other, reacting to events rather than creating 
them. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in its 
attitude to the Labour Party. Throughout these years a debate 
raged within Social-Democratic ranks over re-affiliation to 
the Labour Party. Opponents of this pointed to the Labour 
Party's record on unemployment as convincing proof, if proof 
were needed, of the moral bankruptcy of the Party. Supporters 
of affiliation argued that the SDF's influence would be far 
more effective within the Labour Party, creating a strong 
left- 
wing presence and strengthening the position of critics 
like 
Leonard Hall. The party's position, its middle course, 
created innumerable difficulties for its branches. An 
examination of the debate is illustrative of these and provides 
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a further reason for the revival of Socialist unity and the 
eventual formation of the British Socialist Party. 
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CHAPTER XIII. 
'BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY' - THE SDF 
AND THE LABOUR PARTY. 
The Social-Democratic Federation had withdrawn from the Labour 
Representation Committee in 1901 partly to placate left-wing 
critics within its own ranks but also through a genuine 
desire to maintain its Socialist integrity. Its members 
objected to supporting men they hadn't selected and whose 
principles they opposed - men like Arthur Henderson whose 
victory at Barnard Castle in 1903 was viewed as a fraud per- 
petrated on the working-class electorate. Edward Hartley's 
comment on the Dewsbury by-election, that the Labour movement 
was solely concerned with intriguing men into parliament, what- 
ever their political complexion, was one which commanded wide- 
spread support amongst SDFers and in the ranks of the Clarion 
movement. The early history of the LRC revived many of the 
SDF's traditional suspicions of the trade unions, and the 
balance of forces within the Federation shifted once more 
towards those who supported the traditional separation of the 
economic and political modes of action. Yet the SDF loudly 
proclaimed that withdrawal from the LRC should not be seen 
as a sign of hostility towards the trade unions. Rather than 
animosity 'friendly helpfulness' or 'benevolent neutrality' 
were to define their attitude. In truth the sticking point 
for the SDF, as one of its spokesmen later admitted, was 
the 
fact that they had not been allowed to run candidates, whether 
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at national or local level, under their own colours. ' 
Nonetheless, the decision to stand aloof, arrived at 
after a hard-fought debate, did not signal a clarification of 
SDF policy. There was no conscious commitment to a revolution- 
ary programme which would have clearly highlighted the demarcatio 
lines between Labour and Socialist, a commitment such as that 
made by the 'impossibilists' of the Socialist Labour Party 
and the Socialist Party of Great Britain. The SDF attempted 
to steer a middle course and in so doing adopted a highly 
ambiguous position which confused both its own members and 
those outside its ranks. In May 1903 the Federation issued 
a manifesto on Labour Representation which insisted that mere 
independence from the twin parties of capitalism was of little 
use. It must be an informed and conscious independence which 
aimed at 'Socialist-Labour representation', urged the mani- 
festo. What was needed was 
a knowledge of the forces against you, and at the 
same time a consciousness of your own strength and 
power and of the responsibilities of your cause, 
such as you cannot possibly gain by whittling 
down your efforts to a colourless 
'Labour'Party, 
independent in the House of Commons, perhaps, 
on technical trade matters and trade union 
questions, but unorganised and purposeless 
on 
those great national and international 
issues 
which affect the welfare of the whole of 
your class. 
2 
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The SDF's leaders repeatedly insisted that the Labour Party 
must have a programme and unless that programme was Socialist 
the Federation could not affiliate. The question which 
needed to be addressed, but one which the Social-Democrats 
never really came to grips with, was how that political con- 
sciousness was to be developed. 
The precise relationship of the SDF and the Labour Party 
was subject to fluctuating opinion as the fortunes of the SDF 
ebbed and flowed, but it must be emphasised that there was 
a consistent majority against re-affiliation and that this 
was not simply explicable by Hyndman's influence. In fact 
Hyndman's position was decidedly ambiguous and he frequently 
wavered towards the pro-affiliation ranks. Speaking at the 
1904 Conference he praised the Burnley comrades for their 
progress and argued in favour of their methods. Shortly 
afterwards he pondered that old methods and ideas, suitable 
when Socialists 'were a small set of fanatics with nothing 
but hostile crowds arounds us', were no longer relevant. 
'We are compelled to act with those who do not wholly agree 
with us, in order to obtain results beneficial to the workers, 
whether we like such co-operation or not. 
'3 But the following 
year Hyndman declared that the LRC had changed 
for the worse 
and he would not consent to be bound by 
its constitution to 
support its non-Socialist leaders. In 
1906 Hyndman confidently 
expected to be elected M. P. for Burnley and 
thereby to provide 
a Socialist leadership for the Labour Party. His 
defeat 
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temporarily deflated his spirits but nonetheless he remained 
optimistic about the prospects for the newly-renamed party 
and hoped it would soon use its augmented strength in the 
Commons to put into effect the SDF palliatives. In common 
with many Socialists Hyndman was soon disillusioned. 'Not 
a single Socialist speech has been delivered in the English 
Popular Assembly', he declared at the end of 1906.4 The inept 
performance of the Labour Party, coupled with SDF expansion 
at that time, encouraged hopes of Socialist advance outside 
the Labour Party and prompted the Federation to emulate its 
rival by changing its name to the Social-Democratic Party. 
Nevertheless, at the SDF's 1908 Conference Hyndman voted in 
favour of re-affiliation, ostensibly in response to the Labour 
Party's declaration in favour of Socialism at Hull that same 
year. The SDF should put this to the test, thought Hyndman. 
'We ought to throw the onus of refusing to accept us as 
Socialists on the other people'. 
5 He had also been influenced 
by the resolution of the last two International Socialist 
Congresses, which accepted Labour Party affiliation to the 
International on the grounds that in practice it waged the 
class struggle even if it did not recognise it. As chairman 
of the British section of the International Hyndman 
felt 
obliged to be conciliatory at least. 
Hyndman's uncertainty on the issue was echoed 
by many 
members. Fred Knee, for example, initially supported re- 
affiliation but changed his mind in 1907, 
heartily dis- 
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appointed that the position of Socialism had in no way been 
enhanced by the Labour Party's presence in the House of 
Commons; 'the marriage between the Trade Union movement and 
the emasculated Socialism has proved sterile, '6 he thought. 
Yet Knee too was encouraged by Labour's Hull resolution and 
voted in favour of rejoining the Labour Party in 1908. Broadly 
speaking there was a period of some twelve months after the 
1906 election when opinion flowed in favour of re-affiliation 
and when the SDF appeared to accept the International's line. 
'Whatever may be the shortcomings of the new party', declared 
Justice at the beginning of 1907, 'it certainly marks a 
political cleavage and is the beginning of a definite working 
class Parliamentary movement'. 
7 
This tide was quickly turned 
as the Labour Party fumbled its way through the Parliamentary 
session and rumours of a Lib-Lab pact at the election 
abounded. 
8 Temporarily stemmed by the Hull resolution, 
opinion against affiliation hardened after 1908. Regular 
articles by Ben Tillett, vitriolic in their dei. unciation of 
the Labour Party, were featured in Justice. Whilst at times 
the pro-affiliation voice was raised loud and clear it could 
never command a majority on the matter. A ballot of the 
membership in 1907 produced a two-thirds majority against 
and even at the 1908 SDF Conference, where influential figures 
such as Hyndman, Knee, Gribble of Northampton, and Dan Irving 
voted in favour, the resolution was lost 130-30. Clearly 
then, Hyndman's was not the decisive voice on this 
issue. 
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The hardline opponent of affiliation and the dominant voice 
in the debate was Harry Quelch. 
Quelch it was who had moved the Executive resolution 
proposing withdrawal from the LRC in 1901. Although he was 
motivated partly by a desire to maintain party unity at 
heart Quelch had always been suspicious of the trade unions) 
and the first twelve months of the LRC's existence reawakened 
all his old fears. Consequently he retreated to his instinctive 
separation of the economic and political arenas. The unions 
were to protect the economic interests of their members, 
individual SDFers must work within their unions and educate 
the workers to realise the necessity of a Socialist workers' 
party. Yet a formal political alliance between Socialists and 
Labour was out of the question, for it would compromise the 
independence of the Social-Democratic Federation. From this 
position Quelch never deviated; the LRC, he said, consisted 
of 'discordant elements, thrown together, in most cases, not 
by work for a common object, but by personal ambition. '9 
He could not understand how men like Keir Hardie could, as he 
saw it, sink their principles to work alongside such as Crooks, 
Henderson and Shackleton. His sincerity was transparent; 
Socialists should not seek support under false pretences, he 
argued, and he for one did not wish to win an election standing 
under any banner other than that of Socialism. 'When the 
Labour Party accepts Socialism and is prepared to support 
10 
Socialist candidates as such, our place will be inside. 
' 
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The Labour Party was a compromise said Quelch and, more im- 
portantly, a compromise in which the Socialists lost heavily. 
With a humorous aphorism he suggested that 'When two men 
ride together on horseback one must ride behind' 
11 
a neat 
reference to the trade union paymasters of the Labour Party. 
Quelch's view of the Federation's role was quite simple. 
It was the advance guard, 'the head of the lance') and as such 
should lead the working class, not simply fall in with which- 
ever way it was going. For Quelch and many other members, 
Victor Grayson's election for the Colne Valley in 1907 proved 
that it was possible to stand on an overtly Socialist platform 
and win elections. What was needed was a strong Socialist 
party and to that end he consistently advocated Socialist 
unity, a union with the ILP. 
The Quelch viewpoint inevitably received a considerable 
airing in the pages of Justice but what is both remarkable 
and praiseworthy, as in the debate on trade unions, is the 
extent to which his opponents were given space to argue their 
case. Throughout this period the debate was given considerable 
prominence and it was conducted both at a very high theoretical 
level and on grounds of practicality. Both sides quoted 
Marx in their defence12 and the lines of cleavage, as so 
often with the SDF, are very unclear. isuzuki has characterised 
the northern branches in particular as strong proponents of 
Socialist unity within a Labour alliance, whilst 
depicting 
the London leaders as favouring unity outside such a 
framework. 
13 
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Certainly the Lancashire strongholds of the Federation, Burnley, 
Blackburn and Rochdale particularly, were forcible advocates 
of affiliation but Edward Hartley in Bradford consistently 
argued against and some members of the Burnley branch broke 
away to join the SPGB. In London prominent figures like 
Herbert Burrows and J. B. Askew supported rejoining the Labour 
Party and, as we have seen, Hyndman and Fred Knee were un- 
certain. Neither was there a clear division between right 
and left in the party. Zelda Kahan and Theodore Rothstein, 
two prominent left-wing critics of Hyndman and both members 
of the Hackney branch, were divided over the issue. Kahan 
felt that the Labour Party was fundamentally different to the 
two capitalist parties. 'We have to capture rather than 
oppose it. It is the only material, however resistant at 
present, which we can hope to shape to our purpose, that of 
bringing about the Socialist Commonwealth. ' 
14 
Rothstein 
welcomed the turning of the trade unions to independent 
political action but felt that until they changed their 
political opinions Socialists should remain aloof. 
15 The 
situation in 1901, he said, had been 'Whether to share with 
a large Labour Party confusion and even worse things and to 
renounce clear-cut Socialist agitation among the masses, or 
rather to remain a small organisation but to work unhindered 
16 
towards the Socialist enlightenment of the proletariat. ' 
Yet he admitted that the SDF's position outside the Labour 
Party was anomalous and blamed it on the fact that 
in England 
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the working class organised itself into trade unions before 
the emergence of the Socialist movement. Recognising that 
anomaly Rothstein did not reject the Labour Party out of hand. 
If only the ILP, he thought, would renounce 'Labourism' and 
remember its Socialist principles then the two parties could 
form a bloc within the Labour Party which would be more than 
a match for the trade union leaders. John Maclean, the 
respected Glasgow revolutionary. ) conversely supported reaffil- 
iation whilst being totally antagonistic to the ILP: 
The ILP are loving brothers when they wish SDP members 
to aid in open-air summer propaganda. They work 
separately when the indoor season begins and when the 
selection of constituencies and candidates arrives, 
they carefully avoid taking the SDP into consider- 
ation until the candidate has been put in the field, 
and then again they become anxious for socialist 
unity to return their man.... Those who dream of 
the accomplishment of a single socialist party by 
a kindly feeling being fostered between the leaders, 
etc, are Utopians ignorant of history, ignorant of 
men, and ignorant of the material forces that com- 
pel unity for any purpose. 
17 
There was thus a wide diversity of opinion within the SDF 
which transcended any traditional geographical or political 
difficulties. The issue was further complicated by pressure 
from the Socialist International. In 1904 its Amsterdam 
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Congress had pointed out that there was 'but one proletariat 
in each country' and soon afterwards the French delegates 
to the International Bureau announced the formation of a 
united party in France. The stumbling block to a united 
Socialist party in Britain of course was the question of the 
Labour Party. An International Socialist Council for Great 
Britain was set up towards the end of 1905 but co-operation 
proved difficult and relations worsened when Glasier of the 
ILP placed a resolution on the agenda for the Stuttgart 
Congress in 1907 urging that any 'bona-fide-trade unions' 
should be entitled to membership, whereas previously only 
those who recognised the 'class war' principle were admitted. 
To this the SDF was vehemently opposed, but at an ISB meeting 
in October 1908 a Kautsky resolution was adopted which ad- 
mitted the Labour Party to membership on the grounds that 
'although it does not directly recognise the proletarian class 
struggle, it nevertheless wages the struggle and in fact and 
by its very organisation, which is independent of bourgeois 
parties, is adopting the basis of the class struggle. '18 
Hyndman was infuriated; he detected once again the Machiavellian 
hand of German Socialism seeking to dictate to the movement and 
he objected to Marx and Engels being trotted out as 'political 
popes' when, as he never tired of pointing out, they had 
both 
been wrong regarding the course of events in Britain. 
19 That 
strain of national pride exhibited by Hyndman on 
frequent 
occasions previously thus further confused the 
issue. None- 
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theless the Kautsky resolution in fact delineated the basic 
difference between the two factions within the SDF; tt. ere 
were those who saw the Labour Party as the organised political 
expression of the working class, which therefore had to be 
won for Socialism, and those who felt that it was simply a 
decoy duck for capitalism, the 'tail of the Liberal dog' as 
a Justice cartoon put it. 
20 Their efforts would be put into 
building a new Socialist party. 
The critics of disaffiliation had ample ammunition at hand 
to aid their campaign, for the 'middle course' espoused by 
Quelch placed the party in a ridiculous situation. Individual 
SDFers could be members of the Labour Party via their trade 
unions; branches of the SDF, said the 1903 Conference, should 
join their local Labour Representation Committees - 'It is 
excellent propaganda which cannot fail to bear fruit sooner 
or later'21 -a policy which was confirmed in 1909, but the 
national party should remain independent. The sheer 
illogicality of this position was mocked by J. H. Thornton 
of the Burnley branch: 
Just fancy, that while the S. D. F. by being inside 
the L. R. C. as an organisation might suffer some 
terrible calamity, our comrades Quelch and Jones 
not only do not meet with any sort of 
disaster 
but come out of the debates with credit to 
them- 
selves and to the organisation which 
is proud of 
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them and their ability to represent trade 
unionism as it should be represented and will 
be all the sooner, when the S. D. F. becomes 
affiliated... By our knowledge, energy, deter- 
mination and enthusiasm, the Labour Represent- 
ation Committee can be won by and for Socialism. 
22 
This was an argument which Quelch could hardly dispute for at 
both the 1905 and 1907 Labour Party Conferences he it was who 
moved the amendment opposing women's suffrage based on a 
property qualification, an amendment carried in defiance of 
the views of Keir Hardie who supported the limited suffrage 
bill. He was similarly effective on the London Trades Council. 
Other Social-Democrats were also able to intervene effectively 
at Labour Party Conferences, but their influence was inevitably 
circumscribed by the fact that theybelonged to an organisation 
which refused to affiliate and were therefore easily branded 
as 'wreckers' or 'impossibilists'. The most glaring example 
of inconsistency was the case of Will Thorne. 
Thorne had joined the Canning Town branch of the SDF in 
1884, one of its early working-class members. A 
labourer 
in the Beckton gasworks, his Socialism led him 
into union 
organisation and Thorne was instrumental 
in founding the 
National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers, 
the first 
of the New Unions. He felt that a general union would 
in- 
crease workers' solidarity and provide the necessary 
base to 
launch a new political party, representative 
of the workers' 
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interests and based on Socialism. Thorne was convinced that 
Socialism would be brought about peacefully, through Parliament, 
but in his early years at least was a firm believer in 
industrial action as anecessary adjunct to political organisation. 
The Gasworkers put up candidates in local elections as a matter 
of policy and Thorne himself was elected in West Ham in 1891. 
At West Ham he and other SDF/gasworker members were leading 
lights in the Labour group which won control of West Ham 
Council in 1898. His experiences convinced him of the need for 
a national independent and Socialist Labour Party and Thorne 
was one of the TUC representatives on the committee which 
drew up the agenda for the founding conference of the Labour 
Representation Committee. The Gasworkers, after the Railway 
Servants, were the second lamest union to affiliate to the 
new party. With his SDF and union connections Thorne was a 
natural choice as parliamentary candidate for West Ham South 
in 1900. He stood as a Labour and Socialist candidate on 
a platform which owed much to SDF influence, but poor organis- 
ation and his anti-war stance cost him the seat. Inevitably 
the Federation's decision to leave the LRC caused him problems 
when he stood again in 1906. Thorne wanted to run, as 
before, 
as a 'Socialist and Labour' candidate. The 
local LRC, with 
a majority of SDF members, supported him 
in this but the 
national LRC refused to allow him to do so. 
Thorne therefore 
declared that he would stand down and only some 
determined 
lobbying of the local party and of Thorne 
himself by the 
Gasworkers Union persuaded him to stand as a 
Labour candidate. 
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Without this agreement of course Thorne might have had 
difficulties in winning the seat. MacDonald's secret pact 
with the Liberals in 1903 made the LRC ticket invaluable and 
gave Thorne a straight fight with the Conservative. But al- 
though he ran as an LRC candidate Thorne's election address 
was defiantly Socialist. A vote for Thorne was 
a vote on behalf of the downtrodden and oppressed, 
a vote on behalf of the famished children in our 
schools, and of the disinherited in our pauper 
bastilles; it is a word of hope to the struggling 
masses in all parts of Great Britain, and of en- 
couragement to all who suffer under the heel of 
capitalism, a blow struck for the workers in that 
war between Capitalism and Labour which must be 
waged relentlessly until the emancipation of the 
workers is achieved by the abolition of the 
Capitalist system. 
23 
With a majority of over 5,000, Thorne began a Parliamentary 
career that lasted until 1945. The SDF fully supported Thorne's 
actions, and Quelch attacked those who questioned the 
decision. 
It was ridiculous, he said, to suggest that, just because the 
SDF was not affiliated to the Labour Party, members who were 
officials of their unions should not be allowed to run as 
Labour Party candidates. 'If he were in the same position 
24 Such 
... he would sign the Labour Party constitution'. 
arguments confused many SDFers let alone those 
in the wider 
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movement. What was to Quelch 'benevolent neutrality' was, 
to John Moore of Rochdale, a 'jelly-fish' policy and to J. B. 
Askew a confession of moral bankruptcy. Moore questioned 
the logic of joining local LRCs and supporting non-Socialist 
candidates there whilst at national level opposing the LRC. 
Askew thought it absurd that Thorne could represent his union 
as an M. P. and that Quelch could attend Labour Party Conferences 
as a union delegate yet the SDF. 'a body which claims to be in 
the main a working-class organisation repudiates responsibility 
for the acts of a body to which the greater part of its members 
must of necessity belong. ' 
25 
He accused Quelch of mis- 
interpreting, and even ignoring, the class war. The Labour 
Party, suggested Askew, was, on Marx's definition, a working- 
class organisation. What possible reason could the SDF have 
for not identifying with a body which stood for the political 
independence of Labour? 'The more we stand outside of the 
Labour Party... the more do we play into the hands of those 
very elements whose influences we deplore. ' Socialism, said 
Askew, should be identified not simply with a far-off ideal 
but with daily struggles; the SDF placed far too much emphasis 
on the 'abstract presentation of Socialism... a definite 
system... to be accepted as a whole and too little of Socialism 
as the necessary result of the efforts of the proletarian to 
free himself. '26 Thorne agreed whole heartedly and it is 
noticeable that whereas his manifesto was a clear-cut and 
unashamed exposition of Socialist principles, boldly emphasising 
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the doctrine of the 'class war', Hyndman in Burnley stood 
rather as a moderate 'and his election address containined 
nothing that would suggest revolutionary Socialism. '27 
Quelch had been similarly ambivalent at Dewsbury in 1902, and 
at Southampton in 1906 had actively canvassed an agreement 
with the Liberals in that two-member constituency. Muddled 
thinking seemed endemic in the Social-Democratic Federation, 
over both the Labour Party and political policy generally, 
with the members torn between a desire for electoral success 
and revolutionary purity. Thornton, the Burnley activist, 
expressed the problem very clearly. The SDF's attitude, he 
said, was one of 'maudlin vacillation' and downright timidity. 
Either the Labour Party was 'tending' towards the emancipation 
of the workers or it was not. It it was then the SDF should 
be inside assisting it to its ultimate goal; if it was not 
then it should be vigorously opposed. Either course would be 
preferable to the nauseating policy of 'sentimental sympathy'. 
Make up your mind, urged Thornton, either the Federation is 
purely a party of revolutionary propaganda or it seeks to 
palliate the system too, in which case it is stupid to stand 
'shivering, afraid to take the plunge, fearing the S. D. F. may 
be drowned. '28 Most importantly, thought Thornton, 'This 
dog-in-the-manger policy of the organisation is nullifying what 
is done locally... keeping back the growth and usefulness of 
the S. D. F. and adding to the growth and influence of the I. L. P. 
as a consequence. ' 
29 
Was this an accurate picture of developments in Lancashire? 
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The Socialist movement in Lancashire was stagnant after 1895, 
a reflection of the national scene. With the exception of 
Blackburn, an alliance with the trade unions seemed some 
way off and appeals for Socialist unity, from both SDF and ILP 
branches, were in a sense appeals for survival. The formation 
of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 altered this 
perspective and placed the movement in Lancashire at a cross- 
roads. SDF branches in the county had persistently advocated 
an alliance with the unions and were therefore seemingly well- 
placed to take advantage of national developments. They were, 
consequently, , aghast at the 
SDF's decision to withdraw from the 
LRC and the Lancashire branches, particularly Blackburn, 
Burnley and Rochdale, consistently urged reaffiliation. 
Initially they did not seem particularly affected by the 
decision, but they were divided over tactics. The Blackburn 
SDF supported Quelch on Socialist unity, yet its three 
branches participated in the Labour alliance; Accrington 
wanted to 'permeate and capture the trade unions', whilst Dan 
Irving, chairman of the SDF's 1901 Conference, merely advocated 
more Socialist representatives 'to waken up people'. Seemingly 
the Lancashire branches did not regard the secession from the 
LRC as decisive; the LRC was, as yet, in its infancy and not 
strong in the county and the next election was some way off. 
As the Federation allowed participation 
in local committees 
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there was a feeling that the branches could continue to 
operate much as before. 
An early warning was sounded in Manchester, where the 
two SDF branches joined the local LRC on its formation in 1903. 
The SDF attempt to move a Socialist resolution as the basis 
for the new organisation was ruled out by a combination of 
trade union and ILP opposition, and when the SDF would not 
make a definite promise to contribute to the Committee's 
expenses it was excluded altogether. Manchester was in many 
ways an atypical SDF branch, and it had lost much of its in- 
fluence to the ILP after W. K. Hall's candidature at South 
Salford in 1891. Nonetheless union hostility and ILP moder- 
ation in Manchester reflected national developments and 
demonstrated the dangerous isolation of the SDF after 1901. 
Thereafter the Manchester SDFers reverted to their traditional 
campaigning and propagandist role, with the issue of unemp- 
loyment as their focus, and achieved some success. There 
were ten SDF branches in the area by 1908, although this does 
not imply a corresponding increase in membership, and this 
parallelled a revival of SDF fortunes generally. 
From a position of near extinction in Lancashire in 1903 
the Social-Democratic Federation could boast over 40 branches 
by 1906. In 1903 Irving had loudly complained that the 
Lancashire branches 'need a lesson on the elements of 
organisation' and urged members to 'think less of their 
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individual likes and dislikes, and place themselves under 
the necessary discipline... without which they are so weak 
as to merit the contempt of the enemy, the capitalist class. '30 
Hyndman had voiced similar complaints, 
31 
and although the 
Federation claimed 23 branches in 1902 many of these, outside 
Burnley, existed largely through the efforts of one or two 
members. 
32 
At a Lancashire Federation meeting in May 1902 
only six branches were represented and the Federation was 
consequently disbanded. What then caused the resurrection 
of the party between 1903 and 1906? 
In part the SDF benefiteA., along with all radical groups, 
from a rising anti-Tory sentiment amongst the working class 
during the closing years of the Balfour Government, motivated 
by the issues of tariff reform, Taff Vale, and the indentured 
labour of Chinese workers in South Africa. The Federation was 
able to present sharply distinctive policies, in contrast to 
the LRC which appeared simply to be trailing to the Liberal 
Party. For example it attacked both Free Trade and Protection, 
declaring that 'we oppose the capitalist Free Traders no less 
than their Protectionist opponents. They profess to look 
after your interests by securing for you cheap food, whereas 
they are really concerned only with the cheapness of the supply 
of labour'. 
33 
The return of the trade depression, with 
Lancashire losing export markets, meant the return of unem- 
ployment and the SDF was able to revive its unemployed campaigns. 
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Many Socialists were hugely disappointed with the performance 
of the Labour Party over the issue and could expect few 
radical solutions from the Liberals. With the ILP firmly 
tied to the Lib-Lab axis at this time the SDF offered the 
only alternative, and the issue of unemployment was one reason 
for ILP defections to the British Socialist Party in 1911. 
A final factor was the improved organisation instituted by 
Dan Irving, who became District Secretary. Irving's influence, 
as Selina Cooper had remarked, 
34 
was not entirely beneficial, 
'yet his indefatigable organisation and his links with the 
unions provided a base that presented the Liberals with a 
serious challenge'35 in Burnley. He was aided by financial 
support from the Countess of Warwick, a flamboyant if unlikely 
recruit to the SDF, who thought that Hyndman was destined to 
be the first Socialist Prime Minister and was prepared to back 
his campaign to that end. The arrival in Lancashire of William 
Gee, 'The Socialist Dreadnought' and ex-Scottish organiser, 
also provided an impetus for the SDF. Thus, by 1906 'the 
S. D. F. was once more a lively left-wing party with plenty of 
36 
room in which to operate. ' 
The vital question, of course, was how would the SDF operate 
This apparent growth of the SDF was not reflected in election 
results in the county, and for an organisation which placed 
great emphasis on municipal electioneering as a means of 
obtaining palliatives this was a significant factor. The 
abolition of the School Boards in 1903 closed one avenue of 
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SDF influence, but the key was their exclusion from the 
Labour Representation Committee. Thus, in 1905, they put 
up 19 candidates of whom only seven were successful, and four 
of these were in Blackburn and Accrington where the SDF formed 
part of a Labour alliance. The Nelson branch had recognised 
the problem at an early stage, and argued that withdrawal 
from the LRC would shut off the Federation from local develop- 
ments to the detriment of its own progress. 
37 
Events in the 
town justified their foreboding. Social-Democrats in Nelson 
hoped to field their own candidate at the 1902 Clitheroe by- 
election, but the ILP wanted Philip Snowden. A personal 
quarrel between Snowden and a leading SDFer made agreement 
unlikely and indeed led to a 'decided rupture between the ranks 
of the I. L. P. and S. D. F. ' in Nelson. 
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In the event both groups 
were pre-empted by the newly-formed Labour Representation 
Association which nominated David Shackleton, the secretary 
of the Cotton Weavers. Snowden acquiesced in this decision, 
thereby earning kudos for the ILP, but the SDF were dismayed. 
So strong was the union in the constituency that the Liberals 
and Conservatives declined to challenge Shackleton and he was 
returned unopposed. A Labour Representation Committee was 
formed a few weeks after his success and as a result the 
Textile Workers voted to join the national LRC early 
in 1903. 
The Labour Party in Nelson became a very efficient organisation 
indeed, with the trade unions providing the numbers, the ILP 
the ideology and leading activists, and the Nelson 
Workers' 
Guide the mouthpiece. Between 1903 and 1906 the Nelson 
ILP 
399. 
Ernest Marklew of the Burnley SDF, 
imprisoned for his part in the 
Nelson free speech fight, 1906. 
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doubled its membership and 6 ILP members were elected 
councillors. At the 1906 General Election Shackleton had 
a majority of 8,000, and a few months later Nelson became the 
first Labour-controlled Town Council in Lancashire. As these 
events unfolded the SDF branch was increasingly left out on 
a limb. Its initial reaction was that 'Socialists should 
stand as Socialists and the only alliance they should seek 
is that of all other Socialists'. 
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They even floated a 
Nelson and District Socialist Workers' Union in opposition to 
the official textile body. Consequently influential members 
like Selina Cooper joined the ILP, although she and others 
did retain nominal membership of the SDF as a recognition of 
its role in the formation of a Labour movement in the town. 
This pointed a signpost to the future, the SDF as the conscience 
of the movement rather than an integral part of it. In Nelson, 
as the Social-Democratic Federation hesitated over whether to 
join the LRC, the ILP took advantage of this to overtake and 
eventually replace its rival. The Federation finally decided 
to affiliate to the LRC in June 1906,40 but the marriage lasted 
barely a year. 
Many of the trade unions were suspicious of the SDF's 
motives and the local Liberal press was not slow to whip up 
feeling against the Federation. The Nelson SDF, said the 
Nelson Leader, had been 'in danger of losing their political 
existence' and that was their sole reason for allying 
themselves 
4 
with the LRC, which they had unsparingly criticised 
in the past. 
401. 
Throughout 1906 and into the early months of 1907 the 
Socialists were engaged in a 'free speech' fight with the 
authorities, which led to 'some of the most riotous scenes 
, 42 ever seen in Nelson. Bryan Chapman, the SDF secretary, and 
Ernest Marklew of Burnley were arrested and later imprisoned 
for refusing to pay their fines. The SDF clearly felt that 
the new Labour-controlled council should intervene with the 
police authorities to prevent further prosecutions, and it 
accused the Labour group of reneging on a promise to support 
them in their campaign for a central open-air meeting place 
in Nelson. An acrimonious exchange of letters appeared in 
the local press, with an angry Labour councillor urging the 
SDF to stop its 'mud-throwing'. The Labour view was that the 
SDF was seeking 'Free advertisement and notoriety on the 
cheap', 
43 
the SDF castigated the Labour councillors as a 
'disgrace to our democratic organisations' and said that the 
previous Liberal administration had been far more even-handed 
in its treatment of public meetings. 
44 Eventually the breach 
between the two organisations came over the question of 
municipalisation. 
In February 1907 the Nelson SDF pushed through the annual 
meeting of the LRC a resolution urging the Town Council to 
ballot ratepayers on the question of municipalising the 
drink trade. When this resolution appeared before the council 
though only two Labour councillors backed it. The 
SDF 
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publically condemned the councillors and urged the LRC to 
make all resolutions binding on its members holding public 
office. This caused a furore, with union members of the LRC 
protesting loudly at a 'mere handful of Socialists' attempting 
to dictate the policy of the 'great Labour cause'. 
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The LRC 
snubbed the SDF, refusing to accept Chapman's nomination for 
the Guardian elections, when two Labour Guardians were 
retiring. They stood only one candidate and the SDF, furious, 
ran Chapman on their own behalf. He came bottom of the poll 
with 661 votes, well behind the LRC candidate in fourth place, 
who was elected with 1296 votes. A special meeting of the 
Nelson LRC was called for 28 May 1907 and, as the Nelson Leader 
commented, 'It is a crisis in the history of the Nelson Labour 
Movement'. 
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At that meeting, far more heavily attended than 
usual, the LRC overwhelmingly refused to condemn the Labour 
councillors and asked the SDF to withdraw its affiliation. 
The role of the ILP in these events was ambivalent. A number 
of ILPers had supported the SDF in their campaign for 'free 
speech' and clearly many were disappointed at the council's 
inactivity over municipalisation. One member wrote to complain 
that 'the Labour Party has been in power in Nelson for fifteen 
months and the only thing that stands to its "credit" 
is the 
prosecution of the Socialists ', 
47 
and another attacked the 
Labour mayor, Councillor Rickard, as 'a disgrace to the 
organisation to which he belongs'. 
48 But as an organisation 
the ILP supported the LRC, and criticism from ILPers was 
tolerated by the LRC. They had been members of the 
Committee 
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from the outset and had established an accepted left-wing 
position within. The SDF's late affiliation though was seen 
simply as a belated attempt to ensure their own survival and 
to control the organisation. Many LRC members pointed out that 
the SDF had initially got their resolutions through by narrow 
majorities at sparsely attended meetings, and the packed hall 
for the special meeting was the result of assiduous whipping 
of union members. 
The SDF's response to these events was unambiguous. 
Chapman said that 'if they could not permeate the L. R. C. 
within, they would fight them from without. '49 Temporary 
additions to their ranks as a result of the blaze of publicity 
encouraged them to oppose Labour candidates in three wards in 
the 1907 municipal elections. Results were disappointing and 
the following year only one SDF candidate was advanced. 
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Thereafter the SDF in Nelson became an increasingly ineffective 
voice, a propagandist body adrift from the only mass con- 
stituency it could hope to canvass. 
Events in Nelson were reflected elsewhere. The SDF found 
it increasingly difficult to influence trade unions once the 
LRC became established. After 1901 individual SDFers such as 
Quelch, Atkinson of the Paper Stainers, and Hacking of Rochdale 
Trades Council continued to attend LRC conferences as union 
delegates and, as Jeffrey Hill rightly suggests of 
Atkinson, 
'the SDF suffered greatly through not having more of 
his kind 
to exert their influence'. 
51 But after 1903 there was no SDF 
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spokesman in any of the Lancashire unions affiliated to the 
LRC. The SDF's electoral success in Blackburn in 1900,52 
and Philip Snowden's promising parliamentary campaign as a 
'Labour and Socialist' candidate, demonstrated the gains to be 
made by co-operation with the ILP and the unions. Although 
never a smooth and unhindered relationship with the unions 
the SDF had made headway, and the two Socialist groups recog- 
nised the strength of Conservative values in the town and 
were prepared to fight together. Thus by 1900 the Socialists 
had created a Labour alliance in which they had a dominant 
voice. In general SDF/ILP relations remained close until 
1906, and they again co-operated in Snowden's election 
campaign. Snowden at this time was dubious of any agreement 
with the Liberals, particularly in a Tory stronghold like 
Blackburn, and he urged the electors to 'plump' for him rather 
than vote Liberal and Labour in tandem in this two member 
constituency. He achieved a brilliant victory, and Blackburn 
became the only constituency in the country to elect a Tory 
and a Socialist in double harness. 
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The year 1906 was to be the apogee of SDF fortunes 
in 
Blackburn. On this occasion Snowden had followed LRC 
instruction and stood as a 'Labour' candidate only. 
Along 
with the other ILP leaders he was now prepared to subsume 
his 
Socialism in the attempt to gain parliamentary representation. 
The Blackburn ILP acquiesced in this decision and 
thereafter 
their efforts were concentrated on the Labour alliance 
rather 
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than Socialist unity, whereas previously both strategies 
had been considered as part of a whole. There was also, 
again in line with national trends, a move to rapprochement 
with the Liberals. Snowden, in the two elections of 1910, 
fought in alliance with the Liberals. He could not afford 
to call for 'plumpers' when the two parties agreed on the 
Budget and when Labour desperately needed a reversal of the 
Osborne judgement. This was anathema to the SDF, who 
reluctantly supported Snowden in January 1910 but refused to 
do so in December. They had built their base upon the Tory 
working men of Blackburn and, as Tom Hurley said of the 
Liberals, the SDF did not 'want their vote, never did want 
their vote and never will want their vote'. Yet this base 
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was being eroded. One ex-Conservative trade unionist remarked 
that 'I am a Conservative but I put my trade unionism first. 
This new Labour Party are the best friends trade unions ever 
had. '55 The Trades Council became increasingly involved in 
Labour politics and therefore increasingly co-operative with 
the ILP, which concentrated on the palliatives which had once 
been the hallmark of SDF campaigning in the town. The SDF 
adopted a more aggressive stance which alienated many erstwhile 
supporters on the TradesCouncil. In 1908 and 1909 the SDF 
was wiped out electorally in Blackburn and, apart from a brief 
revival connected with its unemployed demonstrations, was 
largely a spent force by 1910. As in Nelson the 
ILP was the 
chief beneficiary of the development, both nationally and 
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locally, of the Labour Representation movement. By 1909 it 
had 900 members and a full time secretary in Blackburn. Yet, 
in both towns, the SDF had played a substantial role in the 
development of the Labour movement in the political arena. 
Unarguably the decision to withdraw from the Labour Representation 
Committee had negated its influence. 
The Rochdale branch of the SDF had developed a somewhat 
different outlook to that of its counterpart in Blackburn. 
Throughout the 1890s it had striven to make inroads into the 
Trades Council and the trade unions, but in this it had been 
largely frustrated. Nonetheless, basing its approach on 
uncompromising anti-Liberalism, the SDF had become the dominant 
partner in a Socialist alliance with the ILP. This practical 
demonstration of Socialist unity achieved some electoral 
success56 but it did not mean an abandonment of the search 
for an alliance with the unions. What it did mean was that 
the ultimate Socialist vision was always more to the fore in 
Rochdale than say Blackburn or Nelson, and SDFers in Rochdale 
aimed at the creation of a Socialist Labour Party. In this 
they were supported by the ILP branch and the two agreed 
in 
1902 to stand S. G. Hobson as a 'Labour and Socialist' can- 
didate at the next parliamentary election. This candidature 
was not approved by the ILP nationally nor by the LRC. 
Keir 
Hardie asked Hobson to withdraw, and, according to 
Hobson, Glasier 
accused him of being 'a source of embarassment', 
the reason 
being, said John Penny the ILP secretary, that 
'we want 
Rochdale to bargain with for somewhere else' . 
57 A bargain 
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with the Liberals was out of the question for the Rochdale 
SDF, who were vehemently opposed to any 'Progressive' alliance, 
and Hobson declared his intention of standing 'as an avowed 
Socialist free from any galling or uncompromising restrictions. ' 
58 
In so doing neither he nor the SDF/ILP axis were adopting 
a separatist stance, although they clearly rejected Lib- 
Labism. Both Hobson and the Rochdale SDF were fierce critics 
of the SDF's decision to withdraw from the LRC. This, said 
Hobson, was 'a political blunder worse than a crime ... had 
they continued inside there is little doubt that they would 
have shamed the I. L. P. into some kind of Socialist 
consistency. ' 
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John Moore, the Rochdale delegate to the 
SDF's Annual Conferences, frequently urged re-affiliation. 
Thus, at the 1905 Conference in Northampton, he argued that 
they in Lancashire had come to the conclusion that 
the L. R. C. was a living political force; it was 
obtaining an influence among the working classes 
in the great industrial centres.... Breaking 
away from Liberal and Tory associations meant 
a very great step in advance -a revolution 
in 
ideas: and if we refused to take part in the 
movement which resulted from our work, then we 
were going to be left behind. 
60 
Their aim was to create, via Socialist unity, a 
left- 
wing presence in the Labour Representation Committee. 
In July 
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1905 their pressure locally paid off when the Trades Council 
voted by 20 votes to 17 to assist in the formation of an LRC 
'on the national basis'. This was an uproarious meeting, 
followed by the withdrawal from the Trades Council of the 
Liberal-dominated Spinners, Piecers and Power Loom overlookers. 
Secessions aside this was a significant victory for Socialist 
propaganda, and John Moore of the SDF and James Firth of the 
ILP became chairman and secretary respectively of the new LRC. 
In Rochdale the development of the Labour Representation 
Movement was not simply a consequence of anti-Liberalism but 
the result of a decade of Socialist propaganda. Thomas 
Clegg, Hobson's campaign organiser, was the ex-Liberal agent. 
He declared himself won over to the Socialists 'by their self- 
denial, honesty of purpose and work', which inspired him to 
work harder and better for the workers cause. 
61 As one 
observer commented, 'those who had joined the party in Rochdale 
had done so not so much from disgust with the two orthodox 
parties, but because they believed that the Labour principles 
were those which would raise people to a better state of 
existence than ever before. '62 Therewas to be no national 
type LRC-Liberal understanding here. 
Hobson made no concessions to moderate Labour opinion 
in his campaign. His was a full-blooded 
Socialist propaganda 
effort which led the local press to label 
him an unrepresent- 
ative extremist and Charles Redfern of the 
Spinners union to 
appear on the Liberal platform 'in the absence of 
a Labour 
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candidate'. Yet Hobson polled impressively. Attacked by the 
press and the Catholic church, lacking official ILP and LRC 
support, he gained 19.5 per cent of the vote as opposed to 
Clark's eight per cent in 1900. Although the Liberals regained 
the seat their percentage of the vote was the same as in 
1900, yet Lancashire as a whole had seen a massive swing to 
the Liberals. The Socialist alternative to Liberalism was 
gaining strength, attracting recruits from both the major 
parties, and the Rochdale Citizen felt that 'if we progress at 
the same rate during the next few years, victory is assured 
to us. '63 The period 1890-1906 had been a vital one for 
the Labour movement in Rochdale, during which it had weakened 
the Liberal hold on the town. In this process the SDF had 
played a vital role as an educating force, its vitality 
demonstrated by its pre-eminence over the ILP. Hobson 
thought they would have done better still but for the lack of 
official backing. 'If at Rochdale we failed to light a fire', 
he said, 'there were sparks and dry embers. Socialist unity 
had been killed by the careerists', although 'a not incon- 
siderable I. L. P. remnant bestirred itself. '64 Written some 
30 years after the election these reflections were in fact 
an accurate record of events after 1906. 
National trends affected the SDF in Rochdale just as they 
did in Blackburn and Nelson. The immediate effect of the 
disaffiliation decision of 1901 was minimal but as the LRC 
became stronger and more established so the ramifications of 
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that decision became clearer. In all three towns the SDF 
had been instrumental in the formation of the LRC; the 
national policy of the party caused hesitation and heart- 
searching locally, and whilst the SDF dithered the ILP was 
able to take advantage. This was certainly true in Rochdale 
too, where ILP membership grew rapidly after the convening 
of the LRC in 1905, at the expense of the SDF. John Moore 
wasaghast at the party's continued refusal to reaffiliate. 
They had done all the hard work in Rochdale, he raged, had 
contested three elections but now, in 1908, the ILP branch 
had decided to fall in line with its party's national policy. 
The SDF in Rochdale could now either fight on its own, or 
'consent to be snuffed out'. 
65 
Federation hostility to the 
LRC was ridiculous, said Moore; 'we are lost in nebulosity so 
far as political affairs are concerred. '66 Marxists should 
form an integral part of the working-class army, showing the 
way and thus countering the influence of MacDonald and his 
ilk. 
The only other logical way, he argued, was 'impossibilism' and 
at least that would be honest and consistent. As it was the 
SDF in Blackburn, in Clitheroe, and in Rochdale 'are politically 
dead in consequence of our absurd position'. 
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Quelch would 
have none of that. If the SDF was politically dead 
in Rochdale, 
he thought, 'affiliation with the Labour Party would mean our 
burial'. 68 Some Rochdale members obviously thought otherwise. 
and realised that the SDF on its own would not cut an attractive 
figure at the polls. J. Sutcliffe argued against standing 
a 
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Socialist candidate in 1910. 'He travelled to Manchester 
every morning with nine other Socialists, all of whom voted 
for the Socialist candidate at the last election. This time 
every one of them would vote for the Liberal candidate' 
69 
a 
Dan Irving stood in Rochdale in January 1910 supported by 
local funds only. He polled 1,755 votes, as against Hobson's 
2,506 in 1906. In December, again as a purely local candidate, 
he polled slightly better. There was obviously a consistent 
hard-core of Socialist support in Rochdale but the reform 
of the Lords, the National Insurance Bill, the Osborne judgement 
were all matters which touched the everyday life of working 
men and the SDF, outside the Labour Party, could offer a vision 
of the future but nothing in the here and now. Thus the ILP 
reaped the harvest which the SDF had helped sow. Its fading 
appeal was clearly demonstrated in 1911 when the LRC announced 
that Ben Turner of Batley would contest the seat at the next 
election. The Dewsbury Reporter suggested that 'The Labour 
and Socialist parties at Rochdale for some time have had their 
differences' and gleefully reported that the SDF intended to 
70 
run a rival candidate.. However, at Turner's adoption meeting 
John Moore failed to get a hearing, and Turner was accepted by 
a huge majority. George Barnes, speaking for Turner, said 
that many in the Labour Party were Socialist 'but they preferred 
to get what they could out of legislation to being Socialists 
mouthing shibboleths by the fireside. ' 
71 
The workers of 
Rochdale should be represented by a man of their own class. 
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After 1906 three strongholds of the Lancashire SDF had 
been usurped by the ILP as the leading Socialist organisation, 
due largely to the Federation's breach with the LRC. But 
what of Burnley, the premier SDF branch in the country, where 
the ILP barely existed? The Social-Democrats in Britain 
pinned their hopes on Burnley as the point of departure for 
a Socialist Labour Party independent of the LRC. They were 
convinced that Hyndman's election would be the signal for a 
Socialist breakthrough on all fronts, an attitude which led 
Askew to protest at the 'deification' of Hyndman. 'The S. D. P. ', 
he said, 'will become nothing more nor less than an organ- 
isation to secure Hyndman's return to parliament. '72 That aside 
Burnley provides a glaring example of SDF inconsistency. 
Here was a very strong branch, firmly in favour of a Labour 
alliance, but at parliamentary level they could not co-operate 
with the L RC. In 1904 the Trades Council and SDF mounted a 
joint effort in the elections for the Board of Guardians. 
The SDF in fact lost its three seats but for Dan Irving that 
was not important: 
To me, desirous of building up a Socialist-Labour 
Party in the town embracing all organised workers, 
the fact that we have stood in battle array, to- 
together, even to lose a fight, is but the precursor 
of a victorious campaign for Socialism and Labour. 
73 
Irving and the SDF followed this up by arguing for a Labour 
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H. M. HYNDMAN. 
I have advocated vigorously fora quarter of a century the Nationalisa- 
tion and Socialisation of our great means and instruments of creating and 
distributing wealth, under the direct control and in the interests of the whole 
people. The railways, the mines, the public departments, the trusts, pools, 
and combines, which have obtained mastery in this country under Free 
Trade, as elsewhere under Protection, are ripe for this wholesome trans- 
formation. " 
Election Address, 1906. 
Representation Committee, which was finally inaugurated in 
June 1905. This was a major success for a number of unions, 
and particularly the `,: eavers, had always been suspicious of 
the SDF. The Liberal press, however, was quick to take advan- 
tage of the dichotomy between the Federation locally and 
nationally, arguing that the LRC was nothing more than a 
Social-Democratic front aimed at getting trade union money. 
They also seized on the fact that Socialist candidates in the 
elections stood as such whereas Liberals and Tories in the 
LRC could not parade their colours. Many Radicals in the 
weavers' union were prepared to listen" to these attacks and 
to criticisms of Hyndman's secularism. The weavers withdrew 
from the LRC in 1906, depriving it of its chief financial 
contributor, and the SDF, which boasted two councillors in 
every other year between 1906 and 1914, could only get Irving 
elected that year. What effect did this uneasy relationship 
have on Hyndman's parliamentary campaign? 
The Burnley Liberals, with a strong tradition of working- 
class support, had no intention of agreeing to any electoral 
pact with the SDF. In 1903, much to the SDF's rage, they put 
up Fred Maddison, a 'Lib-Lab' compositor and journalist, 
and notorious anti-Socialist. His opposition to the Eight- 
Hour Day, and his attacks on the railway strike whilst editor 
of The Railway Review, earned considerable union hostility and 
both the Trades Council and miners passed resolutions 
in 
favour of Hyndman. Significantly though the Burnley 
Labour 
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Representation Committee adopted a rather curious position; 
whilst passing a pro-Hyndman resolution it did not commit its 
affiliated bodies to that decision and both the weavers and 
the overlookers declared themselves neutral. Hyndman's 
campaign was moderate; he emphasised Home Rule for Ireland, 
parliamentary reform and the SDF palliatives; he made great 
play of his knowledge of foreign affairs. Opposed by a Tory 
free trader and a Lib-Lab, Hyndman guardedly supported Free 
Trade but the working-class vote was inevitably split. Michael 
Davitt's appeal to the Irish vote failed to win over the Irish 
League, which urged its members to vote Liberal. On a 95 
per cent poll Hyndman came third, only 33 votes behind the 
Tory and less than 400 behind Maddison. 
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The result demon- 
strated the significant support for the SDF in Burnley, but 
its failure to win key unions and the anomaly of its position 
in the Labour Representation Committee meant that by a very 
narrow margin it had been prevented from achieving its first 
electoral success. The eight other candidates of the Social- 
Democratic Federation 
75 
were also defeated but, with the 
exception of the somewhat unlikely contest at Camborne in 
Cornwall, all polled creditably. Only Thorne in West Ham and 
Irving in Accrington had straight fights with the Conservatives, 
and the Federation's results were no worse than those of 
Labour candidates in three-cornered struggles. 
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Irving's 
result in Accrington though demonstrated the advantages of a 
Labour alliance. In spite of the fact that he was Hyndman's 
agent at Burnley, and therefore handicapped by 
his absence 
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from the constituency, he polled nearly 5,000 votes and 
established a firm base for future Labour contests. 
The narrowness of Hyndman's defeat provoked mixed 
reactions in the SDF. They felt that success next time was 
assured and Hyndman himself was revitalised, announcing his 
readiness to rejoin the Executive of the Federation if 
nominated. 
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Locally the SDF continued to run as LRC members 
and concentrated their attacks on Maddison, particularly his 
opinion that the level of unemployment was exaggerated. In 
common with many other branches they organised demonstrations, 
formed an Unemployed Workmen's Association, and fought for 
the 'Right to Work'. A few members, antagonistic to the idea 
of co-operation with the unions after the weavers' departure 
from the LRC, formed a short-lived branch of the SPGB but 
that was an isolated protest against the Burnley SDF's policy. 
It remained a seemingly vital force in Burnley politics, but 
even here the warning signs were apparent. The Labour 
Representation Committee collapsed in 1909, the unions increas- 
ingly suspicious of the SDF as nationally it trumpeted its 
opposition to the Labour Party. Irving unavailingly warned 
the Federation of the consequences of its position. Criticism 
from outside was bound to lose its effect, he argued, and 
ensure that the SDF was viewed unsympathetically. 
The SDF had 
achieved its favourable position in Burnley, Northampton and 
elsewhere precisely because it had abandoned its 
isolation. 
To co-operate with the Labour Party at international gatherings 
and to accept them as members of the ISB, whilst remaining 
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apart from them at home was both ludicrous and dangerous. 
However, the supporters of reaffiliation to the Labour Party 
were heavily outnumbered in the years after Victor Grayson's 
election to Parliament. As the Labour Party faltered and fumbled 
so a Socialist revival prospered, inspired as much by Blatchford' 
Clarion as by the SDF or ILP. Socialist unity once more became 
a live issue, with Socialists in Bolton, Manchester, Essex, 
and diverse parts of the country forming united bodies. The 
SDF fought three by-elections in 1908, in constituencies which 
the Labour Party refused to contest: Manchester North-West, 
Haggerston and Newcastle-on-Tyne. The latter was a two- 
member constituency where the Labour Party already held one 
seat, and the Party's attitude towards two-member constituencies 
was heavily criticised both by the SDF and sections of the 
ILP. At the 1910 General Election therefore, in the light 
of this Socialist enthusiasm, Hyndman's chances were again 
viewed optimistically. 
The General Election of January 1910 was fought on the 
issue of Lloyd George's radical Budget and its rejection by 
the Lords. The SDF's election manifesto attacked both the 
Lords and the Budget, and it declared the election to 
be 
'a sham fight' between two factions both intent on plundering 
the people. An article in Justice listed the 
'crimes' of 
Liberalism from the days of Chartism onwards and there were 
calls for Socialists to abstain or even vote Tory 
in order to 
defeat 'the historic party of the capitalist class. 
'78 In 
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Burnley, Hyndman again received the support of the Trades 
Council and the Miners' Executive, for Maddison had once more 
antagonised much Labour opinion by his rejection of the Right 
To Work Bill. Yet Hyndman and the six other official SDF 
candidates79 all came bottom of the poll. Although Hyndman's 
vote held up well all the others registered a sharply reduced 
vote. Their refusal to take a clear stand on the major 
issue of the election had cost them dear. Hyndman's can- 
didature had caused the Liberals to lose the seat, letting in 
the Tories for only the second time since 1868.80 The 
situation in Parliament was now radically altered. Forty 
Labour M. Ps had been returned, each of them without Liberal 
opposition. They now held a pivotal position, for the 
Liberal majority had been wiped out. Yet essentially their 
freedom of action was even more circumscribed; any move 
to bring down the Government would clearly antagonise many 
voters and with the Osborne judgement hanging over the Party's 
head like the Sword of Damocles their inclination to do so 
was somewhat limited. This confirmed the SDF's hostile 
attitude to the Labour Party; the adhesion of the miners, said 
Quelch, had cemented the Lib-Lab alliance and the Labour 
Party now was no different to the old Lib-Lab group which had 
existed prior to the formation of the LRC. 
The SDF's lack of grasp on political reality was never 
more sharply emphasised than in the months between the 
two 
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elections of 1910. It renewed its calls for an anti-Liberal 
vote as a means of pressuring the Liberal Party into granting 
Hyndman a straight fight at Burnley and the SDF a free run in 
seats elsewhere. The Liberal Party had to be smashed to 
clear the way for Socialism said John Maclean, who argued 
that the Liberals in Pollokshaws had lost the seat because of 
SDF opposition. It was as if the SDF was hypnotised by its past, 
unable to adapt to circumstances; the manifesto offered no 
guidance to voters on the great issue of the moment. Victor 
Fisher thought it 'a policy of sterile Little Bethelism'. 
As the constitutional problem rumbled on the SDF called for 
a National Convention to press for political reform whilst 
Hyndman advocated a 'Constituent Assembly' of Democracy to 
replace the House of Commons. Not surprisingly such calls 
elicited little response and Herbert Burrowswas totally 
exasperated. Declaring the SDF bankrupt he said that he was 
'not prepared to plough the sands politically for the next 
thirty years', and he urged the Federation to negotiate with the 
Labour Party. 
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His opinions received added weight when, at 
the second General Election in December 1910, the SDF could 
only afford to run one official candidate, Hyndman at 
Burnley. 
The SDF manifesto now forcibly advocated a vote against the 
Government. The Liberals, it argued, were 'always the more 
82 
hypocritical and treacherous of the two great factions. 
' 
As in Rochdale, many Socialist voters thought otherwise, and 
their votes switched from Hyndman to the Liberals. He again 
finished bottom of the poll and his vote was down by over 
1,000. Hyndman was totally downhearted, beaten he thought 
by 
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'ignorance, poverty and weight of money', and he accepted that 
'with a very poor population promises of great social improve- 
ment in the future cannot hold their ground against profuse 
expenditure in the present. '83 He decided not to contest the 
seat again. 
It is clear that the separation of the SDF from the 
Labour Party was a major barrier to its progress in Lancashire, 
but this did not become evident prior to 1906. Indeed the 
Federation flourished in the county between 1903 and 1906. 
1906 was a significant turning point in the history of the 
Socialist movement in Britain. According to Stephen Yeo 
`the fact was that much of what Socialists had fought for was 
being talked about from within utterly different theoretical 
perspectives, particularly in the years of Liberal government 
from 1906 onwards. ' 
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This caused a crisis within the ILP, 
85 
as it attempted to define its position as a Socialist party 
within the wider ranks of the Labour Party, but failed to lead 
to a similar re-examination within the ranks of the SDF. 
Criticism of the Federation's policy there was, much of it 
from the Lancashire branches, but overwhelmingly its conference 
reaffirmed the larger mission of the SDF. Their practical 
programme should be subordinated to the ultimate ideal, they 
were to lead the working-class movement: 
Should we mix with the slow moving crowd.... 
Or should we rather dash forward, place ourselves 
in front and explain to the crowd the meaning and 
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significance of the road, the aim of the journey, 
and in general act as guides... . The ILP chose the 
first, the SDF the second. 
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Yet locally SDF branches were campaigning for palliatives, 
playing a role in the trade unions, and helping to form LRCs. 
Even Quelch, as chairman of the London Trades Council, at- 
tended Labour Party Conferences. Moreover they placed great 
stress on electioneering at both local and national level, 
not simply for propaganda purposes as with the 'impossibilist' 
groupings of the SLP and SPGB, but with a genuine desire to 
achieve results and a belief that Socialism could be achieved 
through Parliament. This uneasy mixture of reformism and 
impossibilism was exacerbated by the leadership's temptation 
to swim with the tide of political disenchantment with Labour 
which existed after 1906. The consequence was that the SDF 
'guides' were faced with a confused audience, even in that 
SDF stronghold of Burnley. As Jeffrey Hill points out, even 
there the supporters of the traditional trade union line 'were 
, 87 apt to regard the social-democrats as political pariahs, 
and Hyndman himself admitted after his defeat in 1910 that a 
failure to address issues of immediate importance to the 
working class had cost him dearly. The lack of a rapprochement 
between the SDF and the Labour Party in Burnley and Rochdale 
meant a failure to return a Labour candidate before the First 
World War, and in Nelson and Blackburn the demise of the SDF. 
Other SDF strongholds such as Northampton and Aberdeen 
suffered similar declines. One is forced to the conclusion, 
with Jeffrey Hill, that 'the L. R. C. had room for and need 
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of a Socialist left-wing, and in rejecting this position the 
S. D. F. rejected working class unity. '89 
Not until the electoral disasters of 1910 did the Social- 
Democratic Federation begin self-examination in some earnest; 
a few became totally disillusioned with the SDF, J. B. Askew 
for example switching to the ILP. 
90 
Others, including Tom 
Mann and Guy Bowman, rejected political action and took up the 
syndicalist cause. 
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The Lancashire branches, Herbert Burrows, 
Thomas Kennedy, and others continued to espouse the re- 
unification of the SDF and the Labour Party. Kennedy's assess- 
ment of the SDF's position in 1911 is worth noting. 'Ten 
years ago', he said, 'we threw away an opportunity which we 
ourselves created. We refused to lead the British working 
class movement from the inside. Events have proved the impos- 
sibility of our leading it from the outside. '92 They had 
adopted 'a policy of isolation and negative criticism which, 
from the point of view of electoral success, has been a com- 
plete failure. ' He accused the Federation of waiting 'like 
Micawber... for something to turn up... to give us our reward. ' 
But his shrewdest thrust was aimed at the SDF's so-called 
'middle course' between impossibilism and compromise. For 
a Social-Democratic Party which aimed at political power, 
Kennedy argued, such a policy was fatuous. It was 
justifiable 
only if they were simply 'a propagandist body aiming at the 
conversion of public opinion, likely sooner or later to 
be 
expressed through other parties. ' 
93 Kennedy, like Carstairs 
Matheson, the 'impossibilist', some ten years earlier, 
had 
pinpointed the fundamental problem. In trying to 
bridge the 
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gap between reformist tactics and revolutionary aims the SDF 
had succeeded in becomingneither one thing nor the other. 
As so often in the past the Federation sought its salvation in 
Socialist unity. This was now to be achieved by a direct 
appeal to the rank and file of the Socialist movement, over 
the heads of the ILP leaders. Before examining the events 
which culminated in the formation of the British Socialist 
Party, it is worth re-emphasising the diversity of method 
and organisation which existed under the umbrella of the 
Social-Democratic Federation. The Lancashire branches had 
opted for a Labour alliance policy which had gained them a 
significant role in the political life of North-East Lancashire, 
but which eventually confronted them with a_ dilemma they 
were unable to solve. In Yorkshire the branches which main- 
tained a viable existence adopted a different approach. 
The Dewsbury by-election of 1902 had given the SDF its first 
real success in Yorkshire. Its immediate result was the 
demise of the ILP in Dewsbury, and the Federation gained a 
prominent new recruit in Edward Robertshaw Hartley, who was 
thoroughly disillusioned both with the ILP leadership and 
with the Labour Party. Hartley founded a new branch of the 
SDF in Bradford early in 1904. Elsewhere in Yorkshire the 
Federation profited from the general Socialist revival 
in 
the middle part of the decade, establishing far firmer 
bases 
in Leeds and Sheffield and breaking new ground in other areas. 
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By June 1911 there were 14 branches of the Social-Democratic 
Federation in Yorkshire, the maximum extent of its penetration, 
and although they were dwarfed by the presence of the ILP they 
were able to utilise to some extent the frustration of many 
ILPers after 1906 to put down firm roots. The Yorkshire 
branches, however, approximated far more to the traditional 
stereotype of the SDF than did the Lancashire branches. They 
were first and foremost 'propagandist' organisations, opposed 
to the Labour alliance and vehemently in favour of Socialist 
unity. Their aim was simply 'to make Socialists'. 
In Dewsbury the SDF branch prospered after the by- 
election, forming offshoots in Ravensthorpe and Batley, draw- 
ing the Clarion Fellowship into membership and organising 
actively under the aegis of Friend Lister. 
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Its enhanced 
position was recognised by the conciliatory attitude of Ben 
Turner and the Trades Council, who were 'willing to smooth 
over the difficulties of the past and... were anxious to join 
all progressive forces to work amicably together at the next 
election'. 
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A lengthy report of the branch's history and an 
assessment of its prospects appeared in Justice in September 
1902, and it is evident that at this time they were at pains 
to moderate their image in the hope of building upon their 
modest success. They were aiming, said the report, to attract 
not simply working-class recruits but those from the pro- 
fessional and commercial classes too: 
it is absolutely necessary the movement should have 
as respectable an appearance as any other movement, 
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religious or otherwise. So, by being careful 
in our personal appearance and general conduct 
we endeavour to give an air of respectability 
to the movement which, although a detail, is of 
more importance than many imagine. 
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This air of respectability was further emphasised by the 
arrangements at the branch's new premises on Victoria Road. 
Previously, to be a member of the SDF one had to be a member 
of the Socialist Club, and evidently a number had objected to 
this. These objections intensified when, in September 1902, 
the Club became licensed and later affiliated to the Working 
Mens' Club and Institute Union. There was obviously a con- 
siderable temperance element within the SDF who feared that club 
life might dilute the political emphasis of the branch, a 
complaint which was frequently echoed in both SDF and ILP. 
Consequently the club was separated from the main part of the 
premises and one could now join the SDF without being a club 
member. Great stress was placed on education as a means of 
attracting new members. Thus, although the Clarion Fellowship 
had amalgamated with the SDF, it maintained its separate 
identity, 'for those who are interested but not sure. We then 
pay careful attention to him, and by paying a little attention 
to him, he soon passes into the next standard'. 
97 A dis- 
Gussion class was started and of course the library catered 
for the educational nourishment of the members too. There 
was 'not a club in the whole of Great Britain that 
had a 
library as good as Dewsbury Socialist club', recalled one 
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member. 
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Finally the branch, recognising the damage that 
charges of atheism had done to Quelch's prospects, declared 
that anyone, whatever their religious persuasion, was welcome 
to join. 
This aura of moderate respectability, augmented by an 
emphasis on self-improvement via education, found additional 
expression in the branch's attempt to create a Socialist 
culture for its members. The successful garden party in 
August 1902 
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was the first in a series of such events and 
tea-parties, musical evenings and dances were regular features 
too. SDFers could also join the Clarion Cycling Club on its 
excursions. Indeed the Clarion influence in this branch 
remained remarkably pervasive, and themes of brotherhood and 
fellowship, 'love and peace', and Blatchford-style appeals 
to the workers were common. 
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Socialist propaganda though 
was the raison d'etre of the branch and, encouraged by 
Quelch's result, the SDF entered the municipal lists for the 
first time in November 1902. Harry Wood's campaign in All 
Saints Ward was a moderately successful propaganda exercise. 
He urged the municipalisation of coal, milk and all the other 
necessities of life, the erection of good, sanitary housing 
at rents sufficient only to cover construction and maintenance, 
and promised to act as a delegate if elected, leaving a signed 
resignation form with his committee to be used if he failed 
to fulfil his pledges. In common with most Dewsbury municipal 
contests the election was a very low-key affair and Wood came 
bottom of the poll. His opponents thanked him for his 
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honourable campaign and Wood replied simply that 'his hands 
were clean' and he had worked for his principles, which were 
spreading rapidly. 
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All this was in stark contrast to 
Quelch's parliamentary campaign and reinforced the SDF's attempts 
at bridge-building. 
Wood stood again in a by-election for Trinity Ward early 
the following year, against Lib-Lab George Thorpe, the 
President of the local Co-operative Society. In a somewhat 
more aggressive tone he declared that there was no difference 
between Liberals and Tories and castigated the indifference 
and apathy of the electors. He had tried, he said, 'in his 
humble way and his comrades had also tried to arouse interest. 
It was necessary and essential if they wanted to raise their 
status above its present level to take an intelligent view of 
the municipal affairs of the Borough. '102 Thorpe won com- 
fortably103 but the reasons for the SDF's moderate approach 
were soon apparent. In March 1903 168 delegates attended a 
Conference called by the Trades Council to consider the form- 
ation of a Labour Representation Committee for the Heavy 
Woollen District. Both James Ramsay MacDonald and Harry 
Quelch were present as Tom Myers put the resolution for the 
organisation of an LRC. Immediately the Socialists placed an 
amendment urging the adoption of a programme of principle, 
namely 'the socialisation of the means of production, distri- 
bution and exchange. ' Bowers of the SDF spoke forcibly: 
'there was a class war waging, and that war could not 
be 
ended until the proposed objects included in the amendment 
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were realised. It was no use having a Labour Party which 
did not go to the whole extent of the amendment. '104 Ben 
Turner was dismissive. 'They had seen enough of programmes'. 
The conference had been called, 'not to propagate one ism or 
a combination of isms, but to unite a Labour force of the 
three divisions, Spen Valley, Morley and the Dewsbury 
Parliamentary Borough, '-105 MacDonald agreed, advocating a 
platform broad enough to include all workers, and the 
Socialist amendment was lost 146-22. Nonetheless, the SDF was 
not hostile. Quelch reaffirmed his position of 'friendly 
neutrality' and wished the LRC well, although urging it to 
adopt a principled position, and Myers could report soon after- 
wards that 'We are at work drawing up a constitution for a 
local L. R. C. in which the S. D. F. are taking part and showing 
a reasonable spirit. ' 
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This co-operation lasted until 
August, when the SDF ceased to attend meetings. The alliance 
had broken down because of the LRC decision to nominate Ben 
Turner as parliamentary candidate, in spite of the fact that 
Quelch had been re-nominated by the SDF immediately after the 
by-election. Myers and Turner had obviously intrigued to 
persuade union branches to declare against Quelch 'on grounds 
of tactics not principles'. 
107 At a Trades Council Meeting 
it was stated that they would follow the advice of the national 
LRC 'not to oppose their friends but to promote candidatures 
where there were vacancies and opportunities', 
108 
a decision 
confirmed by Turner at the Yorkshire Trades Council 
Conference 
in July. If they limited themselves solely to the Labour 
Party 
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men, he said, they would be 'choked off the face of the 
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earth. ' 
The decision' to run Turner was not without opposition from 
outside the SDF and quite obviously the ill-feeling from the 
by-election lingered on. 'Old Dewsburian' thought that 
Turner 'did not possess the qualifications so far as intel- 
ligence and ability are concerned... In Mr. Quelch we had a man 
who could lead, a man of intelligence, well read and a thinker. ' 
110 This was a little unfair to Turner, who was well res- 
pected in local Trade Union circles, but an irrevocable breach 
was only avoided by Quelch's decision to stand for Southampton 
rather than Dewsbury. The reason given was that his chances 
of success were far greater in that two-member constituency, 
where a deal with the Liberals was expected, rather than in 
Dewsbury where a three-cornered contest made it something 
'of the nature of a forlorn hope. ' 
ill 
The Dewsbury branch 
agreed, arguing that the time for fighting propaganda 
elections was over; electoral success was needed and Southampton 
provided a more favourable opportunity. 
112 The episode demon- 
strated a certain weakness in SDF strategy; this switching 
of candidates was common, rendering a good deal of hard 
work in constituencies wasted and laying the Federation open 
to charges of opportunism. Quelch had a base to build upon 
in Dewsbury, and the reason for his departure was, quite 
clearly, the LRC's intention to run Turner. The Federation 
was not prepared to push the issue to a damaging conclusion, 
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realistically recognising that Quelch would not win a vote 
against Turner in the LRC. 
A final campaign in All Saints Ward marked the end of SDF 
electioneering in Dewsbury until the reorganisation of the 
Borough in 1910. After another defeat Harry Wood remarked 
that he had been urged to drop the 'Socialist' label as a 
passport to electoral success, but 'Honest men could not 
possibly have confidence in him if he threw over his 
principles. ' 
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This set the hallmark for the Social-Democratic 
Federation's presence in the borough; it would campaign for 
Socialist principles free from any encumbrances or alliances. 
There was never any further question of affiliation to the LRC, 
but they did support Turner in 1906 with both local and 
national SDF speakers. Essentially the Federation became a 
propagandist body pure and simple. At the centre of its 
activity was the summer propaganda season, when SDF meetings 
would be held on Sundays in Dewsbury Market Place, in Batley 
when there was a branch there, and occasionally in Heckmondwike 
and Mirfield. By far the most sought after and popular speakers 
were Quelch and William Gee, and they both made regular visits 
to Dewsbury. Gee conducted a series of summer 'missions' which 
led, said The Reporter, to 'a distinct eruption of Socialist 
propaganda in this district', during which 'the wild and 
whirring virulence of the market place' could be heard. 
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To Dewsbury SDFers, however, Gee as a propagandist was 
'a 
full team with a dog under the waggon. '115 He was 
immensely 
popular in West Yorkshire with both SDF and ILP 
branches, an 
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x 
William Gee, the 'Socialist 
Dreadnought', a popular SDF propag- 
andist in Lancashire and Yorkshire. 
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W. GEE, Socialist Candidate for Rossendale. 
The Principles I am here to affirm and defend-the principles of 
Social-Demo- 
cracy-are the principles which alone can redeem 
humanity from the degrading 
5ý and oppressing results of our present industrial anarchy. 
'intellectual and scientific' treat according to the 
116 Huddersfield ILP. During the winter months the branch was 
quiet, with an occasional indoor rally and star speaker to 
remind the town of its existence. In 1906, for example, 
Hyndman was booked for the Industrial Hall, an event which 
would appeal to an audience far beyond the SDF's membership, 
as The Reporter explained. 
He has a commanding personality - tall, stoutly- 
built, with a long flowing brown beard and eyes 
which bespeak the enthusiast. He has a quiet 
style of speaking, and has a pleasing way of 
leading the laughter when, as often happened 
on Monday night, he made a joke. His speech was 
of that type which is better to listen to than to 
read for cold type cannot reproduce the manner- 
isms or gestures which make as much for enjoyment 
and appreciation of a speech by a man like Mr. 
Hyndman as the words themselves. 
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The Socialist orators were entertainers too, their visits a 
stimulus to the members in towns like Dewsbury, often isolated 
from other branches. This particular meeting though was 
illustrative of the failure of the SDF to clearly define its 
policy. Pickles, President of the Huddersfield Trades Council 
and an SDF member, opened the proceedings by declaring that 
trade unionism and Socialism were inseparable whereas Hyndman, 
in concluding his speech, argued that unions were a hindrance 
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to the development of the people. Dewsbury SDFers it seems 
supported Hyndman; they had ignored a two year old strike of 
coal miners in Ravensthorpe and Harry Broome had dismissed 
SDF intervention with these words: 'If the miners themselves 
did not wish to assist their own class then he thought it was 
no use others bothering. ' 
118 
This lack of intervention in local struggles in fact 
typified the Dewsbury SDF. In January 1907 they launched the 
Dewsbury Social-Democrat, a monthly publication which ran for 
two years. 
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Generally speaking the journal ignored local 
events unless they were directly related to SDF activities. 
Articles were culled from Justice or the Clarion; they con- 
sisted of expositions of Socialism, 'simplifying and amplifying 
our position with regard to current topics and Social and 
Industrial Evolution and Revolution. ' 
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Clifford Ragan urged 
the workers of Dewsbury to think for themselves, to study 
Socialism, but the Socialist themselves were not bringing 
about Socialism, which was the inevitable consequence of 
economic development. What then was their task? 'We simply 
point out this development, its direction, its ultimate 
result, and also the obstacles which stand in the way and which 
must be removed if we are to avoid violent revolution. ' 
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The Dewsbury Social-Democrats did not see it as their duty to 
confront individual aspects of capitalist society but capitalism 
as a whole. Their priority was the propagation of Socialist 
ideas, 'the making of Socialists', which set them apart 
from the 
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everyday struggles of the working class and led them, in Alex 
Callinicos's phrase, to 'abstract propagandism. ' 
122 
The 
staged debate was a favoured form of propaganda, and one 
between Harry Quelch and the Reverend Anstey in May 1906 
aroused considerable interest and gave the SDF an opportunity 
to air Marxian doctrines in the local press for some consider- 
able time. 'Something quite novel in the way of Socialist 
Sunday evening gatherings'123 took place at the Theatre 
Royal, Batley, one Sunday evening in March. Victor Fisher, 
a prominent London SDFer, and his wife, billed as Madam San 
Carolo, gave a lecture recital and sang the revolutionary 
songs of various countries. 
Mr. Fisher, who looked more like an artist than 
a Socialist worker, with his closely trimmed black 
beard and velvet lounge coat, lectured on the 
various revolutions of the democracy in various 
lands, and Madame San Carolo - strikingly attired 
in evening dress of a vivid red, with drapings of 
chiffon in the same bright colour flowing down from 
her hair, while a necklet of gold coins completed 
the somewhat bizarre effect - sang the songs of 
124 
revolution in many languages. 
The aim of the evening was to demonstrate that the Socialists 
of the SDF were not simply Socialists in an economic sense 
but 
had a close connection with all which contributed to the 
material and physical well-being of man, whether 
it be art, 
4 35 . 
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Poster advertising a Dewsbury and 
Batley SDF Social Evening. 
literature or science. Rather than an integral part of the 
working-class movement SDFers in Dewsbury tended to be a group 
apart, identifiable by the red ties they sported. In every 
way they typified the branches described in Justice, which 
'have become crystallised into little groups of propagandists 
scurrying to the usual number of meetings, weekly or monthly, 
with no thought beyond that. 
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The tendency to propagandism became more marked after 
1906, as the Dewsbury branch followed the national trend of 
increased hostility to the Labour Party. They were no longer 
prepared to support Turner as parliamentary candidate for the 
borough and they began to look to Socialist unity as an 
alternative to the Labour Party. In this they were doubtless 
influenced by Hartley, an influential figure amongst the 
Socialists after 1902, and an ardent exponent of unity under 
the SDF umbrella. 
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The first suggestion of a Socialist 
alternative to Turner came in August 1907 when delegates from 
the Dewsbury ILP, 
127 
the Batley Clarion Club, the Dewsbury 
Socialist Club and the Dewsbury SDF met to discuss a 
Parliamentary candidate. No firm decision was reached and 
there appeared to be some disagreement over the idea. Indeed 
the SDF were present as observers at an LRC meeting shortly 
afterwards where Turner was adopted, whilst the Clarion 
organisation complained that they had not been invited which 
was 'not conducive to unity'. The SDF position clearly 
hardened 
after that and both victor Grayson and Hartley, visiting 
Dewsbury, 
issued veiled threats to the Labour Party as to the adoption 
of a Socialist candidate. This was partly owing to 
frustration 
437. 
at the Labour Party's feeble performance in Parliament but 
also expressive of a deep-rooted feeling that the Labour Party 
was reaping the benefits of ten years Socialist agitation in 
the constituency. They pointed out that 1902 had been 
the only occasion upon which the Liberals had polled a minority 
of the overall votes cast and that Turner in 1906, with all 
the advantages, had got only 1,000 votes more than Quelch, 
They thought that the SDF had 'completely vindicated its 
right to run a candidate if it so wills', 
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and Harry Wood 
felt that although Turner was a friend of his 'he could have 
no connection with a candidate whose policy and whose mind 
were so confused with relation to the issues which were at 
129 
stake. ' 
Before these tendencies had crystallised a by-election 
was caused by the elevation of Runciman to the cabinet. The 
Socialists had no time to organise a candidate and Turner 
was left unhindered as the Labour Party nominee. He certainly 
proposed a more thorough-going Socialist platform than in 1906, 
largely as a concession to his Socialist critics, and the 
Reporter attributed his poor performance to this. 
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The 
Social-Democrats viewed it differently; that 2,446 voters had 
turned out in appalling weather was, they felt, a tribute to 
their Socialist idealism. When Turner, thoroughly disheartened, 
announced his decision to stand down they seized the opportunity. 
A United Socialist Committee was formed, representing the 
Dewsbury, Batley and E arlsheaton branches of the SDF, the 
Clarion Scouts, the Dewsbury Socialist Club and the Dewsbury ILP. 
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This was to function for electoral purposes only, any idea 
of fusion being emphatically disclaimed. 
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Reading between 
the lines, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
SDF's motive for seeking an accommodation was to solve its 
132 
financial problems, and certainly they had no intention of 
allowing their standpoint to be subjugated. It was a stratagem 
to enable them to announce Bert Killip, the Leeds SDF organiser, 
as their candidate in August 1908. Killip opened his campaign 
in Batley Market Place at the end of September, but the local 
LRC were singularly unimpressed. 'An B. D. F. candidate was 
supposed to be in the field, but the L. R. C. had nothing to 
do with the matter.... It was to be hoped, however, an arrange- 
ment might be come to on real democratic lines. '133 
That Killip's was intended to be a mere propagandist 
campaign was abundantly clear. He didn't expect to win, he 
said, 'But he did hope to do what every Social-Democrat con- 
134 
sidered the best thing, that was to keep the Liberal out. ' 
But with Ben Riley, the Huddersfield bookbinder and councillor, 
intent on standing for Labour there seemed every possibility 
of a damaging split in Labour ranks. In the event all the 
arguments became 'much ado about nothing'. The United 
Socialist Committee collapsed135 as the Dewsbury ILP rejoined 
its fellows in Thornhill and Batley. Killip withdrew because 
he was unable to find the requisite finance and Riley stood 
down in order to avoid a split with the Liberals. No Labour 
candidate stood in either of the 1910 elections. The Labour 
and Socialist movement in Dewsbury at the end of 1909 mirrored 
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the situation nationally. There was disillusionment with 
the Labour Party in Socialist ranks, a reluctance to clash 
with the Liberals in Labour ranks. Socialist unity seemed to 
provide an alternative to Labour, although in Dewsbury it 
flickered only briefly at this stage. Many Socialists opted 
out of the established parties, joining the ranks of Blatchford's 
'unattached'. The Clarion Cylists and the Dewsbury Socialist 
Society were as active as either the SDF or the ILP at this 
time. Market place rhetoric could not hide the fact that the 
main Socialist organisations had made little progress in 
Dewsbury in the first decade of the twentieth century. The 
SDF had between 25 and 30 paying members in 1907 and 19085,136 
excluding the short-lived Earlsheaton branch and the small 
Batley organisation. It also floated a Women's Circle in 
1908. The ILP in Dewsbury had only 30 members, Batley 42, and 
Mirfield existed in name only. Thornhill Lees was somewhat 
stronger. 
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Blatchford however was clearly correct to suggest 
that there existed a much larger, amorphous mass of Socialist 
sentiment, and in Dewsbury much of the credit for this must 
go to the SDF, which maintained unbroken propaganda for 13 years. 
Its propagandist stance at least maintained its identity and 
suggested a distinct alternative to Labourism. Throughout 
1910 and 1911 its attacks on Labour mounted, whilst the massive 
industrial unrest caused it to reappraise its political stance. 
The SDF in Dewsbury was ready and willing to enter the new 
British Socialist Party at the end of 1911, which resulted 
in a radical change of direction for the branch. Their 
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Socialist faith is exemplified by the hand-painted mirror 
still hanging on the clubroom walls, a rising sun framed by 
the words 'Socialism, The Only Hope of the Workers' 
. 
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The SDF branches in Bradford and Leeds exhibited many of 
the characteristics of their counterpart in Dewsbury, but 
they had one distinct advantage in that both could boast an 
exceptionally able organiser and figure of some repute within 
the Socialist movement. Edward Hartley joined the SDF in 1902, 
disappointed at the ILP/LRC refusal to back Quelch in Dewsbury, 
and was instrumental in reforming the Bradford branch early 
in 1904. A prominent ILPer, with a strong base in the Bradford 
Moor area, Hartley was able to build an effective campaigning 
body, particularly in East Bradford. The Leeds branches 
appointed Bert Killip, 'a youngster with a future before 
him' , 
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as organiser in 1907 and he injected new life into the 
SDF with an aggressive and abrasive style of operation. Both 
Hartley and Killip were openly hostile to the Labour Party and 
strong proponents of Socialist unity, and this emphasis 
coloured the activities of the Social-Democratic Federation 
in these two cities. 
The original SDF branch in Bradford had collapsed at the 
end of 1897, leaving one or two isolated members like Charlie 
Clyde and Ben Wilson, the president of the Shop Assistants' 
Union. But Glyde was an individualistic Socialist, unlikely 
to organise a new branch, and Wilson was preoccupied with 
union affairs. Only with Hartley's accession 
did the Federation 
revive its activities, and the branch was restarted after a 
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Hyndman visit, in October 1903, as part of his campaign in 
opposition to tariff reform. 'I had a packed meeting here 
last night', wrote Hyndman to Justice. 'The great towns of 
Yorkshire are getting far beyond mere "Labourism", I rejoice 
to say' . 
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Their initial meeting place was the Clarion 
Club at Whetley Hill, but they later moved to rooms above 
the Rawson Place entrance to the new Bradford market. As in 
Dewsbury the emphasis was primarily upon education and propa- 
ganda, with discussion and industrial history classes featur- 
ing prominently in branch activities. Bradford though was a 
far more active propagandist organisation than its Dewsbury 
counterpart, the unemployed agitation being particularly to 
the fore. Mass rallies, deputations to the Guardians, sieges 
of the workhouse, and a 'landgrab', 
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brought the SDF into 
the limelight in Bradford and placed it firmly in the main- 
stream of the SDF tradition. As elsewhere they were equivocal 
about the use of violence. Hartley condemned window-smashing 
and other illegal activities, 
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yet these sentiments con- 
trasted strongly with his violent language in the council 
chamber after the Postmaster-General's visit in 1908.143 
The presence of Hartley and Glyde on the council was a major 
boost to the SDF, although neither of them was elected on an 
SDF ticket, and it highlighted a major preoccupation of the 
Bradford branch, municipal electioneering, which made it 
almost unique in Yorkshire SDF circles. They put forward 
candidates at every municipal election between 1906 and 
1911, 
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both as a propaganda exercise and in the belief that municipal 
Socialism was possible. Thus Hartley's answer to unemployment 
was to elect Socialists to the council, and D. B. Briggs, 
SDF candidate for East Bowling, showed that he had a thorough 
grasp of the possibilities of the further extension of 
municipal enterprises., 
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These annual election campaigns, 
the unemployed agitation, the almost ritual 'free speech fight', 
history and economics classes, a book club and the whole 
gamut of social activities ranging from whist drives to trips 
to Bolton Abbey made Bradford something of 'a stronghold 
of the S. D. F. '145 It boasted 100 members in 1907,146 al- 
though they were dwarfed by an ILP membership of over 1,000, 
formed a second branch in East Bradford in 1909, and also 
assisted the formation of branches in Shipley and Birkenshaw. 
A solid cadre of members was built up: George Malton, a 
barber and Ruskin Hall corresponding student; Heywood 
Beaumont, a printer; D. B. Briggs of Low Moor, perpetual 
election candidate; Doctor Dessin, close associate of Hyndman. 
Hartley, of course, towered above all, and his two parlia- 
mentary campaigns in East Bradford lent added stature to the 
branch. These contests are instructive as to ILP/SDF 
relationships both locally and nationally and they shed light 
on the growing urgency of the call by the SDF for Socialist 
unity. 
Hartley had always been antipathetic towards the unions, 
viewing them as a reactionary force holding back the working- 
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class movement. Inevitably therefore he was hostile to the 
idea of a Socialist/trade union alliance. His was very much 
the 'orthodox-Marxist', Quelchite point of view, admirably 
expressed during a debate in Manchester, where he likened the 
Labour Party to a child: 
It was an excellent idea to lead the child, but 
if it was bigger than you, and refused to go? Nay! 
What if the child was so big that it not only 
refused to go with you but turned round and 
carried you where you never intended to go? 
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Yet Hartley was also fully aware of the absurdities of the 
situation created by the SDF's decision to withdraw from the 
LRC. His old friend Fred Jowett couldn't support Hartley 
in East Bradford because he would not sign the constitution 
of the Labour Party. Harry Quelch would be disloyal to his 
trade union connection with the Labour Party if he supported 
Hyndman at Burnley. Will Thorne apparently managed to saddle 
both horses simultaneously. Hartley's solution to this 
impasse was Socialist unity. Innately distrustful of the 
leadership of both Socialist groupings, he urged the rank 
and file to demonstrate their commonsense and unite in the 
face of the common enemy - capitalism. And the attitude of 
this united Socialist party to the Labour Party? 
'of course, 
they must have an alliance with the Labour Party, 
but it 
must not be an alliance which dominated and absorbed 
Socialists. ' 148 Each party should work on its own 
lines, 
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for its own ideals, and ally for all objects held in 
common. 
Hartley's philosophy explains his later political career 
in Bradford. He hoped, through his own example, to unite 
the Socialist forces in the city and thereby inspire unity 
nationally. If the stronghold of the ILP could be brought 
into union with the SDF then, Hartley believed, the rest 
of the country would follow within twelve months. 
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The 
ideal vehicle for such a strategy was a parliamentary campaign 
and Bradford East was a most promising constituency, par- 
ticularly in view of Hartley's local reputation. It was the mos 
working-class constituency in Bradford. Unfortunately events 
in Lancashire were mirrored in Bradford, for national develop- 
ments ruled out unity at both local and national level. 
At this time the ILP and LRC were formulating a policy on the 
selection of candidates, and were very concerned that only 
those seats which were potentially winnable should be 
contested. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Dewsbury by- 
election they were insistent that all local Labour organis- 
ations should be consulted before candidatures were given 
official sanction. These conditions often conflicted with 
the impulsive desire of local ILP branches and LRCs to run 
candidates at the earliest opportunity and heated arguments 
resulted, the furore in the Colne Valley over Grayson being 
the supreme example. What was certain was that no support 
would be given to candidates running without the LRC 
label, 
and the animosity of MacDonald, Glasier, and Hardie 
towards 
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the SDF ruled out any LRC/ILP support for Hartley in Bradford 
East. It was felt that this was simply another SDF intrigue 
to gain parliamentary representation, and by using ILP funds to 
boot' 
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Moreover, sanctioning Hartley would direct resources 
from Bradford West and weaken Jowett's chances there. 
Locally however relations were much more cordial, a 
reflection of Hartley's status within the ILP there, and one 
is left yet again wondering what might have been the direction 
of British Socialism if local initiatives had not been 
stifled by national bureaucracies after 1900 or, conversely, 
if the Federation had remained within the LRC as a left-wing 
grouping. Starved of resources, the SDF mounted what was 
essentially a propaganda campaign, boasting proudly that 'No 
canvassing was done and no conveyances were used. '151 The 
distribution of handbills and the chalking of pavements were 
the limits of their efforts. Yet a mass meeting at St. 
George's Hall shortly before the election showed what might 
have transpired. Billed as a pro-Hartley rally with the 
Countess of Warwick as the main attraction, it turned into a 
joint demonstration for Hartley and Jowett, attended by all 
the prominent figures of the Bradford ILP. From the platform 
Jowett wished Hartley every success and referred to the ILP 
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and SDF as simply two sections of the one Socialist party. 
The local ILP paper felt that 'The S. D. F. friends have 
behaved 
with scrupulous fairness throughout the campaign... have both 
tacitly and expressedly recognised priority of claim 
by the 
Western Division. ' 153 Jowett won a famous victory, pushing 
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the Liberals into third place, but Hartley also pulled 
3,090 votes, which was admitted by all shadesof opinion to 
be a considerable success for the Socialists. Like Hobson 
in Rochdale Hartley had proved that there was a sizeable 
body of support for the Socialist option as opposed to the 
Labour alliance, certainly up to 1906. 
The SDF was impressed by the encouraging progress of 
its Bradford branch and the Federation's Annual Conference 
for 1906 was held in the city. Glyde was able to report 
that the six Bradford delegates to the ILP Conference had 
strict instructions to vote for fusion, a further tribute 
to Hartley's efforts in that direction. But the fact that 
he and Dessin voted on opposite sides in the debate on re- 
affiliation to the Labour Party demonstrated that the Bradford 
branch was as unsure over the issue as the parent body. 
Hartley was elected to the provincial section of the 
Executive, a position he retained until his departure for 
New Zealand in 1911. His opinions were clearly expressed - 
the united Socialist party must come first, and it could then 
decide on the question of affiliation to the Labour Party. 
This remained the position of the Bradford SDF. To those in 
the ILP who argued that their strategy was, and must be, 
firmly orientated towards Labour Hartley retorted that 
'A Socialist is a Socialist wanting Socialism and there 
is 
as wide a difference of temperament amongst the various 
members of the I. L. P. themselves as between them and the most 
extreme members of the S. D. F. '154 Between 1906 and 
1911 
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they seemed to be engaged in one long election campaign, 
whether at the municipal level or promoting Hartley for 
Parliament, and the message was insistent and clear - 
'Socialists unite! ' Success or failure was gauged in terms 
of the numbers of new members gained and the extent of the 
co-operation with the ILP. Thus Hartley's defeat and reduced 
poll in January 1910, although disappointing, was viewed 
positively in terms of recruitment and the diffusion of 
Socialist propaganda. 'Our methods are unique: ' they 
proudly announced. 'No canvassing, no posters on the wall - 
nothing but educational methods, leaflets, literature and 
meetings. '155 The reasons for his defeat were correctly anal- 
ysed as a switch of Labour votes to the Liberal as a response 
to the issues of the Budget and the Lords, but that didn't 
matter. Socialist votes were clean votes, votes for principles, 
and the cause of Socialist unity had been advanced. There 
seemed to be some justification for this attitude. In 1911 the 
Railwaymen complained at a Trades Council meeting about the 
Liberal M. P. s vote on the Railway Bill and urged that a 
Labour man should oppose him at the next election. The ILP 
reaction to this request was that the SDF had first claim in 
East Bradford, and the SDF response was clearcut. 'We have 
planted the S. D. P. flag in the division and we are going to 
remain. '156 Hartley's departure for New Zealand shortly 
afterwards did not alter the SDF's direction. They were 
fervent 
proponents of Socialist unity, their views encouraged 
by 
widespread duality of membership and co-operation 
between 
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the two bodies. The SDF in Bradford functioned as a kind of 
haven for left-wing ILPers dissatisfied with their own party's 
moderation; there they could preach the pure, unadulterated 
gospel of Socialism without cutting their links with organised 
Labour. Although the SDF, and Hartley in particular, were 
opposed to a formal Labour alliance they were never overtly 
hostile to the Labour Party or the trade unions in Bradford. 
In Leeds, however, the tension between the SDF and the Labour 
Party was far more marked. 
Leeds was the oldest-established SDF branch in Yorkshire, 
having maintained a continuous existence since 1894. Its 
stronghold was in Armley which, at the turn of the century, 
was reinforced by a Central Leeds branch. Leeds Social- 
Democrats felt a keen sense of isolation, existing in 'the 
God-forsaken broad acres of Yorkshire as far as the S. D. F. 
is concerned', 
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and their activities were limited by the 
difficulties of attracting speakers to the city. Nonetheless 
they played a prominent role in the organisation of the 
unemployed, propagandised ceaselessly on Armley Moor and 
Woodhouse Moor, and instituted a Socialist Sunday School. 
Much like Dewsbury their activities revolved around the 
weekly propaganda meetings and the social life provided by 
the Socialist institute, with few attempts to link these 
activities to organised labour. The appointment of 
Ben 
Killip as organiser in 1907 though brought an aggressive new 
element to the fore. Killip, a Liverpudlian, had been 
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employed for seven years by Birkenhead Corporation as a 
lamplighter but was dismissed for political activity. He 
had then been employed as an organiser for J. W. Gott's 
British Secular League before being taken on by the Leeds 
SDF. A young man of 28 at this time he revitalised the 
Federation in the city, forming three new branches within 
six months and establishing a very successful trading depart- 
ment specialising in 'Red Flag' toffee. By mid-1908 the Leeds 
branches were holding a dozen meetings weekly, and by March 
1909 Leeds Central alone reported nearly 100 members, after 
commencing operations with only six. The essentially pro- 
pagandist nature of their operations meant little contact 
with the local LRC or ILP but relations were not particularly 
strained before Killip's arrival, and the various bodies 
co-operated occasionally for May Day demonstrations and the 
like. Killip however was actively hostile to Labourism and 
convinced that Socialism could win votes. He always 
attracted good crowds to his meetings for, as the Armley 
and Wortley News pointed out, 'Mr. Killip possesses the rare 
gift of making an otherwise dull and dry subject interesting. 
' 
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When Leeds Corporation banned the sale of literature 
and collections in municipal parks Killip was arrested 
for 
defying the ban and his subsequent court case attracted 
further attention to his meetings. He therefore 
decided to 
test public support at the polls by standing 
for New Wortley 
Ward in 1909. The retiring councillor was Owen 
Connellan, 
secretary of the Leeds Trades and Labour Council. 
Thus 
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Leeds provides one of the few instances of an SDFer directly 
opposing a Labour man in an electoral contest. 
Killip's motives are unclear. There was certainly the 
intention of extending SDF influence from Armley into neigh- 
bouring New Wortley and forming a branch there, but the 
primary aim was clearly to expose what Killip saw as Labour 
hypocrisy, expressed in the person of Connellan whom he 
regarded as nothing more than a Lib-Lab of the old school. 
Killip had been a loyal supporter of the Labour Party until 
four years ago, he said, but he had not paid for 'represent- 
ation of a Liberal or Tory character'. 
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Whilst he had 
nothing personal against Connellan, the SDF had to 'dissociate 
themselves from such a compromising position', 
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the Labour 
Party being nothing more than the tool of the Liberal Party. 
Killip's candidature then was an extreme expression of that 
disillusionment with the Labour Party which flourished after 
1906. It caused a furore in local Labour circles, for a number 
of prominent figures clearly sympathised with Killip's attitude 
to the performance of the Labour Party both in Parliament 
and on Leeds City Council, and also empathised with his 
suspicion of Connellan. Bill Morby of Leeds Trades Council, 
for example, wished that Connellan 'could see his way to 
embrace Socialism as they understood it', and others expressed 
the view that Killip should be on the Council. 
161 But, confronted 
by an open challenge to the Labour Party they closed ranks 
behind Connellan, Morby referring to this 
'opposition of an 
extraordinary character'. 
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Even D. B. Foster, a man with 
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close SDF connections, after careful consideration, backed 
Connellan: 'he stood shoulder to shoulder with Councillor 
Connellan to establish a new party, with Socialism stirring 
in it for the life-blood and trade-union elements as the 
elements out of which they were to produce more and more 
Socialists as time went on'. 
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Killip was seen, and saw himself, as 'a Victor Grayson 
in the city of Leeds, fighting in the interests of the 
workers against the capitalists'. 
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He advocated an Eight- 
Hour Day in all Corporation departments as a means of 
reducing unemployment and promised to put his case in the most 
effective way possible, even 'if it meant being carried out, 
or the use of violence, or going to gaol'. 
165 He, like 
Harry Wood in Dewsbury, promised an undated letter of resig- 
nation to his committee. His was a pure, unsullied Socialist 
campaign, and he would not scll the workers or mislead them 
like the Labour men. Labour, he said, were worse than the 
Tories or Liberals because at least the people knew that Tories 
and Liberals were their enemies. To Labour, of course, 
Killip was a wrecker, 'trying to disintegrate the Labour 
Party'. There could be no meeting of minds. What added 
piquancy to the contest was the visit of Will Thorne to Leeds 
to speak for Connellan, a supreme illustration of SDF 
incoherence. Thorne argued that he had promised to support 
Connellan some two months previously and said 
he would not 
allow Killip to bar him from an LRC platform. 
'It was 
regrettable to find two sets of workmen who were 
fighting 
454. 
for the same goal quarrelling over what was really a question 
of method as to how they were to get to that goal. ' 
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This 
view found little favour with the Leeds SDF, who mounted a 
vitriolic attack upon Thorne, tellingly pointing out the 
sheer illogicality of his position. If he supported an SDF 
candidate he violated the LRC constitution; if he supported 
an LRC man without consulting the local SDF branch he violated 
the SDF constitution. At a rowdy meeting, where Thorne was 
called 'a coward and a traitor', Thorne refused to justify 
his stance and simply told the Leeds SDF to refer the position 
to the Executive if they so wished. This in fact they did, 
but the Federation's Annual Conference in 1910 moved the next 
question to avoid embarrassment for the Executive. They could 
not afford to lose their only Parliamentary spokesman, but 
the Leeds affair had demonstrated the sheer illogicality 
of the 'middle road', 
The bitter contest between SDF and Labour Party in New 
Wortley cost Connellan his seat. He was, not surprisingly, 
bitter: 'If ever there was a seat thrown away this was the 
one', he complained, castigating those who had 'Thrown their 
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votes away'. There had been 'treachery in their midst'. 
But the Socialists, in spite of the fact that Killip had only 
polled 168 votes, celebrated. With their Bradford comrades 
they counted success in terms of propaganda opportunities 
and 
membership gains. Their 168 votes were statements of principle 
which could never be reclaimed by 'Tory, Liberal or 
Labour 
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faking'" They had recruited amongst others Joseph Thornton, 
ex-ILP organiser, and Harold Clay, an ex-Labour Party member 
who was impressed by Killip's refusal to sacrifice his 
principles for popularity. Thus, to the bewilderment of the 
local press, 'Far from being despondent we understand that 
members of the S. D. P. had a royal time up at the West Leeds 
Socialist Institute. 
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The SDF in Leeds continued its 
Socialist mission, undeterred by electoral failure. In New 
Wortley the following year Killip's result was derisory, yet 
their extreme propagandist position was further emphasised by 
Killip's resolution at the 1911 Conference that branches should 
not be allowed to join local Labour Parties. This was defeated, 
but by then they too were anticipating the formation of the 
British Socialist Party, that union of Socialistswhich would 
provide a route to power. 
The Dewsbury, Leeds, and Bradford branches of the SDF 
typified the Federation in Yorkshire. Elsewhere only Hull, 
Sheffield and, belatedly, Halifax demonstrated much vitality. 
Sheffield promoted a parliamentary candidate in January 1910 
and made determined efforts in municipal elections. Their 
most prominent member, Elsbury, eventually formed a new branch 
at Bolton-upon-Dearne and there had the distinction of being 
the SDF's first elected representative in the county, gaining 
a seat on the Goldthorpe Urban District Council in 1911.169 
The Halifax branch was reformed in 1909 to rescue 
'the blood 
red standard... out of the mire in which it has 
been dragged 
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by the quasi-Lib-Lab organisationX 
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and the Hull branch 
similarly survived by carrying a 'militant spirit abroad. ' 
The Yorkshire branches suggested an alternative route to 
survival, if not to success, from that put forward by the 
Lancashire branches. Their propagandist stance maintained an 
independent spirit and a separate identity, whereas in 
Lancashire, as Jeffrey Hill has commented, the Labour alliance 
strategy posed the danger of the SDF losing its separate 
identity. 
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The point is that whether in Lancashire or 
Yorkshire a minority group was likely either to be generally 
ignored or absorbed by the wider political Labour movement. 
The problem for the Social-Democratic Federation has been neatly 
assessed by Stephen Yeo in his study of the Reading branch. 
'Coherence implied a certain separateness, which could be 
called by its political enemies "sectarianism" and which did 
involve organising as a sect. And yet dynamism generated an 
organisation deeply involved in the locality. '172 The better 
SDFers did the less they looked like they wanted to be, a 
problem clearly recognised by Hyndman, Irving and others who 
urged elected representatives not to forget their revolutionary 
intent. For moth the Lancashire and Yorkshire branches the 
answer to their separate problems was looked for in the 
formation of one Socialist party. 
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CHAPTER XIV. 
TOWARDS UNITY. 
The Quelch candidature at Dewsbury in 1902 had given rise 
to a certain optimism within the SDF as to the possibilities 
of Socialist unity. Quelch himself remarked that 
The greatest good which will result from the 
Dewsbury election will be the consolidation of 
Socialist forces in this country. The expres- 
sions of goodwill which have come from I. L. P. 
branches... show that they are prepared to work 
with us for uncompromising Social-Democracy, 
notwithstanding the unaccountable hostility dis- 
played by some of their chiefs. 
I 
He was, of course, deluding both himself and his readers for 
the election had intensified the intransigence of the ILP 
leaders towards the SDF. Keir Hardie dismissed any thoughts 
of unity in an article shortly before the election. 
Given the inclusion of the S. D. F. into the I. L. P. 
and one of two things would happen; either the 
entire movement would be reduced to the 
impotence 
of the present S. D. F. level or the 
irresponsible 
irreconcilables would withdraw and form another 
party and the present situation would 
be 
reproduced. 
2 
The question of fusion was disposed of at 
the ILP's 1902 
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Conference by moving the next question and when the Kelmscott 
Club circularised all Socialist bodies to ascertain whether 
or not a conference on unity was feasible the ILP News com- 
mented caustically that 'What special call this club has 
received to take upon itself the duty of setting right the 
Socialist organisations of Britain we cannot imagine. '3 
The same issue violently attacked the SDF as a nonentity 
'out to revive its own ebbing existence by engrafting itself 
upon the I. L. P. and 
asking the I. L. P. in the name of Socialist unity 
to fuse with it and to fuse with it on condition 
that the I. L. P. give up its name, its policy and 
its branch freedom, obscures with vain doctrines 
its teaching of Socialism and abandons its pledge 
to co-operate with working-class organizations 
on independent lines. 
4 
The Kelmscott circular was not placed before the ILP Conference 
and an appeal in The Clarion for unity was similarly 
dismissed. 
When the Newcastle ILP initiated a referendum of branches on 
the question of fusion there was a two to one majority against. 
Undoubtedly, the SDF's departure from the LRC was the prime 
cause of this hostility. 
Such a negative response produced a temporary 
reaction 
within SDF ranks. Theodore Rothstein, who 
had voted for unity 
in 1902, accused Hardie and the ILP of 
'rank opportunism' 
in 
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March 1903 and wrote that 'there are no two Socialist parties 
in England which it is in the interests of the cause desir- 
able to see fused into one, but only one, the S. D. F., which 
must and shall remain alone. '5 The 1903 SDF Conference 
ignored the question of fusion with the ILP, but it was 
suggested that the Federation appeal over the heads of the 
ILP leadership to the rank and file members. This suggestion 
was deferred but it indicated a trend in SDF thinking which 
had initially been sparked by the events at Dewsbury and 
which would grow stronger as the ILP became ever more 
entangled with the perceived failings of the Labour Party. 
Meanwhile the ILP Conference of that year defined its policy; 
it regarded the LRC as 'a practical and sufficient means of 
Socialist and Labour unity'. This was to remain, in essence, 
ILP policy in the coming years, and Hardie remarked in the 
Labour Leader that 'as a live question fusion no longer 
exists . '6 In an interesting letter Max Beer, the London 
correspondent of Vorwarts and historian of British Socialism, 
outlined the differences between the two parties and pin- 
pointed the basic problem. Both parties, he concluded, 
believed 'in their respective sovereignty. Andyou can't have 
two sovereign powers in one body politic. ' 
Between 1904 and 1911 the SDF Conference made an almost 
ritual re-affirmation of its desire for socialist unity. 
In 
an effort to widen its base the 1904 Conference allowed 
local 
Socialist Societies to affiliate to the SDF but to retain 
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their own name and organization. The Amsterdam resolution of 
1904 instructing Socialist parties within each country to 
amalgamate, and the example of the French parties in doing 
so, provided a further impetus to SDF efforts. In the 
localities branches of the two parties often co-operated 
fruitfully. Nationally, however, the stumbling block remained 
affiliation to the Labour Party. After the Federation's 
Carlisle Conference of 1907 Lee wrote to Francis Johnson of 
the ILP in the following terms; 'weexpress our desire to 
witness before another General Election is upon us the 
amalgamation in one party of all organizations and individuals 
willing to work on a definite democratic basis for the 
realization of Socialism. '8 Johnson was informed that the 
SDF had set up a sub-committee to further unity and the ILP 
was asked to nominate three members to that committee. The 
reply was predictable, the ILP suggesting affiliation to the 
Labour Party as a prerequisite for Socialist unity. Similar 
letters were sent to the NAC of the ILP after the 
1909 and 
1910 SDF Conferences, but on each occasion the reply was the 
same, and with SDF conferences voting overwhelmingly against 
rejoining the Labour Party unity seemed as far distant as 
ever. 
Pious resolutions at annual conferences self-evidently 
did not further the cause of Socialist unity, and 
the 
Coventry Conference of 1911 finally took positive steps. 
Responding to the growing feeling that the 
ILP leadership 
was out of step with the wishes of 
its members SDF delegates 
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carried a Rochdale resolution which called on the Executive 
to invite the co-operation of other bodies such 
as the Socialist Representation Committees, the 
South Eastern Counties and the Essex Socialist 
Federations, in the issuing of a circular of 
invitation to be dispatched to every S. D. P. 
branch, I. L. P. branch, local Fabian societies, 
who believe in industrial and political action. 
9 
These other bodies were involved to forestall the suggestion 
'that the whole business was a move on the part of the 
S. D. P. to bring itself to the front. '10 Support was 
received from a wide range of organizations - local Socialist 
Representation Committees, Socialist Societies, the Clarion 
Scouts, the Clarion Cycling Clubs, the Church Socialist 
League - and a circular was sent out over their names 
announcing a conference in Manchester at the end of September. 
Before dealing with the events of 1911, however, we must 
pause to study the SDF's motives in pursuing its campaign 
for unity and its reasons for choosing 1911 to make the 
attempt. 
There was undoubtedly a consistent body of support within 
the SDF for Socialist unity, evidenced by the perpetual 
resolutions on the subject. A number of reasons present 
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themselves. In the first instance, to give the members 
credit, the idea of 'one Socialist party' was undoubtedly 
an altruistic notion, an ideal to be aimed at. All 
Socialists had common principles and it seemed wrong that 
they should be divided, engaged in internicine warfare, 
when there was a glorious goal to be attained. But more 
practical reasons lay at the heart of the matter, particularly 
where the leadership was concerned. The SDF had, quite simply, 
failed to achieve the hoped for success in the first decade 
of the twentieth century. It is true that between 1906 
and 1910 200 new branches were recorded, yet this disguised 
the fact that a considerable number fell away in the same 
period. The average membership between 1900 and 1910 appears 
to have been in the region of 9,000, far short of the ILP 
total, and by no means all of these were regular financial 
contributors. 
11 
Hyndman and the others could see few 
returns on thirty years of active propaganda and Socialist 
unity seemed to offer a way out of the impasse. 
Inevitably for a party much concerned with ideology, and 
for a supposedly revolutionary party operating in a non- 
revolutionary situation, the SDF was plagued by doctrinal 
disputes. The party had split in 1884 and again 
in 1903-4. 
After the expulsion of the 'impossibilists' Hyndman regained 
much of his earlier ascendancy for, as Rothstein conceded, 
'for all his exasperating defects' he was 
'by far the ablest 
man in the movement. '12 A number of revolutionaries 
however, 
473. 
including Rothstein himself, were determined to remain 
within the Federation and challenge what they saw as Hyndman's 
over-rigid Marxism, which relied on the destruction of 
capitalism by inexorable economic processes. Thus, during 
the period leading up to the second major attempt at Socialist 
unity, the SDF found itself racked by dissension, and in 
many ways the disputes were more fundamental than those which 
had accompanied the earlier splits. These divisions within 
the SDF merit closer study, partly because they shed light 
on the eventual enthusiasm for calling a unity conference, 
and more importantly because they presaged the disputes 
within the united party which were eventually to cause its 
downfall. Certain contentious issues have already been 
mentioned. The domination of the party by Hyndman and the 
'old guard' was one. Hyndman's anti-semitism, first de- 
nounced by Rothstein as far back as 1898,13 remained a 
festering sore within the Federation, evidenced by complaints 
from several members, including Joe Fineberg of the 
Whitechapel and Stepney branch, who wrote to complain of 
'the nasty and spiteful references to Jews' in Justice. 
14 
The relationship of the SDF to both the trade unions and the 
Labour Party was, as we have seen, a major subject of 
controversy. There were four issues, however, which tended 
to overshadow all others. 
Belfort Bax was one of the few SDFers who wished 
to 
augment Hyndman's narrow economic conception of 
Socialism 
with a more philosophical outlook. He felt 
that Socialism 
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entailed specific ethical and metaphysical views and was 
convinced that Socialists must destroy and replace deep-seated 
attitudes and sentiments which inhibited the growth of Marxism. 
The emergence of the ILP with its 'popular' Socialism based 
on traditional religious and moral feelings, and his experience 
of patriotic feeling during the Boer War, convinced him of the 
need to develop a new moral consciousness. In this he ran 
very much counter to the views of Hyndman and others who 
operated upon much more utilitarian levels of consciousness, 
seeking to control society in order to secure the 'happiness 
of all' and viewing human motivation largely in terms of 
pleasure and pain. Bax developed his arguments in a series 
of works, Essays in Socialism, The Ethics of Socialism, The 
Religion of Socialism and others, discussing questions which 
many SDFers felt were outside their orbit. The clash of 
opinions was particularly marked over the question of religion. 
The predominant SDF view was that religion was a strictly 
private matter for the individual, an issue which had nothing 
to do with Socialism. They were at pains to stress this 
point because the question was a potential political liability 
for the Federation. From its earliest days the SDF had 
faced charges of being 'actively irreligious'. They seemed, 
wrote William Clarke, an early Fabian, 'to desire revolution 
quite as much for the sake of overthrowing ethics and the 
spiritual side of things as for the sake of improving the 
material condition of the people. ' 
15 Many SDF recruits were, 
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of course, Secularists and made no secret of the fact. 
According to George Lansbury they really were 'intolerant 
16 
of anything like Christianity' and he cited that as one 
reason for his defection. Publically, however, the Federation 
strove to maintain a 'respectable' face, hence the Dewsbury 
branch's pronouncement that it welcomed all recruits 
17 
irrespective of religion. Quelch had been assailed by 
charges of irreligion during his Dewsbury campaign, Hyndman 
faced similar accusations at Burnley. Clergymen were often 
the most active opponents of the SDF in the localities, the 
Reverend Anstey in Dewsbury being one example. Thus, when 
Bax urged that religion in the sense of 'public acceptance 
of a traditional system of dogmatic teaching' must be fought 
by Socialists, that it could not be a private matter, he 
was forcefully attacked. 
18 Guy Aldred was one of his few 
open supporters, resigning from the SDF in 1906 in protest 
at Quelch's attitude to religion in Justice. The case of 
J. W. Gott demonstrated SDF sensitivity on the subject. 
Gott was the organiser of the British Secular League, 
based in Bradford, and publisher of the Truth Seeker, a 
penny monthly once described as 'this most obscene and 
blasphemous paper' . 
19 He was also a Socialist, 'and this 
unusual combination of Secularism and Socialism was... a 
hallmark of the Bradford movement under Gott's leadership' 
20 
A large proportion of the Bradford branch of the 
SDF were 
in fact members of the British Secular League, although 
few 
476. 
of them were as extreme in their views as Gott. He financed 
his activities from a clothing business, later augmented by 
the sale of tea, and employed boycotted free thinkers as 
salesmen. Bert Killip was one of these. As Tommy Jackson 
recalled, 
he would have made a considerable fortune, but 
nothing could stop him from including in every 
parcel of clothing he supplied, a batch of 
"literature". And as Johnnie's taste ran 
strongly in the direction of the more vulgar 
and scurrilous types of anti-clerical propa- 
ganda, customers were quite often shocked by the 
literature, though satisfied with the suits. 
21 
Whilst such trickery tickled Gott's sense of humour his 
activities appalled many of the Socialist leaders, who feared 
that his openly blasphemous articles and pamphlets would 
reflect on the whole movement. Blatchford denounced him, the 
Labour Leader refused to advertise his clothing business. 
In Dewsbury Ben Turner and other ILPers were appalled by 
one of his 'abominable pamphlets', burned them publicly 
and denounced them in the local press, The SDF too was less 
than amused by this pamphlet, Socialism: Christ the 
Enemy 
of the Human Race, which was written as an attack on 
Snowden's 
The Christ That Is To Be.. When Gott refused to stop selling 
this pamphlet outside the Federation's Manchester 
Conference 
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in 1908 he was expelled from the party. This elicited yelps 
22 
of protest from Bax and a more measured response from the 
Bradford SDF, which believed 
whilst not endorsing the views put forth in the 
pamphlet, that if it is right for Christians to 
demonstrate that Socialism and Christianity are 
one and the same thing the atheists have equal 
and exactly the same right to express their views 
on the question of religion. 
23 
Their protests were ineffectual but few SDF members followed 
Gott out of the Federation into the Freethought Socialist 
League, which he founded in an attempt to prevent the capture, 
as he saw it, of the Socialist movement by Christianity. As 
Edward Royle has demonstrated) 'the pull of Socialism appears 
to have been stronger than the distaste for religion', 
24 
and 
by no means all SDFers agreed with Bax that Marxism was, by 
definition, incompatible with religion. 
25 The majority pre- 
ferred to leave the matter well alone as a means of avoiding 
controversy. Gott himself was later imprisoned on several 
occasions for blasphemy, often aided in his free speech fights 
by SDFers as individuals but never by the Marxists as an 
organised body. 
The question of religion was then regarded as peripheral 
to the central economic questions of Socialist theory, and 
this standpoint was also adopted with regards 
to the 'woman 
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question'. Women's role in the SDF was a matter of some 
concern to the members and the suffrage campaigns of the 
early 1900s opened up considerable divisions within the party. 
Underlying the SDF's attitude to women was the assumption 
that they were a reactionary force in society, largely 
indifferent to and ignorant of Socialism. This was a gener- 
alised viewpoint, applicable to women of all classes, an 
attitude in marked contrast to that adopted towards men. 
Women were therefore perceived as a problem: 'they do not come 
into the Socialist movement. In very many instances they 
hinder men from joining the movement, and keep many, even 
of those who have joined, from taking the active part they 
otherwise would. '26 They were seen as the weaklinks in any 
strike, encouraging their men back to work)and as potential 
blacklegs themselves by entering the labour market and under- 
cutting the male 'family' wage. Thus the essential concern 
of the SDF was to educate members' wives, to convert them 
to the cause, or at least to neutralise their conservative 
influence. There was little understanding of the practical 
problems involved in women becoming active Socialists, the 
average SDFer often accepting that a woman's place was 
in 
the home. To draw them into at least passive acceptance 
of Socialist activity was one of the reasons for branches' 
emphasis on social activities - the teas, whist 
drives, 
dances and such like. Education and social activity were, 
therefore, the twin themes of the SDF's attitude to women, 
themes reinforced by a recognition that women were a powerful 
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influence upon the children. As one female activist 
remarked, 'we are anxious to draw women into the movement, 
as they will influence the children, and so we hope to gain 
, 27 future generations. It was no accident that women members 
often specialised in children's work, Mary Gray in Battersea 
originating the Socialist Sunday School movement and others, 
like Mrs. Spinks in Edmonton, very active in expandingit. 
The demand for state maintenance of pregnant women and 
mothers was linked by the SDF to its perennial campaign for 
the state maintenance of children. 
Any accurate estimate of the number of SDF women members 
is impossible. Certainly, as Karen Hunt points out, their 
membership 'continued throughout to be sufficiently novel 
to be worthy of comment, which suggests that they constituted 
only a fraction of the total membership. '28 They rarely 
played a leading role in the Federation's activities, the 
Executive never containing more than two women and often 
none. Prominent women speakers were rare, a sufficient 
novelty to attract good crowds and collections, therefore 
in demand. The SDF put up far fewer female candidates for 
municipal elections than did the ILP, for example. They were, 
to use Hunt's description, 'auxiliaries') acting as branch 
secretaries, officiating at social functions, providing 
entertainment. It was a widespread view, reflecting the 
extent to which SDFers had failed to liberate themselves 
from their upbringing, 'that Socialism needed to 
be 
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sweetened for women and that their tolerance of the serious 
business of political meetings was lower than men's reflecting 
a more flighty and flippant nature'. 
29 
Little of a practical 
nature was done, however, and Justice, opening its pages to 
the idiosyncratic views of Bax and his supporters, was seen 
by many women members as positively discouraging recruits. 
The perception of women as a problem for the SDF 
persisted, and in 1904 Dora Montefiore announced the form- 
ation of a Women's Committee of the SDF whose function was 
to form Women's Circles. Their aim was 'to organise and 
educate women in the principles of Social-Democracy with 
a view to them becoming members of the Social-Democratic 
Federation. ' 
30 
These Women's Circles initially met with a 
mixed reception. Annie Oldacre thought them 'retrogressive 
... silly', pandering to 
'exclusive sex interests'. 
31 
if 
women were Socialist, she thought, they should join the SDF. 
Supporters of the idea argued that there was no intention 
of segregating women, and that the Circles were intended 
as a sort of half-way house to Socialism, preparing the 
women for full membership of the party. This view was 
generally accepted once the Circles were in operation, but 
their activities do not seem to have overcome the stereo- 
types of women's usefulness to the Federation. It is perhaps 
indicative that at the inaugural gathering women acted as 
hostesses for the male SDFers, and most reports emanating 
from the Circles concentrated upon bazaar work and social 
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activities. The stated educational function was little 
emphasised and this caused Dora Montefiore to resign from 
the Women's Committee in March 1905 because 
they have decided to start plain and fancy 
needlework and hold a bazaar and sale of work. 
I feel I must resign from the committee as I 
never on principle associate myself with 
bazaars; I very much deprecate the loss of 
time, money and energy which they entail. 
32 
This educational role was later revitalised but the Women's 
Circles never numbered more than 22, the large majority of 
them in London, reflecting the low priority attached to 
them by the Federation. Its attitude to women was sharply 
focussed by the debate over female suffrage. 
Full adult suffrage had been a central plank in the 
SDF programme from its inception, but the fight for women's 
suffrage met a mixed response within the party. The official 
line was that the campaign of the suffragettes should not 
be supported by the SDF because it was a diversion from the 
struggle for full adult suffrage and, more importantly, 
because 
the suffragettes were a middle-class organisation, out 
'to 
create another privileged class of voters. 
'33 If they 
gained their demand, wrote Quelch, their votes would 
be 
used against the working class. Most members, 
includingthe 
women, supported this line. They agreed with 
'Tattler' 
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and SDF orthodoxy which did 
not admit that women are subject as a sex; and 
therefore there can be no question of their 
emancipation as a sex. Working-women form part 
of the working class and their emancipation is 
bound up with the emancipation of that class... 
the issue is a class issue and not one of sex. 
34 
The question of Socialism was an economic one and all other 
issues distracted from that; their solution would be found 
in the advent of Socialism. This narrow vision ignored the 
question of how peoples' attitudes would be altered to co- 
incide with the changed economic basis of society, a question 
which much concerned Belfort Bax, but it was Social-Democratic 
orthodoxy and would have remained largely unchallenged were 
it not for the extraordinary views on the subject expressed 
by Bax himself. In an article for the Social-Democrat he 
wrote that 
for me there seems no logical ground for 
opposition to the granting of the franchise for 
women save the recognition of inferiority.... 
If one acknowledges complete equality in cap- 
acity between men and women, the case for the 
suffrage seems to be, in itself, unanswerable. 
Bax then proceeded to list the reasons for regarding women 
as inferior, in the physical, intellectual and moral 
spheres. 
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Furthermore, he argued, women were 'an almost boundlessly 
privileged section of the community'; they had not the same 
responsibilities as men, nor were they subject to the same 
legal restrictions. Therefore, he concluded, 'For those who, 
like myself, regard the evidence for the inferiority as 
conclusive, there is no possible alternative to opposition 
35 
to female suffrage. Bax was well known for his eccentric 
opinions on this matter - he was forever complaining about 
the 'noisy feminist section of the party' - but they had 
previously been dismissed as an aberration on the part of 
an otherwise excellent Socialist. In the context of the 
fight for female suffrage, however, they raised a storm of 
protest. There were those such as Herbert Burrows and A. A. 
Watts, no supporters of limited suffrage, who argued 
vigorously that B ax had no right to propound his views in 
SDF publications, thereby giving them the appearance of 
SDF sanction The retort from J. F. Green was that as Bax was 
writing 'on a matter which is after all political and no 
necessary part of Socialism as an economic theory' he had 
a perfect right to express his personal opinions. 
36 
Subsequent correspondence demonstrated considerable support 
for Bax's views and thereby provoked a reaction 
from a small, 
yet articulate section of women, including Dora Montefiore 
and Edith Swift. Montefiore argued strongly that Socialists 
should consider women first as human beings and second 
only 
as a creature of sex. Moreover, far from being privileged 
in any way women were in fact doubly discriminated 
against, 
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both economically and sexually. 
37 
Votes for women, they 
said, even on a limited basis, was one more step forward 
and it was the task of the party to convert the women to 
Socialist views not to conjecture on the way in which their 
vote would be used. The argument became very heated, Bax 
attacking 'the slimy trail of maudlin feminism ' 38 which he 
associated with Zelda Kahan and others. The Executive tried 
to play down the controversy by arguing that 'votes for 
women' was not the most important question at that time and 
it urged 'loyal Socialists' not to divert their energies into 
that campaign; nevertheless the division of opinion remained 
a real one and would resurface in the new British Socialist 
Party. A further result of the controversy was to alienate 
the suffrage movement generally, and this was by no means the 
wholly middle-class movement depicted by Quelch; it had 
a strong working-class constituency in Lancashire and the 
East End of London which regarded the SDF position as far 
from satisfactory. Selina Cooper in Nelson, for one, parted 
company with the Federation over the issue. 
The issues of religion and women raised wider questions 
concerning the role of the party. Many members were dis- 
satisfied with what they saw as the SDF's limited, narrow, 
economically deterministic view of Socialism. Bax's criticisms 
have been noted and Theodore Rothstein had advocated a 
far 
more interventionist policy in opposition to the prevalent 
'propagandist' 
approach at the time of the 
Boer War. Yet 
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the emphasis on the political role of the party and the 
official dismissal of strikes and industrial struggle as 
diversions from, if not actively damaging to, the working- 
class cause remained largely unchallenged. The great in- 
dustrial upsurge of the early twentieth century introduced new 
ideas into the Labour movement. Two areas of influence were 
the gospel of Industrial Unionism, imported from America 
by the SLP, and syndicalist ideas brought from France by 
Guy Bowman, at one time manager of the Twentieth Century 
Press, and Tom Mann. Both of these doctrines emphasised the 
primacy of industrial as opposed to political organisation 
and both appealed to direct action, to the general strike, as 
a means of overthrowing the capitalist system. Such ideas 
gained ground for a number of reasons. The performance of the 
Labour Party in Parliament had led to increasing disillusionment 
with parliamentary activity; the use of the courts against 
the trade unions in the Taff Vale and Osborne judgements, 
and the inability of the Labour Party to counter this effect- 
ively, added to anti-parliamentary feeling. A massive 
increase in unemployment, matched by a real drop in living 
standards, increased discontent and trade union membership 
rose correspondingly. When, in 1910, the first of the major 
strikes occurred, to be followed by wave upon wave of action, 
both official and unofficial, the opportunities for the 
revolutionary movement seemed immense. As one historian 
has 
commented, 'A wild, elemental, pent-up force seemed suddenly 
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let loose, disregarding precedents and agreements, impatient 
of compromise, shaking the old complacent trade unionism 
by the ears. '39 The SDF remained seemingly impervious to 
such developments. Its publications seized the opportunity 
provided by the greatest mass struggles in sixty years 
merely to deliver homilies on the class position of the 
working class. Hyndman could still ask 'Can anything be 
imagined more foolish, more harmful, more, in the widest 
sense of the word, unsocial, than a strike? '40 Our primary 
aim, said Harry Quelchy'is to organise a political party, 
independent, class-conscious, proletarian, and Social- 
Democratic. The function of industrial organisation lies 
with the trade unions. '41 Hyndman and Quelch, after their 
early illusions of an imminent revolution, had invariably 
hoped for a peaceful transition to Socialism, an orderly 
change of society. The advocates of direct action, whether 
syndicalist or suffragette, found little sympathy amongst 
the SDF leaders, yet they once again found themselves stranded 
between gradualism and cataclysm, their middle path leaving 
them unable to respond effectively to unfolding events. 
Members of the SDF closely involved with the industrial 
movement could not accept such a line. Many were disillusioned 
by the Federation's electoral defeats of early 1910 and 
sought both explanations for the SDF's lack of progress and 
alternative routes to socialism. The strike wave revitalised 
hopes of a radically different social order. 'It 
invested 
the daily work of the trade unions with ... a purpose 
that 
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made it worthwhile. ' 
42 
Moreover, the doctrines of syndicalism 
and industrial unionism blurred organisational lines, appealing 
to dissidents in both the SDF and the ILP and providing a 
powerful impetus to unity. Whilst the strike wave only 
erupted some twelve months before the Unity Conference of 
1911, opposition was already gaining strength within the SDF 
and Tom Mann, who had rejoined the Federation on his return 
from Australia, resigned his membership. His reasons por- 
tended future developments: 
the real reason why the trade union movement of 
this country is in such a deplorable state of 
inefficiency is to be found in the fictitious 
importance which the workers have been encour- 
aged to attach to Parliamentary action.... So 
I declare in favour of direct industrial organ- 
isation; not as a means but as THE means where- 
by the workers can ultimately overthrow the 
capitalist system.... I am of opinion that the 
workers' fight must be carried out on the indust- 
rial plane, free from entanglements with the 
plutocratic enemy. 
43 
These three areas of division, religion, the suffrage and the 
role of the party, acrimonious though they were, paled 
into 
insignificance beside the final major area of contention, 
that of international relations and foreign policy. 
Hyndman 
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had often been accused of 'jingosim', a charge he angrily 
refuted, but in the years before 1911 he and other members 
of the Executive were continually in print warning of the 
German threat to Britain and demanding the build-up of the 
British navy to meet the danger. They were met by a barrage 
of criticism, and a furious debate ensued which threatened 
to split the party. 
Hyndman and his followers were against what they called 
'undifferentiated internationalism', which they saw as a 
pious ideal. A manifesto on Social-Democracy and Foreign 
Policy, issued in 1905, argued that 'We are all a bit Nationalis 
at bottom', and Hyndman had always championed nationalism - 
not only that of Britain but of other countries - wherever 
it asserted itself against foreign domination. As he was 
always proud to point out, his views on this question had 
never altered since the publication of England For All, and 
neither had his advocacy of a strong navy, which he regarded 
as essential for Britain's defence. He had no time for 
the anti-patriotism of Bax or for what he saw as the ultra- 
pacifism of the ILP. Initially supportive of the Socialist 
International as an effective counter to reaction, he came to 
distrust it as an instrument of the German Social-Democrats, 
and felt that it would be totally ineffective in view of the 
fact that Socialists controlled no governments and therefore 
had no say in international affairs. Whereas Marxists saw 
the increasing tension of the early twentieth century as a 
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clash between competing capitalisms which could only be pre- 
vented by the solidarity of the international working-class, 
Hyndman contrasted democracy and despotism and argued that 
a defensive war or even a preventive war in the interests 
of democracy was justifiable. To Quelch pious resolutions 
urging the solidarity of the international working class were 
'about as practical as the beating of tom-toms to scare 
away an eclipse'. Whilst war was inherent in a capitalist 
system, and the prime objective of Socialists should be to 
combat one's own government, 'it is quite possible for one 
to be, by virtue of the circumstances, forced into the position 
of championing national and democratic rights against 
imperialist aggression. '44 These circumstances had arisen 
with the increasingly aggressive policy of Germany, seen as 
embarking upon a 'Teutonic world mission' with the conquest 
of England the ultimate goal. The pages of Justice between 
1904 and 1909 resounded with attacks upon 'the jack-boot 
bullying of Berlin', 
45 
and urged two measures to deter German 
aggression. The first of these was accepted by most Social- 
Democrats and was summed up in the phrase 'the armed nation' 
or 'the citizen army', which had been endorsed by the 
Second International. As opposed to a professional or 
conscript army, both of which were instruments of the capital- 
ist state, all citizens should be trained 
in the use of 
weapons under civil law. This would guarantee national 
defence but also assure individual liberty and prevent 
a 
counter-reaction by the forces of the state at the time of 
a 
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Socialist transformation of society. Quelch published a 
pamphlet expressing these views in 1904 , entitled Social- 
Democracy and the Armed Nation. When this pamphlet was 
used by Liberal supporters of Haldane's army reforms in 
1907 to justify conscription, which the SDF vehemently 
opposed, Will Thorne introduced a Citizen Army Bill to the 
Commons to clarify and explain SDF policy. The Bill's main 
provisions were that every male aged 18-29 would have annual 
military training and then pass into the reserves; the 
citizen army would elect its officers and exercise full 
democratic control over them; it could only be mobilised 
to face the threat of invasion. The city or borough council 
of each district would administer the Act. 
46 
Thorne's 
Bill was ridiculed by the ILP, and received no support from 
his Labour colleagues, but it expressed Social-Democratic 
orthodoxy. The second measure, however, the call for an 
enlarged navy, provoked an outcry. 
Few SDFers were outright pacifists and even fewer 
supported Belfort Bax in his forthright statement of Socialist 
internationalism. He placed principles before patriotism, 
affinity with fellow Socialists before national solidarity, 
and wished success to his country's enemies. War, said Bax, 
was a capitalist conflict of supreme indifference to 
Socialists and he attacked those who 'return to their 
patriotic "vomit" like the scriptural dog. '47 Most 
Federation members were more cautious in their approach, 
but they condemned Hyndman's anti-German agitation. 
Leading 
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spokesmen for the opposition were J. B. Askew, Theodore 
Rothstein, Zelda Kahan and E. C. Fairchild. The main thrust 
of their argument was that Hyndman was betraying the prin- 
ciples of Socialism, that in denouncing Germany he was 
encouraging jingoism in his own country, that he was colluding 
with the British government in deluding the people as to 
the true facts of the situation. Rothstein accused Hyndman 
of 'Teutonophobia', of being blind to the fact of English 
naval supremacy which had always been used to block German 
access to the world's markets: 
we find you joining your voice in the war chorus 
of the Imperialists, and calling upon the people 
to... forget the class antagonisms... in a common 
effort to stave off the "national" peril. If 
that is Social-Democracy I for one refuse to 
accept it. 
49 
His critics questioned Hyndman's right to 
lead the SDF, 
wondering whether or not he had 'mistaken the church' 
to 
whose doors he had nailed his opinions. They argued 
for a 
campaign to open the eyes of the masses. 
'Our duty as 
Socialists is to combat the warlike tendencies and 
appetites 
in our own country. ' 
50 What particularly angered them was 
Hyndman's public pronouncements on the question, 
which, 
they argued, would be equated with official 
SDF policy. 
51 
'A greater shame has never befallen a 
Socialist party', 
said Rothstein. 
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Criticism of Hyndman reached a crescendo in 1909, 
culminating in a resolution from the Central Hackney 
branch, of which Rothstein, Kahan and Fairchild were all 
members, urging the SDF Executive to dissociate the party 
from his statements. The Executive was obviously taken 
aback by the torrent of disapproval, and moderated its 
line. A Justice editorial now urged political pressure on 
the Government to pursue peace, which led Kahan to con- 
. 
gratulate the Executive, and at the end of the year the 
paper vigorously attacked Blatchford's anti-German articles 
in the Daily Mail, accusing him of being a tool of the 
Tory press. 'We are for pouring water, not oil, on the 
flames of international suspicion, jealousy and ill-will 
which are unquestionably being fanned alike by German 
jingoes and the foolishly provocative attitude of the 
British Government. 
52 
The controversy died down until 
Hyndman, rarely responsive to criticism, reopened the 
wounds with a letter in the Morning Post on 6 July 1910. 
Emblazoned with the title 'Social-Democrats and a big navy', 
his letter attacked the Labour party's 'turn- the- cheek-to- 
the-smiter pacifism'. 'A sham defence is worse than no 
defence at all', he argued, and he felt that if England 
wasn't going to maintain an effective navy she might as well 
scrap it altogether. The navy was vital for the maintenance 
of her food supplies, said Hyndman, a defensive necessity 
for England but a luxury for Germany. An outraged response 
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ensued. Askew derided Hyndman as a 'good English class- 
conscious bourgeois'; 
53 
Kahan denounced him for 'out- 
stepping the limit of all reasonable licence in free speech' . 
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His arguments were ridiculed. He had portrayed the navy as 
a defender of the right of asylum, a champion of national 
liberty. What about India? What about South Africa? was 
the chorus. Careful not to epitomise the 'peace at any price' 
brigade so scorned by Hyndman, his opponents produced reasoned 
arguments to rebut him and accepted the need for a navy, but 
only strong enough to deter an attack by making it an un- 
acceptable risk. Meanwhile they questioned the logic of his 
rationale for German designs on England. 
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The lines were 
clearly drawn, Hyndman, Quelch and their supporters talking 
of 'the balance of criminality' and the inability of 
Socialists to prevent war, their opponents urging the 
Socialists of each country to oppose the militarism of their 
own government. Once again the Central Hackney branch took 
the lead, calling on the Executive 
publicly to dissociate the S. D. P. from the anti- 
German policy of comrade Hyndman and from his 
demands for further expenditure on the Navy... 
to call upon Hyndman to desist from these utter- 
ances, both in Justice and particularly the 
Capitalist press, since his views on the subject 
are contrary to the spirit and policy of the S. D. 
p. 
56 
As the two sides moved further apart the tone 
became embittered. 
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Hyndman objecting to the 'abuse', 'caucus votes' and 
'sentimental resolutions' directed against him. The 
opposition came to a head at the 1911 Easter Conference. 
Kahan spoke to a resolution calling upon the SDF 
to combat with their utmost energy the demands 
for additional armaments.... Never had the S. D. P. 
made a bigger and more terrible mistake than in 
identifying the Party with the jingo warmonger - 
they had placed themselves outside the inter- 
national movement. 
57 
Quelch moved an Executive amendment which said that war 
was the result of capitalism and therefore a vigorous 
campaign against capitalism was the best way of preventing 
war. Meanwhile 'an adequate navy for national defence' was 
essential. The vote which followed the debate was turned 
into a vote of confidence in the Executive and consequently 
the dissidents were narrowly defeated. The Hyndmanites 
were now satisfied that their position was secure; they 
felt that the vote demonstrated that the divisions within 
the party had been exaggerated and that it vindicated their 
stance: 
By the decision of the Conference... the party, 
while pledged to work for international arbit- 
ration and a limitation of armaments, is not 
committed to a futile bogus and bourgeois 
49,5 
, 
agitation against armaments which only results 
in defeating its own aims; and, on the other 
hand, it is pledged to oppose any expansion of 
armaments, any militarist or naval schemes which 
are not absolutely essential for the national 
defence, or which are designed for imperialist 
aggression or capitalist expansion. 
58 
The position was defined and the air cleared, thought the 
Executive, but they had misjudged the scale of the opposition. 
Although Herbert Burrows and J. F. Green resigned, protesting 
at these 'extraordinary doctrines for professed Marxists 
to hold', Kahan and others decided to stay and fight. The 
campaign centred around the fact that the Executive amend- 
ment had never been submitted to the branches, only being 
introduced on the morning of the Conference, and that the 
debate had been manipulated to allow Hyndman and Quelch the 
maximum amount of time to attack their opponents. 
Criticism 
was so great that it was eventually agreed that 
the so-called 
'Hackney resolution' should be put to the 
branches. Although 
the Hyndmanites controlled Justice and had the support of 
the powerful Lancashire District Council, the plebiscite 
resulted in a victory for Kahan and her supporters 
by 79-60 
and administered a definite rebuff to the 
Executive. 
Such controversies within the SDF 
had important 
consequences for Socialist unity. The leadership, 
finding 
itself challenged in several areas, 
hoped to use the unity 
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campaign as a diversion from the party's internal problems, 
as a unifying force. It was motivated too by the electoral 
disasters of 1910, and by a financial crisis which at one 
time threatened the continued publication of Justice. 
The dissidents, however, encouraged by their success on the 
armaments resolution, hoped to gain new strength from the 
Unity Conference and mount a further challenge to the 
Hyndmanites. 
There were also external reasons for the SDF to move 
towards Socialist unity in 1911. Dismay at the Labour Party's 
performance in Parliament had produced a spirit of revolt 
within the ILP and among Socialists generally. One ILPer 
accused the party of losing 'its political and Socialist 
identity in a frantic effort to gloat over superficial 
successes. 
60 Others, the Huddersfield ILP being a particular 
example, objected to the increasingly oligarchic control 
of the party by the NAC. According to H. Russell Smart, 
the ILP was now 'a mere machine for registering the 
decrees 
of three or four able men. '61 As the pressure of 
its political 
role increased members began to choose, consciously, 
between 
the ultimate Socialist vision and the trade union alliance. 
This impulse found expression with, and was stimulated 
by) 
the election of Victor Grayson, a captivating speaker, 
to 
Parliament for the Colne Valley constituency on a straight 
Socialist ticket. His unwillingness to compromise soon 
made 
him a popular figure with the SDF. Grayson refused 
to abide 
by Parliamentary rules, and was suspended 
from the House in 
497. 
November 1908, leaving it with the words, 'I leave this 
House with pleasure... it is a House of murderers. 
62 
He 
wrote briefly for Orage's New Age and in early February 1909 
became political editor of The Clarion, where he campaigned 
for a more Socialist policy from the Labour Party. With 
the assistance of Sam Hobson he initiated the formation of 
Socialist Representation Committees, alliances of Socialists 
in the localities with the purpose of promoting parliamentary 
candidates. Grayson was in demand everywhere. He was, as 
Walter Kendall has noted, 'a personal embodiment of mass 
dissatisfaction with the policy of the Labour Party leaders . 
'63 
He was also symptomatic of a malaise within the ILP. Between 
1909 and 1911 46 branches collapsed and dues were reduced by 
£200. Dissidents campaigned to return the ILP to Socialist 
principles; they drew closer to the SDF, sharing its plat- 
forms and co-operating in the three by-election campaigns 
of 1908. At the 1909 Conference of the ILP there was a 
consistent vote of one-third or more against official policy 
and a majority referred back a paragraph censuring Grayson. 
Eventually MacDonald, Hardie, Snowden and Glasier resigned 
from the NAC, a desperate measure to restore their authority 
and win approval for the party's policy. The revolt went a 
stage further in 1910 when four members of the NAC signed 
the 
so-called 'Green Manifesto', Let Us Reform the Labour Party, 
accusing the leadership of a 'suicidal revisionist policy... 
bartering the soul of a great cause for the off chance 
of an 
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occasional bare bone. ' The manifesto argued that the party 
should vote in Parliament on each question's merits and not 
on the basis of support for the Liberals. This revolt was 
effective to a degree. Both Hardie and Glasier retained 
their earlier Socialist vision and sympathised with the rebels, 
Glasier re-emphasising the work of Morris and Hardie, interes- 
tingly, quoting Marx in defence of the ILP's tactics. 
63 
The reins of leadership during this crisis fell, however, to 
MacDonald who ensured 'the triumph of politics over ideology. ' 
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He outmanoeuvred the dissidents and not one was re-elected 
to the NAC. Dissatisfied ILPers would have to look elsewhere! 
The SDF was undoubtedly influenced by this crisis in 
the ILP. 
66 Such rank and file disaffection seemed to offer 
a golden opportunity to attract support for the idea of 
Socialist unity. When the dissidents were defeated at the 
ILP Conference in 1911 the time seemed ripe to make the 
attempt. Other trends also offered hope. As Tsuzuki has 
noted, 'The growth of local Socialist societies, independent 
of the SDF and ILP, and often under the influence of 
Blatchford's Clarion, was a feature of the first decade of 
the twentieth century. ' 
67 
Apparently those much-maligned 
'unattached Socialists' were at last bestirring themselves. 
In London a Provisional Committee for the Promotion of 
Common Action among Socialists was formed 
by members of the 
SDF, ILP, and Clarion groups. The formation of a 
United 
Socialist Propaganda League in 1911, to spread the word 
in 
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rural areas, seemed to confirm this development. Add to 
this the growing industrial ferment and it is little wonder 
that the SDF should choose 1911 to revive its campaign for 
unity. The refusal of the ILP and Fabian Executives to 
attend a unity conference did nothing to dampen the SDF's 
enthusiasm. This had been foreseen and it was fully expected 
that individual branches of these organisations would come 
over in large numbers. And then, just as the campaign for 
Socialist unity gathered momentum, came the bombshell' 
Victor Grayson, by now freed from his duties as an M. P., 
launched his own appeal in The Clarion for the formation 
68 
of the British Socialist Party. 
500. 
NOTES. 
1. Justice, 1 February 1902. 
2. Dewsbury Reporter, 18 January 1902. 
3. ILP News, April 1902. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Justice, 7 March 1903. 
6. Labour Leader, 18 April 1903. 
7. Justice, 21 March 1903. 
8. H. W. Lee, The Social-Democratic Party and Socialist 
Unity, p. 14- 
9. Justice, 29 July 1911. 
10. Ibid. 
11. See Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in 
Britain 1900-1921, p. 311. 
12. Rothstein to Kautsky, 18 May 1909, quoted in S. Pierson, 
British Socialists, p. 253. 
13. Justice, 9 July 1898. 
14. Ibid, 12 August 1911. 
15. W. Clarke to T. Davidson, 13 January 1884, quoted in 
J. & J. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 43. 
16. G. Lansbury to K. Hardie, n. d., ILP Archive/Francis 
Johnson Collection, 05/90. 
17. See Chapter XIII. 
18. See, for example, A. A. Watts in justice, 21 January 
1905. 
19. Rev. D. W. Weir of Manchester, quoted in Royle, op. cit., 
p. 278. 
501. 
20. Royle, op. cit., p. 63. 
21. T. A. Jackson, Solo Trumpet, p. 91. 
22. Justice, 22 August 1908. 
23. Ibid., 8 August 1908. 
24. Royle, op. cit., p. 241. 
25. See, for example, a letter to the Dewsbury Reporter, 
23 October 1909. Gott's activities in the Dewsbury area 
led to a heated exchange of letters in the local press, 
contributors including Malfew Seklew, an ex-SDFer, 
who now regarded the Federation as 'progressive 
mugwumps', and David Nicholl the anarchist. The 
activities of the Freethought Socialist League are 
detailed in T. A. Jackson, Solo Trumpet, Chapter 4, 
and in Royle, op. cit., pp. 279-282. 
26. Justice, 9 September 1893. 
27. Ibid., 23 April 1904. 
28. K. Hunt, 'Women and the Social Democratic Federation: 
Some Notes on Lancashire', North West Labour Histor 
Society, Bulletin 7,1980-81, p. 54. 
29. Ibid., p. 57. 
30. Justice, 27 Apri l 1907. 
31. Ibid., 16 April 1904. 
32. Ibid., 11 March 1905. 
33. Social-Democrat, July 1910. 
34. Justice, 25 June 1904. 
35. Social-Democrat, March 1909. See also a similar 
article in Justice, 9 April 1910. 
502. 
36. Justice, 11 January 1908. 
37. Social-Democrat, April 1909. 
38. Justice, 19 March 1910. 
39. Kendall, op. cit., p. 26. 
40. H. M. Hyndman, Further Reminiscences, p. 427. 
41. Social-Democrat, April 1910. 
42. J. T. Murphy, New Horizons, p. 142. 
43. Justice, 13 May 1911. 
44. Ibid., 29 August 1908. 
45. Ibid., 12 August 1905. 
46. See The National Citizen Force Bill, An Appreciation 
and Explanation, an SDF pamphlet published in 1908. 
47. Justice, 1 April, 14 April 1906. 
48. Ibid., 3 April 1909. 
49. Ibid., 10 April 1909. 
50. Ibid., 14 September 1907. 
51. Ibid., 22 May 1909. 
52. Ibid., 25 December 1909. 
53. Ibid., 6 August 1910. 
54. Ibid., 20 August 1910. 
55. See, for example, A. A. Watts in Justice, 23 July 
1910, 
J. B. Askew, Justice, 6 August 1910. 
56. Ibid., 30 July 1910. 
57. Ibid., 22 April 1911. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid., 29 April 1911. 
503. 
60. Labour Leader, 15 July 1904. 
61. Huddersfield Worker, 2 May 1908. 
62. Hansard, 22 November 1908, quoted in Kendall, op. cit., 
p. 36. 
63. Kendall, op. cit., p. 36. 
64. See Pierson, British Socialists, p. 167. 
65. Ibid., p. 178. 
66. See Theodore Rothstein in the Social-Democrat August 
1909, and Quelch in the issue of March 1910. 
67. Tsuzuki, H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism, p. 167. 
68. Clarion, 4 August 1911. 
504. 
CHAPTER XV. 
A CALL TO ARMS! - THE BRITISH SOCIALIST PARTY. 
Victor Grayson's significance as a focus for criticism of 
the ILP's policy was revealed at that party's 1909 Conference. 
Although critics of the Labour alliance were soundly defeated 
on a number of key votes, Grayson was successful in re- 
ferring back a section of the NAC's report which justified 
their action in refusing to book him for meetings. MacDonald, 
Hardie, Glasier and Snowden thereupon resigned from the NAC, 
accusing Grayson of attempting to subvert the ILP. Grayson, 
for his part, felt that the resignations were stage-managed 
in an attempt to rally support to the leadership. Whatever 
the truth of the matter, the Conference had revealed serious 
dissatisfaction with official policy. Opinion on the left 
of the party seemed to be hardening in favour of Socialist 
unity, a fact emphasised. by Grayson himself when he co- 
authored The Problem of Parliament with G. R. S. Taylor and 
expressly dedicated it to the formation of a Socialist party. 
He felt, with Hyndman and Quelch, that the rank and file of 
the ILP and SDF had much in common, and when Grayson joined 
the staff of the Clarion in February 1909 he used the paper 
to agitate for a united Socialist party built out of the 
ranks of the ILP, SDF, and Clarion organisations. As a 
staging post to unity he advocated the formation of 
Socialist 
electoral federations, or Socialist Representation Committees. 
The first steps were taken in Manchester, understandably 
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so, for it was there that Grayson had first risen to promin- 
ence as a Socialist propagandist, and he retained links with 
Socialists of all parties in the city. Manchester was 
'favourable terrain' for such an initiative, having a strong 
tradition of SDF/ILP co-operation and its ILP branches a 
reputation for independence of thought and action. 
] 
The 
initiative was taken by George Simpson, secretary of the 
Clarion Cycling Club and manager of the Manchester Clarion 
Cafe, who circulated 86 branches of various organisations 
towards the end of 1909. Subsequently, representatives of 21 
Socialist societies attended an inaugural meeting in February 
1910, although only 11 societies representing 800 members 
had joined by mid-May. Still, a momentum had been established 
and Grayson, after his defeat at Colne Valley in January 1910, 
issued a unity appeal which backed the Manchester SRC. 
There are thousands of unattached Socialists that 
must be yearning for a party that knows its mind 
and has courage and culture to express it. There 
are branches that are chafing against the tightly 
held rein. Let them come together under a common 
banner and rejuvenate our good cause. 
2 
In June of that year the 'Provisional Committee for the 
promotion of common ground among Socialists' 
issued its 
first circular, supporting the formation of SRCs. 
Although 
the Committee included the SDFers E. C. Fairchild and 
506. 
Albert Purcell, the SDF executive was suspicious of these 
new developments, seeing them as a further dilution of 
Socialism and a threat to the Federation's national organis- 
ation. Quelch attacked SRCs as 'imitations of the Labour 
Party' and argued that 'where people are so closely agreed 
so loose a form of combination is not sufficient. '3 The 
Manchester SDF clearly took his point, for at a meeting of 
the SRC in September they urged that 'Unity can best be 
achieved by affiliation to a Socialist organisation - the 
S. D. F. '4 This certainly did not fit the ILP branches' view 
of future organisation, and Simpson and Grayson were already 
suggesting the formation of a completely new party as a means 
of bringing together Socialists of all persuasions. 
Throughout 1911 the Grayson campaign intensified. SRCs 
were formed at Birmingham and Liverpool, SDF and ILP branches 
amalgamated to form Socialist societies at Oldham, Bury and 
Ashton. Leonard Hall, disillusioned by the failure of his 
attempt to democratise the ILP, joined the Birmingham SRC 
and later in the year H. Russell Smart also defected. The 
adherence of such prominent ILPers and the wave of industrial 
militancy in 1911 gave the idea of Socialist unity the 
appearance of inevitability. Thus Grayson announced, 
in 
August 1911, that 'The psychological moment has at last 
arrived... The time for the formation of "THE BRITISH 
SOCIALIST PARTY" has definitely come! .... If we miss 
this 
moment we have missed the opportunity of a century. 
'5 
Grayson shared with the SDF a belief that the year of 
1911 
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was to be a momentous one for British Socialism, but the 
two campaigns bore a number of significant differences. There 
is no direct evidence to suggest that Grayson's campaign was 
initiated in opposition to that of the SDF, but a number of 
incidents prior to the Unity Conference, which was called 
for Manchester on the weekend of 30 September-1 October, 
demonstrated the tension that lay beneath the surface. 
Whereas the SDF wished already organized groupings to send 
delegates to the Conference, there to discuss the grounds 
for amalgamation, Grayson appealed to individuals to send 
in their names for the formation of a completely new party. 
A mere expansion of already existing parties was not what was 
needed, he argued. 'For our new wine we must have new 
bottles. '6 This was not at all agreeable to the SDF. As 
Justice proclaimed shortly afterwards: 
we cannot regard with any favour any attempt to 
form a new Socialist Party independent of exist- 
ing organisations. Such an attempt... cannot but 
increase the number of rival organizations, and 
add to the present lamentable divisions, instead 
of uniting the Socialist organizations which 
already exist and eliminating those divisions. 
7 
Yet, Grayson's fledgling body appeared to have every 
chance of success. Within a week of his appeal he was writing 
that 'The British Socialist Party is practically an accomp- 
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lished fact... the response has been really extraordinary. '8 
Letters had flooded into The Clarion, embryo branches were 
already in existence, Clarion Cycling Clubs and Socialist 
Churches had agreed to enter the new party. Hundreds of 
ILPers, said Grayson, had written welcoming the BSP. One 
must beware of taking his claims too seriously at this stage. 
Individual ILPers were enthusiastic but ILP strongholds 
remained sceptical. The editor of The Worker, the paper 
of the Huddersfield ILP, remarked of the BSP that it was 
'an odd way of furthering unity, to promote disunity, '9 
when there were already plenty of parties to join. Nonethe- 
less Grayson's appeal had clearly touched a chord, and worried 
SDF leaders warned their members not to fill in the Clarion 
forms but to wait until the Manchester Unity Conference. 
Grayson made his view of the SDF's manoeuvres explicitly 
clear. He accused the Federation of having lost its enthus- 
iasm and efficiency, and stated categorically that it was 
the condition of the SDF as much as anything else which 
rendered the formation of the British Socialist Party 
essential. Their steps to unity, he wrote, 'will amount 
10 
to little more than an enlargement of the S. D. P. 
' 
Differences of outlook appeared very early too. Robert 
Blatchford appealed to his readers at the start of the 
campaign not to confound the principles of Socialism with 
other principles but to let each man be free to express 
his 
views on all points outside the mere plain principles 
of 
Socialism. The British Socialist Party was to 
be a wide, 
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all-embracing party, having 'a natural sympathy with those 
who are organizing the workers on the basis of toil instead 
of craft, for direct action in the industrial field as well 
as for political action on elected bodies. ' 
11 
Leonard 
Hall also expressed the view that 'The people's real hope 
and strength lie for the present in the industrial field. '12 
This emphasis on direct action clearly ran counter to the 
SDF's traditional political orthodoxy and suggested problems 
ahead. 
Yet the new BSP had made spectacular progress even before 
the Conference. Branches in Birmingham and Sheffield reported 
300 and 100 members respectively; the United Socialist 
Propaganda League had come over; a hugely successful meeting 
had been held at St. George's Hall, Bradford, in the heart 
of ILP territory. Grayson's appeal had spread far and wide, 
encompassing all except the 'impossibilists' of the SLP and 
the SPGB, whom he regarded as a probable 'immediate source 
of division. '13 The British Socialist movement appeared set 
for a renaissance. And when Grayson, on the weekend of the 
Conference itself, wrote in very conciliatory terms that he 
had misunderstood the intentions of the SDF and that their 
plan now harmonised 'absolutely with our own project, '14 a 
union of Socialists outside the Labour Party seemed a real- 
isable goal. The events at the Unity Conference 
itself re- 
inforced this optimism. A genuine atmosphere of unity and 
comradeship pervaded the proceedings, overriding any 
dif- 
ferences of opinion as to policy. Thus Hyndman, closing 
the 
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Conference, declared that 
It was a subject of rejoicing that they were 
now sending from Manchester a message to the 
Socialists of the world that at last a step 
had been taken in the constitution of a really 
organized and united Socialist Party in this 
15 
country. 
There was a general feeling of euphoria in the air, summed 
up by Grayson a week later when he wrote that the Conference 
'was the most harmonious and unanimous Conference of its 
kind that has ever been held. '16 Certainly, attendance at 
the Conference was impressive. Delegates claimed to 
represent 41 ILP branches, 32 Clarion organisations, 85 
SDF branches, 50 local Socialist Societies and 12 branches 
of the new BSP, totalling some 35,000 members in all. A 
further 46 organisations, including 18 ILP branches, had 
sent messages of support. The title of 'British Socialist 
Party' had been adopted overwhelmingly, and a provisional 
committee appointed to draw up a constitution. Debates 
had been fraternal and any suggestion of SDF predominance 
seemed unfounded, for six of the ten Provisional Executive 
members were from outside the Federation. 
17 
When Grayson 
wrote that the SDF had 'made a stupendous and generous 
sacrifice in the interests of Socialist Unity' any 
lingering 
doubts as to the homogeneity of the new party should 
have 
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been dispelled. How successful then had been the appeal 
to the rank and file of the ILP? How accurate were the 
membership figures so proudly announced after the Conference? 
Was the BSP truly an expression of Socialist faith en- 
compassing all sections of the Movement or was it, as most 
historians of Socialism would claim, simply the SDF under 
another name? To what extent were the various groupings 
united on policy? 
The debates around the basis of union had been friendly but 
they had demonstrated a number of differing tendencies. 
Harry Quelch moved the resolution on the subject of union 
in the following terms: 
The Socialist Party is the political expression of 
the working class movement, acting in the closest 
co-operation for the socialisation of the means 
of production and distribution.. .. Alike 
in its 
objects, its ideals, and in the means employed, 
the Socialist Party, though striving for the 
realization of immediate social reforms demanded 
by the working class, is not a reformist but a 
revolutionary party, which recognizes that 
social freedom and equality can only be won by 
fighting the class war through to the finish.... 
18 
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Tom Groom, on behalf of the Clarion Clubs, moved an 
amendment which stated that the acceptance of basic 
Socialist principles was sufficient ground for membership 
and asking for the reference to 'class war' to be deleted, 
on the grounds that it would alienate many potential adherents. 
This was defeated, but a more lengthy debate arose around 
a Leonard Hall amendment which proposed a policy for the 
party of 'working by revolutionary industrial tactics sup- 
plemented by political action. ' Hall, the ex-ILPer and 
co-signatory of the 'Green Manifesto', had moved rapidly 
towards syndicalism as he became disenchanted with the 
Labour Party's performance in Parliament. The manifesto 
of the Birmingham section of the BSP, issued before the 
Unity Conference, was an outright syndicalist document 
declaring in favour of the general strike as the means of 
overthrowing capitalism. It also demonstrated Clarion 
influence in its call for a 'workers' commonwealth' rather 
than 'state capitalism'. Hall argued strongly at Conference 
against the parliamentary road to Socialism, which he feared 
would make the BSP a 'second edition of the so-called 
Labour Party', and he urged members 'to popularise both 
the idea and the practical organisation of the sympathetic 
and general strike'. 
19 This was, of course, anathema to 
SDF orthodoxy, Mann having resigned over the issue, and 
leading SDFers argued volubly against Hall. He was 
supported by Alf Barton of Sheffield, an ex-ILPer, and 
by Grayson and although his amendment was defeated by 
92 
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votes to 62 the debate demonstrated considerable support for 
his views. Furthermore, Hall and his supporters had one 
significant success when they attacked the SDF's 'long list 
of absurd palliatives' and succeeded in deleting such 
'reformist' suggestions. 
Other areas of division were also evident. Conflicting 
attitudes to the Labour Party were clearly apparent. Whilst 
the SDF had always opposed reaffiliation a significant 
section of its leadership was in the process of reassessing 
its position. But Grayson and Hall were clearly hostile; 
Grayson's political stance had hardened since 1907 and he 
vehemently opposed any approach by the BSP to the Labour 
Party. Their defection from the ILP was a direct result of 
its attachment to the Labour alliance and they saw no 
reason for the BSP to make the same mistake. George Simpson 
was of like opinion, regarding the alliance as 'one of 
the greatest barriers to socialism'. 
20 
These three were far 
more condemnatory of the Labour Party at this time than were 
the SDF leaders and this issue was one which epitomised the 
way in which the 'Old Guard' were eventually to be out- 
flanked by a younger and more radical generation of Socialists. 
There was also disagreement over the question of organisation. 
Many of the ex-ILPers were strong proponents of internal 
democracy, totally opposed to centralised control; their 
dislike of the ILP cabal of Hardie, Glasier, MacDonald 
and Snowden had been a prime factor in their decision to 
leave the party. The Clarion element was similarly motivated; 
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the rationale of the paper's existence had been an aversion 
to leadership, the need for a rank and file viewpoint. 
Grayson's unity campaign had also emphasised this strain. 
Thus the ILP/Clarion wing of the BSP favoured a loose 
federal structure, as opposed to the SDF, which advocated 
'complete amalgamation, complete fusion'. 
There were in fact three demonstrable groupings at this 
initial conference. There were those, including many ex- 
ILPers, attracted by Grayson and loyal to the cultural 
impulses of Tae Clarion, who hoped for an entirely new 
party, as all-embracing as possible; the SDF, anxious to 
maintain its own traditions as the nucleus of the new party; 
and finally Leonard Hall and his followers, increasingly 
attracted to syndicalism. If the Conference were to achieve 
its aim then these tendencies would have to exist harmoniously. 
As Stanley Pierson has noted of the Social-Democratic 
Federation, `In their efforts to spread their sails to catch 
the gusts of disaffection emanating from the ILP and the new 
winds of syndicalism, the SDP leaders were endangering their 
historic commitment to political action. ' 
22 Would they 
demonstrate a greater sensitivity than in the past to 
currents of thought and action outside their perception, in 
order to maintain their breakthrough from isolation? 
On the surface the BSP progressed smoothly after the 
Conference and its organizers appeared confident. Those 
ILP 
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branches moving over to the new party included Failsworth, 
Maidstone, Romford, Wakefield, St. Helens, Crewe, Stretford, 
Balham and Stoke Newington. The Colne Valley Socialist 
League seceded from the ILP and Conrad Noel, the 'red' 
vicar of Thaxted, resigned his membership and joined the 
BSP. Leonard Hall argued that one-third of the ILP had 
come over to the BSP and Grayson was as definite in his 
claims: 'if the B. S. P. has not up to the present moment 
absorbed at least thirty per cent of the Independent Labour 
Party, our forms are liars and ought to be torn up, '23 he 
said. There is little evidence to support the claim that 
the BSP attracted ILP members in such numbers, and indeed 
much evidence suggests that initial estimates of membership 
were exaggerated. As Morris has pointed out, there are no 
reliable membership figures for bodies represented at the 
Unity Conference other than the SDF and ILP branches. There 
was also 'a fair degree of over affiliation... numerous cases 
of overlap'. 
24 
Delegates attended from SRCs and their 
affiliated bodies, from Clarion groups and SDF/ILP/BSP 
branches in the same town. As fa- as ILP recruitment is 
concerned precise figures are difficult to estimate. Grayson 
and Hall's analysis of 30 per cent was flatly denied by the 
Labour Leader, which put the figure as low as five per cent, 
presumably for propaganda purposes. Quite clearly temporary 
incursions into ILP support were made. Membership in the 
Lancashire division fell by 900 in 1911-12, and the 22 
Lancashire branches represented at the Conference was a quarter 
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of the divisional total. By 1913 Altrincham was the only 
branch left in its federation, many Cheshire members having 
followed their NAC member into the BSP. Other groupings, 
the Colne Valley Socialist League and Openshaw Socialist 
Society for example, were ex-ILP branches which had already 
seceded. Yet there were limits to these losses. They were 
concentrated in South Lancashire, the BSP failing to extend 
much beyond the SDF branches in the north-east of the county. 
'It was also evident that few branches came over in total 
and that some which attended the Socialist Unity Conference 
remained in the ILP. The branches shed were generally smaller 
ones with traditions of disaffection and semi-autonomy'. 
25 
Research into the West Riding of Yorkshire suggests that at 
the height of its support, in March 1912, the BSP there could 
claim 2,000 members, Of these 'perhaps between 1,000 and 
1,300 ILP members went over..., nearer 20 per cent than 
the 30 per cent Glayson claimed. ' 
26 
Many of these were from 
the Colne Valley Socialist League, Grayson's heartland. It 
is obvious therefore that the BSP did appeal to dissident 
ILPers, but certainly not on the hoped-for scale. Many of 
the opponents of ILP policy, J. M. McLachlan for example - 
co-author of the 'Green Manifesto' with Hall and a 
director 
of the Manchester Clarion Cafe - did not cross over 
because 
they were not convinced that the BSP offered a realistic 
alternative to the Labour Alliance. The British Socialist 
Party had first to prove itself. 
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It had been decided at Conference that the SDF should 
retain its organisation intact until a new constitution had 
been ratified by the branches; in other words individual 
branches were not to join the BSP, the SDF would merge as 
one body. Grayson agreed to this, and the Provisional Committec> 
went ahead with drafting a constitution. At its first 
meeting the object of the party was declared to be 'the 
establishment of the Co-operative Commonwealth - that is to 
say, the transformation of capitalist competitive society 
into a Socialist or Communist society'. 
27 
In the immediate 
term the BSP would support all measures which protected the 
life and health of the workers. As to its methods, the 
party would use education, co-operation with the unions, and 
above all the establishment of an independent Socialist party 
in Parliament. The response was sufficiently encouraging 
for H. W. Lee, secretary to the Committee, to report that 
The Social-Democratic Party nationally expressed 
its entire concurrence with the decisions of the 
Provisional Committee, and 105 other bodies and 
branches expressed their readiness to agree to 
the Constitution in order that the B. S. P. might 
28 
go ahead without further delay. 
The first conference of the BSP was arranged 
for Easter 1912 
in Manchester. 
Until this date the organisation had been run 
from 
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two centres. David Reid had dealt with The Clarion operation, 
Lee had looked after affairs for the SDF. With the party now 
officially established activities were centralised at Chandos 
Hall, the SDF headquarters, but as Walter Kendall has 
observed 
Grayson quickly realized that he had been outwitted. 
The SDP had no intention of dissolving into the 
British Socialist Party before the next year's 
conference. In the meantime its organization re- 
mained in being. By relinquishing the Workship 
Street office, and consenting to centralisation 
under Lee, Grayson had handed over organizational 
control of the new party to the SDP. 
29 
Although Lee defended this manoeuvre as a means of allowing 
the SDF 'to wind up its internal affairs', Grayson aired his 
dissatisfaction publicly- early in the New Year. He 
attacked the SDF for its duplicity and argued that 'no 
amalgamation should or can take place until the S. D. P. has 
ceased to exist as a separate organization. ' 
30 
Grayson 
further protested that by transforming the Provisional 
Committee into the Executive Committee, and by transferring 
the headquarters to Chandos Hall on an extended lease, the 
members concerned had taken steps 'for which we 
had not a 
scrap of delegated authority'. Both he and Tom 
Groom insisted 
that the new party needed to make a fresh start or 
it was 
doomed to failure. 
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Although Grayson vehemently denied any split within 
the BSP this was his last article in the Clarion, and he 
gradually reduced his activity. He was absent altogether from 
the 1912 Conference, and a story he w 
reflected his disillusionment. 
31 
For 
still used on propaganda posters, and 
country, albeit intermittently, but a 
marked the end of his commitment. It 
rote for Justice in May 
a while his name was 
he lectured around the 
severe illness in 1913 
has been suggested that 
Grayson's departure was 'the end of the prospect of forming 
a united socialist party' for 'He was perhaps the one figure 
who could have cut across the antagonism between the ILP 
and the SDF. '32 It is doubtful whether anyone could have 
persuaded the ILP leadership to support unity with the SDF 
outside the Labour Party, but this view, to an extent, over- 
estimates the man. Grayson had indeed attracted some ILPers 
into the BSP, but in smaller numbers than he had hoped. His 
main area of support straddled the Yorkshire/Lancashire 
boundary, and he was by no means as popular in the rest of 
the country. Even in the Colne Valley constituency which 
he won in 1907 his erratic behaviour had irritated many of his 
former supporters and France Littlewood, ex-ILP national 
treasurer and a stalwart Grayson supporter at that election, 
denounced his candidature in 1910. His withdrawal 
from the 
BSP at such an early stage, at the first rebuff, suggests a 
lack of moral fibre and his frequent drunken bouts served 
to emphasize this. The place to challenge the old 
SDF group 
was from within the BSP, at Party Conference and on the 
520. 
Executive, where he was certainly not outnumbered. By 
failing to do so he gave credence to the notion that his 
intention hadbeen to form a 'Grayson party' rather than a 
united Socialist party. 
33 
His later career, allied with 
his previous outbursts in Parliament, lead one to suspect 
a certain instability which rendered Grayson incapable of 
buckling down to the everyday work of organization. Fred 
Jowett had justifiably accused him of lacking group loyalty 
during his ILP days and it does seem that he was very much 
an individualist. In this he reflected the Clarion philoso- 
phy; neither he nor Blatchford was capable of sustained 
work within an organisation; like the Clarion they worked 
best as free-lance operators for the movement at large. It 
would not therefore be correct to assume that the SDF had a 
preconceived plan to 'capture' the BSP. There is no evidence 
to suggest that but the somewhat amorphous nature of the non- 
SDF elements, allied to the organisational incapacity of the 
Grayson group, made it easy for the Federation 
'Old Guard' 
to assume control. As they had frustrated dissidents within 
their own organisation so were they able to exasperate the 
new adherents to the BSP. Grayson's departure was 
in fact 
a reflection of his ill-health and of his general 
disillusion- 
ment and it cannot be blamed for the failure of 
the BSP, for 
there were weaknesses inherent in the party 
from its 
inception. 34 
The affiliation of the Clarion groups to 
the British 
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Socialist Party had been diminished by the SDF's insistence 
on maintaining the full rigours of the class-war doctrine 
at the expense of forging a broader alliance. Tom Groom 
declared shortly after the Unity Conference that 'the 
Clarion Cycling Club, as a club, cannot become an integral 
part of the B. S. P. because the new Party will insist very 
definitely on the full acceptance of Socialism as a nec- 
cessary qualification for membership. '35 There were other 
dissenters too. H. Russell Smart appealed to the party 
to carry out a much-needed scrapping of worn-out mental 
rubbish in the form of creeds, dogmas and shibboleths such 
as the ideas of class-consciousness and class war. 
Socialism, as it appears to me, is not diverted 
to fighting this or any other class war to a 
finish, but to organize society on an entirely 
different basis which would remove the causes 
of these fratricidal struggles; and the more 
of real Socialism we get the less the class 
36 
war is apparent. 
Smart's views were ridiculed but they demonstrated the 
heterogeneous nature of the supposedly united party. Groom 
ceased to edit BSP notes for the Clarion and withdrew from 
active work for the party shortly after Grayson's departure. 
The Clarion element was thus severely weakened within the 
first six months and the paper's coverage of BSP affairs was 
greatly reduced. 
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The other major faction at the Unity Conference had 
been the Syndicalists. Although defeated there they were 
temporarily encouraged by the new constitution which declared 
that political and industrial action were complementary to 
each other. Indeed, the issue of a 'Manifesto to Railway 
Workers' in December 1911, calling on them to unite with 
the miners, transport workers, and seamen, 'to act all 
together and simultaneously', seemed to suggest an awakening 
to the realities of the industrial situation and a move 
towards the syndicalist idea of a general strike. This 
proved to be an illusion, as the special New Year's edition 
of Justice illustrated. There Hall declared that the BSP 
'must get and keep busy shattering, by repeated shocks, the 
nerve of the system, by encouraging and assisting to organise 
direct actionist tactics in the industrial field. '37 Quelch 
and Thomas Kennedy though reiterated the traditional SDF 
theme that the Socialist party must be the political expres- 
sion of the working class and, ominously, emphasised the 
need for party discipline. Outside the movement said 
Kennedy, soon to be London organiser of the party, 
'the 
present craze for anti-political direct action' 
is harmless, 
but inside 'its power for evil is enormously 
increased. ' 
The call for discipline worried many. Hall replied that 
'Democracy must begin at home - inside our own organisation 
', 3 
and another comrade retorted that 'rather than 
have such 
39 
discipline I prefer a party of free-lancers. 
' 
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As the new year progressed supporters of Hyndman began 
to attack the syndicalists in Justice and the British 
Socialist. They contended that any concessions gained by 
a strike were more than outweighed by the hardship caused 
to the strikers and their families. They insidiously 
suggested that syndicalist ideas were 'foreign' ideas, 
irrelevant to Britain. But, as ever, the main emphasis 
was that the industrial battlefield was a diversion from 
the question of political power. Fred Knee argued, quite 
correctly, that 
You cannot get very far by mere "industrial 
action". So long as the Capitalist state 
remains, with its army, navy and police, and 
its hand on the machine of administration, so 
long will it be possible for this capitalist 
state, when thoroughly awake to any danger, 
to throttle any strike, however big. " "40 
This was a correct appreciation of the weaknesses of 
syndicalism, but it made no attempt to establish the relation- 
ship which industrial action could have to political action. 
Herein lay the failure of the BSP leadership. Their policy 
of capturing parliament to take over the existing state as 
a vehicle for Socialist legislation ignored the nature of 
the imperialist state, and it totally neglected the signifi- 
cance of industrial struggle as a challenge to that state. 
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Hyndman's boast to The Times that he had 'never advocated 
, 
41 
a strike yet appalled many members. The failure of the 
BSP to provide a revolutionary political lead on all fronts 
of the class struggle encouraged many of the rank and file 
to turn to syndicalism. Although remaining members of their 
political party, as industrial militants they sought to 
express their conviction of the need for revolutionary 
struggle outside parliament, a need which, in the absence 
of a lead from the BSP, could only be provided by syndicalism. 
As the first Annual Conference of the BSP approached 
the Hyndmanites redoubled their efforts to discredit the 
syndicalists by raising the spectre of earlier splits in 
the movement. Syndicalism, declared Justice, was 'A recrudes- 
cence of that parasitical Anarchism which infected the 
Socialist movement in this country some twenty years ago. '42 
They deliberately distorted the syndicalist case, F. Victor 
Fisher suggesting that syndicalism 'merely substitutes the 
individual ownership of working-class syndicates for the 
individual ownership of capitalist trusts. 
'43 In response 
Hall and his supporters combined their demand for priority 
to be given to the industrial struggle with a plea 
for party 
democracy. E. C. Fairchild pleaded in vain for a synthesis 
of political and industrial action: 
'Let the strike and the 
vote, the industrial combination and the political party, 
44 
be as the right arm and the left arm of the 
human body. ' 
This, of course, restated the Provisional 
Committee's declar- 
ation of principles, which the Hyndmanites were 
now ignoring. 
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An initial disagreement over tactics was now a fundamental 
theoretical battle, a replaying of countless arguments with- 
in the SDF since the days of William Morris. Was there a 
parliamentary road to Socialism? Hall stated his position 
unequivocally. 'Industrial Unionism... is the ONLY effect- 
ive instrument of self-defence and self-assertion in the 
workers possession at all... our most potent forces for 
disintegrating Capitalism lie in the industrial field. 41 
Socialism, he argued, could not be brought about by mere 
Acts of Parliament. That would result in 'Bureaucratic 
Collectivism alias State Capitalism. ' Under Socialism the 
co-ordinating centres would be Parliaments of Industry, 
not Parliaments of politicians. This signalled a major 
battle to be fought at the 1912 Conference. 
Meanwhile the question of armaments and war had flared 
up again, with Zelda Kahan and Quelch engaging in a long- 
running dispute in the pages of the British Socialist. 
46 
Its appearance on the Conference agenda was ensured when 
Quelch published a paper entitled 'Socialism and Patriotism. 
' 
47 
The suffrage question also continued to create dif- 
ficulties, with Leonard Hall once more a forceful opponent 
of the official line. Socialists should not 
'be splitting 
hairs and uttering demurrers about methods', he wrote, and 
the BSP should support the suffragettes. 
48 
Bax continued 
to purvey his rabidly anti-feminist views, whilst 
the 
Executive condemned 'the hooligan antics' of the suffragettes 
and maintained its stance in favour of 
'universal adult 
suffrage'. 
nr 
Such controversy gave heightened significance to 
the First Annual Conference of the BSP, scheduled for 
Manchester at the end of May 1912. This would have been 
eagerly awaited in any case as an indicator of the success 
or otherwise of the new party. What progress had it made? 
Reports from around the country indicated increased member- 
ship. In London 59 branches were represented at a London 
District Conference; 
49 
the Manchester District Council 
reported 37 branches in membership, South Salford claiming 
230 members and Stockport 300; 
50 
the West Yorkshire District 
Council claimed to represent 1,000 members, 
51 
the Hull 
branch announcing 110 members, 
52 
Sheffield 200,53 Wakefield 
70,54 and Bradford a phenomenal 400.55 A 'magnifice. nt 
demonstration' was reported at the London Opera House, 
56 
and the Pioneer Boot Company voted to transfer its profits 
from the SDF to the BSP. Perhaps the only sour note had 
been struck by the movement abroad, which failed to grant 
its approbation. Vor-warts, the German Socialist journal, 
remarked that 'By Socialist Unity in England one has always 
understood the union of the S. D. P. and I. L. P. That is the 
problem; there is no other. '57 However, that could not be 
achieved unless the BSP affiliated to the Labour Party and 
in 1912 that was not seriously on the agenda. What the 
1912 
Conference would demonstrate was whether or not the 
BSP 
could maintain its own unity. As the delegates assembled 
many must have been fearful of the outcome. 
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Hyndman's opening address to the 1912 Conference in many 
ways highlighted the contradictions within the party. He 
claimed success for the new BSP yet at the same time admitted 
that there had been difficulties since the Unity Conference. 
The industrial unrest, he said, made paramount the need for 
a revolutionary party but the BSP should also support 
palliatives 'asstepping stones to peaceful revolution. '58 
Most revealing was his reference to the syndicalists. 
Having conciliatorily argued that the party should place 
its resources at the services of the strikers Hyndman 
rounded savagely on those of the industrial persuasion: 
'Of the futility o. f resuscitated Syndicalism it is needless 
to speak. There is nothing real and nothing ideal in the 
floundering and hysterical propaganda of segregated grab. '59 
The 'Old Guard's' view that the main function of the 
Socialist Party 'is the organization of an independent 
political party of the working-class'60 remained unchanged 
and Hall's attempt to make that but one of the party's main 
functions met with vehement opposition. Quelch argued 
that 
the organisation of industrial operations was the 
task of 
the Trade Union Congress and Hyndman for his part mocked 
the proponents of the strike: 'You keep on crying 
"Don't 
shoot"' but they shoot you just the same, and you 
deserve 
to be shot, because you don 't take the means of stopping 
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the shooting. '61 Hall's amendment was defeated, but he 
had gained the support of one-third of the delegates and 
he came second in the ballot for the Executive Committee, 
which suggests the strength of support the syndicalists 
could claim. 
Three other controversial questions arose at conference. 
One was the submission of Quelch's paper on 'Socialism and 
Patriotism', urging the need for a citizen army and a 
bigger navy. This was narrowly approved by 83 votes to 65, 
a further pointer to an increasingly sizable opposition to 
the Hyndmanites. Similarly the discussion on the suffrage 
demonstrated a real difference of opinion. But the question 
of relations with the Labour party took a new turn. J. 
Hunter Watts was the spokesman for a tendency which wished 
the BSP to continue the tradition of the SDF and affiliate 
to the International Socialist Bureau through the British 
Committee, where the Labour Party had a majority. A 
failure to do so, they argued, would isolate the BSP 
totally from the other wing of the working-class movement. 
William Gallacher of Paisley suggested a new tactic: the 
British Socialist Party should 'seek direct and independent 
affiliation to the International Socialist Bureau'. This 
was carried by a large majority. 
What did the first conference of the BSP reveal about 
the party? The national press made great play of disorderly 
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scenes during the debate on industrial action, but Justice 
passed these off as an 'excess of zeal' on the part of 
'comparative newcomers into the movement, whose chief fault 
62 is their deadly earnestness'. The official view was 
that the Conference set the BSP 'firmly on its feet' and 
'defined its policy, its mission and its methods. '63 In 
one sense certainly the outcome was satisfactory, for an 
open breach between conflicting wings of the party had been 
avoided. The constitution, declaring that methods of 
advancing Socialism embraced both 'the advocacy of industrial 
unity of all workers' and 'the establishment of a militant 
Socialist Party in Parliament and on Local Bodies', offered 
hope to the syndicalists. The reinsertion in the constitution 
of a provision for immediate demands and co-operation with 
the unions ensured that the party would not lapse into 
'impossibilism'. Those who feared SDF control were soothed 
by the composition of the new executive. Hall and Russell 
Smart were both elected, along with E. C. Fairchild and 
Zelda Kahan representing the left-wing of the old SDF. 
Ben Tillett and Conrad Noel were closer to these than to 
the Hyndmanites, who were represented by Quelch, Dan Irving 
and F. Victor Fisher. Walter Kendall has commented that 
'The influx of members at the time of the formation of the 
BSP loosened the hold of the old guard on the party, and 
at the same time encouraged new thinking. '64 This was 
true, but in the short term Hyndman and 
his 
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supporters were able to fight off the challenge. 
Yet all the in fighting appeared removed from reality 
for organisationally the picture was far from encouraging. 
The BSP claimed 370 branches and 40,000 members, yet these 
figures obscured the true situation. Total dues reported 
were only E650 which, at one shilling per head, gave a 
total of only 13,000 paying members. This was scarcely 
an advance on the SDF's membership, and the BSP's total of 
150 seats on local government bodies was similarly unimpres- 
sive. Compared with an ILP paying membership of 30,000 
and its 1,070 local government representatives then it is 
obvious that the British Socialist Party had not made the 
hoped for breakthrough. Consequently the Executive launched 
a 'Great Propaganda Campaign' immediately after the 
Conference, headed by H. Russell Smart but the plans for 
the campaign demonstrated a similar marked failure to grasp 
reality. The highly optimistic long-term aim was to enrol 
a million members within five years, but in the short term 
the target was 100,000 members by the time of the next 
conference. A committee was appointed to think up new ideas 
for recruiting members. Meetings were to be attractive and 
entertaining, using choirs and lantern shows, providing 
literature, being advertised by striking wall posters. 
The 
main focus of attention was to be an 'organised and persistent 
65 
house-to-house propaganda and distributing of 
literature. ` 
An appeal was launched to raise £10,000 to finance this 
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campaign but the effort barely got off the ground. The 
last recorded figure showed only £150 raised. 
66 
This 
reflected not only a financial crisis but declining support 
for the party, even in its Lancashire stronghold. As 
early as March there were complaints of Lancashire branches 
defaulting on their dues. The Wigan branch had collapsed 
by June and others suffered from 'the slump which has been 
in evidence all over Manchester. '67 Reports from the 
autumn speaking tour indicated far smaller audiences than 
those present at the beginning of the unity campaign. 
Declining support was both a cause and a consequence 
of financial instability. A feature of the BSP's history 
is its perpetual appeals for money. Attempts were made 
to regularise fund-raising; a Trading Committee was estab- 
lished to retail tea, cocoa, tobacco and the 'Red Flag' 
toffee produced by the Leeds branch; a Co-operative Stores 
was set up; the Pioneer Boot Company continued to plough 
its profits into the party. 
68 
Yet these efforts merely 
staved off crisis, and the problem was compounded by the 
failure of the Twentieth Century Press after a libel action. 
The company was put in the hands of a receiver and eventually 
sold in November 1912 for £1,500. A new company was floated 
and 40,000 one shilling shares were offered to BSP members. 
So poor was the response that fewer than 5,000 were sold 
in the ensuing six months. Financial problems were, of 
course, nothing new for the Socialists but they 
demonstrated 
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the failure of the BSP to expand far beyond the confines 
of the SDF. This was undoubtedly due to political instability, 
to a power struggle between the SDF and the newer elements 
in the party as the 'Socialism versus Syndicalism' contro- 
versy precipitated a damaging split. 
The syndicalist wing of the BSP attempted to counteract 
the assaults on their position with reasoned arguments. 
George Simpson suggested that 
The aim of Syndicalism and Socialism is the same - 
viz, the common ownership of the means of pro- 
duction and exchange - but while the Socialists 
and the Socialist movement believe that the end 
will be attained by political means, the 
Syndicalist believes that Socialism will be 
brought about by means of direct action and the 
general strike. 
Hilaire Belloc's The Servile State had made a considerable 
impact on many Socialists, and Simpson argued that syndical- 
ist methods were in fact the only protection against this 
eventuality, for they would result in the autonomy of each 
industry and commune in terms of organisation, although 
production would be for the benefit of all. 
Simpson was 
at pains to point out that syndicalists were not anti- 
parliamentarian but, he said, 'economic power always precedes 
political power, the latter only being the result 
of the 
former. ' He concluded by quoting Tom 
Mann's thesis that 
once the politicians were backed up by 
'an economic 
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fighting force.. . they will actually be able to do what 
would now be hopeless for them to attempt to do. '69 This 
reasoned statement was met with a counterblast of abuse 
and distortion. Syndicalism was classed as impossible and 
reactionary by Fred Knee, 
70 
as a 'transient excrescence 
on a great world movement'71 by J Hunter Watts. It was a 
denial of the class war, an effort 'to belittle, hamper and 
thwart the political organization and action of the working 
class'72 through a revival of anarchism. Protests at such 
misrepresentation were ignored and indeed the syndicalists 
found it increasingly difficult to get their views aired 
in Justice. Consequently The Clarion and Daily Herald were 
used as a platform, and the newly-formed Central Labour 
College became a seeding ground for their ideas. Their 
attitude hardened and Smart in particular was forthright 
in his denunciation of 'the old reformist hesitancy. ' 
73 
Only Theodore Rothstein seemed able to apply a clear 
revolutionary perspective to the dispute. Echoing 
Engels' 
comments on the industrial upsurge twenty years previously 
he saw the strike wave as developing class consciousness. 
'It is a revolution in the psychology of the working 
class, ' 
he argued, which created a receptive 
field for political 
agitation. 
Never mind that we are a political party 
and 
that our object is to fight on 
behalf of the 
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working-class politically: by lending our 
assistance to the working-class in its econ- 
omic fight.. . we shall be helping to widen the 
area and deepen the contents of the class war 
and thereby accelerate its transformation into 
a political movement. 
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The Hyndmanites, conditioned by 30 years of political 
agitation, had no mind to listen; the syndicalists, forced 
into a corner, saw no alternative but to carry their views 
to the extreme. Birmingham saw the dispute in microcosm 
and one member wrote that 'the Birmingham B. S. P. is being 
rapidly disintegrated over this miserable question. '75 
In October came the inevitable break. 
The Executive issued a Manifesto on 'Political Action 
and Direct Action', emphasising the primacy of the former 
and denouncing supporters of the latter as anarchists, 
levellers and Luddites, belonging to 'a lower stage of 
economic development. ' 
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Hall and Smart quickly dissociated 
themselves from the Manifesto, supported by Conrad Noel who 
saw it as disastrously one-sided. The three charged that 
they had not signed the Manifesto and that it had been 
altered without their knowledge. This was denied but they 
received widespread support, Doncaster and Huddersfield 
branches for example passing resolutions in their 
favour. 
Hall and Smart resigned from the Executive shortly after- 
wards and Hall soon left the BSP altogether. 
He and George 
Simpson later joined the Socialist Labour Party. 
Of nine 
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Birmingham branches represented at the 1912 Conference 
only two sent delegates to that of 1913. Tom Mann also 
entered the fray, making a direct appeal to BSP members: 
'As the idea of Syndicalism spreads among the younger up- 
to-date members of the B. S. P. they will realize more and 
more the necessity for getting rid of the "Old Guard". If 
they don't the "Old Guard" will destroy the B. S. P: 
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The disruption severely weakened the BSP; many of the Clarion 
element became disenchanted and drifted away. As 1912 drew 
to a close the party seemed to be faltering from one crisis 
to another. Fewer than 100 wards were contested in the 
November municipal elections and successes were few. In 
December John Scurr, a long-time SDFer and ex-Executive 
member, announced his resignation from the BSP. The only 
basis for Socialist unity, said Scurr, was the fusion of 
the SDF and ILP and this had not been achieved. Even the 
advances made had been vitiated because 'From the Executive 
Council down to the smallest branch trouble is existing 
regarding policy and method in everything that matters. '78 
An aura of depression surrounded the BSP as it entered 
1913. 'It can scarcely be said that the past year has quite 
fulfilled its promise', 
79 
remarked Harry Quelch, and Fred 
Knee took an even dimmer view of events: 'Judged by all 
outward appearances 1912 has been a setback. politically 
Socialism has achieved nothing in Great Britain 
in this year 
of grace. ' 
80 
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Knee's explanation of the BSP's manifest failure was that 
'the new body has spoken with too many tongues and till 
now has lacked anything like unity of purpose or of doctrines 
81 
Yet it was the very attempt to impose a party orthodoxy, 
or more specifically the old SDF orthodoxy, which had re- 
tarded the party's development. The 'Old Guard's' failure 
either to adapt t or lead working-class struggles, their 
refusal to synthesise political and economic struggles, had 
alienated the majority of the ex-ILP/Clarion element who 
had brought to the BSP a variety of experiences and con- 
tributions. As Pierson quite rightly remarks of the BSP, 
'Not only did it fail to unify the various groups but the 
Social Democrats themselves were increasingly divided', 
82 
and the New Year brought more controversy. 
At an Executive meeting on 14 December 1912 Zelda 
Kahan finally succeeded in her long struggle against 
Hyndman's views on national defence. Her resolution dis- 
sociating the BSP from the propaganda for increased naval 
expenditure was carried by a majority of one. The resolution 
also called upon the British Government 'to desist from its 
provocative attitude towards Germany, to declare in favour 
of abandoning the right to capture at sea in times of war, 
to establish an entente with Germany, and to decrease 
its 
expenditure upon armaments. '83 The internationalist wing 
of the BSP had achieved a signal victory, but their cause 
was far from won. F. Victor Fisher resigned 
from the 
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Executive in protest at the resolution. Ostensibly his 
reasons were honourable: the party had not recorded a 
decision on the matter therefore he favoured liberty of 
thought, especially as any attempt to force a decision might 
split the party. Furthermore, he honestly believed that 
'Kaiserdom, junkerdom and the Prussian political autocracy' 
84 
were a threat to Britain. Darker motives soon became 
apparent though as Fisher attacked a policy 'largely 
inspired by comrades alien in blood and race' which would 
alienate the British public. Hyndman wrote in similar vein 
in the Socialist Record and it was obvious that the old 
anti-semitic, nationalist tone of the SDF was reasserting 
itself. Justice openly pushed the Hyndmanite viewpoint, 
causing Kahan to protest that the party organ should express 
party policy. Hyndman resigned as chairman of the BSP, 
a melodramatic gesture designed to gain support for his 
position, and Quelch, Lee and others peddled the view, quite 
astonishingly for professed Marxists, that the issue was not 
one of Socialist principle and therefore individuals should 
be free to express their own opinions. The Executive, they 
said, should not have taken a vote on the matter. 
Such arguments were too much for Kahan, who was 
becoming 
increasingly irritated by personal attacks on her as an 
85 
'alien Socialist' who 'breathes hatred of Britain. 
' 
She pointed out that the resolution was 
'simply a reaffirm- 
ation of the international Socialist position on the subject, 
' 
86 
which had unfortunately been rendered necesaary 
by 
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Hyndman's strenuous propaganda on the subject in the pages 
of the Morning Post and elsewhere. The BSP had to be dis- 
sociated from such views. There was a clear difference of 
opinion here as to the function of an executive. Kahan 
thought it should 'give our members a lead', 
87 
but the 
Hyndmanites felt that its duty was 'to carry out the mandate 
88 
of the Party' as expressed at Annual Conference, an 
attitude, one feels, expressed with tongue firmly in cheek 
by Hyndman at least. As the argument continued to rage the 
'Old Guard' once more proved themselves masters of political 
intrigue. At an Executive meeting on 15 February it was 
decided to suspend the armaments resolution and allow the 
party to decide the issue, a decision which immediately 
led Fisher to withdraw his resignation. An amazing about 
turn? Not at all, for there were only five Executive members 
present at this meeting. The matter had only been placed 
on the agenda, without prior notice, as a question arising 
out of the minutes of the last meeting. Hall was 
in South 
Africa, and Fairchild only arrived after the question 
had 
been disposed of. Both men had voted for the 
Kahan 
resolution. Noel and Tillett were absent from 
both meetings, 
but Fisher was allowed to vote because 
his resignation had 
yet to be formally considered. Consequently the vote went 
3-2 in favour of suspending the armaments resolution. 
Zelda Kahan was understandably furious. 
She resigned 
from the Executive and threatened to resign 
from the party 
altogether if the matter was shelved at 
Conference. Until 
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then, for the sake of unity, she would drop the subject 
'providing Hyndman and those who think with him pledge 
themselves to do likewise. 
89 
Her appeal fell on deaf 
ears and a further split in the party of Socialist unity 
seemed inevitable. Yet the Blackpool Conference of May 
1913 was, in many ways. an anti-climax. Although the 
national press once more delighted in a number of 'scenes' 
which occurred, the much-heralded split never transpired. 
This was due partly to a boycott of the Conference by three- 
quarters of the Scottish branches, who were largely anti- 
militarist, but even so Hyndman was heavily criticised by 
a number of delegates and, realising the strength of 
opposition, he compromised. For the sake of unity, he 
said, he was prepared to keep his views to himself. The 
resolution allowing members freedom to express their views 
on the subject was withdrawn and in its place the following 
was adopted: 
That this Conference congratulates our French 
and German comrades on their vigorous opposition 
to the increase of armaments in their respec- 
tive countries, and pledges the British 
Socialist Party, as an integral part of the 
International Socialist Party, bound by the 
resolutions on war of Stuttgart and Basle, 
1912, 
to pursue the same policy in Great Britain, 
with the object of checking the growth of all 
540. 
forms of militariým. 
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At the end of the debate Hyndman and Kahan shook hands - 
a breach had been avoided. 
The result of the armaments debate was inconclusive 
but, in the long term, significant. An opposition group, 
by remaining in the party to fight for their position, had 
forced the 'Old Guard' to retreat. After some thirty years 
a truly 'internationalist' stance had been adopted. The 
1913 Conference marked the first victory for the opposition 
and the beginning of a radical shift in policy for the 
BSP, presaging the eventual defeat of the Hyndmanite wing, 
which seceded in 1916 over the very same issue. In one 
sense Kahan's success had come too late, for the Conference 
also revealed a party in decline. In his opening address 
Irving commented that they had not been as successful as 
they anticipated. 'They certainly had not gone back, but 
at any rate they had not had the adhesion to their ranks 
, 
9l 
they anticipated from the Independent Labour Party. 
Even this was a somewhat sanguine appraisal of the party's 
fortunes, for the membership was claimed to be only 
15,313, as compared to 40,000 at the previous conference. 
This was little more than the membership of the 
SDF shortly 
before the unity campaign, and it seemed 
indeed that the 
party was once more centred on the old SDF 
heartland of 
London and Lancashire. Recruitment from the 
ILP had been 
a transitional phenomer_on, a picture reflected 
by the 
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history of the BSP in Yorkshire. 
As has already been noted the idea of Socialist unity, 
based upon the ILP and SDF, had never attracted significant 
support in West Yorkshire, where the ILP was overwhelmingly 
predominant. The Dewsbury by-election of 1902 and the 
subsequent Socialist revival did however suggest a body of 
opinion supportive of the idea, although significantly no 
Socialist Representation Committee was formed in the area. 
Grayson, with his roots in the Colne Valley Socialist 
League, made determined efforts to woo over ILPers to the 
new party and there were 27 organisations from the county 
represented at the Unity Conference in 1911. BSP branches 
mushroomed in the early period of enthusiasm and some 42 
branches can be traced at the height of the party's 
fortunes, with Bradford claiming over 500 members, Sheffield 
200, Hull 100 and Leeds also claiming substantial member- 
ship. Two District Councils were established in Yorkshire 
to co-ordinate activities; ILP defections, as we have noted, 
numbered some 1,300, with the Wakefield branch and Colne 
Valley Socialist League coming over. Skipton reported 
15 
ex-ILPers in its ranks and others were recruited 
in Keighley. 
In March 1912, when both locally and nationally the 
BSP 
was at its zenith, the West Yorkshire District 
Council 
claimed to represent 1,000 members. Add to 
this branches 
not represented on the Council and the membership 
of the 
Colne Valley Socialist League and a figure of 
2,000 members 
in West Yorkshire seems reasonable. Yet significantly 
no 
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prominent ILPer other than Grayson joined the BSP and 
leading ILP figures such as Fred Jowett and W. Leach in 
Bradford were severely critical of the new party. 
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After 
March 1912 support fell away rapidly. Twenty-two branches 
were represented at the 1912 Conference but only 10 at 
that of 1913. Essentially the Yorkshire BSP had slimmed 
down to its pre-1911 SDF core. Electoral success was 
minimal, with only F. Lockwood Liles in Bradford and Alf 
Barton in Sheffield in November 1913 counting as genuine 
BSP victories. Bradford was, in fact, the most successful 
BSP centre but even there it faded badly after 1912. When 
the national body imposed John Stokes, secretary of the 
London Trades Council, upon East Bradford as its parlia- 
mentary candidate the local branch was unable to gain ILP 
acquiescence and its chances of contesting, in the Labour 
interest, the constituency it regarded as its own appeared 
slim. The Leeds branches remained active under the tutelage 
of Bert Killip, who was elected to the Executive in 1913, 
and Sheffield could also boast a reasonably strong branch, 
which inclined towards syndicalism. But in general, 
'Ranged against the membership and successes of the ILP, 
the BSP's impact was embarrassingly poor and failure 
generated failure. '93 Developments in Leeds clearly demon- 
strated this, for in April 1913 the Leeds BSP decided, by 
a substantial majority, to affiliate to the local Labour 
Party. Its correspondent wrote to the Leeds Citizen, 
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explaining that 'we sincerely believe it will place us 
as a B. S. P. branch in a far better position for helping the 
workers of the district in their political aspirations 
and will make us more effective in fighting the class 
struggle'. 
94 
The idea of uniting the ILP and the SDF outside 
the Labour Party had been tried and found wanting, and 
the branch therefore substituted Labour unity for Socialist 
unity. This move foreshadowed events at a national level 
and demonstrated the failure of the Socialist alternative 
to the Labour alliance. 
The rationale for pursuing Socialist unity had been that the 
Labour Party, by compromising with capitalism, was ensuring 
its survival. 'Reformism' simply ensured the postponement 
of Socialism. Conference after conference of the SDF had 
rejected affiliation to the Labour Party and this attitude 
had been carried over into the BSP. Indeed the BSP went 
further than the SDF in seeking separate affiliation to the 
ISB on the grounds that the Labour Party was not a Socialist 
party. The ISB view had been defined by the Kautsky 
resolution of 1908 and direct affiliation was refused, but 
the BSP leaders still rejected the International's advice 
and refused to retreat into 'Labourism'. Relations between 
the BSP, the ILP, and the Labour Party became very strained 
as the BSP attacked the right of the latter to be members 
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or the Bureau at all, and a dispute over the Leicester 
by-election in 1913 caused a major rift. 
The Leicester Labour Party decided to contest a by- 
election in this two-member constituency, but both the 
Labour Party Executive and the NAC of the ILP refused to 
sanction a candidate. The reason was that James Ramsay 
MacDonald held one of the seats and an arrangement with the 
Liberals guaranteed them no opposition in the other. Local 
dissatisfaction encouraged- the BSP to nominate Edward 
Hartley of Bradford, who polled a respectable 2,580 votes. 
In an acrimonious exchange of letters after the election 
the BSP accused MacDonald of actively sabotaging their 
campaign, and when J. Hunter Watts once again suggested 
affiliation to the Labour Party a Justice editorial raged 
against alliance with 'an invertebrate, incoherent and 
lymphatic Labourism. ' Quelch, as ever, was adamant. 'We 
believe that we are right; therefore, those who differ from 
us must be wrong. '95 Yet Quelch soon found himself out- 
distanced by events as the ISB increased the pressure upon 
the British Socialist Party to affiliate to the Labour 
Party. A conference was held in London on 18 July, 1913, 
attended by representatives of the BSP, ILP and the Fabian 
Society and presided over by Vandervelde and Huysmans 
for 
the ISB. The latter suggested two measures: that a 
United 
Socialist Council should be formed, federation as a pre- 
paration for fusion, and that all sections should affiliate 
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to the Labour Party. Irving, for the BSP, argued that 
Socialist unity should not be dependent upon affiliation 
to the Labour Party, whereas the ILP representatives argued 
to the contrary. Glasier wanted no unity at all: 'The 
ILP is convinced that the spirit of the B. S. P. is fatal, 
and therefore it is not wise to tighten the band. 
96 
Old 
reflexes died hard but ISB pressure led to an agreement that 
the two proposals should go to the various executives and 
a further conference of the full executives would be held 
in November. 
As the matter was debated in Justice it quickly became 
apparent that the mood within the BSP had changed. Hyndman, 
Hunter Watts and Irving all expressed support for affili- 
ation, and so too did Zelda Kahan. Their withdrawal from 
the Labour Party, she argued, had not attracted to them 
the best elements of the Labour movement and had facilitated 
the rightward drift of the Labour Party. Because the BSP 
was outside it was mistrusted, seen as hostile and fault- 
finding, whereas 'Inside the Labour Party our criticisms 
would gain a far wider hearing' and 'we can hope to 
strengthen considerably the left wing... and by appearing 
as allies, as friends, as one of them, we shall 
have more 
influence on the rank and file'. Her most telling point, 
a tacit acceptance of the BSP's position as a political 
sect, was that 'The Labour Party, with all 
its weakness, is 
an effort, however faltering, of the working-class 
to take 
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its destiny in its own hands, and as such should be encouraged 
and helped by us. '97 George Moore Bell perhaps best summed 
up the prevailing mood when he wrote: 
Why should we Socialists paddle our canoe in the 
shallowest of shallow water, instead of launch- 
ing out into the broad stream of English polit- 
ical life? 
.... The English people won't have a 
Socialist Party. They like compromise, and the 
Labour Party is a compromise . Up to date a very 
poor one; but it is there and we are here. It 
lacks spirit, and courage, and knowledge. Are 
we going to help it get those things?.. . Shall 
we take the field, or shall we leave it to the 
Liberals? 
98 
Dissillusion, despair, or a recognition of political 
reality? Try as he might Harry Quelch could not stem the 
tide which was now flowing in favour of affiliation. He 
died in September 1913, and in many senses the spirit of 
the old SDF died with him. Quelch more than Hyndman 
epitomised the pioneering role of the Social-Democratic 
Federation and his departure symbolised the radically 
altered nature of the party. The case for the opposition 
was now left in the hands of a number of comparatively 
minor figures, of whom only H. Russell Smart was well-known. 
Smart thought the ISB should have attempted to unify the 
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Socialists first and then turned its attention to the 
Labour Party, but even he was soon forced to admit that the 
time for argument was past. As the campaign for affiliation 
gathered momentum he turned his attention instead to the 
terms of the agreement, arguing that the federated Socialist 
Party should carry equal weight with the Labour Party. As 
the unions dominated by sheer weight of numbers, said Smart, 
so should each Socialist voter be counted when representation 
was discussed. 
In moving towards affiliation the BSP was admitting that 
the movement for Socialist unity had failed. As Justice 
remarked, 'The late S. D. P. did its best for Socialist Unity 
in the formation of the B. S. P. ', but 'the combination has 
not been as large as we could have wished'. 
99 
Conceding 
that, after initial successes, the BSP had slimmed down to 
its SDF core the paper declared that: 'Socialist Unity is 
of such paramount importance that almost everything... may 
be waived if only it can be accomplished. ' 
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Thus, on 13 
December 1913, a Conference of the BSP, ILP and Fabian 
Society committed the British Socialist Party to some form 
of alliance with Labour. Debate centred around four demands 
from the BSP as a condition for affiliation. Two of these, 
that the ultimate aim of abolishing wage slavery should 
be 
clearly stated and that the unions should be aided 
in all 
struggles against capitalism, were easily settled. 
Neither 
the Fabians nor the ILP, however, would accept a recognition 
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of the class war, stressing that the constitution of the Labour 
Party would need to be altered. A compromise of sorts was 
reached when the ILP and Fabian delegates agreed to fight for 
such a change within the Labour Party. On the fourth point, 
that the BSP should be allowed to run candidates as avowed 
Socialists, there was no agreement but it was eventually 
decided to put the question to the members of the various 
organisations. 
As a preliminary step a joint committee was formed to 
organise demonstrations under the auspices of all these 
Socialist bodies. 'From this joint committee and these common 
meetings the permanent United Socialist Council will doubtless 
grow. '101 The BSP Executive made strenuous efforts to attract 
the support of the membership, their decision doubtless re- 
inforced by ever falling numbers and the demise of The British 
Socialist due to declining sales. A manifesto to the members 
assured them that the BSP would maintain its integrity as a 
revolutionary Socialist body within the Labour Party, helping 
to influence the direction of 'the political expression of 
the working class movement of this country'. Many remained 
unconvinced. The Derby branch expressed the view that 'if 
once we affiliate with the less advanced sections of the 
Labour movement then we are in the position to be dragged 
down 
to their level by the majority vote. 
' 102 Frank Tanner made an 
impassioned attack on the idea, bitterly declaring that 
'all 
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the concession is on one side. 
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Herbert Burrows, an 
early member of the SDF, also wrote expressing opposition 
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and the Leicester branch was worried that affiliation would 
'ultimately break up the branch. '105 If the leadership was 
concerned by the opposition it was encouraged by the mostly 
successful series of demonstrations held in March at Cardiff, 
Newcastle, Glasgow, Leeds, Birmingham and London. The fact 
that the ILP, at their Conference, seemed to have moved to 
the left by voting overwhelmingly in favour of a Bradford 
resolution that 'the PLP be asked to vote on all . 
issues only 
in accordance with the principles for which the Party stands' 
also gave them grounds for optimism. Hyndman and Irving 
pressed the case for affiliation vigorously at the BSP 
Conference in April and theiradmission that the SDF would have 
been far more successful if it had remained within the Labour 
Party was a tacit acceptance that past policy had been 
mistaken. Prior to the ballot Justice opened its pages to 
ILP leaders such as Fenner Brockway to reinforce the arguments 
for union. A number of protests were registered over the 
fact that the referendum ballot paper allowed only one vote 
for the two questions of Socialist unity and affiliation 
to the Labour Party, thereby making it impossible to vote 
for the first without approving the second. 
Such complaints 
went unheeded and on 28 May the referendum result showed 
a 
marginal vote in favour of affiliation to the 
Labour Party: 
In favour of Socialist unity proposal 
3263 
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Against Socialist unity proposal 2410 
Spoilt papers 52 
Majority in favour 853 
The large-scale abstention and narrow vote in favour 
demonstrated the still considerable hostility to the idea of 
affiliation to the Labour Party. That the question was won 
must be put down to the massive intervention of the leadership 
on the side of affiliation, and the result was received with 
a great deal of hostility in some areas. The Derby, Farnworth, 
Blackley and Moston branches seceded, and these were all 
areas where the ILP had come over in 1911. A number of 
Dewsbury members broke away to form a branch of the Socialist 
Labour Party, which eventually replaced the BSP. Seven 
London branches asked the Executive to reconsider the matter 
and not to accept the pro-affiliation vote. But on 23 June 
1914 the British Socialist Party made a formal application for 
admission to the Labour Party. This process of events 
effectively demonstrated the demise of the long-held desire 
for Socialist unity, the dream of a mass Socialist party. 
However much the leadership attempted to gloss over the fact, 
the BSP was now committed to a Labour as opposed to 
Socialist 
alliance and had accepted the continued separate identity of 
the BSP and ILP. The decision also marked the end of an era, 
for it signalled a decisive break with the old SDF traditions. 
The distinguishing characteristic of the SDF had 
been its 
insistence on the need to steer clear of 
'reformism' although 
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this emphasis was often obscured by a somewhat muddled 
political strategy. For thirty years it had formed a 
distinctive strand in the evolution of the British Labour 
movement. The formation of the BSP had been an attempt to 
expand its influence without compromising its principles but 
the attempt had failed. Recognising this failure the party, 
after considerable heart-searching, substantially shifted 
its position. What had been anathema over 30 years now 
became 'practical politics. ' Where Marx had been quoted before 
to defend 'separatism' he was now used to justify affiliation 
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to the Labour Party. As one historian has noted, 'The 
BSP was... an uneasy amalgam of forces and carried within it 
the seeds of its own dissolution. ' 
107 
Hyndman admitted as 
much when he dedicated his book, The Evolution of Revolution, 
'To my comrades of the OLD SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION the 
pioneers of Scientific Socialism in Great Britain 1880-1911. ' 
He and others of the 'Old Guard' came to regard the events 
of 1911 as a mistake, and in many ways the Social-Democratic 
Federation's history can be seen to have ended in that year. 
The BSP's affiliation to the Labour Party was delayed by the 
outbreak of war, a war which completed the disintegration 
of the old Social-Democratic tradition. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
WAR AND REVOLUTION 
War came in 1914 with startling suddenness, taking Socialists 
of all shades of opinion by surprise. The assassination 
at Sarajevo had caused little stir and the Austrian ulti- 
matum to Serbia was viewed simply as another of those in- 
cessant Balkan conflicts which, if it came to anything at 
all, would remain localised and be settled by diplomacy. 
The ISB's reaction to the Austrian invasion of Serbia was 
simply to advance the planned International Socialist Congress 
to the 9 August and change the venue from Vienna to Paris. 
That, it was felt, would pressurise governments to remain 
neutral and afforded ample time for the Socialist movement 
to decide on a course of action if action were to prove 
necessary. Glasier, a British delegate to the ISB, affirmed 
the readiness of the British proletariat to obey the 
International's instructions down to the last detail, thereby 
extolling the two pre-war myths of the Second International: 
that the International Socialist Bureau was an effective 
co-ordinator of the European parties and that Socialist 
internationalism was an effective instrument 
for the pre- 
vention of war. The shattering of those myths 
in the first 
week of August caused shock, amazement, 
bewilderment and 
horror, led to schism within the ranks of the various 
national parties, including the BSP, and signalled 
the 
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demise of the Second International. Any brief examination 
of the International's attitude to war explains the con- 
sternation which the outbreak of war caused and the confused 
reaction of the Socialist parties to it; it also locates 
the SDF/BSP on the spectrum of Socialist thought before 1914. 
The founding conference of the International, held in 
Paris in 1889, had laid down two fundamental prescriptions 
which influenced Socialist thought for the next 25 years and 
which were basically a recipe for inactivity. Implicit in 
the resolution condemning standing armies and urging the 
formation of citizen armies, a 'people in arms', was the 
assumption that the interests of the proletariat, everywhere, 
coincided, and that the working class would not be divided 
by quarrels between capitalist governments. This led to 
the comfortable belief that the spread of Socialism and the 
existence of the Socialist International would prevent war 
without further action, a belief paralle1; n. g that of many 
Marxists that the inevitable collapse of capitalism absolved 
them from the need for immediate revolutionary action. 
Secondly, as standing armies were liable to provoke wars 
so the Socialists argued that citizens' militia would prevent 
them; the 'people in arms' would recognise a just war and would 
not fight in another cause. Here was a rhetorical 
internat- 
ionalism which was essentially pacifist in 
its rationale and 
non-activist in implication. Moreover, it ignored certain 
realities, realities which were not significant whilst 
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the question of war was largely academic, as it was in the 
late nineteenth century, but which became increasingly 
relevant with the increased international tension of the 
early twentieth century. As James Joll has emphasised, 
Just as the problem of war became one to which 
socialists, with increasing anxiety and in- 
sistence, were forced to devote their attention, 
so it revealed more clearly than any other the 
dilemmas, equivocations and difficulties in 
which the members of the Socialist International 
found themselves. 
I 
The Second International was essentially a very loose 
organisation of autonomous national units, its proclaimed 
solidarity a sham solidarity which disguised the distrust 
between the various national parties and the theoretical 
divisions which had plagued it since its inception. As 
G. Haupt has pointed out, at times of crisis the distrust 
between the parties was obvious. During the Balkan crises 
of 1911-13 there were 'profound disagreements between the 
socialist parties of the countries directly concerned; each 
party sought to minimise its own country's responsibility 
and, while justifying its own inactivity, to persuade the 
others to act. '2 Hyndman's antipathy towards the 
Germans 
was the supreme example of this. He and 
his supporters 
attacked German plans for world domination whilst 
defending 
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the arms policy of their own country. Always distrustful 
of the German Social-Democrats Hyndman became openly hostile 
to them and, at the SDF's Coventry conference of 1911, he 
accused them of sabotaging the International's anti-war 
campaign. Hyndman's outburst led to his removal from the ISB, 
and they were regarded as individual eccentricities, but in 
truth the German Socialists were always pessimistic about 
the possibility of preventing war. The right of the party, 
epitomised by Bernstein and Bebel, was strongly nationalistic 
and there was a reluctance to step into the field of foreign 
policy for fear that this might lead to government repression. 
Bebel had often warned that the German party would be unable 
to prevent war, arguing that if they indeed possessed that 
strength they would be able to form a government. Conversely 
the French Socialists, particularly Jaures and Vaillant, were 
convinced that international Socialism was a real force which 
could be mobilised to prevent a general war. After the 
Agadir incident distrust grew between the French and German 
parties . 
Given these divisions the International Socialist Bureau, 
established at the Paris Congress of 1900 as a co-ordinating 
body, found it very difficult to function effectively. Indeed2 
the Germans were always reluctant to sanction the convening 
of the ISB and for much of the time it operated as 
little 
more than a letter box for the various parties. It was 
further 
restricted by the fact that there was no agreed Socialist 
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theory as to the action to be adopted in the event of war, nor 
any differentiation between wars. This reflected the fact 
that there existed within the International a basic division 
between right, left and centre; from the first it had lacked 
a consensus on programme and tactics, and these divisions 
played a part in its disintegration during the war. The right, 
or 'revisionist' wing of the movement, associated with 
Bernstein, held that capitalist collapse was not imminent 
and that the democratic state was not oppressive but an instru- 
ment to be mastered for the realisation of Socialism. In an 
advanced democratic state the interests of Socialists were 
identical with those of the State. From this proposition, 
of course, it was easy to deduce that Socialists had a duty to 
defend their homeland. The centre, 'orthodox-Marxist', view- 
point characteristic of the Second International, which 
largely embraced the SDF, found in Kautsky its chief 
theoretician. Its adherents accepted the inevitability of 
Socialism via a peaceful revolution. They relied on the 
operation of impersonal economic forces rather than the 
purposeful efforts of man, which meant that 'Beneath the 
brave show of revolutionary phraseology the germ of 
reformism was already at work. '3 Jules Guesde, the extreme 
exponent of this position, thus argued that there was no 
need for a special treatment of the question of war; they 
should simply propagandise until the victory of 
Socialism 
removed the cause of war and war itself. The majority of 
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centrists however were uncertain, their theoretical orient- 
ation cloudy. They accepted war as acharacteristic of 
capitalist society, but felt that the working class could 
redirect capitalist trends towards peace; thus an agitation 
against militarism, a refusal to vote war credits, was 
acceptable but direct action against war, for example the 
general strike, was not. This was certainly the view of 
the German SPD, who wished to avoid any action which would 
give the government the excuse to suppress them. German 
Socialists were also troubled by the fear that those nations 
with the best organised proletariat might find themselves at 
the mercy of attack from countries where Socialism was less 
influential. Such considerations meant that the centrists, 
at best, could offer a long-term perspective for the triumph 
of pacifism but no theories for confronting the imminent 
threat of war. 
These two strands of thought predominated in the pre- 
war International. Opposed . to them was the as yet minuscule 
grouping of the left around Lenin and the Bolsheviks. They 
were scornful of the reformist road to Socialism, urging 
that a violent revolution was needed to shatter the bourgeois 
state. Bourgeois democracy was simply 'veiled dictatorship'. 
Theirs was an activist philosophy, opposed to the 
idea of 
waiting patiently for the historical process to unravel and 
therefore seeing war as an opportunity to foment revolution. 
Such a perspective was shared by some in the 
West, including 
Rosa Luxemburg, but she opposed the centralised organisation 
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of the Bolsheviks and argued for a general strike rather than 
an armed uprising in the event of war. Thus the Second 
International, anxious to prevent war, could not agree on 
the methods and tactics to be adopted, either before or after 
war broke out. Nor was this the extent of the confusion, for 
many Socialists saw no clearcut division between revolution 
and patriotism. In France the two had been closely linked 
since the overthrow of the monarchy; in Germany the foundation 
and strengthening of the nation state coincided with the 
advent of a mass Socialist party. Hyndman was by no means 
alone in his view that the Socialists of each nation must 
work out their own route to Socialism, that Socialism was 
not anti-national. 
The differences between these groupings were argued 
out at Congress after Congress, and within the national 
parties, in debates theological in character. Yet transcending 
the divisions was the world-view of Socialism as one coherent 
movement; the goal was the same, the tactics might differ. 
Similarly resolution after resolution denounced war as the 
product of capitalism and argued that only the working class, 
organised internationally, could guarantee peace. The 
question was how? Most cherished was the idea of forming 
a citizen army to defend the nation, a utopian dream in view 
of the fact that nowhere did the Socialists form a government 
able to implement such a scheme. But the significance of 
the proposal was that it presupposed the necessity of national 
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defence in certain circumstances. Jaures quite clearly stated 
that French Socialists would be justified in resisting a 
German attack, as did Bebel for Germany in the event of an 
assault by Russia. Similar confusion existed on the question 
of imperialism. Orthodox Marxists agreed with Lenin that 
colonial expansion prolonged the life of capitalism but 
would eventually lead to war and the collapse of the system; 
many however simply argued that all that was needed was to 
await that collapse. Others justified imperialism on the 
grounds that it raised the living standards of backward 
peoples. Some German revisionists supported it as a means of 
maintaining the living standards of their own working class. 
Hyndman and others saw the colonies as a breeding ground for 
Socialist expansion. Definitions of national defence and 
imperialism were further to cloud the issue in 1914, and the 
inconsistencies of the Socialist position were ridiculed by, 
amongst others, Herve. At the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 he 
launched a violent attack on the bureaucracy and 'embourg- 
eoisiement' of the German party and proposed a general 
strike in the event of war. The experience of Socialist 
minorities in Parliament, their ineffectiveness, allied to 
the impact of the 1905 revolution in Russia upon the Socialist 
movement, won-support for his ideas. The Russian revolution 
demonstrated the possibilities of direct popular action 
against war, and reminded Socialists of all persuasions 
that 
a passive awaiting of the pre-ordained collapse of capitalism 
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was not the inevitable route to Socialism. Bebel, however, 
conscious of the power of the German state, forced through a 
compromise which committed noone to anything. The Balkan 
crises and rapidly developing arms race after Stuttgart 
though concentrated minds on the increasing possibility of 
war, and at Copenhagen in 1910 Keir Hardie co-sponsored with 
the French Socialist Edouard Vaillant a further resolution on 
behalf of a general strike against war. By this time German 
Socialists were deeply suspicious of the British in the light 
of Hyndman's and Blatchford's propaganda)and the proposal was 
shelved for consideration by the next Congress in Vienna. 
This Congress, of course, never took place. 
Mutual distrust and suspicion augured ill for successful 
Socialist action in the event of war, yet at the time of the 
first Balkan war the ISB finally got its act together. All 
parties were urged to convene mass demonstrations against 
great power intervention, with a resulting mobilisation of 
250,000 in Berlin on 20 October 1912. A manifesto issued by 
the emergency congress at Basle exhorted the unity of the 
workers to secure peace. The manifesto declared that 
'The 
fear of the ruling classes that a revolution of the workers 
would follow the declaration of a European war has proved an 
essential guaranty of peace' .4 The end of 
the Balkan crises 
seemed to confirm the theory that a European war was 
improbable. 
It was felt that the economic interests of capitalism milit- 
ated against war, but more significantly the 
Socialists were 
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self-satisfied. This successful mobilisation gave them the 
illusion of power and seemed to wipe away any differences bet- 
ween the French and German Socialists, who published a joint 
manifesto in March 1913. Thus the Basle Congress marked 
the high point of the International's optimistic 
self-confidence, and it reveals how far socialism 
had become almost a religious movement in feeling, 
and how much blind faith was placed in the actual 
existence of the International.... The crisis of 
1914 found the Socialists of Europe with the 
bells of Basle still ringing in their ears. 
5 
As late as the 1st of August 1914 Socialist leaders 
seemed sublimely unaware of the likelihood of war; they 
were, suggests Haupt, 'captive of their own myths'6 about 
their ability to prevent war. Consequently, taken totally 
by surprise, they became disorientated spectators of events. 
Tommy Jackson remembered that Socialists were 'paralysed 
by our unbelief in the reality of the war-danger.. .. Its 
7 
coming swept us off our feet as strawa swept by a 
big wind. ' 
The British Socialists, after the meeting of the ISB at the 
end of July, had issued a manifesto signed by Hardie and 
Henderson urging the working class to prevent their govern- 
went from co-operating with Russian despotism. 
On the Ist 
and 2nd of August huge anti-war demonstrations were 
held, 
and from the Trafalgar Square gathering on the 
2nd came a 
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resolution protesting 
against any step being taken by the government 
of this country to support Russia, either dir- 
ectly or in consequence of any understanding 
with France, as being not only offensive, but 
disastrous to Europe... as we have no interest, 
direct or indirect, in the threatened quarrels 
which may result from the action of Austria in 
Serbia, the government of Great Britain should 
rigidly decline to engage in war, but should 
confine itself to efforts to bring about peace 
as speedily as possible. 
8 
Hyndman, like the other British Socialists, had thus far 
adhered to the peace resolutions of the International, but 
the British declaration of war on 4 August brought this unity 
to an end. On that day the French and German Socialists 
approved the war credits for their governments, and on that 
day the Labour movement in Britain, as a whole, sided with 
its government. Their pacifism had been active only insofar 
as it was confined to mass rallies and demonstrations; Socialis 
internationalism was submerged by the wave of nationalism. 
The outbreak of war signalled more clearly than anything else 
the breach between the revolutionary phraseology of the 
Second International and the reformist practice of 
its member 
parties. Victor Adler summed up the dilemma of all: 
'An 
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incomprehensible German to have done anything else. An 
incomprehensible Social Democrat to have done it without 
being racked with pain, without a hard struggle with himself 
and with all his feelings. '9 
The Social-Democratic Federation had always regarded itself 
as an orthodox Marxist party and was seen as such by its 
Continental counterparts. Both in theory and in practice 
it aligned itself with the centre, with Kautskian orthodoxy, 
and the Federation provided a classic example of the party 
which expounded revolutionary theory but espoused reformist 
practice. Yet, although the Federation vehemently criticised 
the 'revisionism' of Bernstein, its leadership had drifted 
rightwards, orientating the party towards electioneering and 
the securing of representation on local and national bodies. 
On the question of war and foreign policy Hyndman and the 
'old guard' were firmly on the right of the Socialist spectrum, 
and his advocacy of military preparation and his commitment 
to the British nation had stimulated increasing opposition 
within the party. An internationalist outlook was particularly 
strong in the Scottish branches and amongst the 
emigre ele- 
ment in East London, and it held a strong appeal for many 
younger recruits. The election of Theodore Rothstein to 
the Executive in 1901 marked an early success for the 
Opposition elements, and as Hyndman's anti-German campaign 
mounted so did the reaction to it. In many ways 
Hyndman's 
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letter to the Morning Post in 1910 was the turning point, 
antagonising many previously loyal supporters, including John 
Maclean. A referendum of members in 1911 defeated Hyndman and 
voted in favour of decreased military expenditure, whilst 
the Socialist Unity Conference of that year further strengthened 
the opposition ranks. The nature of the opposition was 
confused, mirroring the situation in the International as a 
whole. Most SDFers accepted the need for national defence 
but they argued, against Hyndman, that it was no part of a 
Socialist's task to increase the possibility of war by 
agitating for additional 
, 
armaments. Moreover, Hyndman's 
pronouncements stirred up chauvinism and made the task of 
the German Socialists that much harder - the German govern- 
ment could point to Hyndman's patriotism and contrast it 
with the supposed treachery of his German counterparts. 
Therefore the bulk of the opposition to Hyndman lined up with 
the International in urging that the Socialists of each nation 
should agitate against the military preparation of their own 
government; they did not envisage action against war because 
they felt that the international solidarity of the proletariat 
would prevent war. Theirs. was primarily a pacifist sentiment. 
In Britain, as in Europe, there existed an embryonic 
left-wing and John Maclean was the major spokesman for this 
tendency. The first signs of this theoretical position 
emerged at the 1912 conference of the BSP when William 
Gallacher of Paisley, a product of John Maclean's 
Marxist 
570. 
classes, opposed Quelch's paper on 'Socialism and Patriotism'. 
His attack centred on the notion of a citizen army, very much 
an article of faith for the Socialists of the Second 
International. In countries like France and Germany, which 
had conscription, the citizen army was a progressive if some- 
what utopian idea. For Britain, an island state with 
voluntary recruitment, the concept was largely irrelevant. 
Nonetheless, orthodox SDF opinion supported it, whilst the 
Hyndmanites argued that the crux of our defence was the navy 
and they equated the fleet with the continental national 
militia as a purely defensive weapon. Gallacher ridiculed 
the idea of a citizen army as utopian, arguing that the 
ruling class would never grant it and that it would be totally 
ineffective against foreign aggression. As for the navy, 
one couldn't have a citizen navy. 'They should condemn all ideE 
of patriotism', said Gallacher, 'and all idea of militarism, 
unless it took the form of shooting down those who exploited 
them. They must stand as Internationalists, and not trouble 
about nationalism. ' 
10 
Few would have gone as far as Gallacher 
at that time in his renunciation of 'all idea of patriotism' 
but a number sympathised with his assault on the citizen army, 
which they saw as a disguised advocacy of conscription. 
There was thus a broad swathe of opposition within the BSP, 
encompassing the centre and left, which achieved further 
success in 1912 with the election of Zelda Kahan to the 
executive, 'a resounding victory for a woman at that 
time 
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still in her twenties., 
11 
The issue of national defence 
nearly caused a split in the party in 1913, which was only 
prevented by Hyndman's promise not to produce statements 
prejudicial to the party and quite clearly the London leader- 
ship was losing its traditional control over the party. Also 
significant was the absence of many Scottish branches from 
this Conference; Gallacher and others were at this time 
touring Scotland in a 'war against war' campaign. When 
Quelch died in 1913 H. W. Lee became the new editor of 
Justice and he was replaced as party secretary by Albert 
Inkpin, who was not closely identified with the older 
leadership. Demands at the 1914 Conference for members' 
control of Justice and the party's electoral campaigns 
emphasised the challenge to the 'old guard'. Thus, although 
the conflict over the arms budget died down after the 
compromise of 1913, it re-emerged in sharpened form with the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1914. The war brought all the 
existing internal conflicts to a head and, as Stanley Pierson 
has commented, 
the experiences of wartime renewed the inherent 
tendency of British Marxism to divide into 
in- 
compatible modes of action. Marxists in Britain 
once more faced the choice between a 
fuller 
involvement in existing political institutions 
and a new effort to transcend the structures 
of 
national life. 
12 
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The BSP, like its European counterparts, was taken 
totally by surprise at the outbreak of war. Its reaction 
was hesitant, and uncomprehending, although a few brave 
individuals outspokenly attacked the war from the beginning. 
Fred King of Grimsby had to receive a police escort from 
Dewsbury Market Place after arguing that workers would be as 
well off under the Kaiser as King George. Sam Walker of 
Manchester and Arthur Cox in London were arrested for voicing 
similar sentiments. But once the initial shock was over the 
Hyndmanites were the first to reassert themselves. A BSP 
manifesto of 13 August took the view that Germany was the 
aggressor but urged moderation on its readers: 'we appeal 
to you to distinguish soberly between the mass of the German 
people and the Prussian military caste which dominates the 
German Empire. ' 
13 
The Socialists' task was to protect 
the interests of the working class during wartime by agitating 
for rent controls and State control of food supplies and 
employment. Meanwhile they should continue to propagandise 
against secret diplomacy to ensure that there was never a 
repetition of such a cataclysm. However, the overwhelming 
concern of the manifesto was the unity of the party. 'All 
ordinary questions of policy and tactics', it declared 
'are 
of little or no importance at' the present time. 
' 14 Unity 
was needed to ensure that the BSP was able to take 
full 
advantage of the cessation of hostilities and meanwhile 
the 
party had plenty to do to reduce war's impact on the workers 
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and influence in a Socialist direction the collectivist 
policy which the Government would be forced to adopt. 
There was little reaction to this manifesto, a reflection 
of the confusion which the war had engendered within the 
opposition ranks. Most BSPers, in common with all shades 
of opinion, felt that the war would be short and whilst they 
despaired at the stampede of European Socialists into the 
patriotic ranks they saw no clear route ahead. They therefore, 
as T. A. Jackson admitted, 'trimmed' as far as possible, 
evading any direct consideration of the issue. They 
clung to the resolutions of the International which had urged 
them, in the event of war, to work for a negotiated peace 
and a speedy resumption of fraternal relations between nations. 
What forced the oppositionists to address the question more 
directly was a further manifesto in September which called 
upon members to accept invitations to participate in the 
recruiting campaigns. The left wing was outraged, seeing 
this as a betrayal of internationalism, a contradiction of 
both the Stuttgart and Basle Congresses which the BSP had 
endorsed. Opposition was strongest amongst the 
emigre 
membership in East London and in Glasgow. Fifteen out of 
eighteen London branches demanded a withdrawal of the state- 
ment and although Hyndman protested that the resolution 
had 
only advocated participation if members were allowed 
to 
speak in favour of a Socialist programme Joe Fineberg, a 
prominent left wing critic, won an executive 
by-election for 
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London in October. It was also significant that Peter Petroff, 
to the left of Fineberg, polled as heavily as F. Victor 
Fisher, the party's most chauvinistic propagandist. John 
Maclean led the outcry in Scotland. 'Cur first business', 
he said, 'is to hate the British capitalist system'. Blame 
for the war was unclear but the motive force was the 'profit 
of the plundering class.... It is mere cant to talk of German 
militarism when Britain has led the world in the navy 
business. ' Maclean urged Socialists to develop 'class 
patriotism' and ignore the 'moral' excuses put forward to 
explain a Capitalist war. 
15 
From September onwards opinion within the party fragmented. 
In an attempt to atomise the opposition five regional con- 
ferences were held in February 1915 as opposed to the usual 
national gathering. 
16 
Prior to these conferences the Central 
branch, composed largely of 'old guard' members, circularised 
the branches with a statement of the Allied case which 
affirmed the inevitablity of England's intervention and 
stressed that liberty and democracy were at stake. It 
appealed to members not to vote for any resolutions which 
might be viewed as anti-patriotic and therefore retard the 
party's influence. Fairchild and Fineberg, the London 
Executive members, protested bitterly at this attempt to 
influence opinion. The aggregate voting of the regional 
conferences revealed a divided and confused party, with pro- 
and anti-war elements very evenly divided. In 
Glasgow and 
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London the oppositionists held the upper hand. The conference 
at Leeds revealed overwhelming support for a pro-war policy, 
leading Arthur Gardiner of Huddersfield to suggest red, white 
and blue ribbons for the delegates. Lancashire, the trad- 
itional centre of Social Democracy, followed Hyndman but the 
more recent adherents to the party, like the Openshaw branch, 
opposed the war. On the crucial issue of its policy towards 
the war the party rejected both nationalist and internationalist 
resolutions in favour of a compromise which called for a 
speedy termination of the war. A Central Hackney resolution 
regretting the statement on recruiting was carried 59-56 
but a demand for the statement's immediate withdrawal was 
defeated 67-57. More confusing still, an Aberdeen resolution 
calling upon the party to take no part in recruiting meetings 
under any conditions was voted through by 76-62. Further 
uncertainty was demonstrated by a vote of 73-53 in favour 
of the citizen army followed by approval of a Huddersfield 
amendment which deleted the same and substituted a declar- 
ation of anti-militarism. A substantial minority of the 
party obviously had no clearly defined position but overall 
the internationalists fared slightly better than their 
opponents, and the overt nationalisms received a resounding 
rebuff when a Central branch resolution urging a 
fight 
'to the point when the Central European autocracies 
will have 
been destroyed' was lost 81-46. The 
internationalists got 
a 5-4 majority on the Executive, but the 
Hyndmanites con- 
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trolled Justice and consolidated themselves in the Central 
branch - an uneasy peace prevailed. 
Shortly after these regional meetings a Conference of 
Allied Socialists was held in London. Litvinov, the Bolshevik 
representative in London, attended and argued for a united 
front of Allied and enemy Socialists against the war. His 
views were anathema to the majority of delegates and after 
continual interruptions Lit. vinov walked out. The Kentish 
Town branch of which Chicherin, later Soviet foreign minister, 
was a member protested that the Conference represented an 
attempt to destroy the International and deplored BSP 
participation in such a gathering. 
18 
This view was common 
currency amongst the European left, which now attempted to 
reorganise the International via a Conference at Zimmerwald 
in September 1915. Bruce Glasier for the ILP and Fairchild 
for the BSP were deputed to attend but were refused passports. 
The influence of this gathering of minority Socialist opinion 
on the war was negligible, but it marked a significant step 
towards the formation of the Third International and signalled 
a rapprochement of centre and left elements in opposition to 
the majority on the right. The Zimmerwald Manifesto blamed 
the war on imperialism and capitalist greed: 
In this unbearable situation we... who stand not 
on the ground of national solidarity with the 
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exploiting class but on the ground of the 
international solidarity of the proletariat and 
of class struggle, have assembled to retie the 
torn threads of international relations and to 
call upon the working class to recover itself 
and fight for peace. 
19 
It stopped short of supporting Lenin's call for revolutionary 
war, but he saw it as the first step towards the success of 
his cause. 
The substance of Zimmerwald was accepted both by the ILP 
and the BSP, in spite of the fact that it was diametrically 
opposed to official Labour Party policy. There was a move 
within the ILP to break with the Labour Party, but this was 
rejected at its Newcastle Conference in 1916. Yet the ILP 
was able to reconcile its differences in the interests of 
organisational unity; this the BSP found impossible. Hyndman 
and his followers rejected the Zimmerwald resolution as 
totally unacceptable. 'The group around Fairchild committed 
to the rebirth of the Second International, firmly opposed to 
the creation of a fresh organisation, found itself sym- 
pathetic to the views expressed, yet hostile to key practical 
proposals. '20 John Maclean and his supporters were enthusiasti< 
By this stage of the war it was possible to discern four 
distinct strands of opinion within the BSP. 
Hyndman had often predicted that a 'shock from without' 
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was needed to precipitate the triumph of Socialism, but his 
great fear was that this would come in the form of bloody 
revolution. He envisaged that the exigencies of wartime 
would increasingly force the Government to adopt Socialist 
measures and to intervene in industry. The work of the 
War Emergency Workers' National Committee, established within 
twenty-four hours of the declaration of war, seemed to 
encourage the prospect of social change and Hyndman, as the 
BSP representative, devoted a tremendous amount of time and 
energy to its work. It allowed him that direct engagement 
with national problems for which he had always longed and 
which his failure to win Burnley had prevented. His efforts 
here served to emphasise the increasing moderation of his 
Socialism, and his close collaboration with Sidney Webb on 
the Committee demonstrated still further his move away from 
revolutionary Marxism. The defence of workers' interests 
in wartime was accompanied by ceaseless propaganda for an 
Allied victory. Convinced of the justice of the Allied cause 
Hyndman also felt that an identification with the anti-war 
movement would irreparably damage the Socialists' standing 
in the country. He thus spoke of the Allies fighting 
'a 
people's war', a war of liberation, a war for the workers, 
and moreover a war which would signal the triumph of 
Socialism. 
In an attempt to justify his pro-war policy, Hyndman col- 
laborated with Bax in an article for the English 
Review which 
sought to reconcile Marxist theory with support 
for the war. 
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Interestingly, Hyndman modified his hitherto materialist 
view of history to argue that the common Marxist interpretation 
of the war as capitalist in its origins was 'extreme doc- 
trinaire dogma'. Bax of course had always expounded a more 
wide-ranging Marxist philosophy and the two suggested that 
mental and psychological factors had been as instrumental as 
the economic factor in the outbreak of this war. 'All wars 
are no more of necessity economic wars', they 
all internal conflicts are of necessity class 
They attributed the European conflict to 'the 
of Prussian Militarism to retain its predomin 
by conquest and annexation abroad. ' This was 
to defend the positionof the Prussian Junkers 
said, 'than 
conflicts. ' 
final effort 
ance at home 
a foreign war 
in Germany against 
the increasing influence of both capitalists and Socialists. 
Their victory would threaten both democracy and Socialism, 
whereas their defeat might well lead to Socialist triumph. 
2' 
Bax's support for Hyndman's position illustrated the 
extent to which the internationalist cause had collapsed in 
the early months of the war, for he had been one of the 
leading critics of Hyndman's utterances on foreign policy. 
22 
Yet they were not mere jingoes or Germanophobes as their 
critics suggested. In the same article they paid tribute 
to the efforts of German Socialists over the years to prevent 
war, pointed out that Bebel and others had always warned 
that 
they were not strong enough to prevent war, and aaluted 
Karl 
Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and others who had opposed 
this 
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war. The present success of Prussian militarism, they argued, 
did not rule out Germany's progress towards Socialism; indeed, 
defeat in the war might hasten it. Hyndman made a similar 
point in a letter to The Times23 and early in 1915 refused 
to join an 'Anti-German League', saying that 'Nations cannot 
afford to indulge in permanent hatred. '24 
Hyndman's nationalism was accentuated as the war pro- 
gressed and his attitude to Germany hardened as the casualty 
lists lengthened and the outcome became increasingly uncertain. 
Yet his was what might be termed a sane patriotism, which 
never obscured his fundamental Socialist beliefs. He was 
supported by the bulk of the 
'old Guard' and, with differing 
emphases, by many of the rank and file. Alf Barton of 
Sheffield spoke for many in a pamphlet published in 1915, 
when he argued strongly that the war was capitalist 
in its 
origin: 'The German Empire is, in the main, 
fighting to obtain 
commercial and economic advantage; the British Empire 
is 
25 
fighting to maintain commercial and economic advantage. 
' 
Thus far he disagreed with Hyndman, but Barton too characterised 
the anti-war position as absurd. 'The British 
Empire, he 
said, 'is Capitalism tempered by Democracy.... 
The German 
Empire is Capitalism hardened by Militarism'. 
Although 
Britain'spolitical liberty was by no means great 
it was a 
precious possession which must be 
fought for, against their 
own government if necessary but even more 
so against foreign 
domination. Thereafter Barton supported 
the Hyndmanite 
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perspective - the war provided the opportunity for a mental 
revolution which would pave the way for Socialism. Socialists 
should seize that opportunity whilst defending class interests 
and political liberty: 
Whatever the defects of the Allies, it is evident 
that Prussianism is Capitalism, or Class Rule, in 
its most virulent form, and a victory for German 
arms would. . . put still further off the advent of 
Liberty and Social Justice. 
26 
Bert Killip of Leeds argued in similar vein, 
27 
and all 
supporters of this position repeatedly reiterated that they 
had protested against the Boer War in the interests of small 
nationalities and therefore to be consistent they had to 
support the Allies against the German violation of Belgium. 
The 'sane patriotic' position then supported the war and 
wished it brought to a speedy conclusion via an Allied 
victory, but with no annexations or calls for vengence. 
Its proponents hoped for Socialist gains from the war, indeed 
foresaw the increasing socialisation of the means of pro- 
duction and distribution as a result of the war. Support 
for the war would, they thought, strengthen their position 
in the public eye as the lessons of the war were driven 
home. 
The majority of this tendency supported participation 
in 
the recruiting campaign, both as a means of avoiding 
conscription and as an opportunity to publicise the 
Socialist 
582. 
case. J. Hunter Watts even recruited a special 'Comradeship 
Company' of Socialists to serve in the trenches. 
28 
There were a number of Socialists, both inside and 
outside the BSP, who felt that the position outlined above 
was too weak an espousal of the British cause. They wanted 
a war to the finish, an outright victory over Germany, but 
initially more importantly the ultra-patriotic element wished 
to establish a clear pro-war alternative to the pacifist 
elements associated with the ILP. The leading light in 
this operation was Victor Fisher of the BSP, and on the 16 
April 1915, at a meeting held at his house, a body calling 
itself the Socialist National Defence Committee was estab- 
lished. In Fisher's words the SNDC was concerned 'to counter- 
act the peace at any price policy of the anti-national 
elements in the Socialist and Labour movements in the 
country. ' 
29 
Its committee included A. M. Thompson and 
Robert Blatchford of the Clarion, its supporters Dan Irving, 
Bert Killip, Ben Tillett, J. J. Terrett and Will Thorne of 
the BSP. A number of right wing Labour M. P. s such as John 
Hodge and G. H. Roberts, along with J. A. Seddon, ex-T. U. C. 
Chairman, featured prominently in the early activities. 
More significantly, the SNDC was closely associated with 
Lord Milner who saw it and its successor, the 
British 
Workers' League, as a vehicle for transforming 
his views 
on Empire and Socialism into political reality. Milner 
felt 
that some form of social reform, 'Gas and Water 
Socialism', 
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was needed to preserve the health and intelligence of the 
masses who were vital to the strength of the nation and 
thus the Empire. With the outbreak of war he was concerned 
to counteract the pacifist sentiment of the ILP within the 
Labour Party and to line up the patriotic Labour elements 
in favour of a programme of national service, limited social 
reforms and Imperial unity. To this end he saw Fisher as 
a valuable ally and, as J. 0. Stubbs has pointed out, 
Milner manipulated the SNDC and later the BWL in his own 
interests. 
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The SNDC held its first public meeting in London on 
21 July 1915. Hyndman spoke for the Committee on this 
occasion but, as Tsuzuki demonstrates, he was never 
officially associated with its activities and soon distanced 
himself from it. At this stage, however, he sympathised 
with its attempts to associate Socialism with the national 
cause, and most importantly he did not dissociate himself 
from the events of that day. A number of the BSP opposition 
attended the meeting, and E. C. Fairchild suggested a negoti- 
ated peace and the re-establishment of contacts between 
British and German Socialists. At that violence erupted; 
soldiers were used as stewards, along with several members 
of the largely pro-war Central branch of the BSP. 
Albert 
Inkpin, the party secretary, was beaten about the 
head and 
ejected from the meeting with blood streaming 
down his face. 
Many others were similarly treated, and Fairchild caustically 
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remarked that 'The Socialist National Defence Committee... 
will be remembered as the first Socialist body which, in 
any country, employed soldiers to suppress social-democratic 
, 31 opinion. Within a short space of time the SNDC abandoned 
all pretence of presenting a distinctively Socialist view- 
point. It supported the candidature of C. B. Stanton, an 
ex-SDFer, in opposition to the official Labour candidate in 
the Merthyr by-election of November 1915, an election which 
Stanton won. Evolving, via the British Workers' League, 
into the National Democratic Party it became avowedly 
critical of Socialism, and many of its leading spokesmen 
ended their political careers in the Tory Party. Most of 
the BSP members who had participated in its early activities 
soon dissociated themselves from the organisation, but J. F. 
Green, ex-SDF treasurer, and J. J. Terrett remained members 
and so too did Edward Hartley. Hartley, a veteran Clarion 
Vanner, had obviously imbibed much of Blatchford's philosophy, 
a fact which he admitted at a public meeting of the Bradford 
BSP in August 1915. It did seem strange, said Hartley, 
after 40 years of advocating peace to be moving a resolution 
which favoured a complete and crushing victory over Germany 
and which urged the immediate enlistment of all men. 
'But 
willy-nilly, we were at war, and to prate about peace and 
talk about the terms of peace before we knew which side was 
going to win was a waste of time' . 
32 Their task was to ensure 
an Allied victory. The meeting was accompanied 
by the singing 
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of the National Anthem and the music of the Royal Artillery 
band, and it was notable for a furious attack by Ben 
Tillett on the 'cowards' and 'poltroons' who were betraying 
their country. 'He was a revolutionary', said Tillett, 
'but he yielded to no man as a lover of his country. 
33 
Tillett's statement was indicative of the SNDC's stance, 
which can best be summed up in Blatchford's phrase 'Britain 
for the British'. The significance of the SNDC, as H. W. 
Lee later remembered, was that it drove many of the neutral 
or uncertain elements within the BSP towards the opposition 
camp. The association of a number of leading Social-Democrats 
with the Committee in its early days, and particularly 
their presence on the platform at the Queen's Hall meeting 
in July, alienated many members from the pro-war group. 
They failed to differentiate between the 'sane' and 'ultra' 
patriotic elements. 
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A further wedge was driven between the pro and anti-war 
elements by the vicious attacks of the Hyndmanites on their 
critics. Although Hyndman's views on the war were not as 
extreme as sometimes depicted he demonstrated an over- 
whelming intolerance of those who disagreed with him. 
Opponents were smeared as German agents, traitors to the 
Allied cause and, as Raymond Challinor comments, 
'merely 
to express doubts was sufficient to arouse the anger of 
Hyndman and his group. '35 Leading members of the party 
found themselves shadowed by the police and suspected 
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supporters of Hyndman of acting as informers. In Sheffield 
there was uproar when Hunter Watts and Russell Smart 
attempted to recruit members for the armed forces by a com- 
bination of bribes and intimidation. Smart was eventually 
expelled for his activities. Two incidents in particular 
aroused resentment. In March 1915 Hyndman wrote to L'Homme 
Enchaine, a French newspaper published by Georges Clemenceau, 
accusing the ILP of being financed in its anti-war activities 
by the Germans. The BSP executive dissociated itself from 
his views and several branches protested. When the editor 
of the Glasgow Forward challenged the BSP rank and file 
to declare their position John Maclean wrote a long letter 
denouncing Hyndman for betraying the BSP and attempting to 
establish 'a British Sdcialist Autocracy' with himself as 
'autocrat-in-chief'. 36 The second incident was the public- 
ation of an article in Justice entitled 'Who and What is 
Peter Petroff? ' Petroff, a veteran of the 1905 Russian 
Revolution and an active opponent of Hyndman within the BSP, 
was at this time a close collaborator of Maclean in Glasgow. 
The article was a vindictive attempt to stifle opposition) 
for it incited the authorities to arrest and deport Petroff, 
and there could be little doubt of the fate awaiting him 
in Russia. Maclean again sprang to the attack,. bitterly 
criticising Justice and asking 'Who and what are Messrs 
Hyndman, Bax, Fisher, Hunter Watts, Gorle, etc? '37 Control 
of Justice was, in fact, the main bone of contention, causing 
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bitter disputes. Lee's refusal to moderate its patriotic 
line led Zelda Kahan to warn that the opposition would have 
'nothing to do with the paper and even. . . hinder its 
, 38 circulation, In September 1915 Maclean launched his 
own paper, the Vanguard, as the organ of the Glasgow District 
Council of the BSP. This was the first open breach with the 
Hyndmanites. When the Vanguard was suppressed in January 
1916 E. C. Fairchild started the Call in London to expound 
the opposition cause. Yet their position was not clear and 
their line on the war indecisive. 
The bulk of the anti-war elements within the BSP 
adopted the centrist position outlined earlier. At the 
outbreak of war they were confused and hesitant and they 
remained diffident about adopting an unequivocal anti-war 
stance. Thus, although analysing the war as a capitalist 
war, they were reluctant to draw the conclusion that it was 
no concern of the working class, and they were against any 
direct action which might imperil national defence. E. C. 
Fairchild warned that 'all action should be rigorously 
39 Joe avoided, calculated to endanger national defence; ' 
Fineberg argued that a German victory would be disastrous 
for Europe, and H. Alexander claimed that his 
internationalism 
'did not prevent him being a nationalist, prepared 
to defend 
his own country. '40 They looked to the International 
Socialist Bureau to use its influence to bring about peace 
at the earliest opportunity, a somewhat naive attitude 
in 
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view of the fact that Vandervelde, the chairman of the ISB, 
was a member of the Belgian cabinet and had made it plain 
that he would not convene a meeting of the ISB as long as 
German soldiers remained on Belgian soil. The International 
was effectively a hostage of the Allies, hence the 
Zimmerwald Conference in 1915. BSP reaction to Zimmerwald 
was equivocal; the Executive hoped that it would prompt the 
ISB into action, but Kahan criticised it as 'international 
impossibilist' for failing to consider the question of how 
to stop wars under the existing capitalist system. Fairchild 
was adamantly opposed to the Bolshevik proposal for the 
establishment of a new Socialist International, and he spoke 
for the majority of the BSP centre. In essence 'it saw the 
path to peace as coming through an agreement of socialist 
parties to work in unity for this objective, and made its 
own adoption of an anti-war campaign contingent upon such an 
agreement. 141 Before taking a stand the BSP wanted the 
withdrawal of all troops from occupied territories which, 
says Challinor, 'placed the onus upon German Social Democrats 
42 
to force the German government to make the first move. ` 
This was simply not feasible and it meant that the centre 
reverted to that state of immobility which had often charact- 
erised the SDF. They would propagandise against the war and 
for an early negotiated peace but they did not consider 
direct action against the war. In the last analysis 
theirs 
was a pacifist opposition, and Lenin's assessment of 
them as 
'confused and vacillating elements' was essentially 
accurate. 
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The Bolshevik position that only the overthrow of 
capitalism could secure a lasting peace and that Socialists 
should undertake revolutionary work leading to civil war 
found few supporters in Britain. Unaffected by military con- 
flict on our soil British Socialists saw little relevance in 
Lenin's concept of 'revolutionary defeatism'. The major 
exception tothis was John Maclean, who adopted a line 
closer to Lenin than that of any other British Socialist. 
Indeed, he was some way to the left even of prominent emigres 
like Kahan and Rothstein, who at that time approximated to 
the Mensheviks position. Maclean was exceptional amongst 
British Social-Democrats in his attempts to integrate 
Marxist theory with workers' immediate struggles. He saw 
wartime developments, particularly on Clydeside, as providing 
fertile opportunities for revolutionary agitation. The 
grievances of engineering workers over dilution, the increased 
industrial discipline of wartime, anger at price and rent 
rises, were seen by Maclean as providing the opportunity 
for a Socialist appeal closely attuned to the 
immediate 
concerns of the workers. As Gallacher remarked the 
Clyde, 
perhaps alone in Britain, was not taken completely 
by surprise 
by the outbreak of war. Socialists of the 
ILP, SLP, the 
Clarion and the SDF had propagandised ceaselessly 
in the 
years before 1914, preaching an anti-war and anti-militarist 
message which found a receptive audience. 
When war erupted 
anti-war speakers were at least tolerated and, 
as the war 
dragged on, increasingly appreciated. 
Maclean therefore 
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hoped to connect working-class economic grievances to 
Marxist theory and to turn the Clyde Workers' Committee 
towards a revolutionary strategy. To this end he worked 
like a man possessed, and 'Maclean's classes, his agitation, 
constituted the elemental driving force behind the whole 
revolutionary movement on the Clyde. 
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The activities of Maclean and his followers on 
Clydeside lend the lie to the illusion that it was the ILP 
which played the leading role in the anti-war campaign. 
Indeed the ILP's position was often ambiguous and its leading 
members frequently dodged the issue. At both a national and 
local level there were very few members of the ILP who 
adopted a clear-cut pacifist position, and there was 'a 
professional, middle-class, temper to this group which was 
composed largely of writers, journalists, academics and 
doctors. ' 
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Harry McShane's comment on the Glasgow ILP, 
that its members 'didn't know where they were, and concentrated 
on the issue of secret diplomacy until conscription gave 
them something they could really fight on', 
45 is appropriate 
for the party as a whole. Its national spokesmen, Hardie, 
MacDonald and Jowett, supported national defence and 
wavered between settling the war as quickly as possible and 
urging the necessity of an Allied victory. 
Their speeches 
in their parliamentary constituencies often 
differed 
dramatically from those made elsewhere. Keir 
Hardie's 
famous article, 'We Must see the War Through, 
but denounce 
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Secret Diplomacy', perhaps summed up their attitude. The 
BSP centre was far less equivocal over the question of 
recruiting, and its line on the war hardened much earlier 
and was much firmer than that of the ILP, whilst the left 
around Maclean was uncompromising. Maclean's role has been 
much underplayed, largely in the interests of Labour ortho- 
doxy but also, on the left, because of his later refusal to 
join the Communist Party. Tom Bell, Gallacher and, more 
recently, Raymond Challinor and James Hinton have attributed 
the leadership of the anti-war campaign on Clydeside to the 
SLP and the Shop Stewards' Movement. 
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This is simply untrue. 
Their attitude was largely syndicalist, their politics sub- 
merged in workshop struggles. Both McShane and Harry Pollitt 
remembered that the war was rarely mentioned, even in the 
munitions factories, and the Clyde Workers' Committee con- 
centrated on the threat to trade union conditions. 
47 
Only 
Maclean and the BSP in Glasgow applied a Marxist analysis and 
gave a concrete militant lead; for Maclean the political 
issue was central, the need for an organised political party 
paramount. The SLP still tended to ultra-left sectarianism, 
and on one occasion Petroff and James MacDougall were 
ejected from a meeting of the Clyde Workers 
'Committee for 
attempting to raise the political issues of war and 
conscription. That Maclean posed the real danger to the war 
effort was well recognised by the authorities, who 
arrested 
him in October 1915, and again in February 
1916, when he 
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was sentenced to three years imprisonment. 
State action against the anti-war elements within the 
Socialist movement hastened the crisis between the patriotic 
leadership of the BSP and its anti-war opponents. The 1916 
Conference of the BSP met at Salford on the 23rd and 24th 
April, in the aftermath of the arrests on Clydeside and the 
general imposition of military and industrial conscription. 
It was attended by 106 delegates representing 91 branches, 
and held in an atmosphere of intimidation. Fearing pro- 
ceedings under the Defence of the Realm Act the Executive 
recommended that the Conference be held 'in camera' so that 
delegates should feel free to express their views. This was 
hotly opposed by Hyndman and his followers and in the en- 
suing debate tempers became frayed. H. W. Alexander, the 
treasurer, in a speech supporting the Executive resolution, 
pointed to Hyndman, Irving and others and declared that 
'Colleagues of these men are responsible for Scotland Yard 
dogging the footsteps of men like myself. '48 Hyndman 
attempted to reply but was shouted down, in spite of Fairchild's 
efforts to secure him a hearing, and the Executive's recom- 
mendation was voted in by 76 votes to 28. Thereupon, 
in 
accordance with a pre-arranged plan, 22 pro-war delegates 
representing 18 branches walked out of the Conference. 
49 
'This action called forth a spontaneous demonstration 
from 
the great body of the delegates, who stood upon the chairs 
and tables cheering and singing "The Red Flag" as 
the 
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dissentient delegates walked out. '50 Although some of the 
dissentients later returned to take part in the debates 
they were overwhelmingly defeated on all resolutions and in 
the subsequent Executive elections Internationalists took 
all the seats but one. 'Hyndman and the old Social-Democratic 
leadership had, in effect, been expelled from the organisation 
they had largely built. 
51 
Hyndman and his supporters adjourned to the Deansgate 
Hotel, Manchester, where they announced the formation of a 
National Socialist Advisory Committee. In June this was 
transformed into the National Socialist Party and Hyndman, 
at the age of 74, set out to 
'begin the Socialist movement 
here anew'. The title of the new party expressed his con- 
viction that 'both the B. S. P. and the I. L. 
P. have cut them- 
selves adrift from the people of these 
islands. '52 With 
Joseph Burgess, ex-president of the Bradford ILP, as 
its 
national organiser the NSP claimed 
43 branches by the end 
of the year. Its main advantage was 
its continued control 
of Justice, but the BSP held on to the party 
headquarters 
and retained a substantial majority of the 
branches and 
membership. Hyndman felt that this was accidental, 
that 
the bulk of his supporters were at the 
front or otherwise 
involved in the war effort, and that 
he would soon be able 
to resurrect the strength of the old 
SDF. He was to be 
disappointed. The bulk of his support came 
from the 'old 
guard', long-serving and aging members of 
the SDF, and this 
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was true of all parts of the country. 53 The Executive of 
the new party consisted almost entirely of veterans; Lee, 
Thorne, Irving, Stokes, Hunter Watts, Jones and others. 
New blood was strikingly absent in the leadership. Regionally 
the picture was confused. East London and Glasgow were 
strongholds of the BSP, but Hyndman retained strong support 
in the Central London branch and North-West Ham. Previous 
centres of SDF activism such as Nottingham, Northampton 
and Reading remained largely loyal to hyadman, as did the 
largest branch in Lancashire, Burnley and its near neigh- 
bour Nelson. In Yorkshire the two most prominent BSP 
members, Bert Killip and E. R. Hartley, were both pro-war. 
Killip remained in the Hyndman camp but Hartley was of the 
ultra-patriotic persuasion and joined Fisher's British 
Workers' League. He died at the beginning of 1918, but 
his defection and Killip's support of Hyndman deprived the 
BSP of much of its already limited support in the county. The 
regional conference at Leeds in 1915 had already demonstrated 
overwhelming support for the war, with only Arthur Gardiner 
of Huddersfield outspoken in the anti-war cause. He and 
Fred Shaw ensured a strong Huddersfield branch of the BSP 
after the split and there remained small branches at 
Birkenshaw, Bradford, and Elland, one in Leeds and an active 
branch in Sheffield. The BSP Conference in 1917 reported 
a total loss of 23 branches, but a number of these were 
divided on the issue and minorities immediately reformed 
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their branches. Additionally, the Jewish Social-Democratic 
organisation, with two London. branches and further bases 
in Manchester, Leeds and Glasgow, affiliated to the BSP. 
Certainly the BSP emerged from the split with the larger 
number of branches, but it must be remembered that the party 
as a whole was already something of a declining force. 
From a claimed 40,000 members in 1912 the BSP had slumped 
to less than 10,000 paying members by the outbreak of war. 
The vicissitudes of wartime led to a further diminution of 
numbers and at the 1917 Conference the party could only 
boast 6,435 paying members. As the NSP never rose above 
2,000 members the Social-Democratic tradition in British 
politics was obviously a much reduced force. 
The First World War was not, of itself, the cause of the 
schism within the BSP. It brought to a head long simmering 
differences of opinion, differences which had erupted 
in the 
early years of the twentieth century with the formation of 
the SLP and SPGB, which had threatened to split the party 
again during the long-running controversy over 
'the big navy', 
and which had been accentuated by the accession of new 
elements to the SDF at the formation of the 
BSP. Fainsod's 
appraisal of the effect of war on the 
Second International 
serves as an appropriate comment on the 
BSP: 
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The World War marked the end of an era in the 
history of labour and socialist internationalism. 
The schism which had been dimly foreshadowed 
by the internal disagreement in the pre-war 
International had at last matured. The World 
War was not responsible for the cleft, except 
in a very proximate sense. The war merely 
accelerated a process of dissolution which was 
implicit in the incompatible positions of Right, 
54 Center, and Left Wing Socialists. 
However, the Salford Conference of 1916 was not the final 
chapter in the history of Social-Democracy in Britain. At 
Zimmerwald the Centre and Left had combined to oppose the 
patriotic or Right wing elements. Similarly in this country 
the group around Fairchild had allied itself with Maclean's 
left wing faction to defeat Hyndman. The jailing of Maclean 
and Petroff meant that leadership of the BSP after the 
split passed to the London men, the inheritors of the pre- 
war 'Internationalist' mantle. They still looked to a 
restored International Socialist Bureau to instigate a ne- 
gotiated peace, and they determined to remain affiliated to 
the Labour Party despite its support for the wartime 
coalition government. In essence the new BSP leaders were 
reaffirming the orthodox tenets of the Social-Democratic 
tradition which Hyndman and his followers had 
implicitly 
abandoned. Convinced that the party, as yet, lacked the 
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mass base necessary for any practical action to achieve 
Socialist objectives, they maintained the essentially 
propagandist stance which had characterised the SDF and 
regarded their main task as educating the workers. In 
Kendall's words, they visualised revolution 'as a spontaneous 
upsurge of the masses sparked off like an explosion by the 
unendurable pressure of economic and political conditions 
on a waking population already prepared by social democratic 
propaganda. '55 Their opposition to the war remained of a 
pacifist nature and they made no attempt to cause political 
unrest. This is not to denigratethe BSP contribution to the 
anti-war campaign. At one time 4 members of its Executive 
were imprisoned, as were three prominent emigres, Petroff, 
Askew and Kehrhahn. The Huddersfield branch alone had 25 
members in prison at one stage. 
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Yet their opposition 
to the war, and more importantly the nature of that opposition, 
allowed them to draw closer to the ILP, and in August 1916 
a United Socialist Council was convened. The BSP was once 
more attempting the middle road, but its inability to choose 
between participation in the political process and genuine 
revolutionary activity again left it floundering and open 
to criticism from both left and right. Moreover, it was 
very susceptible to pressure from outside forces, and the 
revolution in Russia in 1917 influenced the party in new 
directions. 
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The February Revolution in Russia was universally 
welcomed by the Labour and Socialist Movement. Majority 
Labour opinion hoped that it would bring about a more 
effective prosecution of the war effort, whilst the downfall 
of Tsarism removed the misgivings of many about the British 
alliance with Russia. They could now genuinely claim 
that the war was one in defence of democracy and the rights 
of small nations. The Socialists hailed the Revolution as 
a triumph for the cause of democracy and hoped for a knock- 
on effect here, and they also believed that it would provide 
new impetus for a negotiated and early end to the war. In 
April the BSP Conference declared its 'profound admiration' 
for the revolutionary initiative of the Russian working class 
and passed the following resolution. 
The Conference pledges itself and the Party to 
act in the spirit of the Russian Revolution by 
endeavouring to arouse the British working class 
to a sense of the despotism and militarism which 
are growing up in this country, and by redoubling 
its energy in an agitation for the restoration 
of the International, and for the speedy 
termination of the war on terms involving no 
57 
annexations, and no humiliation to any country. 
But what did the BSP mean by its promise 'to act 
in the 
spirit of the Russian Revolution'? Nothing the party or 
its 
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Executive did suggested that they envisaged any form of 
direct action here. Moreover, the resolution again demon- 
strated the predominance of the Centre in its call for a 
restoration of the International and a negotiated peace. 
The rhetoric of revolution belied the essential moderation 
of the party's stance, and this impression was reinforced 
at the famous Leeds Convention of 3 June 1917. 
The initiative for Leeds, called 'to follow Russia', 
came from the United Socialist Council. Some 3,500 dele- 
gates hailed the Russian Revolution in enthusiastic fashion 
and talked wildly of a British sequel. Diverse shades of 
opinion were able to declare their support for revolution, 
Philip Snowden talking of painting Britain red, W. C. 
Anderson urging the formation of 'Councils of Workmen 
and SoldiersýDelegates' and Robert Williams favouring 'the 
dictatorship of the proletariat'. But, as Beatrice Webb 
noted, they were swayed by emotions. 
58 Beneath the 
rhetoric and bravado what united the heterogeneous elements 
was pacifism and the desire to end the war. The Provisional 
Committee's instructions to the Councils which were to be 
set up were scarcely revolutionary. They were concerned with 
safeguarding working-class rights during wartime, with 
uniting working-class organisations. W. C. Anderson, who 
sponsored the resolution in favour of establishing such 
councils, saw them as preparing for rebuilding after 
the war 
and even talked of getting government support. 
Thus they 
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were not intended to be Soviets in the Russian sense; 
indeed British Socialists knew next to nothing about con- 
ditions in Russia. Thus, to echo Stephen White, the Workmens 
and Soldiers' Council movement 'was in its essence an 
organisation formed in order to press for a negotiated 
settlement of the war rather than for revolutionary social 
change or "dual power". 
59 
The BSP later claimed that if other organisations had 
displayed the same spirit and enthusiasm as itself, the 
Workers' and Soldiers' Councils would have been far more 
successful. 
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Certainly the ILP's was the dominant voice 
at the Convention, with three times as many delegates as the 
BSP and a similar preponderance on the Provisional Committee, 
but there is no evidence to suggest that the outcome of the 
gathering would have been significantly different if the 
situation had been reversed. The Convention took place less 
than two months after the BSP Conference and nothing had 
happened to alter its perspective. As White points out, 
'No BSP speaker suggested that it might be possible to end 
an imperialist war only through socialist revolution. '61 
Common to both BSP and ILP was the view that the immediate 
question was to press for an honourable peace on the lines 
set forth by the Russian Provisional Government. Industrial 
and social problems could be left until after the war. 
A challenge to this perspective emerged as the situation 
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in Russia was clarified, and here the role of the emigres 
in the BSP was crucial. They Possessed, in Kendall's phrase, 
'revolutionary authenticity' 
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and were able to influence 
the membership because of that. In July four Russian delegates 
arrived in Britain to establish contacts with the British 
Socialist movement. Chicherin and B. Kahan, uncle of Zelda, 
were on the reception committee. Thenceforward links multi- 
plied and one consequence was the introduction of Bolshevik 
ideas to a wider audience. This coincided with the release 
of Maclean from jail at the end of June. He found allies in 
Tom Quelch and Theodore Rothstein, and they began to push 
for a more activist policy. The BSP was urged to participate 
more actively in the Shop Stewards Movement, to translate 
economic grievances into revolutionary political demands. 
Rothstein argued that it was possible to organise the masses 
for war resistance via a general strike in the munitions 
factories. The debate assumed dramatic relevance with the 
actuality of the October Revolution. 
The Bolshevik coup d'etat made them the single most 
important factor in the international Socialist movement. 
'It changed the outlook of the whole world movement. "The 
Revolution" was no longer a distant dream; it had begun! 
63 
As with the February Revolution enthusiasm was not confined 
to the revolutionary left. At the Labour Party Conference 
in 
January 1918 there was spontaneous singingof the 
'Red Flag', 
cheers at the mention of Trotsky's name and an ovation 
for 
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Litvinov. A Labour Leader editorial proclaimed that 'the time 
is now ripe for the democracies to unitedly rise and sweep 
their stupid and incompetent governors aside and take the 
settlement of the war into their own hands. '64 Such emotions 
did not generate any action; the feeling of the Labour Party 
and the bulk of the ILP was that one might legitimately defend 
revolution in Russia whilst still supporting reform in Britain, 
where conditions were very different. Thus all sections of 
the Movement participated in the 'Hands off Russia' campaign, 
but the majority of Labour and Socialist opinion ignored the 
Bolshevik appeal for revolutionary mass action to bring about 
peace and foment revolution. But for many on the revolutionary 
left the Bolshevik Revolution had saved the honour of the 
Socialist movement. 'The sense of defeat and humiliation 
which had weighed us down since August 1914 was dissipated 
completely, ' said T. A. Jackson. 'Now we were able to cast 
caution to the winds and go boldly over to the counter- 
attack. '65 The Revolution opened their eyes to new possibilities 
it heralded the general collapse of capitalism. Socialism was 
no longer something to be passively awaited but something to 
be fought for. Capitalism could be attacked at its weakest 
link by Socialists with the courage of their convictions. 
In Harry McShane's words, 'We had only known working-class 
66 
revolt: now we could talk about working-class power. 
' 
The British Socialist Party gave the Bolshevik Revolution 
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unanimous and unstinting support. It was welcomed by The 
Call67 and formally endorsed by the Executive in January 1918, 
BSP connections with Russia were strengthened when Chicherin 
and Petroff were deported in January 1918, to assume prominent 
roles in the Revolutionary Government. Joe Fineberg also 
returned to Russia and he facilitated the arrival of Bolshevik 
propaganda in Britain. Theodore Rothstein became the chief 
Bolshevik agent in this country, acting as the conduit for 
funds from Russia to support the revolutionary movement here 
and arranging publication of Lenin's State and Revolution in 
November 1919. At the party's Leeds Conference in 1918 
Fairchild declared that they would 'have to apply precisely 
the same methods as the Bolsheviks were applying in Russia. 
There would have to be a definite break with constitutional 
methods, and recourse to the revolutionary process. '68 Yet 
his speech and its overwhelmingly enthusiastic reception, 
disguised serious policy differences between those who wished 
to follow the Russian example and the more cautious elements 
who believed that there was no revolutionary road open to 
Britain in the foreseeable future. Fairchild belonged to 
the latter group. He wished to maintain affiliation to the 
Labour Party, which was 'the political movement of the working 
classes'. The BSP's task, he said, was still to build a 
strong party by educating the workers 
in Marxist principles, 
and this could best be done by maintaining close 
links with 
the ILP and the Labour Party. Maclean on the other 
hand 
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warned against sacrificing principles for unity. In his eyes 
the Labour Party was inextricably bound up with Capitalism, 
and the present upheavals in society gave them the oppor- 
tunity to develop workers' class consciousness and sweep 
away the Labour Party. But on this question Maclean was 
isolated. The majority on the left supported affiliation. 
Fineberg accused its opponents of acting like a 'Jewish 
sect... Revolutionary Socialism was a grand faith to have but 
it was not our function to have it for ourselves. '69 His 
views reflected a process of self-examination and re-appraisal 
within the BSP ranks. 
One of the main effects of the Bolshevik Revolution was 
to influence BSP members to adopt a far more agitational 
role in the trade unions and Labour Party. Fred Shaw remarked 
that 'experience had taught him and others that instead of 
standing aloof from existing organisations, they should go 
into them' and win them for Marxism. 
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Political activity 
was no longer regarded as separate from industrial organisation 
and BSPers were active in the Shop Stewards Movement, which at 
the beginning of 1918 declared all-out opposition to the war. 
In the light of the Revolution many followed T. A. 
Jackson's 
example: 'I pulled my Marxism to pieces, examined every piece 
closely and critically in the light of objective practice... 
71 
helped by the works of Lenin as they appeared 
in English. ' 
This led them to a new appraisal of the state as an 
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instrument of class domination, whereas previously they had 
operated largely within the context of existing national 
political structures. It also emphasised the need for an 
immediate revolutionary strategy which accepted that Socialism 
was not guaranteed but had to be won: 'our Russian comrades 
have shown us that the working class... can, under the most 
trying and difficult circumstances, assume power and maintain 
it. ', said M. E. Quelch, and British Marxists should develop 
7 
a similar 'sense of power'. 
2 
They were led away from 
parliament as the main focus for their activities towards an 
acceptance of Lenin's strictures that it should be used to 
smash the system, to expose workers' illusions in parlia- 
mentary democracy. Similar arguments could be advanced for 
affiliation to the Labour Party. During the autumn and 
winter of 1918 Socialist unity once more appeared on the 
agenda, but now the BSP looked leftward, to the SLP. The two 
parties found common ground in the idea of Soviets springing 
up spontaneously from the revolutionary instincts of the masses. 
In January 1919 the Bolshevik call for the establishment of a 
Third International heralded a renewed struggle within the 
BSP, as Fairchild and Alexander led a small minority in 
continued support of the re-establishment of the Second 
International. The BSP Conference of April 1919 demonstrated 
conclusively that 'Sovietism' had captured the party. 
Fairchild and Alexander, protesting bitterly that the 
BSP was 
acting as though there had been neither parliament nor 
trade 
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unions in British history, left the party altogether. The 
Bolshevik Revolution had 'initiated the final stage in the 
decomposition of the Social Democratic tradition in Britain'73 
and the BSP's acceptance of the Soviet as the agency of the 
Socialist revolution meant 'the decisive break with the 
Social Democratic orthodoxy and constituted the ideological 
basis for the formation of a unified revolutionary party. ' 
74 
Less than twelve months later the BSP fused into the new 
Communist Party of Great Britain. 
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EPILOGUE. 
The negotiations leading to the formation of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain and the merger of the BSP into the 
new party have been well documented, I and fall outside the 
concerns of this thesis, but one point is worthy of some 
consideration. Walter Kendall has argued that the CPGB was 
an artificial creation imposed upon British Socialists by 
the Comintern at a time when the indigenous revolutionary 
movement was breaking out of the sectarian isolation which 
had retarded its development since the 1880s. Kendall sees 
John Maclean as the central figure in 'the formation of a 
native British Marxist tradition'2 and Theodore Rothstein 
as the villain of the piece, taking advantage of Maclean's 
imprisonment to divert the BSP from a genuine revolutionary 
strategy into Comintern sectarianism. Raymond Challinor 
agrees with Kendall's attacks on Rothstein and also suggests 
that Rothstein misinformed Lenin as to the true situation in 
Britain. Indeed Challinor questions Rothstein's revolutionary 
credentials in an attempt to portray the SLP as the true 
originators of British Bolshevism and to downgrade the role 
of the BSP. 
3 
How valid are these assertions? 
In the first instance Kendall has a somewhat naive 
estimate of Scottish radical potential, both in 1915-16 and 
again from 1918-20. His suggestion that the British 
revolutionaries 'missed the boat' and failed to capitalise 
on their opportunities quite simply misjudges the 
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revolutionary potential of those years. The grievances of 
the workers were industrial and community-centred; they 
would accept Socialist leadership on those issues but did 
not connect them with opposition to the war. Indeed, as 
military victory became more certain opposition to the war 
became even more limited. Workers' demands were largely 
sectional; there was little agreement amongst the munitions 
workers, for example, let alone amongst the wider working- 
class, and very often agreements were reached on a plant by 
plant basis. Economic conditions were never as bad in Britain 
as in those countries where revolution did break out, and 
Britain was one of the victors in the armed conflict. Trade 
union officials were always able to divert working-class 
militancy into channels harmless to the system, whilst the 
authorities never lost the capacity nor the determination to 
govern. There was never any serious disaffection within the 
armed forces. Finally, the pre-requisite of a revolutionary 
transformation, the establishment of 'dual power' in the 
shape of soldiers' and workers' councils, was never a serious 
possibility as the events surrounding the Leeds Convention 
demonstrated. For these reasons I do not consider that a 
revolutionary situation existed in Britain either during 
or after the war. Nonetheless, defence of sectional 
interests 
can contain the potential for Socialist growth and certainly 
on Clydeside there developed a group of articulate 
Socialists, 
with Maclean the most prominent, which suggested 
the growth 
of a significant Socialist current based in part on workplace 
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organisation. Kendall suggests that Maclean's arrest in 
1918 'shut down the dynamo'4 of revolutionary development 
and that thereafter Rothstein's influence was crucial. 
The picture is confused by a lack of clear evidence but 
a number of points suggest themselves. Rothstein was certainly 
a late convert to Bolshevism; for much of the period he 
supported the Menshevik position, which opposed the war but 
doubted Russia's readiness for Socialism. His Essaus on War 
and Peace, published by the BSP in 1917, called for a negotiate( 
peace rather than an end to the war through Socialist 
revolution. He backed the entry of the Mensheviks into the 
Provisional Government and criticised the Leninite opposition 
to that. Rothstein was certainly to the right of Maclean 
prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, but Maclean was almost 
unique amongst British Socialists in his advocacy of 
'revolutionary defeatism'. There was no clear picture of 
events in Russia and most British Socialists were reactive 
rather than creative in their policies. Rothstein's later 
career hardly validates Challinor`s questioning of the 
legitimacy of his conversion. 
Maclean himself was undoubtedly the inspiration of the 
BSP left and a major figure on Clydeside. His three years 
in jail after April 1916 are suggestive of Government aware- 
ness of his potential influence, and his appointment 
as 
Bolshevik Consul in Glasgow does not suggest that Lenin 
underestimated him either. Yet the left was not 
the major 
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force within the BSP prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Fairchild and the centre predominated and their attempt to 
sustain the Social-Democratic tradition did not suggest a 
transformation of strategy or a major breakthrough from 
isolation. After the Bolshevik Revolution the ideological 
debate which had always characterised the SDF/BSP continued, 
to be won eventually by those favouring the Bolshevik model. 
That debate is the key to subsequent events. Kendall fails 
to see any continuity of tradition in the CPGB yet it was, 
in fact, firmly rooted in domestic experience. From the turn 
of the century the party, in common with all parties of the 
Second International, had experienced continuous debate over 
the role of the party. Breakaways by the SLP and SPGB had 
proved less successful than the SDF itself, but many remained 
to continue the debate. Kendall attacks the emigres for 
their influence, but they were instrumental in challenging 
the Hyndmanites and Rothstein in particular provided that 
synthesis of theory and practice of which Maclean later 
proved to be the most able exponent. The industrial upheavals 
of 1910-20 produced a profound re-examination of ideology 
amongst many militants and it led them to question many funda- 
mental Social-Democratic beliefs. Their search for an 
ideology was 'the fundamental dynamic of change 
in the British 
revolutionary movement in the decade preceding the 
formation 
of the Communist Party'5 and the influx of new elements 
into 
the BSP in 1911, as the Hyndmanites later regretted, eventually 
overwhelmed the Social-Democratic tradition. Their 
beliefs 
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were examined in the context of events, of which the 
Bolshevik Revolution was the most influential. To Socialists, 
devastated by the experiences of wartime, it provided new 
hope; it reawakened that apocalyptic vision, 'an ever present 
aspiration... to transcend the structure of British 
institutions', 
6 
to which even Hyndman had been susceptible, 
AsChallinor admits, 'The October Revolution endowed its 
custodians with immense prestige', 
7 
and it reawakened that 
internationalism which had all but been destroyed in 1914. 
Revolutionaries looked to Russia for guidance and sought to 
emulate her example. One must agree with Hugo Dewar that 
those who came together to form the CPGB 'were for the most 
part deep-rooted in the native soil of the labour movement', 
8 
and echo the sentiments of Arthur Horner: 
Above all the Russian Revolution had inspired 
millions with the idea that the working people 
could take power and create a classless society. 
We did not think of Soviet Russia in those days 
as a State but as the first Socialist Government 
set up by the working class. 
9 
Kendall is probably correct to assert that without Russian 
intervention there would have been no unity; the history of 
the British movement could not inspire confidence 
in the 
ability of its various sections to sink their 
differences. 
Yet for most revolutionaries association with 
the International 
was a matter for pride. 'It gave them a sense of 
strength 
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and assurance to be members of a world-wide organisation 
which was in power in Soviet Russia. ' 
10 
One must ask what 
would have happened without Russian insistence on unity, and 
the experience of the unity negotiations suggests that their 
intervention 'probably saved the revolutionary movement from 
a fragmentation far more sterile than anything for which the 
Communist Party itself' was responsible. 
11 
As one com- 
mentator observed, 'Had it not been for the Russian Revolution, 
Marxism in all probability would have dropped into the realm 
of rejected beliefs in the 1920s. '12 If the BSP had been 
won for a revolutionary policy earlier and if Maclean had 
remained influential would this perspective have been 
radically different? 
To present the BSP as a credible revolutionary instrument 
is invalid. The party was small in numbers, 59 branches being 
represented at its 1918 Conference including only ten 
from 
Scotland and twenty from London. It was hardly a party with 
a mass membership. In some areas the ILP was an obstacle 
to 
growth and this was certainly true 
in Glasgow where, by 1918, 
ithad gained hegemony as a result of 
its campaigning on rents 
and housing. A revitalised Labour Party would prove 
a greater 
barrier to success elsewhere. There were moments 
of unrest 
and centres of discontent, but the task of 
transforming 
industrial upheaval into revolutionary political 
channels was 
beyond the task of the relatively 
few revolutionary Socialists. 
Challinor presents the SLP as a more credible 
alternative but 
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its membership was far smaller than that of the BSP and 
it was concentrated almost entirely in Scotland. Moreover it 
retained much of its sectarian nature; some of its members 
refused to welcome the Bolshevik Revolution as premature, 
many opposed affiliation to the Labour Party and remained 
aloof from the CPGB for that reason. Maclean could command 
a following amongst Socialists of all persuasions, but it 
would be true to say that he was an educator and propagandist 
rather than a revolutionary leader, simply because there was 
no revolution to lead. His rebuffs on the Clyde Workers' 
Committee when he attempted to link industrial discontent to 
opposition to the war prove this. He could not command a 
majority in the BSP until after the Bolshevik Revolution and 
then, with the majority, he 'did not in the least object to 
the BSP being remodelled on Bolshevik lines. '13 Revolutionary 
influence on Clydeside was limited; the so-called red base 
of Glasgow could only deliver I in 5 votes and one parlia- 
mentary seat to the Labour Party at the general election of 
December 1918. Maclean polled a very creditable 34.3% of 
the vote in the Gorbals as Labour candidate but thereafter, 
outside the Labour Party, his personal following declined. 
Maclean's later career is controversial. Certainly he 
and Rothstein quarrelled, largely over the role which 
Maclean 
was required to play in the BSP. He and a number of others 
became disillusioned with BSP tactics and the party's 
leader- 
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ship, reflecting in part Maclean's distrust of London 'juntas'. 
Accusations that imprisonment had left him suffering from 
paranoia and delusions are dubious; his political statements 
remained coherent, as David Howell has demonstrated, 14 but 
his perspective was simply not plausible. He too overestimated 
the radicalisation of the Scottish working class, thus attempt- 
ing to form a separate Scottish Communist Party. His accept- 
ance of much of the syndicalism he had once rejected and his 
attempts to gain support for one big union were not feasible 
in view of the post-war depression and the victimisation, 
following the 40 Hours Strike. Latterly Maclean was pre- 
occupied with the organisation of the unemployed, hardly the 
basis for a durable political movement. Neither Maclean nor 
the BSP provided the basis for a lasting revolutionary party, 
as Maclean's subsequent decline demonstrated. Their political 
space was limited by the Labour Party and they faced massive 
problems operating within a non-revolutionary situation. 
This indeed was the problem of the CPGB and not that of out- 
side dictation and finance. What is important is that between 
1914 and 1919 the Marxists of the BSP came to accept the 
Bolshevik viewpoint not because it was imposed upon them but 
because they accepted its validity. In so doing they abandoned 
Social-Democracy, the Marxism of the Second International. 
Its British founding father, Henry Mayers Hyndman, attempted 
to reinvigorate that tradition. 
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Some of Hyndman's political activities after his departure 
from the BSP 'bordered on the hysterical'. 15 He joined the 
Morning Post's 
volunteered his 
spy waiters' in 
was employed by 
took the necess 
pique allied to 
campaign to 
services to 
London. On 
the Foreign 
ary steps to 
his intense 
root out enemy spies and even 
the police to investigate 'German 
discovering that Theodore Rothstein 
Office as a Russian expert Hyndman 
ensure his dismissal. Personal 
patriotism ensured a continual 
barrage of invective against the BSP and ILP. His reaction 
to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917., allied to his wartime 
activities, revealed much about Hyndman's Socialism. He 
bitterly disowned Lenin's claim to have carried out a social 
revolution such as Marx contemplated, savaging the Bolsheviks 
as 'doctrinaire, premature and impossibilist. '16 In the 
first instance Hyndman was appalled at the Bolsheviks' uni- 
lateral declaration of peace at Brest Litovsk. He could never 
forgive them for weakening the Allied war effort. More 
fundamentally he attacked 'them on orthodox Marxist lines, 
arguing that Russia, being economically backward, had not 
attained the stage of highly developed capitalism, which alone 
made the advent of Socialism inevitable. They had skipped 
several stages in the slow advance of social evolution, 
claimed Hyndman, and 'Nothing will persuade me that people 
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can make twelve o'clock at eleven, in economicsand sociology, 
by dogmatism, corruption and wholesale butchery. 17 The 
direct action of the Bolsheviks was, to Hyndman, simply a 
manifestation of anarchy, against which he had railed all his 
political life. The argument was certainly Marxist if, as 
Joseph Clayton pointed out, one treated Marx as an infallible 
guide and could claim to infallibly interpret his writings, 
'8 
but Hyndman was hardly consistent in his use of Marxist 
principles. He had already partially disavowed the materialist 
interpretation of history in his article with Bax in the early 
months of the war, and had argued in the case of Finland at 
least that Socialism could be achieved in an industrially 
backward country. Tsuzuki feels that 'In reality it was 
opportunism rather than theory that led Hyndman to attack the 
Bolshevik leaders, and the cause of his opportunism was his 
commitment to the Allied war effort. ' 
19 
But there was more 
to it than that! 
Hyndman remained convinced that the advent of Socialism 
was closest in Britain, where capitalism was at its most 
highly developed. Indeed the European war had strengthened 
this conviction; the Government's recognition of the power 
of Labour, he said, 'had 'put the clock of progress on 
five- 
and-twenty years... We have entered the beginning of the 
transition period. '20 George Bernard Shaw ridiculed 
Hyndman's 
attitude to the Bolsheviks in a review of The Evolution of 
Revolution. He had denounced the Germans for voting war 
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credits, now he denounced the Russians for surrendering 
'when they were hopelessly bleeding to death'. The English 
arch-Marxist had 'been confronted with the fulfilment of all 
the articles of his religion' yet 'he out-Churchills Churchill 
in his denunciation of the Bolsheviks'. This was nothing 
but 'naive John Bullism' said Shaw. What did Hyndman expect 
the real revolution to be like? The real reason for 
Hyndman's anti-Bolshevism 
seems to be that he has set his heart on England 
being the Holy Land of the Communist faith. John 
Bull again! Also, curiously enough, on the trans- 
ition being a peaceful parliamentary one. The 
old Internationalist is a patriot at heart, the 
old revolutionist a pacifist. 
21 
Shaw's assessment was accurate. Hyndman had shifted his out- 
look and altered his strategy to enter more fully into the 
political process. His remaining militancy had been dissipated 
by patriotism and he had adopted a Fabianlike faith in an 
evolutionary advance of Socialism via existing agencies, the 
evolution of revolution. Essentially this had been his outlook 
since the heady days of the 1880s, although Hyndman in common 
with most Social-Democrats retained enough of the apocalyptic 
vision to be swayed by events, for example the pre-war 
industrial militancy. Wartime, however, had removed even 
that vestige of revolutionary Socialism. Hyndman, unlike 
Morris, Bax and others, had never adopted Socialism as a 
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whole philosophy of life and remained committed to changes 
within existing systems, to a peaceful transition through 
democratisation of the existing order. His prediction of 
revolution in 1889 had failed to materialise and he had 
shifted to a long-term view of Socialist advance. 'Hyndman's 
Socialism was, despite its Marxist inspiration, much like 
22 
Webb's Fabianism', utilitarian in concept. 
Thus Hyndman, initially hostile to the affiliation of 
his new National Socialist Party to the Labour Party because 
of its anti-war elements, welcomed the new Labour constitution 
in 1918 because it definitely committed the party to Socialism. 
He regarded this as a vindication of SDF agitation over the 
years and the NSP affiliated immediately. Its aim was also 
to form a pro-Ally group within the Labour Party. In the 
'khaki election' of December 1918 eleven NSP members stood 
as candidates on a programme 
'to kill Bolshevism, Capitalism, 
Militarism' and six were successful. 
23 
Burnley at last 
returned a Labour M. P. in Dan Irving, some recompense 
for 
Hyndman's unsuccessful campaigns. The 
SDF24 had, at last, won 
a place in the parliamentary Labour Party 
but Tsuzuki's 
assessment was all too accurate: 
'its representatives were 
too old and too conservative to make very much 
impact with 
their ideas. ' 
25 Harry Lee, the party's historian, 
later 
argued that the SDF had changed places with 
the ILP to act 
as a Socialist ginger group within 
the Labour Party. If so 
it 
was singularly unsuccessful. They no 
longer claimed to be a 
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vanguard but rather a 'loyal soldier in the working class 
army. ' 
26 
However, as rapidly became apparent, 'Having sub- 
merged itself in the working-class political movement, the SDF 
had lost any distinctive ideological basis for its existence 
and entered a course leading to its extinction. 
27 
There is a touch of pathos to the last years of the 
Social-Democratic Federation. Its history is one of a 
declining and aging membership, its passage marked by the 
death of its stalwarts. Hyndman himself passed away on 22 
November 1921, Irving in 1924, Bax in 1926. The organisation 
was in desperate financial straits and Justice ceased pub- 
lication in January 1925, to be replaced by a monthly Social- 
Democrat. This struggled on until 1933. Branches were formed 
but many collapsed. The previously stalwart Edinburgh branch 
failed to raise a quorum at a meeting called for the purposes 
of winding it up. 
28 
SDFers were actively engaged in their 
unions and in the Labour Party and had little time to spare 
for the SDF, thus vindicating Irving's warning two decades 
previously. Potential new recruits saw little reas-on to join 
the Federation as well as the Labour Party, and those on the 
left gravitated to the ILP or the Communist Party as the new 
standard bearers of revolt. The speeches of its leaders could 
have been written 40 years previously, their theme still the 
education of the working class in the principles of 
Socialism, 
but they were now tinged with a touch of desperation 
in their 
claim that the Labour Party had in reality become a Social- 
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Democratic Party. They had become, says Clayton, 'part of 
the existing order, elements not of revolution but of 
stability., 
29 
The Jubilee Conference of 1931, held in Bristol, 
suggested a revival but was in fact a celebration of past 
history, an occasion for reminiscing and self congratulation. 
Many of the delegates were 'pioneer leaders of the Labour 
Movement, some more than 70 years old'. 
30 
The following year 
the SDF could not afford to hold an Annual Conference, 
31 
and in 
1933 the affiliation fee to the Labour Party was paid on the 
reduced figure of 1,000 members. In 1935 there were serious 
discussions about the advisability of ceasing operations32 
and thereafter the decline hastened. At the last a few veteran 
right-wing Labour Members of Parliament, including Thorne and 
Kennedy, met annually for a Hyndman Commemoration Dinner. 
The outbreak of war delivered the final blow to the party. 
Burnley, the sole remaining branch with a spark of life, 
suspended its activities and a special Executive meeting on 
the 12 October 1939 resolved to wind up the SDF immediately. 
This process was concluded in 1941, by which time the shares 
in the Twentieth Century Press had been sold, the last 
headquarters vacated, and the executive meetings concluded. 
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CONCLUSION. 
'What of the Social-Democratic Federation? ' asked George 
1 
Bernard Shaw in 1904 and the question remains as pertinent 
today as it was then. Labour history is often the history 
of successful leaders and organisations, but the movement 
has evolved as 'the outcome of a highly uneven historical 
process, involving the ebb and flow of various currents. 
Groups such as the SDF may seem sectarian and unimportant but 
they have been justified by history in that they are the 
direct ancestors of the Labour Party, and the debates which 
exercised the Federation preoccupy Socialists today. Yet its 
critics have been many, including those from whom one might 
have expected sympathy. They have been relegated to the 
margins of history by the modern Labour movement, anxious to 
refute any Marxist antecedents. It is no accident that 
historians have seized on Hyndman as synonymous with the SDF 
for, as John Foster has remarked, 'They love Hyndman, and they 
love to exaggerate his eccentricities. '3 Through Hyndman it 
is possible to dismiss the Federation, as Henry Pelling does, 
as 'a band of ex-Tory adventurers' attempting to impose an 
alien dogma on a sensible and moderate British people. 
4 More 
surprisingly Communist historians were also critical, their 
attitude determined by the hostility of Marx to Hyndman, of 
Engels to the SDF, and by the criticisms of Lenin. 
John 
Foster and Eric Hobsbawm, however, have done much to redress 
the balance, 5 and as Hobsbawm suggests, whilst 
'It cannot 
simply be approved' neither can it be 
'simply condemned' and 
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'It certainly cannot be dismissed'. 
6 
In the first instance one cannot criticise the Social- 
Democratic Federation for what it could not seriously hope to 
have achieved. Various commentators have remarked on the non- 
revolutionary character of the British working-class. As 
Keir Hardie would have it, 'We are a solid people, very 
practical and not given to chasing bubbles. ' 
7 
Theodore 
Rothstein, a prominent SDFer, considered, retrospectively, that 
the failure of the SDF to exercise greater influence on the 
development of the Labour movement was inescapable given the 
relatively favourable economic situation of British capit- 
alism. 
8 
In an illuminating article Ross McKibbin has detailed 
the difficulties confronting a Marxist party, prior to 1914, 
and he concludes that 'Marxism lost all ways'. 
9 The structure 
of British capitalism and the nature of British trade 
unionism meant that the potential clientele for a Marxist 
party was very small. In Britain there was an existing working- 
class culture, based on sports, religious affiliation and 
hobbies, which competed with party political action. 
As 
McKibbin points out 'it was a life 
in the broadest sense 
political - the same kind of people who 
founded pigeon- 
breeding societies also founded the Labour 
Party', 
10 but one 
had to be comparatively unusual to do both. 
Furthermore 
Marx's aphorism that the past 
'weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living' aptly aasesses the 
inherited traditions 
in this country, which gave legitimacy 
to political institution! 
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and sentiments which in turn largely precluded a revolutionary 
strategy. Few questioned that a representative parliament 
was the proper focus of working-class aspirations, that 
electoralism was legitimate political action whereas the 
political strike was not. 'This ideological pattern by itself 
almost entirely distinguished Britain from most of the con- 
tinental countries', 
11 
and in this context Hyndman's and the 
SDF's concentration on electoral politics is explicable. 
Thus James Mawdsley saw no contradiction between his activities 
as a representative of labour and his position as a 
Conservative parliamentary candidate; he drew a distinction 
between the interests of labour and his wider world view in 
a way common to many. Similarly the traditional separation 
of economics and politics persisted in Britain, shared by 
employers and employees alike and exemplified in the support 
for Free Trade. McKibbin concludes that 
Two of the prime assumptions of any Marxist party 
-a rejection by much of the working class of 
existing social institutions and a belief in the 
unity of "economics" and "politics" - simply did 
not hold. The Labour Party, therefore, was not 
free to choose between Marxism and reformism 
but 
12 
only between varieties of reformism. 
Marxism thus operated in an uncongenial climate, and a 
hostile environment. These early Socialists were victimised 
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at their place of work; lists of names were posted in the 
local police station; employers' associations kept 'black- 
lists'; their meetings were assaulted, and often kept secret 
in consequence. They were truly pioneers and that alone 
ensures their place in history. 'Those early agitators and 
propagandists' said George Hicks, one time General Secretary 
of The Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers, 'must 
have been heroes indeed possessed of lion-hearted courage and 
13 
faith that conquers'. In the 1880s they were charged with 
an almost millenial fervour: 'we were enthusiasts, fanatics, 
what you will, imbued with the faith that moves mountains'. 
14 
convinced of the imminent collapse of the capitalist order, 
and therefore unmindful of the need for a coherent political 
strategy. The very existence of the group was a strategy 
in itself - 'its increase in membership, its collective 
missionary and other activities, just its being there, however 
small, being a major part of what it was necessary to do to 
bring Socialism about. '15 As that phase of the movement passed, 
and it became necessary to address more pragmatic considerations 
one can examine the SDF in the light of what was achievable. 
As the Socialist movement fragmented after 1895 the myth 
developed that the SDF was attempting to import an alien 
ideology into Britain. Bruce Glasier was the prime exponent 
of this argument and his views have been accepted 
by Labour 
orthodoxy and its historians. This is mythological nonsense. 
Marxism offers a critique of society rather than a 
finished 
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body of doctrine, and its critique was readily accessible 
to the native traditions of the British Labour movement. It 
must be seen in the context of the autodidactic tradition, 
the movement for intellectual self-improvement, which flourished 
among sections of the working class during the nineteenth 
century. The early experience of grinding poverty was common 
to many of the SDF's proletarian members. Will Thorne, 
Quelch, Tillett, Jack Williams and others needed no texts to 
convince them of the inhumanity of capitalism or the existence 
of class-conflict, but, like their Owenite and Secularist 
ancestors, they read and studied in response to their condition, 
and attempted to work out a general theory which would explain 
their position. 
The idea that Marxism was foisted on such men "from 
outside" is mistaken: to study and reflect upon a 
great working-class thinker was as natural to 
Scots tailors like James MacDonald, or the SDF's 
atheist Northamptonshire shoemakers, as it had 
been for their fathers and grandfathers to study 
16 
and reflect upon Owen, Paine and Spence.... 
What was just as important was that they saw themselves 
in 
that tradition; the emphasis was as much on Owen and Bronterre 
O'Brien as Marx, particularly in the early days of the 
Federation. The ethical and Nonconformist tradition 
fostered 
by the ILP was as alien to the secularist radicals of 
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Northampton and London as Glasier claimed Marxism to be. 
In addition, the first generation of British Marxists were an 
integral part of the intellectual and moral reaction against 
high Victorian materialism. The SDF collection, How I 
Became a Socialist, revealed a common process of moral 
awakening and self-discovery in individuals as diverse as Bax 
and Quelch, a process identical to that undergone by members 
of the early Fabians, the members of the various Christian 
Socialist movements and the Labour Church. Morris, undoubtedly 
a Marxist, could with equal ease be claimed by the ILP and 
the SDF because of his combination of social criticism and 
aesthetic concerns. 
The Marxist critique of capitalism had considerable 
impact upon the rest of the Labour movement. Kenneth Morgan 
has pointed out that Keir Hardie often claimed to be a 
disciple of Marx, although it was very much 'a Marx... in his 
own image. '17 Nonetheless, the point remains valid and as 
critics of the social order the SDF played a vital educating 
role, they were the educators supreme. As Max Beer put it 
the SDF had 'revolutionised many a head or, at least, com- 
pelled thinking'; it had done 'pioneer work, drawing the 
plough, sowing the seed'; but it had allowed others to reap 
the fruit. 18 The explanation for this is to be found 
in the 
Federation's application of theory, not in the theory 
itself. 
SDFers viewed themselves as a vanguard party, yet they 
failed 
to act in a manner which would prepare them 
for the taking 
of power. Indeed, they were quite unable to visualise 
the 
F34_ 
problems of revolt or the seizure of power for there was no 
precedent in living memory in Britain. Their vision of the 
inevitable collapse of capitalism, followed by spontaneous 
revolution, meant that they limited themselves to an 
evangelical function. In 1912 Leonard Hall stated that 
'Their main function was the education of people in the 
19 
principles of Socialism', a point which Hyndman would have 
made in 1884 and which Lee was still stressing in the 1930s. 20 
Consequently they failed to develop an organisational theory 
with the result that both in the unions and in the political 
field 'it proved capable of striking an important response 
yet in neither case did it have the means to turn the response 
21 
to advantage. ' 
The high-water mark of the Federation's influence was 
undoubtedly the late 1890s, when even Pelling admits that it 
provided a serious challenge to the ILP, 
22 both in terms of 
membership and influence. It was the driving force behind 
the trade union and Socialist alliance which captured the 
West Ham borough council in 1898, and it had established an 
alliance with similar potential in Bow and Bromley. In both 
those constituencies the SDF had effectively won the political 
leadership of the working class from the Liberals, so much so 
that in the 1900 General Election it could secure a straight 
fight against the Tories. After 1896 the Federation controlled 
the London Trades Council. In London, says Paul Thompson, 
the SDF 'far from being the dogmatic bitter sect with 
little 
6 35 . 
significant support traditionally pictured by historians, 
was winning more hard-working and idealistic members among 
working men than any other political movement. 
23 
The SDF's 
Marxist Socialism had replaced secularist radicalism as the 
typical creed of the politically active, working class Londoner. 
Similarly the Federation had established strong roots in Burnle} 
and the cotton towns of North-East Lancashire, in Northampton 
and in Reading, where Justice had a circulation of 2,000. 
The SDF provided a viable Socialist alternative to the ILP for 
those who were dubious about a party which refused to call 
itself Socialist and who were hostile to its 'Labourist' 
policies. However the logic of national events - the Labour 
alliance - eroded the SDF alternative even in those localities 
where it had established a major presence, and it is clear 
that the SDF decision to withdraw from that alliance was a 
massive blunder. 
The withdrawal of the SDF from the LRC was a consequence 
of its failure to develop an effective organisational theory, 
and in particular its separation of the economic and political 
spheres of activity. It is quite wrong to say that the 
SDF was 
hostile to trade unions, but its conception of their 
importance 
was limited and distorted, both by a reliance on 
the limited 
number of Marxist texts then available and 
by the fact that 
the Federation was formed when the craft unions and 
the labour 
aristocracy were still influential. The 
SDF strategy was to 
form progressive, Socialist unions that were general 
unions 
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and which were subordinated to action in the political sphere. 
This explains its strategy in 1889-90, when Quelch set up the 
South Side Protection League and when SDFers had key positions 
in other unions. They aimed to transform the new unions into 
citadels of Socialism, yet the SDF unions collapsed because, as 
general unions in an era of high unemployment, they had no 
stable base within particular trades. Their attitude to trade 
unions wasxeflected in their attitude to the LRC. What was 
wanted was a Labour Party affiliated to by all unions and 
informed by socialist doctrine. Because that was demon- 
strably not the case the SDF withdrew; if it could not control 
the Labour Party then it would not participate. The SDF's 
relationship to the Labour Party demonstrates the essentially 
propagandist nature of its role. It had no conception of 
organising from below, yet at a time when the LRC had a 
federal structure the Socialist groups could have exercised 
considerable influence from within. Rothstein's debate with 
Hyndman during the Boer War emphasised the point. Socialism, 
he said, 'cannot be spread like margarine... but must be fought 
for and won. It is not by preaching the gospel of discontent, 
but by fighting the cause of the discontented that socialism 
becomes the all-conquering living force that it is. '24 In 
an attempt to steer a middle . -path 
between reform and revolution 
the SDF achieved neither. It reacted to events, rather than 
initiated them, which explains its characteristic abrupt 
changes of policy. Kendall neatly assesses the problem 
when he argues that 
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the absence of an effective organisational 
theory reduced socialists to endeavouring to 
influence developments within the labour move- 
went from without at times in which the only 
effective challenge could be mustered by 
active participation from within. 
25 
This was true of the L RC and it was also true of the 
Federation's lack of an industrial strategy, for which its 
concentration on electoral success never compensated. Thus, 
although the party had a correct appreciation of the weaknesses 
of syndicalism it made no attempt to establish the relation- 
ship which industrial action could have to political action; 
the function of the party and the trade union were compart- 
mentalised. 
Revolutionary in theory, reformist in practice, the 
theory became reserved for street-corner oratory, divorced 
from what the party actually did. As palliatives became more 
and more the day to day concern so the theory came to reflect 
the practice. The SDF paid lip-service to the idea that 
parliament was a sham but in fact became more and more wedded 
to the electoral approach, preached the self-activity of the 
working-class but in practice renounced it, rejected utopianism 
for Marxism but in its view of the working class and 
its 
concentration on propaganda was almost utopian 
in outlook. 
The goal of revolution was something that had shifted 
to the 
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future and party members had to commit themselves to a 
decidedly non-revolutionary round of party activities. This 
was almost an excuse to do nothing, and it explains both the 
staying power of the SDF and its stagnation. However, it must 
be emphasised that the failures of the SDF were the failures of 
the Second International, with the fundamental difference that 
here there was no mass party because of the different British 
situation. In common with the parties of the Second 
International the SDF debated its dilemma at great length - 
the problem was that the debate went on too long - but finally 
split asunder under the pressure of war. The Bolshevik 
Revolution resolved the debate by posing a stark choice - 
revolutionary practice OR reformism and as a result the 
Social-Democratic tradition merged into the Labour Party and 
lost its rationale for existence. 
To what extent was the party's failure the responsibility 
of Hyndman and the leadership? Hyndman's personal faults 
have been well-documented, his idiosyncracies maligned. He 
was notoriously difficult to work with, 'the worst leader 
that ever drove his followers into every other camp', 
26 
and 
his personality was a major factor in the splits which plagued 
the SDF and deprived it of valuable supporters. There was a 
strong element of paternalism in his attitude to the Federation 
and to the working class generally, exemplified 
by his resig- 
nation from the Executive in 1901. To outsiders Hyndman was 
the Federation and this was the problem; he portrayed 
a 
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sectarian attitude which was assumed to be representative of 
the party. His attitude stemmed from his adoption of Marxism 
as a formula which predicted the inevitable collapse of 
capitalism and posed the SDF as the inheritor of state power 
when the collapse occurred. In the meantime the party should 
remain theoretically correct and free from compromise. The 
leadership therefore failed to give any guidance to its 
members on how to apply their theory. Hence Jackson's comment 
that they 'thought their duty done' when the message had 
been preached. One must agree with Hobsbawm that 'superior 
leadership could unquestionably have given the SDF far greater 
success and made it far more influential in the wider labour 
movement than it ever became. '27 Yet one should not under- 
estimate Hyndman's role. He was a tireless pioneer propa- 
gandist for Marxism and he gave the SDF a prominence which it 
would otherwise have lacked. As Tom Mann admitted, Hyndman 
attracted 'the curious-minded' who would not have stopped to 
listen to an orator in workman's clothing, whilst his speaking 
ability and his propagandist tracts were of great value. 
28 
Theodore Rothstein similarly admitted that, with all 
his 
faults, Hyndman was the only figure able to give the party a 
national presence. An uncommitted observer, Holbrook 
Jackson, 
thought him 'persuasive, eloquent, laborious... clean and 
lovable and honest, adored by his followers, 
honored by 
Socialist conformists and nonconformists alike, and 
mis- 
29 
represented by his foes. ' 
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What is also underplayed is the fact that the SDF was 
not the highly centralised body it is often portrayed to be. 
Its branches were autonomous, its debates democratic and, 
as Hobsbawm points out, the party often ignored Hyndman where 
he conflicted with its fundamental orientation and eventually 
abandoned him altogether. The rank and file often worked 
independently of the leadership; they did participate in 
strikes, join unions, agitate for school meals, and enter into 
local Labour alliances and this meant that the party never 
became just another sect, cut off from the outside world. 
Developments in Lancashire and Yorkshire illustrate the diversit 
of SDF activity. In Lancashire the party sank strong roots 
because it adapted to the local situation and its members 
responded to local concerns. They actively assisted the 
formation of early ILP branches, worked for an alliance with 
the trade unions, entered their local Labour Representation 
Committees and performed valuable service on local government 
bodies. This round of activity did pose a problem for the 
Lancashire SDF in that it could easily lead to a loss of 
their Socialist identity, but their enthusiasm for Socialist 
unity, their unemployed campaigns and their ceaseless pro- 
paganda ensured a distinctive presence. In Burnley, 
Rochdale, 
Blackburn and Nelson viable Socialist parties were established 
which, in the 1890s, suggested an alternative strategy 
to the 
Labour alliance proposed by the ILP. The 
SDF never gained 
such a prominent position in West Yorkshire. 
It was a late 
arrival on the political scene in the county and 
the area's 
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predominant nonconformity did not provide a congenial 
atmosphere for the Federation. The formation of the Labour 
Representation Committee in 1900 and the SDF's subsequent 
withdrawal proved a watershed for the party. The contrast 
between the SDF's national position and the route taken by 
the party in Lancashire posed a dilemma which local activists 
were unable to overcome. Although the appeal of a Socialist 
alternative persisted, as evidenced by the Socialist revival 
1905-09 and the short-lived enthusiasm for the BSP, the logic 
of national developments eventually eroded the party's influence 
in Lancashire. Paradoxically the SDF in Yorkshire expanded 
after 1901. Here too there was evidence that the appeal of 
a Socialist alternative to the Labour alliance persisted. 
Quelch's campaign at Dewsbury drew support from all shades of 
Socialist opinion, and in Bradford Hartley was able to build 
a strong, campaigning branch by appealing to dissident ILPers 
unhappy with their party's subservience to the trade unions. 
Yet overall the logic of the situation was as clear here as in 
Lancashire. Outside the Labour Party the SDF would remain a 
small, albeit active, minority. Inside the Labour Party, 
acting in concert with the left wing of the ILP, the SDF 
could have exercised a more considerable influence at a 
formative period in the Party's history. After 1901 the 
Federation was cramped by a lack of political space and 
the 
formation of the BSP came too late to offer a credible 
alternative to the Labour Party. This was soon recognised 
by the Leeds branch of the BSP, which affiliated 
to Labour 
in 1913, and thus anticipated the actions of 
the national 
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bodies. Affiliation to the Labour Party was essentially a 
recognition that the SDF had failed to build a viable 
Socialist Party in Britain, but that should not obscure the 
Federation's achievements. 
In the first instance the point about the Social- 
Democratic Federation is that it lasted. It maintained a 
national political presence for 40 years whilst its rivals 
on the revolutionary left disappeared or remained negligible 
bodies of regional influence. In several areas it established 
itself as the major Socialist organisation, achieving 
municipal electoral success and widespread influence within 
the Labour movement. More importantly it educated and it 
operated as a powerhouse transmitting ideas to the wider 
movement. The SDF produced a whole generation of working- 
class intellectuals - Quelch, Mann, Lansbury, Maclean, 
Jackson, Pollitt and Gallacher to name but a few - and it 
influenced the whole movement out of all proportion to its 
numbers. James Ramsay MacDonald, Ernest Bevin and Margaret 
Bondfield all spent formative periods in the SDF ranks, 
whilst in the localities hundreds of local leaders were 
introduced to Socialism by the party. As Laurence Thompson 
says, 
There was scarcely a pioneer of modern British 
Socialism who did not pass through it or owe 
some debt to it... it was Marxism popularised 
at various levels by Hyndman and his handful 
of disciples which created the modern mass 
Socialist movement in this country. 
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The SDF educated but also it agitated and in agitating 
it originated many of the tactics of mass action taken up in 
later years. Unemployed agitation was an SDF monopoly. It 
organised the first unemployed hunger march, inaugurated mass 
action against Boards of Guardians, and set up 'Right to 
Work' Committees. They linked the issue of unemployment to 
that of housing, and took the initiative in forming the 
Workmen's National Housing Council in 1898. On the question 
of free speech, a question vital to working-class interests, 
the SDF role was crucial. It mobilised masses of people on 
this issue not only in London but in towns up and down the 
country. More significantly, as John Foster points out, SDF 
agitation was effective. The Chamberlain circular on unem- 
ployment in 1886 and the Booth survey of London poverty were 
both partly responses to SDF action, whilst in 1904-05 
government policy on unemployment was made in direct response 
to the SDF's street protests. 
The SDF contribution to education is often under-valued. 
The demand for free, compulsory, secular education was one of 
the main points in the original SDF programme, and the 
demand 
for free school meals was originated by the SDF. Justice 
devoted considerable attention to the physical condition of 
31 
the children and the branches awarded it similar 
importance. 
The Federation was instrumental in providing 
breakfasts for 
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starving children in East London. The Times obituary of 
Matilda Hyndman commented that 'she organised free meals 
for children, for several winters in succession... and was 
also active in the provision of free holidays for children, 
long before either of those things received any general 
recognition. ' 
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The SDF co-operated with the TUC and the 
London Trades Council in sponsoring the Guildhall Conference 
for the consideration of State Maintenance in January 1905, 
and the issue was the main priority in its Election Manifesto 
of 1906. Furthermore, Dan Irving was the first to relate 
the demand for state maintenance to the question of child 
labour in factories, the half-time system. The SDF was 
firmly opposed to this 'and it is to its credit that it took 
this issue up at a time when such a stand did not make for 
popularity among textile workers or in other quarters. 
'33 
The most direct way of influencing developments was 
by 
electing representatives to the School Boards, and the ability 
of voters to give all their votes to one or two candidates 
aided the return of minority interest groups. 
Jonathan 
Taylor of Sheffield was the first SDFer to 
be elected to a 
School Board, in 1885, and others followed in his steps. 
Although always in a minority on the Boards the record of 
SDF members was impressive. They were instrumental 
in en- 
suring that School Board contracts should only 
be given to 
firms who paid 'fair wages', and in campaigning 
for the 
abolition of school fees. In Burnley Dan 
Irving also 
succeeded in getting special classes for the physically 
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and mentally handicapped. Robert Smillie won the provision 
of free books in Larkhall. SDFers in Reading forced an 
official enquiry into childrens' health which led to the 
appointment of a Medical Officer in a consultative capacity, 
'an important achievement in itself and perhaps even more 
important as a precedent. '34 Finally, in the field of adult 
education, the SDF played an important role in organising 
classes for sustained study, concentrating particularly on 
Marxist works. John Maclean's Glasgow classes were outstan- 
dingly successful but all local branches devoted time to 
these study classes, forming a tradition which persisted into 
the Plebs League and the Central Labour College, and which 
produced generations of working-class militants. 
Education and propaganda were the main achievements of 
the Social-Democratic Federation producing, to use Foster's 
phrase, 'a cultural combativeness' against the culture of 
the ruling class. Its agitation too was effective. 
Organisation, however, was its weak point, both in theory 
and in practice. Yet this should not blind us to the role 
played by SDF members in the growth of new unionism, nor in 
the development of the Independent Labour Party and the Labour 
Party. Lastly, the Federation recreated the tradition of 
working-class internationalism. It originated in a reaction 
to coercion in Ireland and continued to support Irish 
liberation, Hyndman's record of support for the Indian 
National Congress was unsurpassable, so much so that 
the 
British Government banned the sale of justice in India. 
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And, of course, the BSP was the third European Socialist 
party, after the Russians and Italians, to declare its 
opposition to the Great War. The record of the SDF was- a proud 
one. It met the fate of many a pioneer, but where it first 
trod many followed: 
At street corners, in the parks, at workmen's 
clubs this Socialist propaganda proceeds inces- 
santly. Common labourers become ready speakers, 
ordinary workmen skilled organisers. You see 
that delicate-looking young man holding forth at 
that gathering of half-a-hundred persons a little 
way up that back street under the lamplight. 
Don't regard him as an unimportant or uninteresting 
figure. His words will come back to these people 
when they have a Labour grievance. He is in 
earnest, and those people with the shabby clothes 
approve heartily his every word. Time was when 
the Socialist would be ridiculed, or persecuted! 
Now he sits in Parliament and on the City Council, 
is the lion of drawing-rooms and the pet of slums. 
And it is this Social-Democratic Federation which 
has made these things possible. 
35 
H. G. Wells said of Hyndman that he had 'a magnificent 
obstinancy, '36 George Bernard Shaw that he had no virtue 
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except one - 'he has kept the flag flying - the red flag... 
the exception suffices. 
37 
What was true of Hyndman is no 
mean epitaph for the organisation he founded, for the SDF 
operated in an environment which was not conducive to its 
development. The frustrations of its activists led to 
divisions within the party which did not enhance its cause. 
In the end it was working-class organisations which adapted 
to the structure of British society which did best, a fact 
which the SDF belatedly realised. In the 1880s the Federation 
had hoped 'to make twelve o'clock at eleven', to initiate 
revolutionary change in British society. Thereafter the 
leaders of the party postponed the Socialist ideal for the 
future and concentrated on more immediate goals, but they 
would not accepted the organisational corollary of this 
change, namely to work. within the existing structures and 
organisations of the Labour movement. Such a course would 
undoubtedly have maintained and extended its influence, but 
the fate of the ILP is a salutary reminder that this altern- 
ative provided no panacea for Socialist success. The ILP 
worked for a Labour alliance, the SDF attempted to build a 
Socialist alternative which espoused a middle path between 
reform and revolution. Ultimately, to borrow R. E. Dowse's 
epithet, they were both 'Left in the Centre'. 
38 
The only 
alternative to the Labour Party was a revolutionary party, a 
fact recognised by the majority of the BSP whop once more, 
embarked as 'a tiny caravan of missionaries' 
into the communist 
Party of Great Britain in 1920. 
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APPENDIX A. 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES. 
These notes, although not exhaustive, cover some of the 
major figures, both local and national, discussed in the 
text. They serve to emphasise the diversity of opinions 
and experience within the SDF, whilst the later careers of 
many of these SDF members demonstrate the importance of the 
Federation as a training-ground for Labour activists. 
ALFRED BARTON, 1868-1933. 
Born 30 July 1868 in Bedfordshire, the son of a foundry 
labourer, Barton moved to Manchester in 1890. He joined 
the Socialist League, and was on its anarchist wing. Barton 
was arrested several times during free speech fights. He 
moved to Sheffield in 1897, joined the ILP, and gained a 
reputation as the "Monolith Orator". By this time Barton had 
abandoned anarchism for more coventional political activity 
and became a member of the Shop Assistants' Union and its 
delegate to the Trades Council. In 1907 he was elected 
Councillor for the Brightside ward, but lost the seat in 1910. 
Discontented with the record of the Labour Party he joined 
the BSP in 1911, in the same year publishing a pamphlet, 
The Universal Strike, which revealed his support 
for 
syndicalism. Barton regained his Brightside seat 
in 1913, 
standing as a BSP candidate without Trades Council support, 
1. 
and held it until 1920. He supported the Allied war effort 
from the 'sane patriotic' viewpoint, as expressed in his 
pamphlet The War: How it was Made, who shall profit by it? 
After a brief flirtation with the Communist Party he moved 
towards 'ethical Socialism' and rejoined the ILP. After 
two unsuccessful parliamentary contests he rejoined the 
Council in 1926 and was made an Alderman in 1929. He died 
9 December 1933. 
ERNEST BELFORT BAX, 1854-1926 
From a middle-class, Nonconformist background, Bax was turned 
to thoughts of revolution by the Paris Commune. Contacts with 
the English Positivists attached him to the idea of a 
'religion of humanity', whilst a visit to Germany in the mid- 
1870s encouraged him to develop his own philosophical system 
which replaced the old religious sentiments with feelings 
and energies centred on a social ideal. Bax viewed Marxism 
as a case of arrested development, of a 
'crude and dogmatic 
materialism' which ignored underlying metaphysical 
issues. 
Nonetheless, believing that Marx had discovered the under- 
lying factor which determined the constitution of society, 
he accepted the Marxist theory of economic 
development and 
believed that fundamental changes in human consciousness would 
await the revolutionary transformation of society. 
To this 
end he was one of the pioneer Social-Democrats, 
joining the 
Democratic Federation in 1882. He wrote an article 
summarising 
Marx for English readers in 1882, but thereafter 
saw his task 
11. 
as enlightening Socialists to their ethical or religious 
mission rather than participating in political or economic 
struggles. In many ways akin to Morris Bax followed him into 
the Socialist League, co-wrote its manifesto, worked closely 
with him on Commonweal and collaborated in the writing of 
Socialism, Its Growth and Outcome. Bax left the League in 
1888, as it drifted into anarchism, and rejoined the SDF 
where he occupied himself largely with attacking middle-class 
conventions and developing the Socialist ethic. His attacks 
on Christianity worried many SDFers, who saw them as a 
political liability, but his two volumes of essays The 
Religion of Socialism and The Ethics of Socialism were very 
influential and his historical writings widely read. Within 
the SDF his views on women were controversial, whilst he was 
a fervent internationalist and opponent of Hyndman pre-1914. 
However, with the advent of war he accused the pacifists of 
abandoning all ethical judgements and supported Hyndman. Bax 
remained in the SDF until his death in December 1926. 
HERBERT BURROWS 1E45-1921. 
Burrows was born in Redgrave, Suffolk, the son of a Chartist 
and Methodist local preacher. He studied at Cambridge and 
established a Unitarian Church there with William Clarke, the 
early Fabian. At first a teacher he became an Inland Revenue 
official. In June 1881 Burrows attended a Democratic 
Federation meeting at the Memorial Hall, London, and was 
identified with the SDF thereafter. He was also a close 
iii. 
associate of Annie Besant, helping her to organise the 
Bryant and May match girls in 1888 and sharing her conversion 
to Theosophy. Burrows was twice a defeated candidate for the 
Shoreditch, Haggerston constituency, in 1906 and 1910. He 
resigned from the SDF in 1911 in protest at Hyndman's 
support for an enlarged navy but rejoined soon after. He died 
in 1921 after a paralysis lasting six years. 
H. H. CHAMPION 1859-1928. 
From an upper-class background Champion attended Marlborough 
school and then joined the Indian Army. Converted to 
Socialism by reading Henry George and Chen Marx, Champion 
left the army at the age of 23. With a legacy from his 
father he bought a printing press and in 1884 started the 
monthly magazine Today. The year previously he had joined 
the SDF and become its first secretary. He helped to found 
the Clerkenwell branch and was prominent in the SDF's un- 
employed campaigns in the mid-1880s. Champion's role in the 
'Tory Gold' controversy excited much condemnation, although 
it is clear that the plan had Executive sanction. By late 
1886 Champion was disillusioned with the SDF and in May 
1887 he started Common Sense and in 1888 the Labour Elector, 
which advocated immediate reforms and the ultimate formation 
of an independent Labour party. In the meantime Champion 
advocated intervention in elections to seek pledges from 
candidates on labour issues. He was active 
in Keir Hardie's 
Mid-Lanark campaign and co-operated with Mann, 
Burns and 
iv. 
Tillettin the London dock strike. Champion contested 
Aberdeen in the 1892 general election, but his continued 
association with Maltman Barry obliged the ILP to repudiate 
him and in 1894 he emigrated to Australia, his political 
career in Britain over. In Australia he resumed his 
publishing activities, was active in the Victorian Socialist 
Party, and a supporter of women's suffrage. 
SELINA COOPER, 1864-1946. 
Selina Cooper was an early member of the Nelson SDF and a 
founder member of the Brierfield branch. She was a passionate 
believer in women's self-education and, later, in women's 
suffrage. In 1901 she was elected onto the Board of 
Guardians as a joint SDF/ILP candidate, but she gradually moved 
away from the SDF as the Labour alliance became increasingly 
important in Nelson. The SDF's attitude to women's suffrage 
was also a factor. After 1904 she was increasingly involved 
in the suffrage movement and became a full-time organiser 
for Mrs. Fawcett's National Union of Women's Suffrage 
Societies. Thereafter she was a prominent ILP activist. 
E. C. FAIRCHILD, 1874-? 
Born in London on the 27 September 1874, Fairchild was 
apprenticed as a bookbinder, was later a workshop manager, and 
subsequently devoted himself to full-time political activity. 
lie joined the ILP in 1894 and the SDF in 1895. Fairchild 
was elected to the Hackney Borough Council 
in 1903, became 
London organiser of the SDF in 1910 and later the manager 
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of Co-operative Supplies Limited. A leading figure in the 
pre-war opposition to Hyndman, he led the opposition to 
Hyndman on the Executive of the BSP during the war. An 
orthodox or 'centre' Social-Democrat, Fairchild resigned 
from the BSP on its acceptance of Communist tactics in 1919. 
JOE FINEBERG, 1886-1957. 
Joe Fineberg was born in Russian Poland in 1886 but came to 
England when only 18 months old. An East London tailoring 
worker, he was a consistent opponent of Hyndman within the 
SDF. He was a member of the BSP Executive from 1914 to 1917 
and, after the October Revolution in Russia, Fineberg was 
unofficial Bolshevik representative in Britain. He returned 
to Russia in June 1918 and was involved in the preliminaries 
to the foundation of the Communist International. Later, 
in 1925, he became Tass correspondent in Peking. He died in 
1957. 
F. VICTOR FISHER, 1870-1954. 
Born in London in 1870 of a Hungarian father and English 
mother, Fisher was educated privately in London and then in 
Paris. In the 1890s he worked in Paris as a journalist and 
banker and then in Manchester as a journalist. He opposed 
the Boer War, became secretary of the National Democratic 
League and moved, via the Fabian Society, to the SDF. 
Bitterly opposed to pacifism, Fisher became the leading 
figure 
in the Socialist National Defence Committee and the British 
Workers' League, but he eventually ended up in the 
Conservativ( 
Party, for whom he was an unsuccessful candidate 
in the 1923 
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General Election. He died in 1954. 
WILLIAM GALLACHER, 1881-1965. 
Gallacher was born in Paisley on the 25th of December 1881. 
He became prominent as a trade unionist and Socialist leader. 
Originally an ILPer he joined the SDF in 1905 and was later 
influenced by syndicalism. A leading member of the Clyde 
Workers' Committee and the Shop Stewards' Movement during 
the First World War, he attended the 2nd World Congress of 
the Communist International in August 1920 and subsequently 
joined the CPGB. Gallacher later achieved fame as one of the 
few British Communist M. P. s, representing West Fife from 1935- 
50. He died on the 12th August 1965. 
CHARLES AUGUSTUS GLYDE, 1869-1923. 
Born in Leeds in 1869, Glyde and his family moved to Bolton 
in 1887. He was at that time a member of the Salvation Army 
but soon joined the SDF, where he was greatly influenced by 
Tom Mann, then the Bolton organiser for the Federation. Glyde 
moved to Bradford in 1890 and after witnessing the Manningham 
Mills strike joined the Bradford Labour Union and the Fabian 
Society. He became a close associate of Edward Hartley and 
a well-known figure with his aggressive speeches and flam- 
boyant style. Elected councillor for Tong Ward in 1904, Glyde 
was a forceful advocate of the feeding of schoolchildren and 
became one of the leaders of the Bradford unemployed, organising 
the land-grab in 1905. His outstanding contribution to 
the 
Bradford Socialist movement was as a propagandist and 
he 
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published eight 'Pamphlets for the People'. Later he edited 
his own newspaper, the Bradford Socialist Vanguard. Glyde was 
adamantly opposed to the 1914-18 war, seeing it as contrary 
to all principles of Christian brotherhood and Socialist 
internationalism. He was prosecuted under the Defence of 
the Realm Act in 1916. His intense political activity 
eventually affected his health and he retired from public 
life in 1920, and died in August 1923. 
J. F. GREEN. 
Ex-curate and possessed of a small private incom. _, 
Green was 
at one time treasurer of the SDF. He resigned from the 
Federation in 1911, along with Herbert Burrows, in protest at 
Hyndman's 'big navy' agitation. Upon the outbreak of war, 
however, Green became virulently anti-German and followed 
Victor Fisher into the Socialist National Defence Committee 
and then the British Workers' League. He defeated James 
Ramsay MacDonald at West Leicester in 1918 by 15,000 votes. 
Green gravitated to the right and eventually took a position 
in Unionist Headquarters. 
JAMES GRIBBLE, 1868-1934. 
James Gribble was born on 12 January 1868, the eldest of nine 
children. His father was a machine closer in the shoe trade 
and Gribble started work in the boot trade at the age of 
12. 
He served in the army from 1885-1893 and then returned 
to the 
boot trade in Northampton, joining the National Union of 
Boot and Shoe operatives and, in November 1894, the 
SDF. 
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Gribble became a full-time organiser for the NUBSO in 1902 
and served on its National Executive 1906-09. He was the 
dominant figure in the local SDF, helping to launch the 
Northampton Pioneer in 1897, organising the famous Raunds 
unemployed march in 1905, and initiating the Pioneer Boot 
Works which contributed £2339 to SDF funds between 1904 and 
1916. Gribble was full-time manager of the Boot Works 1905- 
14. Known locally for his fiery temperament, Gribble was 
arrested several times on unemployed demonstrations and in 
1904 was ejected from the council chamber and charged with 
assaulting a local alderman, for which he served oremonth in 
prison. In 1903 he was elected councillor for the North Ward, 
serving intermittently until 1915, and he was also a Poor Law 
Guardian 1904-07. Gribble was twice an unsuccessful parlia- 
mentary candidate. He followed Hyndman in supporting the war, 
served on the Northampton Appeals Tribunal and established the 
Northampton Allied War Fund. He became a J. P. in 1923 and 
died in August 1934. 
THOMAS J. HACKING, 1870-1906. 
By trade a baker, Thomas Hacking was one of the most prominent 
advocates of trade unionism in Rochdale. He was connected with 
the Bakers' and Confectioners' Socie--y over a period of 
15 
years, holding various official positions, and was 
its delegate 
to the Trades Council from 1892. In 1898 he won Wardleworth 
West Ward for the SDF, its first municipal success 
in Rochdale, 
and he was returned unopposed in 1901 and 
1904. Hacking was 
a member of the Health, Building, and Education 
committees 
on the Council. 
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LEONARD HALL, 1866-? 
Born in 1866 in Windermere, the son of Dr. S. T. Hall, Leonard 
Hall was first employed as a parcel-boy in 1879, then succes- 
sively as a printer's boy, sailor and, during a visit to the 
United States, as a cowboy. Upon his return from America 
Hall became a journalist, was active in organising the Ship 
Canal Navvies, and was elected General Secretary of the 
Lancashire Labour Amalgamation. He was an early member of 
the SDF but moved to the ILP, becoming President of the 
Lancashire and Cheshire ILP. At one time on the Executive 
of the party Hall became disillusioned with its attachment 
to the Labour Party and was one of the signatories of the 
'Green Manifesto' in 1910. He was one of the founders of 
the BSP, a member of the Provisional Executive elected at the 
1911 Unity Conference, and elected to the Executive in 1912. 
However, Hall soon gravitated towards syndicalism and broke 
with the BSP because of its refusal to approve industrial 
action. He later joined the Socialist Labour Party. 
W. K. HALL, 
Hall, SDF parliamentary candidate for South Salford 
in 1892, 
was something of a jack of all trades, ex straw-plater, navvy, 
canal boat man, foundry labourer, tramguard, and collier. 
As a foundryman in Scotland he had studied at night, 
including 
Latin and French. He had read Louis Blanc 
in French and 
looked up the SDF after reading justice. 
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EDWARD ROBERTSHAW HARTLEY, 1855-1918. 
Hartley, a Bradford butcher, came into prominence in local 
politics in the early 1890s at a time of severe unemployment. 
He helped to form the Bradford Labour Union and was a founder 
member of the ILP, but the events surrounding the Dewsbury 
by-election in 1902 led him to join the SDF. Hartley was 
always a strong proponent of Socialist unity and his reput- 
ation in Bradford helped to prevent a repetition of the 
national disputes between the SDF and the ILP. He was on the 
SDF Executive for seven years and fought five unsuccessful 
parliamentary campaigns under its auspices. He was also 
Secretary of the Clarion Van Movement 1910-12, and then went 
to Australia and New Zealand for 18 months. During the First 
World War Hartley joined Fisher's British Workers' League and 
as a result lost much of his support in Bradford. He died in 
1918. 
AMELIA (AMIE) JANE HICKS, 1839/40? -1917. 
Arnie Hicks was the daughter of a Chartist. In 1865 she and 
her husband William emigrated to New Zealand but returned to 
England in the early 1880s. By the spring of 1883 they and 
one of their daughters, Margaretta, had joined the Democratic 
Federation. She was elected to the Executive 
in 1884, and 
was a candidate for the London School Board in 1885 and 
1888. 
Arnie was both a popular open-air speaker and 
lecturer. She 
was fined £20 during the Dod Street free speech campaign and 
was also involved, with her son Alfred, 
in the unemployed 
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agitation. At the time of her School Board contests she was 
a midwife. After the Dock Strike Amie helped to form the 
Women's Trade Union Association and was also elected secretary 
of the East London Ropemakers' Union, a Position she held 
for 10 years. As their representative on the London Trades 
Council Amie was the first woman to sit on a Trades Council. 
From 1894-1908 she was on the Executive of the Womens' 
Industrial Council, and in her last years a vice-president 
of the National Organisation of Girls' Clubs. Her daughter 
Margaretta was secretary of the Womens' Council of the BSP. 
THOMAS HURLEY, ? -1933. 
A native of Blackburn and son of an Irish exile, 'Tom' Hurley 
was reared in a Radical atmosphere but was converted to 
Socialism and became one of the original members of the SDF 
in the town. He was a great orator, 'fluent in speech and 
trenchant in debate', and an omniverous reader. Hurley caused 
a sensation in Blackburn when he headed the poll in the School 
Board Election of 1895, and even more of a furore when he 
forced and won the first election for the position of 
elective auditor in 1898. In 1899 Hurley won St. Paul's Ward 
for the SDF, but resigned from the Council two years later. 
After three unsuccessful attempts to regain a seat Hurley 
returned to public life in 1921, but he was now a changed man, 
more tolerant of the views of others and less militant. 
At 
various times a shuttlemaker, quarryman, and club steward, 
he was secretary of the local branch of the General 
Workers' 
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Union and later district organising secretary of the 
Amalgamated Society of Shuttlemakers. He was also vice- 
president of the old Blackburn Trades Council, first president 
of the reorganised Trades Council and Labour Party from 1923 
until his death in 1933, and a Poor Law Guardian after 1925. 
'Tom' Hurley was truly a pioneer of the Socialist/Labour 
cause in North-East Lancashire, and his work for education 
in Blackburn drew tributes from all political parties. 
HENRY MAYERS HYNDMAN, 1842-1921. 
Founder and leader of the Social-Democratic Federation, Hyndman 
left his impress on the party until 1916. Born to a pros- 
perous family of colonial connections, he attended Trinity 
College, Cambridge, studied for the bar and travelled in 
Italy, Australia and the United States. After a failed attempt 
to run for Parliament Hyndman read Das Kapital in the French 
and was converted to Socialism. He helped to found the 
Democratic Federation in 1881, issuing delegates with his 
England for All which used some of Marx's ideas without 
acknowledgement - this occasioned a breach both with 
Marx 
and Engels. In 1883 The Historical Basis for Socialism was 
published, the first native Marxist text. The following year 
the Federation became a definitely Socialist party. 
As its 
leading public figure Hyndman was an invaluable asset 
but his 
authoritarianism and inflexibility alienated many, 
leading to 
splits in the party in 1884 and again 
in 1903-04. After the 
revolutionary enthusiasm of the 1880s Hyndman adopted 
an 
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essentially parliamentary stance, and was a candidate for 
Burnley on four occasions. Although defeated each time he 
remained essentially optimistic that Britain would be the 
first country to reach Socialism, via a peaceful transition 
of society. His views were increasingly challenged after the 
SDF merged into the British Socialist Party in 1911, and 
opposition to his leadership increased when he voiced outright 
support for the Allied cause in the First World War. He led 
the pro-war group in a breakaway from the BSP in 1916, forming 
the National Socialist Party which later readopted the name of 
Social-Democratic Federation. Hyndman died in 1921. 
DAVID DANIEL (DAN) IRVING, 1854-1924. 
Dan Irving was born in Birmingham in 1854. After a spell in 
the mercantile marine between the ages of 13 and 21, he 
became a foreman shunter for the Midland Railway Company. 
Embittered by his demotion after losing a leg in an accident 
Irving joined the Socialist movement. Originally a member 
of the Bristol Socialist Society he joined the Starnthwaite 
farm colony in the Lake District 1892-93 and then became a 
full-time organiser for the Burnley SDF. He was the secretary 
of the Burnley branch for 25 years and a member of Burnley 
Town Council and Education Committee for 22 years. 
On the 
Executive of the SDF from 1897-1915, Irving was a 
firm 
adherent of Hyndman and followed him out of the 
BSP in 1916. 
After several unsuccessful parliamentary candidatures 
for the 
SDF he was elected Labour M. P. for Burnley 
in 1918, and 
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retained the seat until his death in 1924. 
T. A. JACKSON, 1879-1955. 
Born in Clerkenwell, the son of a compositor with radical views, 
Jackson joined the SDF in 1900. He joined the 'impossibilist' 
revolt against Hyndman but, being blacklisted in the printing 
trade because of his Socialist views, became a free-lance 
orator and writer. He soon won attention as a militant Marxist 
and atheist, participating in J. W. Gott's campaigns against 
the blasphemy laws. He was arrested during the war and 
charged with sedition, but Jackson conducted his defence so 
skilfully that the case was dismissed. Around that time he 
joined the SLP and supported the faction which merged into 
the CPGB in 1920. He was a member of the party's central 
committee from 1924-29. Although he remained a party member 
for the rest of his life he took a very critical attitude 
towards the party leadership in the late 1920's, objecting to 
the way in which the Comintern imposed an 'ultra-left', 
sectarian policy upon the CPGB. After 1929 Jackson moved to 
live in Sussex, where he spent much of his time writing and 
lecturing. During the Second World War he was re-employed by 
the Communist Party as a lecturer, and remained so until 
1949. 
The last five years of his life were spent largely 
in reading 
and writing, and in 1953 appeared what was 
intended to be 
the first part of a two volume autobiography entitled 
Solo 
Trumpet. This is invaluable for its account of the 
Federation' 
activities and internal disputes at the turn of 
the century. 
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GEORGE AND HENRY JESSOP. 
George Jessop, a Batley tailor, had supplied dozens of suits 
and cloth to striking miners in Hemsworth. He had a factory 
on Station Road in Batley and shops on Bradford Road and 
Commercial Street, with a further outlet in Heckmondwike. 
'Everybody went to George Jessop's-', remembered one Batley 
man, and a worker at the factory thought him a 'cheerful 
little man... always swearing. ' He had introduced an Eight- 
Hour Day for his workers with no wage reductions, and promised 
that if employers elsewhere were paying higher wages then 
he would match them. Jessop was a Liberal councillor but 
obviously one of extreme Radical views, for he contributed to 
the funds of the SDF and later the SLP. He also allowed his 
grounds to be used, free of charge, by the Socialists. His son 
Henry was 'an ardent supporter' of the SDF and also a free- 
thinker. At the SDF garden party in August 1902 he explained 
his position thus: 
Whilst they could scarcely call him a working man 
in the ordinary sense of the word he would rather 
be a working man than anything else. 
He had known 
what it had been to scramble from the 
bottom rung 
of the ladder, and he had the deepest possible 
sympathy with his fellow workmen. 
He had often 
been told by manufacturing friends of 
his that 
he was no Socialist. Possibly that was 
true 
and he could only say that he wished 
he were a 
Socialist. It was because he had sympathy 
with 
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the movement that he had asked them to spend the 
day with him in the hope that he might in that 
way do them a good turn. 
Henry Jessop was a prominent local benefactor and the family 
is still remembered through Jessop's Park on Healey Lane, 
which they converted from a field to a recreation area for 
old people. 
J. L. JOYNES, ? -1893. 
A schoolmaster at Eton, Joynes was much impressed by Henry 
George's Progress and Poverty and spent the summer of 1882 
travelling in Ireland with George. The two were temporarily 
imprisoned under the Coercion Act, and when Joynes recounted 
his experiences, first in The Times and later in book-form, 
he was forced to resign his post. He joined the DF, was 
founder and co-editor of the Christian Socialist and Today, 
and a translator of German poetry. Ill-health curtailed his 
activities and a serious illness in 1889 made it impossible 
for him to take any further active part in the Socialist 
movement. 
THOMAS KENNEDY, 1876-1954. 
Kennedy was born at Kennethmont, Aberdeenshire, and educated 
at Kennethmout Public School and Gordon School, Huntly. He 
was for seven years a lecturer on Socialism under 
the auspices 
of the Clarion, before joining the SDF. He was appointed 
the 
Federation's Scottish organiser in 1903 and was 
its 
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parliamentary candidate for Aberdeen North in 1906 and 
January 1910. Kennedy was a devoted Hyndmanite and 
supported the Allied war effort, enlisting in the forces 
himself. After demobilisation he became General Secretary 
of the reformed SDF and remained a member through its 
declining years. He won Kirkcaldy Burghs for Labour at a 
by-election in 1921, lost the seat in 1922, but regained it 
in the general election of 1923. Kennedy held the seat until 
1931 and then again from 1935-44. He was Lord-Commissioner 
of the Treasury in the first Labour government, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Treasury in the second and Labour chief 
whip from 1927-31. 
BERT KILLIP, 1879-? 
Born in 1879, Killip was employed by Birkenhead Corporation 
for seven years but victimised for his political activity 
on behalf of the Birkenhead Socialist Party. He was then 
employed by J. W. Gott as a salesman for his clothing firm, 
a job which enabled him to act as organiser for Gott's 
British Secular League. Killip was appointed organiser of 
the Leeds SDF in 1907, where he established a trading depart- 
ment producing 'Red Flag' toffee and chocolate, which 
contributed much needed funds to the party. 
Until 1913 
Killip was very much against SDF affiliation 
to the Labour 
Party, and he provoked uproar in Labour ranks 
in 1909 when 
he stood against the Trades Council secretary 
in Armley ward 
and cost him the seat. He also moved the expulsion 
of Will 
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Thorne from the party in 1910 on the grounds that his 
position as Labour M. P. was incompatible with his membership 
of the SDF. His views mellowed however, and in 1913 the 
Leeds BSP affiliated to the Labour Party. He became a vice- 
president of the Labour Party in Leeds and the party's 
elective auditor. Always a staunch Hyndmanite, Killip was 
present at the founding meeting of the NSP in 1916. After 
serving in the Forces he returned to the SDF and acted as 
organiser for Kennedy at the by-election at Kirkcaldy Burghs 
in 1921. 
FRED KNEE, 1868-1914. 
Fred Knee was born in Frome, Somerset in 1868, the son of a 
weaver. As a boy he thought he had a vocation for the religious 
life but this changed, in adult life, into a vocation to work 
for the cause of labour. He moved to London in 1890 to work 
as a compositor in the printing trade, and in 1891 joined 
both the Fabian Society and the SDF. His political activity 
was more than matched by his trade union endeavours and in 
1896 he became 'father of the chapel' at his workplace. From 
1900-06 he was an alderman on Battersea Borough Council, 
resigning because of political disagreements with John Burns, 
the M. P. for Battersea. Knee was reader, then sub-editor, 
of Justice under Harry Quelch, and from 1909 a full-time 
employee of the Twentieth Century Press. At the same time 
he was Secretary of the Workmen's National Housing Council, 
which he had helped to found in 1898. The success of this 
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organisation, which succeeded in getting state aid for local 
authority housing adopted in the Housing Act of 1914, was 
largely due to Knee. The great achievement of his last years 
was the formation of the London Labour Party, in the face of 
much opposition from Quelch, who regarded it as a betrayal 
of the class war. 
GEORGE LANSBURY 1859-1940. 
One of nine children born to a railway timekeeper, George 
Lansbury led a rough and semi-nomadic childhood. Both his 
parents drank heavily, hence he became a strict teetotaller 
and temperance man. After two years in Australia, 1884-86, 
he became involved in Liberal politics, secretary of the 
party in Bow and a Liberal agent. A visit to Ireland in 1889 
and the shouting down of his proposal for the Eight-Hour Day 
at the Liberal Conference in Manchester led him into the SDF. 
He was elected to the Board of Guardians in 1892 and he and 
others gained a considerable Socialist influence both there 
and on the Poplar Borough Council. Lansbury was political 
secretary of the SDF in 1897 and stood unsuccessfully for 
Bow and Bromley in the 'khaki election' of 1900. Thereafter 
he moved away from the Federation. He won Bow and Bromley 
for Labour in December 1910 and gained notoriety for his 
support of the suffragettes: he was expelled from the 
Commons 
in 1912, arrested under the 'Cat and Mouse Act' 
in 1913, and 
resigned his seat to refight it on the suffragettes' 
behalf. 
He lost. In 1913 Lansbury became the editor of the Daily 
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Herald, which took a strongly anti-war stance. From 1919-22 
he was Mayor of Poplar, leading thefamous Poplar revolt against 
the Government over the poor rate. He was re-elected to 
Parliament in 1922, became First Commissioner of Works in the 
Labour Government of 1929, and was the sole surviving member 
of the Labour cabinet after the election which followed the 
formation of the National Government. Hence he was leader 
of the Labour Party until 1935, when he resigned over the 
issue of rearmament. He visited all Heads of State, including 
Hitler, in a desperate individual attempt to prevent war. 
JAMES LEATHAM, 1865-1945. 
From a radical, self-improving background in mid-Victorian 
Aberdeen, James Leatham became the principal standard-bearer 
of Socialism in his native city and was, indeed, one of the 
leading Socialist pioneers in Scotland during the late 1880s. 
and early 1890s. He moved to Manchester in the mid-1890s as 
organiser for the SDF and later, as editor-manager of the 
Worker Press at Huddersfield, he was a leading ILP journalist 
and writer. He joined the Labour Party in 1918 but was dis- 
illusioned by the experience of the first Labour Government 
and resigned his chairmanship of the East Aberdeenshire 
Divisional Labour Party in 1924. Thereafter he devoted him- 
self to local politics in the area, regarding the 
'making 
of Socialists' as his outstanding concern. 
H, W. LEE, 1865-1932. 
Lee developed radical views as a youth via a shoemaker-uncle 
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who had been connected with the Chartist movement, and the 
reading of Reynold's Newspaper. Whilst listening to Charles 
Bradlaugh speak in Trafalgar Square on August Bank Holiday 
1883 Lee bought a copy of Socialism Made Plain. This led 
him to study Socialism and he became convinced that advanced 
Radicalism and, in Lee's case, Republicanism offered no 
solution to social and economic problems. He enrolled in the 
Democratic Federation in January 1884. At that time he was 
a clerk at a West End stationers, but in August 1885 he was 
appointed secretary of the SDF. Lee remained secretary of 
the SDF/BSP until 1913, very much an anonymous figure but 
essential to the party's organisation. As he later remembered, 
he never visited any of the provincial branches prior to 1911, 
so tied up was he with his administrative duties in London. 
After Quelch's death in 1913 Lee became editor of Justice, 
remaining in that post until the paper's demise in 1924. 
Always a loyal Hyndmanite Lee followed his leader in support 
of the war and out of the BSP in 1916. He wrote the 
first 
half of the Federation's official history, Social-Democracy 
in Britain, but died before the work was complete. 
JAMES MACDONALD, 1857-?. 
Born in Edinburgh in 1857, MacDonald came to London 
in 1881 
and worked in the West-End as a tailor. 
He joined the Central 
Marylebone Democratic Association and then became one of 
the 
first members of the SDF and a member of 
its first executive. 
MacDonald followed William Morris into the Socialist 
League, 
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but rejoined the SDF in 1887. In 1888 he and Lewis Lyons 
were instrumental in the agitation which led to the founding 
of the Amalgamated Tailors' Union. In 1905 he led a seces- 
sion from the national union to form the London Society of 
Tailors and Tailoresses. MacDonald was a member of the London 
Trades Council Executive from 1891 and its Secretary from 
1896-1913. He was twice parliamentary candidate for Dundee, 
although running under the auspices of the ILP. 
JOHN MACLEAN, 1879-1923. 
John Maclean was born in Pollokshaws, the sixth child of 
working-class parents whose families had both been forced by 
poverty to migrate to the industrial south of Scotland from 
the Western Highlands. His father died while John was still 
young, but his mother managed to send him to Glasgow University, 
and he then became a teacher under the Govan School Board. 
He was converted to Socialism by reading Blatchford and to 
Marxism by Das Kapital. Around 1903 he joined the SDF, rapidly 
becoming its principal speaker in Glasgow. Initially an 
orthodox Social-Democrat Maclean became estranged from the 
party leadership over the issue of national defence and 
moved rapidly to the left. He was totally opposed to the 
First World War and played a major role in the upheavals on 
Clydeside. As a result he was imprisoned five times 
for 
making seditious speeches. Maclean's was very much an 
isolated voice in the BSP as he called for opposition 
to the 
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war to be transformed into a revolutionary war to bring 
down the government. His unstinting support for the 
revolutionary cause was recognised by Lenin in 1918 when he 
appointed him Bolshevik Consul in Britain. Events in 
Scotland during the war years led John Maclean to a distin- 
ctive synthesis of nationalism and Socialism. He refused to 
join the CPGB as a result and early in 1923 founded the 
Scottish Workers' Republican Party. 
year. 
TOM MAGUIRE. 1864-1895. 
He died later the same 
From a very poor Irish Catholic background, Maguire was an 
active Socialist before the age of 20 and the pioneer of 
Socialism in Leeds. He formed the Leeds branch of the SDF 
in 1884, but the branch went over to the Socialist League 
in 1885. Maguire was a member of the first provisional 
Council of the SL, helped to organise the 1889 building 
labourers' strike in Leeds, and was one of the founders of 
the ILP. He died of pneumonia in March 1895, at the age of 30. 
TOM MANN, 1856-1941. 
Born in Coventry, the son of a colliery clerk, Mann went to 
work down the pit at the age of 9. He moved to Birmingham 
in 
1870, became a foundry apprentice and attended a number of 
technical and bible classes. Here he gained experience as a 
speaker on temperance. In 1877 he moved to London, 
joined 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in 1881 and 
became 
converted, via Henry George, to land nationalisation. 
Mann 
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joined the SDF in 1885, acted as organiser in the North-East 
and in Bolton, but became disillusioned with the leadership 
of the party. He was active in the Dock Strike, became 
general secretary of the ILP in 1894, played a leading part 
in the establishment of the Workers' Union and was a member 
of the Royal Commission on Labour. After acting as organiser 
for the National Democratic League, a non-Socialist radical 
reform movement, from 1900-01, he left for an 8 year stay in 
Australia and New Zealand. He returned to Britain in 1910 
and rejoined the SDF, but his advocacy of Industrial Unionism 
soon led to a further breach with the party. He formed the 
Industrial Syndicalist Education League, published the 
Industrial Syndicalist, and was at, or near, the centre of 
many of the episodes of labour unrest 1910-14. Mann joined 
the British Socialist Party in 1916 after its break with 
Hyndman, was a foundation member of the Communist Party, and 
was a delegate to the first conference of revolutionary trade 
unions - the Red International of Labour Unions - and to the 
Congress of the Communist International in Moscow. He was 
General Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
1921-23, carrying through the amalgamation to the A. E. U., 
chairman of the National Minority Movement 1924-32, and active 
in the unemployed campaigns of the 1930s. His career 
encompassed many of the strands of the Socialist movement 
in this country. 
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DORA MONTEFIORE 
, 1851-1934. 
Born into a ruling class Surrey family Dora married a wealthy 
Australian Jewish man. Upon his death she returned to Europe, 
worked in Paris helping Russian refugees and then in Britain 
joined the Womens' Liberal League and the National Association 
of Womens' Suffrage Societies. She joined the SDF in the 
1890s and in 1898 toured on a Clarion Van with George Belt, 
the Hull ILP organiser. This caused a scandal in the ILP, 
for Belt was a married man with children, and when their 
relationship continued Belt was sacked by the Hull ILP. The 
repercussions of the episode were widespread: Dora was 
refused permission to read a paper at the International 
Womens' Congress in 1899 and the LRC Executive refused to 
sanction Belt's candidature for Hammersmith in 1906. There 
was a marked difference between ILP and SDF attitudes, for 
the SDF gave Belt a job as their Scottish organiser. Meanwhile, 
after suffering imprisonment for her suffrage activities, Dora 
travelled abroad to Italy and the U. S. A. She had resigned from 
the SDF Executive, to which she had been elected in 1904, 
because of its attitude to the suffragettes but on her return 
to this country became active in the party again and was on 
the BSP Executive. After further foreign travel, including 
three years in Australia and a tour of South Africa, she was 
a BSP delegate to the founding conference of the CPGB. 
Elected to the party's Executive in 1920 she was also 
International Secretary of the First International 
Conference 
of Communist Women and acted as Australian 
Communist Party 
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delegate to the 1924 Moscow Congress. 
WILLIAM MORRIS, 1834-1896. 
Morris was born in 1834 at Walthamstow, and educated at 
Marlborough and Exeter College, Oxford. He was, briefly, 
pupil to an architect but after meeting Rossetti he was 
encouraged to paint and to write. He published several 
volumes of poetry, started an interior decorating business, 
established the Society for the Protection of Ancient 
Buildings, and produced a series of fine books from his 
Kelmscott Press. Morris was appalled by the evils of 
industrialisation and turned to Socialism as part of his 
crusade against the materialism and ugliness of Victorian 
England. From the moment he joined the SDF Morris changed 
his whole way of life, taking an active part in all aspects 
of the Federation's work, and giving generous financial 
contributions to the cause. He led the opposition to Hyndman, 
feeling that the duty of Socialists at that stage was 'to 
make Socialists'. He made the Socialist League's weekly 
journal, Commonweal, the outstanding Socialist magazine of 
its time. After the demise of the Socialist League Morris 
formed the Hammersmith Socialist Society, but he was reconciled 
to the SDF and worked closely with it on many occasions. 
His last lecture before his death had as its subject 'One 
Socialist Party', to which he had devoted his last years. 
W. J. NAIRN, ? -1901. 
A stone breaker by trade, Nairn was an original member of 
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the Glasgow SDF, and on the SDF Executive in 1895,1896,1898 
and 1899. He contributed the 'Sandy MacFarlane' column to 
Justice in the mid-1890s. Nairn was a teetotaller and an 
active member of the Co-operative movement. 'He, more than 
any other', said Bruce Glasier, 'was the founder and 
pioneer of the Social-Democratic Federation in Scotland'. 
CONRAD NOEL, 1869-1942. 
Conrad Noel joined the Guild of St. Matthew, the Church 
Socialist group, in 1895, and the SDF soon after. He was 
ordained in 1898. In July 1906 he formed, with others, the 
Church Socialist League, a more avowedly Socialist movement 
than the Guild of St. Matthew and one more directly involved 
in the Labour movement. The failure of the Labour Party to 
make an impact in parliament led him into the BSP, and he was 
on the Executive in 1912. He resigned over the issue of 
syndicalism and turned towards Guild Socialism, being present 
at the founding conference of the National Guilds League 
in 
1915 and on its Executive from 1920-22. Noel was 
famous as 
the 'red' vicar of Thaxted from 1910-42, and there 
he put 
into practice his principles of Social-Democratic 
Catholicism, 
bringing the social gospel to the common people. 
HARRY QUELCH, 1858-1913. 
Quelch was born in Hungerford, Berkshire. 
A self-educated 
man, he entered politics as a Conservative, 
in association 
with George Shipton, secretary of the London 
Trades Council, 
but he became a Socialist and joined 
the SDF. He was editor 
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of Justice from 1886-1913, apart from a brief period in the 
aftermath of the Dock Strike when he was organising the South 
Side Labour Protection League. Quelch was an unsuccessful 
parliamentary candidate on four occasions, but he was widely 
respected for his sincerity and ability, even by his political 
opponents. He was an influential figure in the SDF, usually 
a loyal supporter of Hyndman but on some issues to the left 
of him. His opposition to the Labour Party swayed many members 
into opposing SDF affiliation to that body. Quelch achieved 
notoriety at the Stuttgart conference of the International 
in 1907, where he referred to the Hague Peace Conference as a 
'thieves supper' and was expelled from Wurtemberg for refusing 
to apologise. 
THEODORE ROTHSTEIN. 1871-1953. 
Rothstein was born in Lithuania, but. moved to the Ukraine 
two years later. His membership of a Socialist study group 
brought him to police attention and he arrived in Britain in 
1891. After two years in Leeds he moved to London and joined 
the SDF's Hackney and Kingsland branch. He quickly rose to 
prominence as an opponent of Hyndman, urging an inter- 
nationalist view and pleading for the SDF to abandon its 
sectarian attitudes. He was on the Executive 1901-06, but 
thereafter concentrated on journalism, and wrote frequent 
articles in Justice attacking Hyndman's jingoism. Rothstein 
resigned from the BSP upon the outbreak of war, to avoid 
internment as an alien, but he continued to participate 
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informally and was close to the anti-war group. Under the 
pseudonym of John Bryan he was a regular contributor to The 
Call. After the October Revolution Rothstein was the chief 
Bolshevik agent in Britain and played a key role in the 
negotiations leading to the formation of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain. He returned to Russia in August 1920. 
ANDREAS SCHEU, 1844-1927. 
Scheu was a Viennese furniture designer, active in German 
anarchist politics before coming to London in 1874. He joined 
the SDF, but animosity between himself and Hyndman was a 
contributory factor to the SDF/SL split. Scheu was a close 
friend of William Morris, an effective speaker and a writer 
of Socialist songs. He moved to Edinburgh in 1885 to become 
a salesman for Jaeger, and returned to Germany in 1911. 
JOHN SCURR, 1876-1932. 
Scurr was born in Australia but grew up and spent most of 
his working life in Poplar. He joined the SDF in the late 
1890s, was a member of the Poplar Labour League from 1897, and 
also president of the Poplar Trades and Labour Representation 
Council. He was on the SDF Executive in 1910. Scurr was 
conspicuous in the dock strike of 1910-11 and a prominent 
supporter of the suffrage movement. In 1921 he was one of 
the Guardians imprisoned for refusing to collect the rates. 
He served as mayor of Poplar 1922-23, and was elected Labour 
M. P. for Stepney Mile End in 1923. 
1931 and died in the following year. 
He held the seat until 
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FRED SHAW, 1881-1951. 
Born in Lindley, near Huddersfield, Fred Shaw attended the 
local elementary school. His first job was in the black- 
smith's shop of a local woollen mill. By 1903 he was 
secretary of the Lindley LRC, and in 1905 was a founder 
member of the Clarion Cycling Club and the Huddersfield 
Socialist Party. He became the first agent in Britain for 
Kerr and Co., the Chicago publishers. Shaw was one of the 
BSP's national propagandists and a keen advocate of 
industrial unionism. He was elected to the BSP Executive in 
1916, stood as Socialist candidate for Greenock in 1918, and 
was on the first Executive of the British Communist Party. 
From 1919-22 he was a councillor for Longwood Ward. After 
1923 Fred Shaw became a loyal Labour Party man, and was 
Yorkshire organiser for the National Council of Labour Colleges 
He was intensely interested in scientific matters, lecturing 
widely on evolution, astronomy, sociology etc. Shaw typifies 
the pre-war working-class Socialist of the SDF/BSP type. 
H. RUSSELL SMART, 1858-? 
Born in London and educated at Dulwich College, Smart served 
a brief career in a solicitor's office and was., for 10 years, 
an actor. Thereafter he worked as a sanitary engineer. He 
joined both the ILP and the SDF, was ILP candidate for 
Huddersfield in 1895, and later on the NAC of the ILP. 
Smart 
was a signatory to the 'Green Manifesto', a 
founder member of 
the BSP, and on its Executive 1911-12. 
He left the party 
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over its attitude towards syndicalism, but was a member of 
the reformed SDF in 1923. 
WILL THORNE, 1857-1946. 
Thorne's father was a brickmaker and gasworker, and Thorne 
himself was working a 12 hour day at the age of six for a rope 
and twine spinner. A variety of labouring jobs followed. 
His arduous childhood left a lasting impression on Thorne, 
and turned him towards Socialism. He went on the tramp in 
1875, eventually arriving at Beckton gasworks, London, in 1882. 
He joined the SDF and was instrumental in the formation of the 
National Union of Gas Workers and General Labourers. Thorne 
was General Secretary of the Union for 45 years, on the 
Parliamentary Committee of the TUC 1894-1921, and on the 
General Council 1921-33. He was M. P. for West Ham South 
1906-18, and for Plaistow 1918-45. His membership of the LRC 
and then the Labour Party, by virtue of the Gasworkers' 
affiliation, led to some friction with the SDF. Yet Thorne 
remained a member long after its influence had declined and 
long after he had moved to the right-wing of the Labour Party. 
BEN TILLETT, 1860-1943. 
Born in Bristol, Tillett had a childhood of extreme poverty. 
After a spell in the merchant navy, he founded the Tea 
Operatives and General Labourers' Association on the London 
docks in 1887. His role in the dockers' strike of 
1889 raised 
him to national prominence and he became General 
Secretary 
of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union, 
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a position he held until 1922. Tillett's politics were some- 
what mercurial: he was, at various times, an ILP parliamentary 
candidate, a member of the SDF/BSP Executive, a fund-raiser 
for the Daily Herald, and a prominent syndicalist. During 
the war he was a member of the SNDC and active in recruiting 
campaigns. Thereafter he moved steadily to the right. He was 
M. P. for North Salford 1917-24 and 1929-31, but largely 
inactive after that. 
FRANCES EVELYN (DAISY), COUNTESS OF WARWICK, 1861-1938. 
Born in Mayfair, of distinguished parents, in 1881 she married 
Lord Brooke, who became Earl of Warwick in 1893. Although 
in the top rank of society she initiated a number of philan- 
thropic schemes to help alleviate rural unemployment and was 
elected to the Warwick Guardiansin 1894, where she served 
for a decade. When Robert Blatchford wrote a biting critique 
of her lifestyle she sought him out, and the subsequent 
discussion marked a turning point in her intellectual 
development. She read Socialist literature, had grave doubts 
about the Boer War, and joined the SDF in November 1904. In 
her own way she worked hard for the cause, giving generous 
financial contributions and always attracting curious crowds. 
Her main energy was devoted to the campaign for free meals 
for schoolchildren, and she also provided Socialist clergy- 
men such as Conrad Noel with Essex livings of which she was 
a patron. She was anti-war, supported the Bolshevik 
Revolution, but joined the Labour Party after the war. 
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J. HUNTER WATTS, ? -1923. 
A refugee from Secularism, Hunter Watts was an early and 
lifelong member of the SDF. He became treasurer of the party 
when Morris's group seceded, but always remained on friendly 
terms with Morris. In the late 1880s he was SDF organiser in 
Manchester. Watts was a member of the SDF Executive 1895-96, 
1902-06 and 1911. A loyal Hyndmanite, he followed Hyndman 
into the National Socialist Party in 1916. He was also an 
early advocate of Socialist Sunday Schools. 
JOHN ('JACK') WILLIAMS, 1854? -1917. 
Born in Holloway, North London, Williams was raised in a 
succession of workhouses. His childhood experiences of 
poverty and deprivation gave him an undying hatred of the 
capitalist system. In the early 1870s he was a passionate 
supporter of Irish nationalism. He joined the Rose Street 
Club in 1879, then the Democratic Federation, where he became 
a fervent Hyndman loyalist. Williams played a prominent 
part in the free speech agitation, serving two prison terms 
which permanently affected his health. Although twice a 
parliamentary candidate, and on the Federation's 
Executive 
in 1884,1895 and 1896, his chief value was as a street 
corner propagandist. He was an active organiser of new 
unionism, but his major contribution to the 
SDF was as an 
organiser of the unemployed. His prison sentences and 
his 
reputation made it very difficult for him to 
find work, and 
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his ceaseless political activity allied to his poverty finally 
broke his health. Williams was one of whom it can truly be 
said 'he gave his life to the movement'. 
I 
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APPENDIX B. 
SDF/BSP MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS 1890-1913. 
1. LANCASHIRE. 
I. BLACKBURN. 
NO. OF VOTES 
YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF SDF NO. OF 
% VOTE CLLRS. 
1892 St. Paul's 626 - 268 30 - 
1893 St. Paul's 690 488 269 18.6 - 
1894 St. Paul's - 706 323 31.4 - 
1895 NO CONTESTS 
1896 St. Paul's 707 - 570 46.5 - 
1897 St. Paul's - 633 627 49.8 - 
St. Peter's - 706 299 29.7 
1898 St. Paul's 533 - 799 60 1 
St. Peter's - 672 325 32.6 
St. Luke's 618 - 382 38.2 
1899 St. Paul's 404 467 652 42.8 2 
St. Luke's 699 - 461 39.7 
1900 St. Paul's - 912 513 36 
2 
St. Andrew's 788 - 269 25.4 
1901 St. Paul's 703 - 702 50 
2 
St. Luke's 552 - 430 43.8 
1902 St. Silas 705 - 120 
14.5 1 
St. Michael's 763 - 209 
21.5 
St. Andrew's 702 - 402 
36.4 
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St. Mark's - 744 453 37.8 
St. Paul's 701 - 778 52.6 
St. Luke's 605 - 579 48.9 
1903 St. Andrew's 760 - 446 37 2 
St. Mark's 741 - 353 32.3 
St. Paul's 776 - 750 49.1 
St. Luke's 583 - 722 57 
1904 St. Mark's 832 - 393 32.1 3 
St. Paul's - 789 729 48 
St. Luke's 622 - 707 53.2 
1905 St. Mark's 812 - 541 40 4 
St. Paul's 650 - 938 59 
St. Luke's 699 - 7102 50.4 
1906 St. Mark's 1068 - 396 27 3 
St. Paul's 1038 - 713 40.7 
St. Luke's 925 - 568 38 
1907 St. Mark's 1048 - 361 34.4 2 
St. Paul's - 1155 486 42.1 
St. John's 797 635 153 9.7 
St. Luke's 867 - 496 36.4 
1908 St. Mark's 1078 - 543 33.5 - 
St. Paul's 1080 - 748 40.9 
St. Luke's 826 - 662 44.5 
1909 St. Paul's 991 - 718 42 - 
St. Luke's 820 - 687 45.6 
1910 St. Mark's 868 531 315 18.4 - 
xxxix. 
YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF 
SDF NO. OF 
% VOTE CLLRS. 
St. Paul's - 965 322 25 
St. Luke's 815 - 595 42.2 
1911 St. Mark's 952 677 200 10.9 - 
St. Paul's 888 828 130 7 
St. Luke's 729 445 319 21.4 
1912 St. Luke's 774 - 502 39.3 - 
1913 St. Luke's 795 - 512 39.2 - 
1. By-elections are not included, which explains the 
discrepancy between the election results and the number 
of SDF councillors in some years. 
2. The SDF now held all three seats in St. Luke's Ward. 
This and St. Paul's were the SDF strongholds in Blackburn, 
and as late as 1913 the SDF polled nearly 40 per cent 
of the vote there. 
XXXX. 
ii. BURNLEY. 
I 
YEAR WARD CON LIB OTHER SDF SDF % NO. OF 
VOTE. CLLRS. 
1892 Stoneyholme - 469 - 193 29.2 
Burnley Wood 702 -- 320 31.3 
1893 Stoneyholme 313 329 - 240 27.2 1 
Fulledge 410 197 - 385 38.8 
Burnley Wood - 561 - 688 55.1 
Trinity 534 304 - 279 25. 
Whittlefield 329 306 - 181 22.2 
Burnley Wood2 376 555 - 582 38.5 2 
Healey1 383 379 - 104 12. 
Gannow1 411 370 - 206 20.9 
1894 Danehouse - 867 - 430 33.2 1 
Whittlefield 315 414 - 123 14.4 
Stoneyholme 387 438 - 143 14.8 
Fulledge 752 -- 232 23.6 
Burnley Wood 472 675 - 460 28.6 
Trinity 652 -- 299 31.4 
1895 Stoneyholme 343 461 - 164 16.9 1 
Burnley Wood 628 641 - 321 20.2 
1896 Burnley Wood 522 757 - 205 13.8 - 
Fulledge 607 -- 449 
42.5 
1897 Danes House - 604 - 
517 46.1 - 
Burnley Wood - 788 - 
382 32.6 
Gannow 459 476 - 255 
21.4 
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1898 Danes House - 873 - 405 31.7 - 
Burnley Wood - 789 - 487 38.2 
Gannow 513 427 - 255 21.3 
1899 Gannow 529 406 - 258 21.6 - 
1900 NO CONT ESTS. 
1901 Gannow 579 -- 533 47.9 - 
1902 Gannow 540 -- 746 58.1 
1903 Burnley Wood - 890 - 654 42.4 1 
1904 NO SDF CONTESTS. 
19053 Burnley Wood - 749 - 800 51.6 1 
Whittlefield 343 338 - 300 30.6 
Gannow - 779 - 736 48.6 
19064 Danes House* - 785 - 511 39.4 2 
Stoneyholme - 549 - 397 42. 
St. Peter's* 607 -- 168 21.7 
St. Paul's* 624 - - 214 29. 
Fulledge 870 - - 374 30.1 
Healey 415 523 - 163 14.8 
Trinity 727 - - 341 31.9 
Gannow* 470 499 - 625 39.2 
Lowerhouse 489 618 - 430 28. 
19074 Danes House - 913 - 566 
38.3 2 
Stoneyholme - 484 - 470 
49.3 
St. Peter's* 534 - - 1'3 
22.3 
St. Paul's 454 - - 239 
34.5 
Fulledge* 816 - - 304 
27.1 
Healey - 662 - 
278 29.6 
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YEAR WARD CON LIB OTHER SDF 
SDF % 
VOTE. 
NO. OF 
CLLRS. 
Trinity 711 - - 376 34.6 
Whittlefield - 577 - 299 34.1 
Gannow* 851 - - 622 42.2 
Lowerhouse 755 - - 507 40.2 
19084 St. Andrew's - 1459 - 751 34. 2 
Danes House* - 957 - 497 34.2 
Stoneyholme - 640 - 401 38.5 
St. Peter's 695 - - 159 18.6 
St. Paul's* 940 - - 348 27. 
Fulledge* 940 - - 736 43.9 
Healey* - 820 - 232 22. 
1908 Trinity 804 - - 356 30.7 
Whittlefield5 564 - Ind. - - 
Soc. 
196 
LRC. 
128 
Gannow - 876 - 568 39.3 
Lowerhouse 364 745 461 29.4 
1909 Stoneyhouse - 552 - 334 
37.7 2 
Burnley Wood - 832 - 544 
39 .5 
Gannow 423 485 SPGB 670 
42.4 
4 
1910 Stoneyholme 432 407 - 211 
20.1 2 
Fulledge 676 - - 
290 30. 
Burn ley Wood 673 567 - 
454 26.8 
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YEAR CON LIB OTHER SDF VSDF OTE 
ýLLRSS. 
Trinity 600 -_ 369 38.1 
Whittlefield - 584 - 231 28.3 
Gannow6 505 403 - 505 35.7 
1911 St. Andrew's - 1168 ILP 538 387 18.5 2 
BurnleyWood 701 633 - 418 23.9 
Trinity 594 -- 370 38.4 
Gannow 695 418 - 588 34.6 
1912 St. Andrew's - 1249 - 487 28.1 2 
BurnleyWood 687 784 325 18.1 
Trinity 574 -- 297 34.1 
Gannow NO CONTEST RE- 
ELECTED 
1913 Fulledge 750 619 - 314 18.7 2 
Gannow 614 -- 791 56.3 
1. By-elections are not included, other than those for 1893, 
which explains the discrepancy between the election 
results and the number of SDF councillors in some years. 
2. By-elections. 
3. A Labour Representation Committee was formed in this 
year and the SDF fought the elections under the LRC 
banner. 
4. In 1906,1907 and 1908 all candidates ran under the 
LRC's auspices. The local press regarded the LRC as a 
'front' for the SDF and therefore referred to all can- 
didates as Socialists. Consequently, 
it is difficult 
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to differentiate SDF candidates from those of the ILP 
and the Trades Council. Where candidates are known to 
have been put forward by the ILP or Trades Council those 
results are omitted; those marked with an asterisk 
are definitely SDF candidates; the credentials of the 
other LRC candidates are unclear, but their results 
are entered in the SDF column. 
5. In the Whittlefield ward in 1908 dissident SDFers, 
dissatisfied with the alliance with the unions, put up 
a candidate against the LRC. Backed by some ILPers, 
they pushed the LRC candidate into third place. 
6. After the tied vote in Gannow ward in 1910 the 
Presiding officer gave his casting vote to the retiring 
Conservative councillor. 
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iii. NELSON2 
YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF LAB 
SDF 
% VOTE. 
1892 Bradley - 315 163 - 34.1 
1893 Central - ? 202 - 
Bradley - 416 157 - 27.4 
C t l1 en ra - 420 263 - 38.5 
1894 Bradley 170 314 239 - 33.1 
1896 Netherfield 340 257 43 - 6.7 
1899 Southfield - 349 254 - 42.1 
Bradley - 419 270 - 39.2 
1901 Bradley 202 473 264 - 28.1 
1902 Bradley - 368 360 - 49.5 
1907 Bradley - 402 167 - 29.3 
Southfield - 346 120 438 13.3 
Netherfield - - 193 498 27.9 
1908 Netherfield 540 - 103 584 8.4 
1911 Southfield 352 - 111 593 10.5 
Netherfield 496 - 112 543 9.7 
1912 Southfield - 613 342 - 35.8 
1. By-election. 
2. The above contests are those where identifiable SDF 
candidates went to the polls. Some may have stood as 
Labour candidates prior to 1902. 
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iv. ROCHDALE 
YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF OTHER 
SDF % 
VOTE 
NO. OF 
CLLRS 
1890 Castleton E. 797 613 21 - 1.5 - 
Spotland E. 560 605 22 - 1.9 
Wardleworth E. 421 - 78 - 15.6 
1891 NO SDF CANDIDATES 
1892 Wardleworth E. - 522 158 - 23.2 - 
1893 Wardleworth E. 381 - 117 - 23.5 - 
1894 Wardleworth W. - 365 276 - 43.1 - 
1895 Wardleworth E. - 431 104 - 19.4 - 
Wardleworth W. - 377 120 - 24.1 
1896 Wardleworth W. - 450 173 - 27.8 - 
1897 NO SDF CANDIDATES - 
1898 Wardleworth W. - 399 478 - 54.5 1 
1899 Wardleworth W. - 534 368 - 40.8 1 
1900 Wardleworth S. 570 700 179 - 12.4 1 
Castleton 
1 
521) 640) 295 - 8. 
Moor ) ) 
496) 554) 
461) 487) 
1901 Wuerdle - 649 180 - 14. 1 
Wardleworth W. SDF UNOPPOSED 
1902 Castleton E. 786 665 210 - 12.6 1 
Wuerdle 501 632 112 - 9. 
1903 Wardleworth E. - 467 235 - 
33.5 1 
Spotland E. 
2 
- 680 222 - 
24.6 
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SDF % NO. OF 
YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF OTHER VOTE CLLRS 
Spotland E. 2 647 655 88 - 6.3 
Castleton E. 2 782 725 153 - 9.2 
1904 Castleton S. - 800 646 - 44.7 - 
Wardleworth S. 369 - 455 Labour 33.2 
546 
Wardleworth S? - 778 627 - 44.6 
Wardleworth S. SDF UNOPPOSED 
1905 Castleton S. 743 721 442 - 23.2 2 
Wardleworth S. - 797 509 - 39. 
Wardleworth E. - 553 349 - 38.7 
Wardleworth W. - 556 5653 - 50.4 
Castleton S. 
2 400 737 499 - 30.5 
1906 Castleton E. 770 - 410 - 34.7 2 
War Wardleworth S. - 679 6253 - 47.9 
Castleton 
- 513 557 - 52.1 
Moor 
1907 Wardleworth W. 496 320 300 - 26.9 14 
Castleton E. 968 - 318 24.7 
Castleton 
943 - 463 - 32.9 
Moor 
1908 Wardleworth S. - 810 723 - 
47.2 - 
Wardleworth W. 593 - 5003 - 
45.7 
1909 Castleton 
7473 - 48.5 - - 786 
Moor 
Wardleworth WS ? ? ? - 
18. 
1910 Castleton E. 848 - 514 - 
37.7 
Wardleworth E. - - 187 Ind. 
Lab . 
26 .6 
516 
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YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF OTHER 
Wardleworth W. 372 457 3293 - 
Wuerdle - 727 395 - 
Wuerdle2 495 668 260 - 
1911 Wardleworth W. 354 390 268 Labour 
208 
1912 Wardleworth S. - 722 233 - 
1913 Wardleworth W. - 601 314 - 
SDF % NO. OF 
VOTE CLLRS. 
28.4 
35 .2 
18.3 
22. - 
24.4 - 
34.3 - 
1. This was a new ward, created by boundary re-organisation, 
and therefore three councillors were to be elected. 
2. By-elections. 
3. Stood as a Labour candidate. 
4. The SDF member who won Wardleworth West in 1905 had 
subsequently left the party. 
5. I have beenunableto trace the figures for this contest, 
which was probably a by-election. However Robert W. 
Garner, in his dissertation Municipalism in Rochdale 
1880-1914, records the percentage of votes cast for each 
candidate as follows: Conservative 35%, Liberal 
47%, 
SDF 18%. 
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2. YORKSHIRE. 
i. BRADFORD' 
YEAR WARD CON LIB SDF OTHER SDF % 
VOTE 
1905 Bradford Moor 946 808 12072 - 40.8 
1906 E. Bowling 1074 890 634 - 24.4 
1907 E. Bowling 1374 - 697 - 33.7 
E. Bowling3 - 954 702 Independent 31.7 
559 
1908 E. Bowling - 1355 799 - 37.1 
South Ward 993 732 301 - 14.9 
1909 E. Bowling 1136 - 816 - 41.8 
South Ward 800 865 230 - 12.1 
1910 E. Bowling 742 911 560 - 25.3 
East Ward 1268 - 350 - 21 .6 
E. Bowling3 859 910 662 - 27.2 
1911 E. Bowling 861 1022 579 - 23.5 
East Ward 1126 1242 318 - 11.8 
Tong 
4 475 587 296 - 21.8 
1912- 
13 5 
1. Although both Edward Hartley and C. A. Clyde were 
elected to the council at various times, neither stood 
as SDF candidates and their success was largely 
due 
to their ILP associations. Hartley was a 
far more 
prominent SDF member than Clyde. 
1. 
2. E. R. Hartley was elected on an ILP ticket, although 
shortly afterwards he stood as SDF parliamentary 
candidate for Bradford East. 
3. By-elections. 
4. Tong had been held by C. A. Glyde since 1904. Glyde 
was a dual ILP/SDF member, but was very much an 
individualist Socialist with a strong personal following 
in Tong. He did not stand in 1911 but regained the 
seat in 1913. No other Socialist candidate, whether 
of the ILP or SDF, could win the seat until the 
Labour successes of 1919 and 1922. 
5. Although two BSP members, F. L. Liles and Glyde, were 
elected to the council in 1913 they were 
both long- 
serving ILP members and their success was not 
due to 
their membership of the BSP. These results are 
therefore omitted. 
ii. 
ii. DEWSBURY. 
In Dewsbury candidates did not stand under party labels 
therefore the results are tabulated differently. 
1902 All Saints F. Newsome 486 
Ward R. Machell 463 
H. Wood (SDF) 201 
1903 Trinity Ward G. Thorpe 544 
H. Wood (SDF) 191 
All Saints E. Marsh 434 
Ward S. Teale 368 
J. Kershaw 317 
H. Wood (SDF) 142 
1910 Trinity South G. W. Ibbotson 848) 
)elected 
Ward J. E. Kilburn 777) 
S. M. Oldroyd 625 
M Day 483 
F, Reuss 457 
H. Wood (SDF) 147 
J. Brook 54 
SDF % vote - 17.5 
SDF % vote -11.3 
SDF % vote -_4 .3 
lii. 
iii. LEEDS. 
YEAR WARD CON 
1909 New Wortley 810 
1910 New Wortley 630 
1911 North-West 1971 
Ward 
LIB LAB SDF SDF 
% VOTE 
890 800 168 6.3 
937 575 84 3.8 
1613 - 478 11.8 
liii. 
APPENDIX C. 
SDF/BSP/NSP PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1885-1924. 
i) 
SDF 
BSP 
BSP 
NSP 
SDF 
IV 
YEAR 
1885 
1892 
*1892-5 
1895 
*1895-1900 
1900 
*1900-1906 
1906 
*1906-1910 
(JAN) 
1910 (JAN) 
1910 (DEC) 
*1910-1918 
(DEC) 
1918 
1918 
*1918-1922 
1922 
1923 
1924 
CANDIDATES 
(M. P. s) 
3 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
8 
3 
TOTAL 
VOTES 
657 
659 
347 
3,730 
544 
6,997 
1,597 
21,974 
4,233 
AVE RAGE 
VOTE 
219 
330 
347 
781 
272 
3,499 
1,597 
2,306 
1,411 
AVERAGE 7 
OF VOTE 
2.2 
4.8 
6.8 
8.4 
2.8 
40.5 
13.6 
16.9 
10.2 
9 15,184 1,498 11.8 
2 5,711 2,856 19.2 
3 4,536 1,512 11.1 
16 71,762 
4 (2) 26,230 
1 (1) 11,674 
2 (1) 29,474 
5 (4) 58,612 
4 (3) 43,498 
(1)* = by-election results. 
4,485 
6,588 
11,674 
14,737 
11,722 
10,875 
21.1 
28.3 
53.4 
43.9 
43.5 
42.9 
liv. 
(2) The SDF election results 1906-18 do not include 
those of Will Thorne, who stood as a Labour Party 
candidate. They therefore differ from the Federation's 
own claims. 
(3) After 1924 the SDF, presumably through lack of finance, 
ceased to sponsor parliamentary candidates. 
(4) After 1916 the SDF(NSP) was affiliated to the Labour 
Party, as was the BSP for the 1918 elections. In 1918 
12 of the 16 BSP candidates were endorsed by the 
Labour Party and one by the Co-operative Party. One 
of the NSP candidates had Labour Party endorsement 
and one joined the Labour Party shortly after his 
election. Thereafter all candidates had Labour Party 
endorsement. 
lv. 
ii. SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION ELECTION RESULTS 1885-1924. 
YEAR CONSTITUENCY 
1885 Hampstead 
Lambeth, Kennington 
Nottingham, West 
1892 Bethnal Green, N. E. 
Salford, South 
*1895 Newington, Walworth 
1895 Newington, Walworth 
Burnley 
Northampton (2) 
Salford, South 
*1896 Southampton 
*1898 Reading 
1900 Tower Hamlets, Bow 
and Bromley 
West Ham, South 
*1902 Dewsbury 
1906 Bradford, East 
Burnley 
Northampton (2) 
Northampton (2) 
Southampton (2) 
Camborne 
Accrington 
Aberdeen, North 
J. E. Williams 
J. Fielding 
J. Burns 
H. R. Taylor 
W. K. Hall 
G. Lansbury 
G. Lansbury 
H . M. Hyndman 
F. G. Jones 
H. W. Hobart 
C. A. Gibson 
H. Quelch 
G. Lansbury 
W. J. Thorne1 
H. Quelch 
E. R. Hartley 
H. M. Hyndman 
J. E. Williams 
J. Gribble 
H. Quelch 
J. J. Jones 
D. D. Irving 
T. Kennedy 
lvi. 
VOTES % OF 
VOTES 
27 0.6 
32 0.5 
598 5.4 
106 2.0 
553 7.5 
347 6.8 
203 3.8 
1,498 12.4 
1,216 6.7 
813 10,8 
274 2.4 
270 3.1 
2,558 36.7 
4,439 44.2 
1,597 13.6 
3,090 22.8 
4,932 32.5 
2,544 11.7 
2,366 10.9 
2,146 8.0 
109 1.5 
4,852 38.3 
1,935 25.1 
CONSTITUENCY CANDIDATE VOTES % OF 
VOTE S 
Kanchester, N. W. D. D. Irving 276 2.6 
3horeditch, Haggerston H. Burrows 986 17.7 
Jewcastle upon Tyne E. R. Hartley 2 971 10.4 
3horeditch, Haggerston H. Burrows 701 11.1 
3radford, East E. R. Hartley 1,7+0 12.0 
3urnley H. M. Hyndman 4,948 30.2 
, arlisle A. C. Bannington 777 11.3 
lorthampton (2) J. Gribble 1,792 7.7 
Jorthampton (2) H. Quelch 1,617 7.0 
tochdale D. D. Irving 1,755 12.6 
Sheffield, Brightside C. Lapworth 510. 4.7 
Lberdeen, North T. Kennedy 1,344 16.9 
, urnley H. M. Hyndman 3,810 23.8 
: ochdale D. D. Irving 1,901 14.5 
'OR ELECTION RESULTS 1911-18 SEE UNDER BRITISH 
OCIALIST PARTY AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY. 
. 
irkcaldy Burghs +T. Kennedy1 11,674 53.4 
urnley +D. D. Irving1 17,385 
39.1 
irkcaldy Burghs T. Kennedy1 12,089 48.6 
slington, South +W. S. Cluse1 
7,764 37.0 
slington, West +F. Montague1 
7,955 41.4 
urnley +D. D. Irving1 
16,848 37.8 
uckingham E. J. Pay1 
11,824 47.0 
irkcaldy Burghs 
1 
+T. Kennedy 14,221 
54.4 
lvii. 
YEAR CONSTITUENCY 
1924 Islington, South 
Islington, West 
Buckingham 
Kirkcaldy Burghs 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
+W. S. Cluse' 
+F. Montague 
E. J. PayI 
+T. Kennedy1 
VOTES 7 OF 
VOTES 
10,347 22.8 
10,174 45.3 
8,9 39 30 .6 
14,038 52.7 
*By-elections. 
IEndorsed 
by the Labour Party. 
+Elected. 
Cluse, Kennedy and Montague were all re-elected in 
1929, but were sponsored by their local Labour Parties 
(2) = Two-member constituency. 
lviii. 
iii. BRITISH SOCIALIST PARTY ELECTION RESULTS, 1911-18. 
YEAR CONSTITUENCY 
*1913 Leicester 
*1913 Reading 
*1914 Tower Hamlets, Poplar 
1918 Islington, North 
Bradford, South 
Edmonton 
Great Yarmouth 
Grimsby 
Hastings 
Portsmouth, Central 
Salford, South 
Sheffield, Central 
Sheffield, Park 
Southampton (2) 
Walthamstow, West 
Glasgow, Gorbals 
Glasgow, Tradeston 
Greenock 
Motherwell 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
CANDIDATE 
E. R. Hartley 
J. G. Butler 
J. J. Jones 
J. Arnalll 
W. Hirst2 
F. A. Broad 
W. McConnell 
C. E. Franklin 
J. G. Butler 
H. Hinshelwood 
J. Gorman 
R. G. Murrayl 
A. Barton 
T. Lewis 
V. L. T. McEntee 
J. Maclean 
J. D. MacDougall 
F. Shaw 
J. T.. W. Newbold 
VOTES 
% OF 
VOTES 
2,580 11.4 
1,063 10.4 
893 11 .6 
4,000 19.3 
8,291 30.9 
3,575 25.7 
1,845 12.8 
9,015 33.7 
3,556 24.1 
4,004 19.1 
3,807 19.0 
643 4.0 
3,167 20.4 
7,828 10.6 
4,167 29.3 
7,436 34.3 
3,751 19.4 
2,542 11.2 
4,135 23.2 
*By-elections. 
1Without 
official Labour Party endorsement. 
2Co-operative Party candidate. 
(2) = two-member constituency. 
lix. 
iv. NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY ELECTION RESULTS, 1918. 
YEAR CONSTITUENCY 
1918 Burnley 
Reading 
West Ham, Silvertown 
Romford 
% OF 
CANDIDATE VOTES VOTES 
+D. D. Irving' 15,217 -'41.9 
L. E. Quelch 1,462 5.2 
+J. J. Jones2 6,971 51.6 
A. Whiting 2,580 14.4 
(1) +Elected. 
(2) 
1With Labour Party endorsement. 
(3) 
2Joined the Labour Party, February 1919. 
SOURCE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS: F. W. S. Craig, 
British Parliamentary Election Results 1885-1918, (1974), and 
Minor Parties at British Elections 1885-1974, (1975). 
lx. 
APPENDIX D. 
YORKSHIRE BRANCHES OF THE SDF 1884-1911. 
Batley, 1902-04; 1908-10. 
Bingley, 1895. 
Birkenshaw, 1907-1911. 
Bolton-upon-Dearne 1909-11. , 
Bradford, 1895-97; 1904-11.1 
Charlestown, 1900-06; 1908-11. 
Dewsbury, 1897-1911. 
Earby, 1893; 1903. 
Earlsheaton, 1908-09. 
Gomersal, 1911. 
Halifax, 1895-96; 1909-11. 
Hull, 1884-85; 1894-96; 1899; '1902-11. 
Keighley, 1907-10. 
Leeds, 1884-85; 1894-1911.2 
Low Bentham, 1895-98. 
Ravensthorpe, 1902. 
Rotherham, 1907-11. 
Sheffield, 1885; 1888; 1891; 1893-98; 
3 1899-1900; 
1904-1911.4 
Skipton, 1897-98; 1900-02. 
I. From 1909 there were two Bradford branches. 
2. There was a continuous SDF presence 
in Leeds between 
1894 and 1911. The Armley branch existed 
throughout 
this period and, at various times, was augmented 
by 
others, to a maximum of five. In 
1911 there were four 
Leeds branches. 
1x1 
3. For a short period of time, 1893-94, there were four 
branches in Sheffield. 
4. From 1904-06 there were two Sheffield branches, Brightside 
and Crookes. 
1xii. 
APPENDIX E. 
YORKSHIRE ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE 
SOCIALIST UNITY CONFERENCE, MANCHESTER, 1911. 
Bingley BSP. 
Birkenshaw SDF. 
Bradford Clarion Cycling Club. 
Bradford SDF. 
Burley ILP. 
Clayton BSP. 
Colne Valley Socialist League. 
Dewsbury BSP. 
Doncaster BSP. 
Farsley Clarion Cycling Club. 
Gomersal SDF. 
Hebden Bridge Socialist League. 
Heckmondwike and District Socialist Society. 
Huddersfield Socialist Party. 
Hull SDF. 
Keighley Socialist Society. 
Leeds BSP. 
Leeds Clarion Scouts. 
MiddlesbrougL BSP . 
North Leeds SDF. 
Sheffield BSP. 
Sheffield SDF. 
Skipton BSP. 
lxiii. 
Wakefield ILP. 
West Leeds SDF. 
York BSP. 
Yorkshire Union of Clarion Cycling Clubs. 
1xiv. 
APPENDIX F. 
YORKSHIRE BRANCHES OF THE BSP. 
Exact details of BSP branches in Yorkshire are difficult to 
assess. The Clarion ceased publication of BSP notes in 1913, 
Justice was reduced in size after the outbreak of war in 1914 
and branch reports were therefore curtailed, and branches often 
could not afford to send delegates to the party's Annual 
Conferences. The following list may therefore be incomplete, 
but where possible exact dates are given. 
Adwick-le-Street, 1912. 
Barnsley, 1912. 
Bingley, 1911-12. 
Birkenshaw, 1911-20. 
Bolton-upon-Dearne, 1911-14(? ) 
Bradford, 1911-20.1 
Charlestown, 1911. 
Colne Valley, 1911-17(? ). 
Dewsbury, 1911-16. 
Dinnington, 1912. 
Doncaster, 1911. 
Eiland, 1911-18. 
Farsley, 1911-13. 
Gomersal, 1911. 
Halifax, 1911-16. 
Heckmondwike, 1911-16. 
Huddersfield, 1911-20. 
1xv. 
Hull, 1911-16(? ) 
Keighley, 1911-12. 
Leeds, 1911-20.2 
Mexborough, 1911-12; 1914-18. 
Middlesbrou9t 1911-14. 
Ossett, 1912. 
Rotherham, 1912. 
Rothwell, 1912. 
Sheffield, 1911-20. 
Todmorden, 1911-15(? ) 
Wakefield, 1911-16(? ) 
York, 1912. 
2. 
In 1912 Bradford had six BSP branches: Central, East, 
Dudley Hill and Tong, North Bierley, Clayton, and West 
Bowling. A reorganisation of branches in 1913 led to 
branches based on Manningham, Eccleshill, Great Horton, 
West Bowling, and East Ward. At least three of these 
still existed in 1916, at Eccleshill, Great Horton and 
East Ward, but by the end of the war Bradford had only 
one branch. 
In 1912 Leeds had five BSP branches: Central, West, North, 
Burley and the Clarion Scouts. By 1914 there were two, 
Leeds West and Leeds West Ward, both of which were 
represented at the 1916 Annual Conference, 
but by 1918 
only one branch remained. 
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